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China’s rise has put it on a trajectory to overtake the international system’s dominant powers – 
the United States of America (US) and the European Union (EU) – at some point this century. 
Some observers conclude that the historical pattern of such transitions catalysing great power 
conflict is likely to continue with China’s ascendancy. Power-transition theory (PTT) 
anticipates that the established powers will strive to maintain the status quo by extending their 
relative power advantage over the rising challenger and curtailing its power where possible. 
Yet the actual responses of the US and the EU have not conformed to these expectations; 
instead, they have both largely welcomed China’s rise and sought to integrate it into the 
international system. We can see that policymakers continually express interpretations of 
China’s rise which we would not expect to find if the logic of PTT prevailed. This raises a 
question: How have different interpretations of the ‘rise of China’ influenced the foreign 
policies of the US and the EU towards China?   
 
I argue that varied perceptions of the implications of China’s rise have shaped policy 
preferences in ways that are inconsistent with concerns over the threat of an impending power-
transition. Policy discourse at key junctures in bilateral relations revealed that ‘China’s rise’ is 
actually a contested notion and that the different interpretations in play at that point in time 
affect the policymaking process in ways that cannot be accounted for from state-centric 
perspectives. While China’s growing power and relations with these actors have been widely 
studied, little attention is paid to how competing interpretations of China’s rise impact upon 
policymakers’ preferences and the eventual responses. Despite the growing prevalence of 
threat rhetoric (at least in the US), China’s rise is often conceptualised by key policymakers as 
presenting considerable economic and political opportunities. In the EU, perceptions of 
economic and political opportunities have not been challenged by threat interpretations and 
thus its overall approach has been informed by the former with little substantive debate 
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 2008 – days after my PhD studies began – taikonauts completed China’s 
first spacewalk, only the third nation to accomplish this feat behind the United States of 
America and the Soviet Union/Russia. A few months prior, the world’s attention focussed on 
Beijing as it hosted the Olympic Games; up until then, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) 
generally sought to avoid close scrutiny of life inside the country. The spectacle of the opening 
ceremony and China’s dominance of the medal table seemed emblematic of its new-found 
confidence on the international stage. On the eve of the 59
th
 anniversary of the PRC, Premier 
Wen Jiabao praised the contribution of these achievements towards “the great rejuvenation of 
the Chinese nation” (cited by Xinhua, 2008).   
 
The rise of China is frequently posited as one of the most important international 
developments since the end of the Cold War; the speed with which it has risen has prompted 
predictions that it will become the predominant power sometime this century. This has 
implications for the standing of the system’s current great powers – how they react will be 
crucial for the future of international relations. Great power behaviour is one of the main 
points of inquiry within International Relations (IR) scholarship; seeking to understand the 
factors which drive behaviour and especially the tendency for interstate conflict. It is within 
such contexts that observers have attempted to analyse what to expect from China, not only as 
a great power but also from the process of its ascendancy and how this affects others.  
 
Attempts to understand great power behaviour are reflected in the interest in and debate over 
the impact of China’s capabilities and intentions on the international system. China’s rise is 
now an inescapable issue for policymakers, regardless of whether they regard it as hostile or 
benign. Attempting to understand how other international actors have responded – and should 
do in the future – has taken up much scholarly attention. Mainstream International Relations 
(IR) theories and the associated literature offer different perspectives on the principal motives 
driving state behaviour and responses. The genesis of these different perspectives is rooted in 
the development of IR theories following World War II when scholars focussed predominantly 
on the causes of war. No single understanding of global affairs emerged; instead, a plethora of 
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theories blossomed from scholarly attempts to understand the world. The two leading camps – 
realism and liberalism – have been pitted against each other, shaping the development of IR as 
a discipline (Smith, S. 2007: 4).  
 
Realism is the school of thought that arguably came to dominate the post-war academic 
landscape, advanced as an explanation politics driven by power unfolded in an anarchical 
system. Structural/neo-realism is widely considered to be the dominant theory of IR and has 
retained great influence since its articulation in Kenneth Waltz’s Theory of International 
Politics (1979). The issues of China’s rise are clearly connected to a number of neorealism’s 
core assumptions: states as the primary global actors; a condition of international anarchy 
entailing security threats; states differentiated on the basis of their relative power capabilities; 
and states paying close attention to the balance of power. Yet the neorealist preoccupation 
with state survival is arguably less relevant: for all the concerns regarding China’s rise, there is 
scant evidence that any other major polity considers its very survival to be under threat. 
Furthermore, there is no definitive form of the theory: variations within the neorealist camp – 
e.g. between Waltz’s (1979) defensive realism and Mearsheimer’s (2001a) offensive realism – 
create the possibility of different explanations of outcomes depending on the strand utilised.  
 
Neoliberalism accepts the concept of international anarchy (Keohane, 1982: 332) although 
there is disagreement with neorealism regarding the limitations imposed by it (Baldwin, 1993: 
5). Neoliberalism emphasises the potential for cooperation (often via the mediating influence 
of institutions) as a means for actors making absolute gains (Baldwin, 1993: 5). The option to 
use force is likely to be constrained by conditions of interdependence (Keohane and Nye, 
2001: 23) generating an incentive for cooperative engagement. Constructivist approaches to 
understanding international affairs have proliferated in the post-Cold War era, yet despite the 
prevalence of certain works – such as Alexander Wendt’s (1999) Social Theory of 
International Politics – again there is no single definitive constructivist theory. The diversity 
of theoretical approaches can be illuminating, but also makes it difficult to identify where to 
start in terms of testing the utility of particular ones in relation to developments in the 
international arena. In addition, proponents of these approaches have generally favoured 
abstraction – that is, developing the capacity to refer to the international system as a whole, 
rather than discrete events within it. While such comprehensive approaches may be useful for 
claims to relevance and simplification of a vast, complex array of international relations, they 
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necessitate further theoretical development if one wants to move from a level of abstraction to 
a specific issue or development. 
 
Thus in effect, the plurality of IR theoretical disciplines provides numerous perspectives from 
which China’s rise could be examined. However, this thesis focuses on one: power-transition 
theory (PTT). Whilst a wide range of theoretical frameworks could be adapted to examine 
how established powers respond to China’s rise, they are not specifically designed to do so 
and thus proponents could contest the application of the theory to particular developments, 
situations or relationships
1
. On the other hand, PTT is designed to examine precisely the 
development unfolding since the end of the Cold War: a rising power gaining in economic, 
political and military power in a way that could potentially alter the status quo arrangements 
of the international order as upheld by the established powers. Power-transition theory 
arguably emerged out of what Brian Schmidt (2002: 8) called the “elusive but persistent goal 
of mainstream IR in the United States to achieve the status of a ‘true’ science”.  
 
China’s emergence (or more accurately, re-emergence) as a great power arguably represents a 
continuation of the historical pattern of greats powers rising and falling, as extensively 
researched by Paul Kennedy (1988) among others. Over the past half century, research has led 
to the development of power-transition theory (PTT) which posits that established powers will 
attempt to maintain their position for as long as possible by adapting their behaviour and 
offsetting gains made by the rising power. Transitions have often resulted in conflict – a trend 
which some observers argue is set to continue. PTT is the theory which we would expect to 
provide the clearest insights into how the established powers respond to the rise of a potential 
challenger. Rather than assess which IR theory is ‘best’ at explaining these responses, this 
thesis concentrates on PTT because it is the one that should have the most purchase in relation 
to these issues. Moreover, as is demonstrated in the following chapter, there is evidence to 
suggest that the ideas of PTT have influenced how some commentators understand China’s 
rise to a degree that is not true of other theories. For instance, Waltz’s (1979) defensive 
realism suggests that a bipolar system is inherently more stable than a unipolar system; such 
logic has not been invoked to argue for the positive implications of China’s rise. At the same 
time, Keohane and Nye’s (2001) arguments on complex interdependence should decrease 
                                                 
1
 For instance, see the debate between Colin Elman (1996a; 1996b) and Kenneth Waltz (1996) over the 
applicability of neorealism to the examination of foreign policy. 
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concerns over conflict; while many have acknowledged the economic opportunity presented 
by China’s rise, there are persistent concerns that it may use hard power to get what it wants at 
some point in the future.  
 
PTT has clear expectations for how established powers are expected to respond to the rise of a 
potential challenger (China) because it threatens the status quo arrangements which the 
dominant power (here, the US) and its allies (which includes the EU) wish to preserve. When 
the challenger is rising rapidly, this creates uncertainty about the future and consequently 
generates instability amongst the powers. Authoritarian states such as China are presumed by 
PTT to be inherently dissatisfied with a status quo in which democratic states dominate and 
thus automatically will challenge this when they get the chance. These factors, in combination, 
increase the risk of conflict between the challenger and the established powers. As a result, the 
rapid rise of an authoritarian state poses an existential threat to the system which the dominant 
powers benefit from and uphold.  
 
Some of the academic literature and political commentary would suggest that these ideas have 
infiltrated policy discourse over China’s rise. Debates amongst policymakers, political 
commentators and analysts have generated opposing sets of ideas about China’s rise as either a 
‘threat’ or an ‘opportunity’. The ‘threat’ characterisation has given substance to the idea of an 
impending power-transition between China and the US. Invoking the logic and language of 
PTT, many commentators are drawn to the conclusion that China’s rise brings about the 
possibility – for some, the inevitability – of conflict. Under PTT logic, it appears that 
policymakers will progressively perceive China’s rise in terms of a ‘threat’, with alternative 
perspectives diminishing in salience as the external environment becomes increasingly 
incongruous with such conceptualisations.  
 
By focussing on interactions between rising and established powers, PTT should be capable of 
providing insights into how the US has reacted to the rise of China, a potential challenger to its 
dominant status. There has indeed been a general drift towards threat rhetoric based on PTT 
logic within the US; despite its significant power advantage, some US policymakers have 
expressed concerned that the gap is closing, which will allow China to act upon hostile 
intentions. However, the US has largely adhered to an approach of engagement with China, 
which is difficult to reconcile with PTT. By logical extension, other powers which derive 
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benefits from the status quo (‘satisfied’ powers within PTT lexicon) such as the EU – arguably 
one of the US’ closest partners – should also be concerned by such developments. Yet the 
existing literature and empirical record would initially seem to suggest policy discourse within 
the EU does not seem to reflect these concerns and its behaviour has differed in discernible 
ways from the US. This leaves open a question regarding how US and EU responses to key 
events in their relations with China match up with expectations that can be derived from PTT.   
 
Looking at how policymakers have debated responses to China’s rise, it becomes clear that 
how they actually perceive their external environment is not consistent with what we would 
expect if PTT were correct. This leads to the central question driving the research: how have 
different interpretations of the ‘rise of China’ influenced the foreign policies of the US and the 
EU towards China? I intend to investigate the extent to which actors’ perceptions of their 
external environment and understand the implications of this drives their preferences for 
action, and assess whether this presents a more compelling account of foreign policy 
behaviour than accounts which privilege international-level factors and material capabilities. 
PTT appears to implicitly assume that perceptions are ‘fixed’ as states are the primary actors, 
with policymakers responding objectively to the changing international system. Considering 
how the US and the EU have responded to key events within their respective relationships 
with China will allow me to examine the discourse around these and subsequently determine 
what the arguments revealed about policymakers’ interpretations of China’s rise. This 
facilitates the analysis of the importance of perceptions in the determination of specific 
policies and US and EU responses to the rise of China more broadly.   
 
The advantage of the approach I develop here is that its applicability is not restricted to one 
polity; by using it to explain responses to discrete events and general trends across a period of 
twenty years for two very different international powers, I demonstrate the analytical model’s 
versatility as a tool for understanding the development of foreign policy. Beyond the project’s 
analytically innovative features, the empirical focus should also be of interest to those 
examining US- and EU-China relations and scholars of IR/Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) 
more broadly. Most in-depth analyses of and explanations for foreign policy behaviour tend to 
focus on a single set of bilateral relations. Examining two sets of bilateral relations has given 
this project a broader empirical scope without sacrificing analytical purchase; the utility of the 
model is demonstrated by its explanatory capacity in each instance. Secondly, while 
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perceptions have been explored elsewhere in FPA literature, there is a lack of such studies in 
US- and EU-China relations; this thesis fills that gap.  
 
2. Case Selection and Timeframe of Analysis 
 
China, as the object of study, has become a more significant international force over the past 
three decades; its rise in the international arena has been catalysed by substantial economic 
growth since opening its markets at the end of the 1970s (Yee and Storey, 2004: 2). Since the 
late 1980s China’s leaders have been converting this economic power into military power. The 
collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s left China as one of the few potential great 
powers in the system. As a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC), a member of the nuclear club, and with an economy ranked fourth by GDP in 2007 
(World Bank, 2008), China is already a significant player in the international arena and its 
centrality to the future of global affairs is set to increase. World Bank President Robert 
Zoellick has aired the concept of the US and China comprising a ‘G2’ (China Daily, 2009a) at 
the core of world politics in the 21
st
 Century.  
 
Through increasing economic, military and political power, China is changing the landscape 
of international relations. It fits the criteria for a potential challenger under the logic of power-
transition theory: a large nation undergoing rapid economic development and working its way 
up the international rankings. The speed at which this is occurring creates uncertainties about 
how the Chinese government will behave – both abroad and at home – because of its 
authoritarian regime type. The latter also feeds into concerns that China is dissatisfied with the 
Western-led international system and will seek to exert its newfound power to change the rules 
of the game in its own favour. China is arguably the first real (if not only) potential challenger 
to American dominance in the post-Cold War era. This uncertainty over when China will 
‘arrive’ as a superpower and what it will want fosters debate and disagreement among outside 
observers.  
 
The United States has been indisputably the predominant power in the international arena 
throughout much of the 20
th
 Century and into the 21
st
 Century; in 2005, it accounted for forty-
eight percent of world military expenditure (Stålenheim et al, 2006: 301). The US also remains 
the world’s leading economy, and is a member of both the UNSC and the nuclear club. It was 
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also a key architect of the post-World War Two international system, contributing to the 
establishment of its key institutions and instilling its values in international law and norms. In 
this light, the US fits with the dominant, status quo power of PTT and as the classic ‘state’ 
actor in wider IR theory and FPA. Since the end of the Cold War, the US has been the sole 
superpower of the system but China’s rise has put it on a trajectory to emerge as another 
superpower. The relationship between the two has grown considerably, both economically and 
politically with extensive high-level contacts between the two sides. 
 
The US has extensive security interests in East Asia through its close ties with Japan, South 
Korea and Taiwan; maintaining its forward presence is tied into its consideration of itself as 
the key guarantor of regional stability. Both are also significant trading partners for the other 
in terms of cheap imports for the US and a key market for exports for China. In 2008, they 
were each other’s respective second-largest trading partner (Morrison, 2009a: 1; Morrison, 
2009b: 9). The sheer size of the US’ political, economic and military power means it has a 
significant interest in any developments in the international arena; China’s rise is arguably one 
of the most significant developments since the end of the Cold War. Its status as the world’s 
predominant power makes it an ideal actor to include in a study of how perceptions of this rise 
of China influence behaviour on the international level. 
 
The second polity subjected to analysis, the EU, is a major economic force in the world and its 
Member States retain significant military capabilities whilst two of the members – France and 
the United Kingdom (UK) – are also nuclear powers and sit with the US and China on the 
UNSC. The initial stages of European integration were facilitated by the US’ security 
guarantee and the EU has continued to derive benefits from the status quo and can be 
considered as a major contributor to the maintenance of this system. There are intense debates 
over the EU’s status as an international actor, with many rejecting the concept altogether and 
arguing that focus should remain on the states as has been the tradition in mainstream IR 
thinking. For instance, Robert Kagan (2004) argued that the EU is not an international security 
player and therefore its involvement in such matters is expected to be minimal at best. Yet it 
has increasingly been treated as one, not only by academics but by other international actors – 




While mainstream IR theories have been relatively slow to embrace this idea, some scholars 
have applied realist theories to the EU’s international behaviour (Hyde-Price, 2006, 2008; 
Zimmermann, 2007). Other EU scholars, particularly those advocating the ‘normative power 
Europe’ framework (Manners, 2002) – which is arguably now the dominant approach in the 
literature – treat the EU as an international presence while explicitly rejecting the notion that 
the EU should attempt to develop state-like qualities. PTT has rarely been utilised in relation 
to the EU with the exception of Kugler et al’s (2004) analysis of the Iraq war via PTT, 
wherein the EU was treated as a unitary actor. Yet EU specialists have not incorporated the 
theory into their work, perhaps because ‘China threat’ rhetoric is less prominent in European 
policy discourse.  
 
I align with arguments that the EU is an international actor with discernible foreign policies 
that are distinct from the aggregate policies of its Member States. I do this because there has 
been a concerted effort to deal with China at the EU-level, rather than just Member States 
seeking to forge their own policies. What we see is that there are not just statements of EU 
policies but also clear examples of EU actions towards China, thus it is more than a rhetorical 
‘front’. It is not treated as analogous to a state, but rather as a distinctive, multifaceted actor 
(Bretherton and Vogler, 2006). Accordingly, in relation to all three principal actors, I use the 
term ‘polity’ throughout the thesis. Treating the EU as an international actor in its own right 
entails that it has a distinctive foreign policy separate from that of its Member States – as 
Larsen (2009: 544) argued, “EU foreign policy and member state foreign policy both belong 
to European foreign policy governance, but can be separated analytically”. The case of the EU 
demonstrates the need for using analytical approaches which transcend traditionally state-
centric approaches to both IR theory and FPA. The Member States remain important in the 
analysis, but rather than focussing on their behaviour independent of the EU, I look to their 
foreign policies as indicators of their preferences for the EU-level policy response. The 
Member States are the key actors within the EU’s primary foreign policymaking subsystem – 
the Council. A comprehensive analysis of all Member States is beyond the scope of this 
research, therefore I focus on two Member States in particular – France and the UK. This 
allows me to explore the relationship between Member States’ preferences and their 




As mentioned above, both France and the UK are significant players in world affairs as 
military powers and members of the UNSC and retain activist foreign policies. They constitute 
two-thirds of the so-called ‘EU3’ at the core of EU politics, and therefore their preferences on 
and input to the development EU foreign policy are crucial. Germany completes the EU3, but 
I have chosen to concentrate on France and the UK for a number of reasons. These two have 
differing visions for the EU as a global power, particularly in terms of its security/military role 
(Gordon, 1997/98: 89) whereas Germany tends to align with France on this matter. All three 
have extensive bilateral relations with China, but varied approaches. Fox and Godement 
(2009) identify France and Germany’s stance towards China as relatively similar, while the 
UK stands apart. France has been a more proactive player in China policy, with Germany 
often following its lead. Consequently, France and the UK offer a more interesting avenue of 
research for this project.  
 
In the US and the EU, we have two very different international actors facing China’s rise. 
They are two actors with varied forms of international presence and different levels and types 
of international importance. These factors are not only significant because they are at the core 
of many studies of great power relations, but have often been central to the explanations of 
behaviour. The US is the world’s sole superpower and the classic ‘state’ actor; the EU is 
arguably an economic superpower but in some senses it is still ‘finding its feet’ with respect to 
political presence. The US has more extensive interests and responsibilities in East Asia. The 
US defines its interests globally and although the EU supports the status quo arrangements of 
the international order, the scope of its interests is not comparable. The EU is often 
conceptualised as fundamentally different to the US in terms of its approach to international 
relations – exemplified by the concepts of civilian power (Duchêne, 1972) and normative 
power (Manners, 2002) – which would suggest that its reaction to China’s rise would be 
distinctive from that of the US. In light of these differences not only between the nature of 
their international presence but varied levels of importance to and responsibility in the 
international arena, we might expect the US and the EU to respond very differently to the rise 
of China.   
 
Although adding a layer of complexity to the analysis, it is hoped that the comparison of their 
responses to China’s rise will bolster the arguments by demonstrating the importance of 
interpretations of the external environment in the formulation of policies. To advance these 
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arguments, I devote Chapter Five to the study of the transatlantic debate over the EU’s 
proposal to lift its arms embargo which revealed that their respective discourses contained 
different sets of interpretations of China’s rise. This is particularly interesting to examine as it 
is surprising just how vociferous the US’ reaction to the proposal was given the similarities in 
their overall responses to China’s rise up until that point. Explaining this and the divergence 
between their stances on the issue – despite both polities imposing similar policies at the same 
time and in reaction to the same event – is an important step in my attempt to explain the 
importance of perceptions to the generation of foreign policies. Examining the factors which 
contributed to this provides a significant opportunity to test the thesis’ analytical approach.  
 
The timeframe of analysis runs from January 1989 until January 2009. Before the end of the 
Cold War the main focus of American and European concern was primarily the Soviet Union. 
After 1989, China became more prominent as an international actor given that the 
international system changed from one of bipolarity to unipolarity and a few ‘potential’ 
powers. The US was then free to concentrate on other international issues – including other 
prospective rivals. China was exceptionally militarily weak until the end of the Cold War but 
for the past two decades has focussed on upgrading its military powers, made possible by its 
rapid economic expansion over the same time period. The end of the Cold War also presented 
the opportunity for the EU to pursue a distinctive international role, which led to attempts to 
construct a more coherent external policy including the institutionalisation of the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy.  
 
This period is also significant for the rate of China’s rise and numerous events in its 
relationships with the two established powers. The timeframe is sufficient in scope to identify 
some general trends in the foreign policies of these actors, allowing for comparison between 
the general drift in their policy discourse and the responses to particular events. Many – but 
not all – of these events have received scholarly attention already but questions remain over 
how they have impacted the evolving interpretations of and responses to China’s rise. The 
timeframe also allows for changes of key actors within the decision-making process, enabling 
consideration of whether particular interpretations are resilient over time or whether the 
changing identity of decision-makers simply determines foreign policy behaviour. The 
timeframe also opens up the opportunity for conducting interviews with policymakers 
involved at the time; events further in the past would likely have negated this. The 2009 cut-
11 
 
off point avoids bringing in another US administration and considering changes to the EU’s 
foreign policymaking processes brought in by the Lisbon Treaty. 
  
In the chapters examining the US and EU responses to China’s rise, I employ six case studies 
of events within the relationship that represent instances which catalysed discourse on the 
appropriate policy response and in some cases initiated heated debates between policymakers. 
These events make it possible to examine how key policymakers perceived China at the time 
through the content of the preferences they expressed in relation to how to respond. This is 
important because simply analysing foreign policy documents and statements represents a 
single view carefully shaped by the government of the day; there are limited clues as to what 
led to those positions being adopted. However, looking at the debates and arguments over 
policy responses to developments in relations with China allow us to identify the range of 
preferences and the arguments that are used to substantiate these. The cases selected are all 
important points in the development of US- and EU-China relations in different ways. 
Through this approach, my research engages in comparison between two polities, as well as a 
longitudinal study of the evolution of US and EU responses. This allows me to consider the 
research question in a number of different settings, allowing for comparison between the 
findings and thereby assessing whether the arguments developed hold up when comparing the 
development of policies of the two polities.  
 
The logic behind each case selected is elaborated at the start of the relevant sections in 
Chapters Three and Four; however, it is worth giving an overview of the reasoning here. The 
selection of the incidences was based on examining the literature to determine which episodes 
in relations with China’s rise had received the greatest attention. In both sets of literature on 
the US and the EU, the Tiananmen crackdown and China’s accession the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) were the two incidences which have been common in almost all major 
studies because they have been taken to represent, respectively, a major setback and a major 
step forward in both sets of relations. The Taiwan Strait crisis has been seen as something of a 
watershed in US-China relations as it was the closest the two sides came to armed conflict in 
the time period studied, yet it is conspicuous by its absence in EU-China studies despite the 
EU’s interests in regional stability. These three cases, in addition to the arms embargo debate 
in Chapter Five, establish the basis for making comparisons between the US and the EU’s 
responses in the Conclusion. To develop the analysis of the US’ policies, I also look at the 
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Clinton administration’s policy of connecting China’s trade status to its human rights record 
and subsequent reversal, because at first glance it indicates a reversal of a ‘tougher’ approach 
to China.  The 2001 spy-plane collision and the response to China’s anti-satellite (ASAT) test 
both provided instances where tensions in the military domain could easily have escalated, yet 
this does not appear to have been the case. As well as receiving considerable attention as 
isolated events from academics, each case has been integrated into studies of the overall 
relationship.  
 
In the EU’s case, I look at the common policy on tabling resolutions on China within the UN 
Commission on Human Rights which, like the US dropping linkage between trade and human 
rights, indicates that the EU’s position on the importance of admonishing China’s human 
rights situation had changed.  The formation of the EU-China strategic partnership suggests a 
significant advance in the relationship and the potential for closer cooperation, thus is worth 
studying, especially as it contextualises subsequent developments. On the other side, the 
refusal to grant Market Economy Status goes against the grain in terms of increasingly 
cooperative relations and subverts the notion of the EU’s approach to China as unconditional 
engagement.  As I highlight in Chapter One, there are few systematic studies of EU-China 
relations which integrate studies of such events; however, each of these has been widely 
discussed in isolation within the academic literature, particularly the strategic partnership. I 
illustrate that there is scope for analysing more extensively what their significance is to the 
development of the EU’s response to the rise of China over the twenty year period.  
 
In a broad sense, the transatlantic arms embargo debate is interesting because it appeared to 
provide further evidence of the strategic rift in the transatlantic relationship, mostly notably 
revealed by the divisions over the Iraq war in 2003. The underlying concern for some 
policymakers and observers was that the US and the EU now effectively saw the world quite 
differently, rather than isolated disagreements over particular policies or events. I dedicate an 
entire chapter to the study of the debate because it presents the clearest opportunity to explore 
how the differing interpretations China’s rise have influenced a particular policy which was 
imposed by both the US and the EU at the same time for the same reason. Moreover, we can 
use it to help understand the substantive similarities and differences between interpretations of 
China salient within the US and the EU at the time and why these came to be. These 
opportunities are not present in the other cases examined in Chapters Three and Four, as the 
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embargo case was a unique example of the same ‘starting point’ for the two sides only to 
develop in different paths over fifteen years. Importantly, the analyses in Chapters Three and 
Four help to contextualise the arguments developed in relation to this case, thus their inclusion 
is necessary as much of the explanation of the arms embargo debate rests on a deeper 
understanding of the evolution of US and EU responses to China’s rise up until that point.   
 
3. Analytical Approach, Methodology and Sources 
 
The Analytical Framework 
 
Up until now, I have only provided brief insights into the analytical approach and how it 
facilitates the development of my arguments. As stipulated in the research question, I am 
interested in developing an account of how the responses of the established powers to the rise 
of China have been influenced by differing interpretations of this phenomenon. I do this by 
engaging in a study of how China’s rise has been interpreted by policymakers in both the US 
and the EU and the subsequent impact upon their policy preferences. The approach developed 
draws on both FPA and EFP in order to understand the relationship between policymakers’ 
perceptions and the international level behaviour of the polities they serve (I will return to set 
out my project’s relationship to FPA/EFP literature in Chapter One). This is applied to the 
examination of a series of events that represented significant junctures in the US- and EU-
China relationships in Chapters Three and Four.  
 
Robert Jervis’ (1976: 14-5) work on the importance of perceptions in foreign policy stipulated 
that differences in policymakers’ preferences can be traced back to their perceptions of their 
external environment. As a state-centric approach, PTT cannot account for factors at the 
decision-making level. Neoclassical realists have attempted to bridge the gap, but concentrate 
only on perceptions of threat (Schweller, 2006: 38) and assume that there is an objective 
reality which can be perceived correctly or incorrectly by policymakers. I leave aside 
questions of whether actors can accurately perceive reality objectively because I am only 
interested in how the perceptions they have created influence their preferences – hence I do 
not engage with the notion of ‘misperceptions’. I use ‘perception(s)’ and ‘interpretation(s)’ 
interchangeably to denote the same phenomena and convey that there are discrepancies 
between how actors perceive the external world; this point might get lost if only using 
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‘perception(s)’. I favour these terms over ‘images’ because, as Larsen (1997: 3) noted, these 
“are often seen in the literature to be of a general character coming close to belief systems, 
perceptions are often understood as perceptions of something, in other words, as more 
concrete”. In this sense, images can be impressionistic whereas perceptions have a specific 
‘ground’ – a characteristic or trait of another entity/actor.  
 
I establish policymakers’ perceptions of China by looking at the arguments presented over the 
course of the decision-making period of the case under examination. Policymakers do not 
simply state their preferences, but attempt to justify them in an attempt to persuade others. To 
do so, they make claims about both the significance of China’s rise and the implications of the 
current situation being dealt with, which reveal their perceptions. To uncover these 
perceptions, I rely on various sources, particularly media reports, congressional/parliamentary 
proceedings and reports, interviews and primary data collected by others and published in the 
academic literature. By looking at policy discourse before, during and in some cases after the 
decision-making in response to a specific case, I am able to ascertain the perceptions 
influencing the process, rather than post-hoc justifications of preferences.  
 
It is impossible to discount the possibility that policymakers were concealing their true 
motives, but given the commonalities in arguments over time – in some cases, from the same 
people – it is reasonable to make the assumption that these were sincere expressions of 
preferences in order to ‘win’ the debate and have policies consistent with their views 
implemented. There is a degree of resilience to perceptions even as China grew in power; this 
can be attributed to the tendency for people to assimilate information to their pre-existing 
views (Jervis, 1976: 143). Since policymakers’ pre-existing interpretations of an external actor 
shape how they view new developments, this produces a tendency whereby new information is 
interpreted so as to fit with these (Jervis, 1976: 153). As Yaacov Vertzberger (1990: 343) 
explained, “currently held perceptions serve as important actual and interpretative inputs in the 
formation of present and future perceptions”. This is precisely why we do not see perceptions 
of China changing in line with its shifting material power.    
 
I utilise an open-ended, holistic approach to examining the development of policy by drawing 
on numerous sources to create an account of the sequence of events in the policy-making 
process. This allows me to gain insights into the discussions (discourse) which unfolded 
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during the decision-making process in each of the cases examined in later chapters. 
Consequently, I am able to pinpoint not only actors’ preferences for how to respond in each 
instance, but also their interpretations of China’s rise as they attempt to justify their 
preferences and persuade other actors. Additionally, we can see the trajectory of the salient 
interpretations of China’s rise over a twenty year time period, illustrating how perceptions – 
and subsequently responses – have evolved as China grows more powerful. In the decision-
making process, actors engage in debates, advancing their preferences which are predicated on 
their perceptions of China’s rise as a phenomenon on the international stage and understanding 
of its implications. The premise of this approach is that differing interpretations of China’s rise 
produce varied preferences for how to respond through policy. Debates amongst policy actors 
are not just about how to respond in that specific instance; they are also part of a wider 
contestation of what ‘China’s rise’ means and the ensuing implications.  
 
However, not all actors have the same opportunity to translate their preferences into policy. 
Thus while there may be debates within the wider policy community over the appropriate 
response, at the actual point of decision-making, only certain actors will determine what is 
done. For both the US and the EU, this is not always the same group of actors, depending on 
the nature of the event they are facing. Drawing on the work of EFP scholars (White, 2001; 
Stumbaum, 2009), I define foreign policies as the product of foreign policy subsystems rather 
than of the state/polity as a whole. Subsystems are particular institutional arrangements within 
which certain agencies and actors assume responsibility for decision-making. In later chapters 
I specify the characteristics of the US and EU’s subsystems, but for the purposes here it is 
enough to say that different subsystem arrangements have implications for who is able to 
(attempt to) translate their preferences into policies. The historical record enables 
identification of which subsystem was in play by the issue-area said to be relevant to the case 
by the main actors. 
 
Within democratic polities such as the US and EU, the number of policy elites able to voice 
their preferences on policy during the normal day-to-day business of government is almost 
impossible to track. There is no way to possibly consider the extent to which the perceptions 
of every actor who engaged in the policy discourse had any impact. Thus, for the purposes of 
this research, there needs to be a way of moving beyond the cacophony of competing voices in 
the policy community at large and consider which perceptions mattered most when it actually 
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came to determining the response to be adopted. Examining decisions through foreign policy 
subsystems focuses the attention on the actors who were involved with the process of taking 
those decisions. The differing subsystem arrangements in the US and EU can facilitate or 
constrain the ability of particular actors to translate their preferences into policies. 
Approaching the analysis of decision-making via subsystems is advantageous as it overcomes 
the conceptual barrier that the US and EU’s policymaking processes are simply too different to 
enable comparison; we can look across the different subsystems to understand how 
policymakers’ preferences were translated into policies.  
 
These ideational and institutional components of foreign policymaking inform the empirical 
research in the thesis; the actual analytical framework is operationalized through a two-step 
process of addressing the following questions in relation to each case studied:  
 
 How did the differing interpretations of the rise of China inform policymakers’ 
preferences in relation to the issue(s) at hand?  
 Which actors were involved in decision-making and to what extent were their 
preferences mediated by the subsystem through which policy was developed? 
  
While there is a range of scholarship examining the influence of various cognitive factors on 
decision-making (Hudson, 2007: 22-27, 30-33), I focus on ideational factors which are 
expressed through policy discourse, rather than trying to ‘get inside the head’ of individual 
policymakers. While such analyses have significant merit, given that in both the US and EU 
there are large numbers of actors with a role to play in foreign policymaking going down this 
path would necessitate collection of quantities of empirical evidence well beyond the scope of 
this project. I contend that it is also unnecessary within the objectives of this thesis; the 
interpretations of China’s rise expressed in policy discourse are sufficient grounding for my 
arguments. I use this approach to examine why decision-makers do not react to changes at the 
international level in accordance with PTT’s expectations.  
 
By applying this model to the various case studies in the US and EU’s bilateral relations with 
China it is possible to establish whether the varied interpretations of China’s rise influenced 
policymakers’ preferences in a particular direction and any subsequent impact on the policy 
responses chosen. PTT anticipates a clear relationship between changing external factors and 
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the foreign policy behaviour of the established powers but struggles to account for deviations 
from these because it ignores the fact that how policymakers interpret these external factors 
and then frame the development in policy discourse influences the policies adopted. My 
approach may have greater scope to account for the impact of external factors on foreign 
policy behaviour via the decision-making process and, consequently, why power-transition 
frames have not dominated the policymaking agenda. 
 
Methodology and Sources 
 
My open-ended approach to policy analysis is suitable for considering how ideational factors 
influence the decision-making process. As mentioned above, I employ this technique to 
determine how perceptions of China’s rise have influenced the responses of the US and the 
EU. The aim is to uncover how specific events were debated in policy discourse and assess the 
content of the interpretations conveyed through actors’ arguments. As I am dealing with 
intangible ideational factors, I determined that checking that the inferences made were 
consistent with evidence from multiple sources would contribute to a more robust analysis.  
This necessitated triangulation via multiple sources in order to ensure the analysis’ validity 
and reliability. Triangulation in qualitative research is “a validity procedure where researchers 
search for convergence among multiple and different sources of information to form themes or 
categories in a study” (Creswell and Miller, cited in Golafshani, 2003: 604).  
 
The first step was to build a comprehensive picture of the events studied as far as possible 
using the available public records, academic literature, third-party reports and media sources. 
This uncovered significant amounts of useful evidence yet as far as my research was 
concerned it remained incomplete, thereby necessitating further research. Textual analysis of 
key policy documents was utilised to reveal insights into how China’s rise was interpreted at 
the time of their publication. However, official documentation that recorded decision-making 
processes and debates pertaining to the relevant events were frequently found to be 
inaccessible to the public. Numerous freedom of information requests were lodged with the 
relevant authorities to gain access to these. However, these were often rejected for a variety of 
reasons; commonly, ‘national security’ concerns were cited. I was able to conduct archival 
research at the British Library, National Archives (London), European Commission Library 
(Brussels), National Security Archive, Library of Congress (Washington, DC) and the George 
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HW Bush Presidential Library (College Station, Texas) to access some documents not 
otherwise available.  
 
Extensive semi-structured interviews with open-ended questions – a style suited to 
interviewing elites (Leech, 2002: 665) – were conducted to collect primary data. The 
interviewees included policy elites (officials and elected representatives), think tank 
researchers, analysts, observers and commentators in London, Paris, Brussels and Washington, 
DC between 2010 and 2011
2
. Varying levels of identification were offered to interviewees and 
references to interviews throughout the thesis reflect this. The objective was to gain detailed 
insights into how events and China’s rise in general were perceived by policymakers and build 
a picture of the decision-making process in (some of) the cases studied in Chapters Three 
through Five. These interviews unearthed useful evidence which I have incorporated into my 
analysis; some insights are novel and therefore help to fill empirical gaps in the literature. 
Cross-referencing between the accounts of various interviewees also serves to increase 
reliability in the findings and ameliorating (to some extent) problems associated with the 
accuracy of historical accounts presented by individuals.  
 
One issue here was that I did not manage to interview as many current and former policy 
officials as I would have liked. In particular, those who were still in office at the time were 
unable or unwilling to talk to me about issues which were or even still are sensitive in the 
context of relations with China. Some interviewees preferred to remain completely off the 
record, providing me with information on the guarantee that I would not use it in my thesis. 
Former officials who had moved on were often difficult to track down. This was especially the 
case in the EU. In the UK, my access to current policy officials was restricted by the 
institutions themselves, granting me limited access to an individual who was designated as 
‘representing’ the official view. Overall, I conducted around fifty interviews for the research. 
Aside from ‘off the record’ interviews, some simply did not provide much in the way of new 
information. Nevertheless, I believe that the interviews I have cited are of high quality and 
drawing on other sources – in particular committee hearings and media reports – has provided 
a wealth of supporting evidence throughout the thesis.    
 
                                                 
2
 Ethics approval for the fieldwork was granted by the (then) Faculty Ethics Committee in March 2010.    
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4. Main Findings and Contribution 
 
The central finding is that the notion of ‘China’s rise’ has been interpreted in various ways by 
different actors over time; the lack of a single, objective meaning has led to contestations 
between preferences for how to respond to this shift in the international arena. This has been 
not been explored in the literature to date, with little critical reflection on the concept and its 
impact on policy preferences. The problem is, many policymakers and academics have been 
preoccupied with questioning whether China is rising or not, without considering what the 
notion of ‘China’s rise’ is taken to signify. These differing interpretations shape policymakers’ 
preferences for how to respond to China’s emergence.  
 
I argue that there are considerable variations in how policymakers have interpreted the 
significance of China’s rise, yet there has been little real discussion of what the term ‘China’s 
rise’ actually means within policy communities. Instead, the focus appears to be on 
disagreements between the implications of this, resulting in contestation between divergent 
preferences for how to respond. The evidence suggests that ‘China’s rise’ takes on different 
meanings for different actors at different points in time. For the most part, the US and EU’s 
responses to the rise of China have not been predicated on perceptions of an impending threat 
to their position in the status quo. Even looking at perceptions of China in the context of 
specific dimensions of international relations – military, economic and normative – there is 
little evidence that ‘threat’ conceptualisations were the dominant view amongst policymakers. 
Instead, the economic and political opportunities presented by China’s rise have persisted and 
contributed to the development of the overarching strategies of engagement for both the US 
and the EU. The commonality between their responses is interesting given that both are very 
different international actors: the US is the classical model of the superpower state, whereas 
the EU is generally considered to have a unique presence based on its civilian/normative 
values. Thus, it might be expected that they would pursue different paths in dealing with 
China. In the existing literature on US and EU responses to China’s rise, there is still work to 
be done in terms of developing explanations of their behaviour over time.  
 
Further, although China’s power grew considerably over the timeframe of analysis, this has 
not elicited the sort of responses from the established powers we would expect to see if they 
operated under the logic of PTT. As very different international actors with different 
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policymaking structures (subsystems) we might expect to see very different reactions to 
China’s rise from the US and EU – but this has not transpired. We also see that their 
respective policy discourses over China’s rise have varied considerably, with different 
perceptions evinced by policymakers. Ultimately, the broad similarities between their 
strategies were down to interpretations of China’s rise as presenting economic and political 
opportunities prevailing within both the US and EU. Crucially, these were frequently held by 
the key policymakers within the main subsystems, therefore policies often reflected 
preferences predicated on these interpretations. This tendency has translated into the 
maintenance of strategies of engagement in response to China’s rise.  
 
Labelling China’s rise as either a ‘threat’ or ‘opportunity’ obscures the fact that interpretations 
are multifaceted. In the thesis, I identify six overarching interpretations pertaining to different 
aspects of China’s rise which I outline in detail in Chapter Two. These aspects are the military, 
economic, normative and political dimensions of the relationships with China. These are then 
presented in pairs: first, China as either a military threat or not (non-threat). This has related to 
the threat presented to its neighbours, the US within the regional context but also potentially – 
in the extreme arguments – globally. Second, China as an economic threat or an opportunity, 
in terms of whether its economic power will hurt the established powers, or benefit them 
through increased trade and raising China’s stake in the current international economic system 
and its various institutions.  
 
Third, China as a normative threat versus a political opportunity are paired as there has been 
no discussion of China as presenting a ‘normative opportunity’. Those attempting to counter 
perceptions of the Chinese regime as a threat to the norms and values of the international 
system tend to concentrate on political opportunities of drawing China into the established 
system, increasing its stake in the maintenance of the status quo and playing a more significant 
role internationally, commensurate with its growing size. In some respects, the threat 
interpretations are concerned with an ‘active’ China, whereas the opportunity interpretations 
convey a sense of passivity, wherein it is not so much China’s direct behaviour that generates 
these, but rather they are a by-product of its rise. The former also spark a greater urgency 
about the immediate implications, as the threats were often seen as real in the present, rather 




The analysis in Chapter Two lays an important foundation for subsequent understanding of the 
policy responses examined in the later empirical chapters as the interpretations outlined are 
reflected in the discourse of the US and the EU to varying degrees with changing salience over 
time. These underpinned the preferences of policymakers and contextualised the policy 
debates over specific events; in other words, the cases were not treated as isolated incidents by 
policymakers but a part of the broader relationship, thus the implications they drew from their 
interpretations of China’s rise shaped how they sought to react in these instances. Even so, 
there was little real explicit debate over what ‘China’s rise’ signified amongst policymakers in 
either polity, despite the apparent gaps between interpretations. Due to the lack of explicit 
recognition of this, the groundwork in Chapter Two provides a way of identifying these gaps 
and the implications they had for the development of policies towards China. There was little 
disagreement in terms of the fundamental objective – ensuring China’s peaceful emergence – 
but actors often had different preferences for how best to achieve this. While all of the threat 
perspectives became more prominent in the US, only the normative and economic threat 
perspectives gained much traction in the EU and even then these were rare. In both polities, 
the political and economic opportunity interpretations appeared to grow as China did with the 
implication that they continued to dominate even as discourse – at least in the US – became 
more heated.    
 
The analysis shows that understanding the nature of preferences alone is not enough, but there 
needs to be some consideration of who gets to translate their preferences into policies and how 
they go about doing so. In other words, although the discourse over China’s rise is ongoing 
throughout the American and European policy communities and a variety of actors can 
participate in debates over the appropriate responses to specific developments, the final 
decisions are taken by select actors. These could be identified by looking at the foreign policy 
subsystem responsible for the formulation of responses on the relevant issue-area. 
Nevertheless, these actors cannot ‘shut out’ the preferences of others entirely and compromise 
between competing sets of preferences can and does occur. Therefore we need to look at the 
discourse taking place to understand why key actors do not always simply translate their 
preferences into policies.   
 
The research has significant implications for understanding US- and EU-China relations. In 
both cases, I assert that there is not a single, overarching ‘China policy’, but rather multiple 
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policies which are underpinned by a general commitment to engaging with China, assisting its 
development as an international actor as opposed to attempting to contain its rise. Even as 
China’s power increased rapidly and debates intensified over the implications of its ascent to 
great power status with more references to its rise presenting a threat – particularly in the 
military and economic dimensions – the US’ policies have largely adhered to the engagement 
strategy. The growing threat perceptions have been overshadowed by the dominance of 
perceptions amongst key policymakers of China’s rise as presenting economic and political 
opportunities. As a result of the presence of sharply contrasting interpretations of China’s rise, 
policies were vigorously contested with substantial debates emerging at many key junctures in 
the relationship. There was a particularly evident schism between the administration and 
Congress, where perceptions of China as an emerging threat held greatest sway. Congress was 
not always involved in policy formulation but some of its members used their public platform 
to keep their views alive within policy discourse.  
 
In the EU’s case, I demonstrate that it has foreign policies towards China which are distinct 
from the aggregate of Member States’ policies but, as noted, no single, definitive policy. The 
concept of engagement has been embraced more wholeheartedly than in the US, with little in 
the way of substantive debates over the implications of China’s rise or even over significant 
junctures in the relationship. This has meant that the policies have not been produced through 
a substantive public debate over the appropriate response to China’s rise. The most notable 
feature in the EU’s consideration of China’s rise is the degree of convergence around 
interpretations of significant economic and political opportunities for the EU. By 2003 this had 
developed to the stage where the concept of China as a strategic partner emerged within EU 
policy discourse and effectively became an interpretation of China in its own right. 
Differences in actors’ preferences were produced largely by disagreements over whether the 
economic or political dimensions of the relationship should be prioritised. The only true 
dissent came from the European Parliament, but it had no decision-making responsibility in 
the relevant subsystems, therefore could only affect discourse at the margins, with virtually no 
impact on the preferences of the other actors.  
 
The transatlantic debate over the EU’s proposal to lift its arms embargo against China 
(imposed in response to the Tiananmen crackdown of June 1989) was the first time that the 
implications of China’s rise really became subject to scrutiny in the context of the EU-US 
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relationship. Examining this case in depth demonstrates the importance of interpretations of 
China’s rise for the development of specific policies. The debate evinced that although both 
the US and the EU were committed to engaging China as it emerged, the implications of this 
process – as they saw it – differed considerably. Whilst in the EU the dominance of economic 
and political opportunity interpretations led the embargo to be regarded as outdated and 
harmful to progress in the relationship, on the US side it was considered to be more necessary 
than ever.  
 
This was due to the increasing salience of perceptions of China as a potential military threat 
therefore preventing its acquisition of high-end technology which could advance its military 
capabilities significantly was considered a priority. Although interpretations of China as an 
economic and political opportunity had until then prevailed in the US’ policy discourse, there 
was no ‘opportunity’ from the US in this case – only possible losses if the EU transferred 
technology to China which would increase its military threat potential. There were clear 
political and economic opportunities for the EU, but in the US there was no scope for actors 
who generally subscribed to such interpretations to frame the move in such terms. The original 
reason behind imposition – China’s human rights record – was not central to either side’s 
preferences. For each side, the underpinning logic of their embargoes had shifted due to 
evolving interpretations of China’s rise. Although both had acted upon interpretations of this 
as an economic and political opportunity, in the US the growing presence of military threat 
perceptions had produced a continuous contestation between rival perspectives; there were no 
possible gains from the EU lifting its embargo thus proponents of threat perspectives of 
China’s rise were able to dominate the US’ discourse on the issue. The shifting logic 
underpinning their respective embargoes meant that they were essentially talking past each 
other: the preferences of the other side were not fully understood as they were incongruous 
with their own interpretations of China’s rise.  
 
Demonstrating the contested nature of ‘China’s rise’ within the US and the EU and the 
subsequent impact on the evolution of their policies constitutes a direct challenge to 
mainstream IR theories – particularly PTT – which presuppose that material factors and the 
structure of the international system determine behaviour. The ‘big changes’ to the balance of 
power and the international order – with which mainstream IR is preoccupied – are grounded 
in the interactions of policymakers and the decisions that they make on the basis of their own 
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pre-existing ideas and preferences. The US and EU’s responses to the rise of China have not 
been predetermined by material interests or the desire to preserve their relative positions as 
PTT would expect. The examination of the intersection between material and ideational 
factors within the decision-making environment makes a contribution to FPA’s task of 
reconnecting IR to its ground of human beings (Hudson, 2005: 2).             
 
The thesis presents new empirical material on US- and EU-China relations and examines a 
number of events in their relationships from a new perspective. Particularly on the arms 
embargo case study, my analysis concentrates on the transatlantic debate which I contend is 
where the ‘real’ debate took place; internal EU deliberations largely focussed on questions of 
timing. The importance of the arms embargo debate as a window into broader interpretations 
of China’s rise – particularly in the US – has been overlooked in the existing literature.   
Finally, the analytical model itself is an innovative contribution: analysis of variations within 
and between the US and EU’s responses to the rise of China demonstrates its utility in 
generating robust explanations for foreign policy behaviour. Although the project did not start 
out to be a work of ‘comparative foreign policy’, the model enables cross-polity analysis of 
foreign policymaking. The model may be of use to Foreign Policy Analysts working with 
single or multiple case studies and should appeal to either ‘classic’ FPA or EFP scholars. 
 
5. Structure of the Thesis 
 
The next chapter reviews the relevant literature, starting with an overview of PTT before 
concentrating on existing accounts of US and EU relationships with China and their responses 
to its rise. In addition, I consider the small bodies of literature which look at the arms embargo 
debate in varying degrees of depth and also the US-EU-China relationship. The intention is to 
further expand on the importance of the questions raised in the thesis and highlight the 
potential for this research to contribute to the debates within the literature. Chapter Two 
outlines the six main interpretations of China’s rise which were present in the US and EU over 
the timeframe. These require elaboration due to the tendency for others to categorise China’s 
rise in terms of an either/or threat-opportunity dichotomy, which overlooks important 
variations between different types of threats and opportunities. Drawing on evidence from the 
policy discourse and also the measures which their proponents use to substantiate their 
arguments – such as China’s military budget, economic growth and trade flows – the chapter 
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establishes the differences across the different interpretations and relates them to the more 
general concept of China’s rise outwith the context of particular decision-making instances.  
 
I then move on to the main empirical analyses of the foreign policy behaviour of the two 
established powers. Looking first at the US in Chapter Three, I analyse the six cases in 
bilateral relations; through my analytical framework I develop an understanding of how 
evolving interpretations of China’s rise impacted upon US policies in response to these. 
Throughout, I contemplate the expectations in each case from the power-transition perspective 
and reflect on what value my approach has compared to this theoretical approach. This process 
is then repeated for the EU in Chapter Four. Having then dealt with the US and EU separately, 
Chapter Five turns to examine the evolution of their respective arms embargo policies towards 
China and the transatlantic debate sparked by the EU’s proposal to lift its embargo in detail in 
order to demonstrate what comparative insights the analytical approach can deliver. The final 
chapter summarises the findings of the thesis and discusses their implications for the study of 
responses to China’s rise and also wider IR debates and the advancement of FPA and EFP. It 
also reflects on opportunities for future research based on questions thrown up over the course 
of the research. 






China’s rise is a hot topic, regularly referred to as the most significant change to the 
international system since the end of the Cold War. It is now commonly accepted that China is 
rising – although ‘how fast’ is debated extensively – and that this will have significant 
implications for the future of international relations. Whatever course it takes, China will be an 
important player in the world for the foreseeable future. Its political, strategic and economic 
relationships with the US and the EU have received considerable scholarly attention (more so 
the US). However, what is meant by ‘China’s rise’ means different things to different people; 
there are numerous interpretations of the implications of China’s rise within these two polities, 
which have had a significant impact upon the policy discourse around this development and 
subsequently the preferences of policymakers.  
 
Some parts of the literature reflect these debates – between scholars writing that China’s rise 
poses a challenge to the established powers and those who see it as more likely to integrate 
with the established international system. Others argue that it is too early to say for sure how 
China will emerge and subsequently suggest erring on the side of caution. Scholars do not 
appear particularly eager to subscribe to threat perspectives (although there are prominent 
exceptions) yet there is generally little critical reflection on how these debates are contributing 
to policymaking at key junctures in the relationships between the established and rising 
powers. In short, the importance of how different interpretations of China’s rise are shaping 
the responses of the US and the EU has not been explored within the majority of studies.   
 
The first section develops an overview of the power-transition theory (PTT) literature, 
elucidating its precepts and implications for relations between established and rising powers. 
PTT has had a significant influence over some studies of China’s rise, specifically on US-
China relations where its logic and language are frequently invoked, even though the theory 
itself is rarely employed in these analyses. The ‘received wisdom’ of PTT is now of more 
significance than its theoretical models developed during the Cold War, precisely because of 
its impact on the thinking of some scholars and observers. From there, I then look at the 
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literature on US-China and EU-China relations in sections 1.3 and 1.4 respectively. I find that 
contributions to the literature on China’s rise and its relations with the US and EU, while 
valuable, have missed opportunities to explore the impact of interpretations on policy. The 
US-China section also examines studies which have employed or critiqued PTT to assess US-
China relations (to date, PTT has not been applied to EU-China relations).  
 
My review of the arms embargo debate literature reveals that the dominance of Euro-centric 
analyses has obscured the importance of the transatlantic debate. This section then considers 
the limited number of studies of US-EU-China relations, suggesting that this reflects a 
tendency to prioritise bilateral relationships in International Relations (IR) scholarship. The 
penultimate section covers the literature that informs my analysis and arguments and that I 
build upon. Specifically, I review the IR, Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) and European 
Foreign Policy (EFP) literature and studies which inform this analysis and those which have 
examined the importance of perceptions and interpretations in foreign policymaking. I 
conclude that the explanations for the behaviour of the US and the EU towards China rarely 
share much common ground in terms of their analytical focus. My arguments bridge the gap to 
some extent by presenting an account of behaviour which focuses on the interaction between 
international developments and actors’ subjective interpretations of their external world which 
shape the development of foreign policies. 
 
1.2 Power-Transition Theory 
 
I argue much of the ‘threat’ rhetoric surrounding China’s rise employs language and logic that 
is derived from PTT. By introducing PTT’s precepts here, I provide a basis for substantiating 
the links between it and the various ‘threat’ perspectives. Although Tammen et al (2000: 6) 
attempted to disaggregate PTT from realism (preferring the label of ‘rationalism’) the theory 
clearly has its roots in this school of thought. PTT rests on analysis of international relations at 
the structural level in which states are the primary actors, differentiated by their relative power 
capacities. PTT shares with offensive realism (Mearsheimer, 2001a) and hegemonic stability 
theory (Keohane, 1980; Gilpin, 1981) the view that a preponderance, rather than equilibrium, 




Deeply concerned by the upheavals of the two World Wars and post-WWII uncertainty, AFK 
Organski (1958) developed PTT to “provide a framework that… affords a better basis for the 
prediction of future events than does the theory of the balance of power” (Organski, 1958: 
300). Decades before China’s rise, Organski (1958: 307, 310) recognised that it would become 
a major world power, linking its regime type to the potential for a clash with the dominant 
power. Organski (1958: 321) observed that China (along with Russia) was “still far behind the 
Western nations in power, although one might not think so if he took the newspaper reports 
and speeches of Western military and civilian leaders at face value”. This point relates directly 
to my claims – more than fifty years later – regarding interpretations of China’s threat. 
Discrepant interpretations were recognised by the founder of PTT but treated as an anecdotal 
curiosity rather than important in their own right.   
 
Organski’s (1958: 322-3) argument which formed the core of PTT was that  
 
challenges by newcomers result in war… the major wars of recent history have 
all… [involved] the biggest power in the world and its allies against a challenger 
(or group of challengers) who had recently risen in power thanks to 
industrialization. One could almost say that the rise of such a challenger 
guarantees a major war.  
 
Wars result when the rising power is dissatisfied with the status quo order; satisfied powers 
are not confrontational (Organski, 1958: 330-2)
1
. Thus whether Western policymakers take 
China to be a satisfied or dissatisfied rising power will shape their attitudes towards it – as is 
shown subsequently, there is still much debate on this point. Organski and Jacek Kugler 
(1980) further developed the theory
2
 and through statistical analyses found that half of all 
historical transitions were followed by conflict. The authors intended to incorporate analysis 
of “the culture of elites, their belief systems, their skill in negotiation, their ability to decipher 
signals from other leaders, as well as in the constraints and opportunities imposed on and 
                                                 
1
 This explained why the transition between the UK and the US did not result in conflict. The latter did not 
actively pursue world leadership and its internal developments benefitted the UK economically (Organski, 1958: 
323). The US did not seek to challenge the extant order: “far from destroying the Anglo-French international 
order” the US gave it “a new lease on life by continuing to defend it after England and France alone no longer 
possessed the power to do so” (Organski, 1958: 324).  
2
 DiCicco and Levy (1999: 681) consider Organski (1958) and Organski and Kugler (1980) to constitute the 
foundations of the PTT research programme. 
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provided for all elites by the institutions in which they must operate” (Organski and Kugler, 
1980: 14). In reality, they continued to prioritise “a particular shift in capabilities, the 
surpassing of the most powerful nation by another” (Morrow, 1996: 327).  
 
Adjusting earlier arguments, Organski and Kugler (1980: 28) postulated that conflicts would 
not always be initiated by the rising power in an attempt to accelerate the transition process, 
but could be “a desperate attempt on the part of the still-dominant nation to intercept the 
challenger’s progress”. Yet the transition is inevitable even if the process takes decades, 
“punctuated by a number of armed conflicts” (Organski and Kugler, 1980: 28). The authors 
aimed to “establish a single, reliable measurement” of the distribution of power as separate 
indicators were inherently weakened by “impressionistic estimates” which often proved 
“fanciful” (Organski and Kugler, 1980: 33). They opted for Gross National Product (GNP); 
recognising that this was an imprecise measure, they incorporated flexibility by declaring 
“equality” to be achieved when the rising power reached eighty percent of the established 
power’s GNP (Organski and Kugler, 1980: 49).  
 
For the present purpose it is unnecessary to cover the various strands of PTT; however, to 
understand its implications for debates on China’s rise it is expedient to draw attention to its 
core assumptions, outlined by DiCicco and Levy (1999: 684). First, states are the primary 
international actors and their leaders “are rational” in their choices. The international system is 
hierarchical – not anarchical – under a dominant power, in which change is dependent on 
states’ internal economic growth. PTT scholars take economic power as prior to military 
advances (Schweller, 1999: 2) since measurements of military components “fail to capture the 
dynamics of power change” (Tammen et al, 2000: 16). That is not to say that military power is 
unimportant under PTT, as interstate war is impossible without it. However, it has not been 
incorporated into theoretical modelling by PTT scholars.   
 
Lemke and Werner (1996: 240) diverged with the exclusion of military power, arguing that 
spending patterns are a crucial variable for measuring power and assessing intentions, as a 
rapid increase “indicates that the challenger is committed to changing the… status quo”. Such 
logic is frequently invoked by those who see China’s rise as a military threat to the US. Kim 
(1992: 157) observed a fast-rising power can produce a situation in which both the rising and 
dominant powers are “caught unprepared” for the impending transition, increasing the 
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propensity for conflict. The speed of China’s rise has indeed formed a core aspect of threat 
interpretations. Morrow (1996) indirectly established that PTT is also applicable to EU-China 
relations. Morrow (1996: 313) posited that the “logic of overtaking” meant that PTT applied 
not only to the relationship between the dominant power and the rising challenger, but any 
case where one state’s “capabilities are growing relative to the other’s” – that is, PTT also 
holds when the rising challenger passes others ‘on the way’ to the top.  
 
A single measure of satisfaction/dissatisfaction with the status quo remains elusive in PTT 
scholarship (DiCicco and Levy, 1999: 690) which clouds certainty in judgements over likely 
future behaviour. In China’s case this is amplified by the tendency for threat proponents to 
link its revisionist intentions to its regime type and rapid development of military capabilities. 
Power-transition theorists have argued that democratic states tend to support the status quo 
(Lemke and Reed, 1996) because it promotes their interests and values. As a non-democratic 
state, the concern is that China seeks to change the system to safeguard its interests and values. 
Additionally, timing issues continue to complicate PTT with disagreement over whether wars 
will occur prior to, at the point of, or following the transition (DiCicco and Levy, 1999: 694). 
Yet the extent of (dis)satisfaction and its focus – whether it is far-reaching or only in relation 
to specific issues – are potentially important factors still underspecified in the PTT literature.   
 
Morrow (1996: 329) noted that PTT scholarship had not explained why the dominant power 
does not defeat smaller powers before they cross the line from potential to actual challenger, 
which is arguably relevant in relation to the US’ response to China’s rise. The supposition that 
the dominant power will not initiate conflict as it is satisfied with the status quo is problematic 
precisely because the emergence of a potential challenger “constitutes a potential threat to the 
status quo” (DiCicco and Levy, 1999: 695). Thus an early war would be a prudent move to 
maintain the status quo. Tammen et al (2000: 27) contended that  
 
initiating conflict is counterproductive since the dominant power… having set the 
international rules and norms… cannot disrupt them by its own actions without 
serious loss of support… by preserving the status quo, the dominant nation seeks 




Since the rising challenger will eventually overtake the dominant power and change the rules 
anyway, it is not clear why the latter allows this to transpire. It also fails to account for the 
tendency of great powers to bend the rules of the game in their own interest while expecting 
others to abide by them. For example, the US waged war on Iraq in 2003 even though – as 
prominent PTT scholars have noted – Iraq could not meet the criteria of a global challenger 
(Kugler et al, 2004: 169). If the hope is simply that the rising power will eventually become 
satisfied, this would constitute non-rational ‘wishful thinking’ on the part of the dominant 
power, violating a core tenet of PTT. I contend that PTT’s theoretical parameters are too 
restrictive to properly encapsulate why the predominant power does not crush its potential 
rival(s). More convincing explanations are found through examination of how interpretations 
of the rising power influence the responses developed at the policymaking level.   
 
PTT does not predict that all transitions necessarily entail war (Kim and Morrow, 1992: 896). 
The problem has been, as Lemke and Kugler (1996: 20) pointed out, that “some scholars 
have... treated power transitions as necessary and sufficient conditions” for war. However, 
application of the theory’s precepts to the case of China’s rise from the late 20th Century 
onwards does not give much hope that its overtaking of the US will be peaceful. Organski and 
Kugler (1980: 226) set out a pessimistic view of the future, predicting that at some unspecified 
point China’s economic development would lead it to “overtake the Soviet Union and then, 
decades later the United States. The period after each passage will create the conditions for 
nuclear wars to occur”. A significant limitation of PTT’s statistical models is that they must be 
applied retrospectively. Although scholars have indulged in predictive modelling, the range of 
variables held constant removes the politics from the future of international relations.  
 
Drawing together these various facets of PTT, it is possible to identify core expectations for 
great power behaviour: 
 
1. The dominant power and its allies are satisfied with the status quo and seek to preserve it. 
2. To qualify as a ‘potential challenger’, an actor’s power must be on a trajectory for parity 
with the dominant power.  
3. Fast-rising powers are more likely to cause instability.  
4. Transitions involving dissatisfied rising powers are likely to result in conflict.  
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5. The dominant power and its allies will seek to preserve the status quo order, through 
encouraging integration or confrontation. 
6. The rising challenger will eventually be successful, even if the transition takes time.  
 
 Although PTT scholars see two options for the dominant power(s) – engagement with a view 
to integration, or confrontation – they effectively treat these as binary and thus have difficulty 
explaining more complex behaviour which does not neatly conform to either. PTT cannot 
specify when one will be chosen over the other and anticipates a linear pattern of behaviour: as 
the challenger’s power increases, the behaviour of the established power is likely to become 
increasingly confrontational if the prospects for integration diminish (unless the rising power 
is clearly becoming satisfied – for which there is no definitive test). Behaviour which 
oscillates between these two paths is also difficult to explain from a PTT perspective. The 
assumptions of states as coherent actors operating in environments of complete information 
struggle with uncertainty over levels of (dis)satisfaction and future intentions. I argue that PTT 
routinely overlooks the unique characteristics of the relevant relationships, the decision-
making processes within polities and the specific climate of international relations at a given 
point in time. 
  
PTT scholars have failed to recognise their own impact on how actors interpret the rise of new 
powers. Thanks to their scholarly efforts, the consequences of power-transitions are well 
known and frequently referenced by some analysts and policymakers – even if understanding 
of PTT’s theoretical precepts and methodologies remains limited. This has led to the ‘lessons’ 
of PTT infiltrating some areas of policy discourse. PTT effectively assumes a single 
understanding of international relations between the rising and established powers, thus there 
is only one interpretation of the situation possible. We could thus expect that policymakers, 
armed with this knowledge, would favour confronting the rising challenger as soon as possible 
as allowing a challenger to approach parity will spell the end of the dominant power’s reign. I 
aim to draw these assumptions into the light and challenge them, highlighting the problems 
with PTT’s influence over conceptualisations of China’s rise. Tackling PTT in this thesis is 
important because it should be applicable to these relationships, yet it constantly falls short of 




1.3 US-China Relations 
 
Despite their apparent potential, few scholars have harnessed FPA approaches to examine the 
importance of perceptions in US-China relations. I draw on insights from cognitive FPA 
without ‘getting inside the mind’ of the individual decision-maker. Goldstein (1997/98: 38) 
analysed interpretations of China’s arrival, interrogating whether these matched up to ‘reality’, 
finding that its rising power was actually quite modest and projections for “great gains in the 
foreseeable future” were exaggerated. Goldstein (1997/98) concentrated on perceived versus 
actual power, rather than broader interpretations of China’s rise in relation to different issue 
areas. Broomfield (2003) concentrated on threat perceptions, dividing them into three 
categories – ideological, economic and strategic – which is replicated here, although I utilise 
different labels and examine non-threat/opportunity interpretations which are only hinted at by 
Broomfield (2003), who implies that the ‘China threat theory’ is largely based on 
misperceptions. 
 
Herbert Yee (2005: 112) contended that “perceptions of a China threat are often affected by 
domestic political factors”. Yee (2005) explicitly addressed the debates between factions 
within the US policy community. However, this was somewhat generalised, concentrating 
mainly on outlining the content of the China threat thesis in US policy in broad brushstrokes. 
Although Yee (2005: 117-124) acknowledged debate between proponents of containment 
versus engagement, there was little systematic research into how these impacted the 
development of policy or consideration of the evolution of these perspectives in response to 
China’s rise – although the relatively limited analytical scope is perhaps explained by the fact 
that this was a chapter in an edited volume. Yee (2005) appeared optimistic that mutual 
perceptions could be improved, paving the way a more stable relationship. Zhao Quangsheng 
(2007) argued that there was an emergent perception of “one up, one down” in relation to 
China overtaking a declining US, mostly based on expectations of future trends from current 
change in relative power. However, these scholars have not engaged in systematic analysis of 
perceptions within an FPA framework, thus there is scope for building on their accounts.   
 
As Scott (2008) observed, studies of US responses to China’s rise are often more interested in 
speculating about the future rather than explaining recent history. Rich, descriptive works 
from Robert Suettinger (2003) and Nancy Tucker (2001) provide excellent insight into what 
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was going on ‘behind the scenes’, but do not engage in analyses of the factors critical to the 
development of policy towards China. Other studies in the decision-making FPA tradition 
have examined in close detail the processes in the formulation of policies, but these rarely 
engage with broader theoretical discussions, leaving a gap between IR and FPA scholarship. 
Since the mid-1990s academics were asking whether China should be contained or engaged 
(Shambaugh, 1996) and debates over China’s rise proliferated in the late-1990s following the 
Taiwan Strait crisis (Cooper, J., 1997; Dreyer, 2000). Some have suggested that China’s threat 
in this regard was not particularly high (O’Hanlon, 2000; Ross, 2002), or in fact presents 
opportunities for cooperation on global issues (Medeiros and Fravel, 2003).  
 
Within the diverse range of literature which analyses US-China relations, there have been 
numerous studies rooted in decision-making FPA, which is essentially the dominant approach 
(compared to cognitive or societal approaches) in US academia. Tan Qingshan (1992) drew on 
the decision-making models proposed in Essence of Decision (Allison, 1971). Tan’s approach 
is not formally adopted here, but the examination of the executive-legislative subsystem’s 
dynamics was influenced by the ‘interbranch’ model in his text. Others have sought to include 
decision-making approaches in wider analyses. Rosemary Foot (1995) critiqued realist 
explanations of the relationship, arguing that a variety of other factors within the wider 
contextual structure of both international and domestic arenas influenced the relationship. 
Both of these studies focussed on a time period prior to the post-Cold War era; much has 
changed in the relationship that is worth further exploration. Robert Ross’ (1998) edited 
volume examined domestic-level variables, although the findings were not reconciled in a 
final analysis. However, the individual contributions reflected the growing interest in such 
factors in the context of US-China relations.  
 
Myers et al (2001) investigated domestic political factors (executive/legislative influence, 
NGOs and interest groups), the Taiwan issue and external actors such as the EU, Asia-Pacific 
nations and China itself but omitted reconciliation of these factors. In another decision-making 
FPA study, Jean Garrison (2005) identified the recurring patterns in US-China relations, 
finding that in the post-Cold War era the policy objectives of the three Presidents have been 
broadly similar and had to deal with domestic opposition. I concur with Garrison’s (2005) 
conclusions on the constraining influence of Congressional politics and the continuity in 
preferences across multiple administrations; however our analytical foci differ as Garrison did 
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not interrogate broader questions of great power behaviour, instead concentrated on 
institutional processes in policymaking. Of the few studies that attempt to link specific events 
together and generate more nuanced explanations, David Lampton’s (2001) Same Bed, 
Different Dreams is a key contribution. Looking at the international, national and individual 
levels, Lampton (2001:314, 355) found that the complexity of the relationship is such that 
there is little scope for one or a small number of individuals to determine its development. 
While our approaches differ, Lampton’s (2001) work provided a platform to build upon by 
linking different levels and looking at the dynamics of decision-making.  
 
Some scholars have continued to push mainstream IR perspectives as the best lenses with 
which to view the relationship. Russell Ong (2012) produced a structural realist account of 
China-US strategic competition, asserting that Chinese policymakers favoured the creation of 
a multipolar world rather than replacing US unipolarity with its own. Ong (2012) did not 
envisage an immediate challenge to the US on the basis that China’s central objective of 
continued economic growth requires international stability which necessitated a degree of 
strategic cooperation with the US. Despite treating China as a dissatisfied power, Ong (2012) 
disagreed with PTT theorists on likely behaviour because it was not so dissatisfied as to seek 
an immediate revision to the international’s systems structures and rules. Yet Ong (2012: 13, 
144) implicitly agreed with PTT when arguing that the US’ concern will be to maintain its 
hegemonic position and avoid China gaining parity in the military, political or economic 
realms. Although Ong (2012) touched upon the prevalence of differing interpretations of 
China’s rise in the US, his structural perspective led him to discount their impact on policy 
development and conclude that both sides were largely motivated by balance of power logic. 
 
PTT-specialists Tammen et al (2000: 33, 153) claimed China has “surfaced as the new threat 
to US dominance of world affairs” and must be watched at both regional and global levels. It 
is interesting that they expected “some US opinion leaders… to fall back on familiar Cold War 
rhetoric and policies such as containment” (Tammen et al, 2000: 164) which will increase 
China’s revisionist tendencies, yet failed to recognise that such rhetoric is often informed by 
PTT itself. The “anti-Chinese forces” in the US, they claim, will make it difficult for the US to 
manage China’s emergence as a satisfied, status quo power (Tammen et al, 2000: 174). The 
implicit assumption running through their work is that China will emerge as a dissatisfied 




Rapkin and Thompson (2003) suggested that it is still too early to judge China’s level of 
dissatisfaction but acknowledged the growing salience of the China threat narrative within the 
US. On military capabilities they argued that qualitative differences matter, a first for PTT 
scholarship (to my knowledge). They considered the dominant power’s perception of 
(dis)satisfaction levels, but not of relative power which have fuelled China threat perspectives. 
They concluded that the power-transition is still inevitable, concurring with Tammen et al 
(2000) that the US should encourage China’s development as a satisfied power. Eric Weede 
(2003) argued that PTT was ambivalent as to China’s level of dissatisfaction but advocated 
integrationist strategies to avoid conflict. Tammen and Kugler (2006: 35) warned that the war 
on terror jeopardised the US’ continued predominance as it diverted resources which would be 
better directed at future challengers. China’s military development did not constitute an arms 
buildup (Tammen and Kugler, 2006: 48), although this ignores concern within sections of the 
US policy community. While acknowledging evidence of China’s satisfaction with the 
international order, they argued that US policies should be directed at encouraging China’s 
development as a satisfied power (Tammen and Kugler, 2006: 52). 
 
Other analyses applying PTT have arrived at contrasting conclusions. For Schweller (1999: 
26-7), China’s growing power was alarming precisely because “both history and scholarship 
show that countries undergoing economic transitions tend to pursue assertive and expansionist 
foreign policies”. Combining this factor with the government’s attempt to remain in power and 
the inability to predict future intentions, Schweller (1999: 27) concluded that engagement will 
be difficult, reducing the prospect of integrating China into the established order. David Lai 
(2011: 2) claimed that the US and China were “willing to blaze a new path out of this deadly 
contest” and would break with history. While Lai acknowledged rival interpretations of 
China’s rise, he did not link them to recent behaviour but instead pointed the paths they might 
take the US down. Lai (2011: 202) saw Taiwan as the most likely cause of conflict but argued 
that the two sides recognised that they are in a power-transition, reducing the possibility of 
such outcomes. Such an argument does not take seriously the possibility that dissatisfaction 
with the status quo might lead China to challenge the US, as PTT expects. 
 
Zhu Zhinqun (2006: 2, 4) explored whether a US-China power transition would lead to a 
major war via “an agent-structure model that… emphasises the role of decision-making and 
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diplomacy in the study of power transition”. Although critiquing traditional PTT models, Zhu 
(2006) essentially worked within PTT logic to establish ways to avoid its expectations, rather 
than critique their limitations. His central hypothesis is that “if the government, the public and 
top leaders in both the dominant power and the challenging power have positive evaluations of 
the bilateral relationship in a friendly international system, power transition will end in peace” 
(Zhu, Z., 2006: 23). While the centralisation of “positive evaluations” has strong parallels with 
the focus of this thesis, my approach differs in that I am looking to explain recent behaviour, 
rather than what will happen in the future. Zhu’s (2006, Ch. 5) examination of US-China 
relations between 1990 and 2005 was generalised and, while acknowledging different 
interpretations, used these to project into the future rather than consider the impact on relations 
to date. I agree with Zhu’s general ideas about how best to understand international relations, 
but reject PTT as an appropriate starting point and seek to explain rather than predict.   
 
Robert Ross and Zhu Feng’s (2008: 293) edited volume China’s Ascent attempted to “wed 
[PTT] with the policy problems of peaceful management of the rise of China” by examining a 
range of domestic and international factors which would impact China’s rise. Ross and Zhu 
(2008: 314) concluded that war between the US and China is avoidable due to a range of 
variables not employed by core PTT scholarship, yet still considered it an appropriate starting 
place for examining US-China relations. Robert Art’s (2008: 289) chapter concluded that 
“great power status does not doom a state to be aggressively expansionist and warlike”, 
instead the choices of Chinese elites will shape its behaviour. On the US’ side, Art (2008) 
recommended a policy of accommodation where not contrary to national interests; however he 
was more prescriptive than analytical of US behaviour up until now.   
 
Steve Chan (2008: 121) examined PTT on its own terms and found no evidence that China 
was approaching the US in terms of power. As such, Chan was critical of applications of PTT 
to US-China relations on empirical grounds but contended that PTT as a theory of 
international relations should be revised rather than rejected. This included the hypothesis that 
it would be a “nervous declining power” rather than rising power that initiates conflict (Chan, 
2008: 122). He also warned that “mistaken beliefs about the other can lead to self-fulfilling 
prophecies” and cautioned against popularising some interpretations of reality whilst 
dismissing others (Chan, 2008: 123). However, Chan (2008) did not take seriously the impact 
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of power-transition perspectives in US foreign policymaking, sticking mostly to state- and 
structural-level analyses.  
 
Evelyn Goh (2009: 80) argued that PTT’s utility in the study of US-China relations was 
limited as it could not help “identify which power is likely to start a war, or when”. Goh’s 
analysis ruled out a direct confrontation as a plausible scenario on the basis of the considerable 
power gap between the two sides and the fact that China was effectively a status quo power. 
Yet she highlighted that asymmetric warfare would obviate the need for power parity between 
the two sides, an argument I pick up on later in the thesis. Goh’s (2009: 82-3) rejection of PTT 
is largely structural, essentially leaving open the possibility that its concepts might become 
relevant in the future. Zhao Quansheng (2005) argued that US policy has been directed at 
integrating China with the established order, consistent with what he claims are PTT 
expectations as sides work to avoid the conflict which, as he acknowledged, others have 
anticipated. I agree with Zhao’s summary of US policy but not his take on PTT expectations 
which are puzzling as he does not explain why other power-transition theorists do not arrive at 
such conclusions. I argue that Zhao has focussed on the policy recommendations of PTT 
scholars and retroactively applied these to US behaviour. This is problematic as PTT scholars 
would argue that to ignore their theory’s expectations would guarantee their realisation. 
 
Chin and Thakur (2010: 120) put forward a more nuanced form of a power-transition which 
did not necessarily entail conflict by criticising the oversimplification of depicting China as 
choosing two paths at a crossroads; they envisaged an alternative route where China will 
continue to internalise “select global practices and norms, alongside registering its desire and 
right to be at the table for rewriting some others”. They explicitly claimed that China’s 
ascendancy as a significant political opportunity for the West – especially the US – as reforms 
to the global system and its institutions require Chinese cooperation (Chin and Thakur, 2010: 
134). However, they noted that US rhetoric emphasises “burden-sharing” but avoids 
acknowledging the need for “power-sharing”, which will be a vital part of discussions if the 
US wants to prevent a return to balance of power politics (Chin and Thakur, 2010: 134-5).  
 
We can also see PTT logic in the work of other theorists. As a prominent example, John 
Mearsheimer’s (2001a, 2001b) offensive (neo)realism drew similar conclusions regarding the 
implications of the likely behaviour of the status quo and rising powers; China’s emergence as 
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a regional hegemon would lead the US to contain it. Mearsheimer (2010: 381-382) has 
asserted that China’s rise is unlikely to be peaceful as a dissatisfied, revisionist power and will 
prompt the US to behave more aggressively, contributing to a “gathering storm”. Zhao and Liu 
(2007: 601) have demonstrated the limitations of offensive realism in relation to China’s rise, 
and suggested that power-transition perspectives require greater consideration. Chan (2008: 
129) also pointed out that if all states are expansionist when the opportunity arises, “a status-
quo power is an oxymoron”. Nevertheless, the similarities in predictions about the potential 
for conflict are important, especially given Mearsheimer’s prominence in the field.  
 
Others have argued that China’s relative rise is not as pronounced as some analyses suggest, 
but do not break free from the analytical constraints of PTT – and broader mainstream IR – 
perspectives. These often concentrate on questions over the extent of China’s rise, with less 
interest in its perceived significance, contending that it does not yet challenge the US’ 
influence either regionally (Economy, 2005; Sutter, 2007) or globally (Smith, MA., 2012). 
Elizabeth Economy (2005: 425) argued that China could not displace the US even at the 
regional-level, although the latter could not “remain complacent about the status quo” because 
of China’s increased regional activism. Avery Goldstein (2005: 212-3) argued that historical 
analogies of other rising powers are weak, with ‘status quo’ or ‘revisionist’ labels 
oversimplifying reality.  
 
Moreover, China’s foreign policy behaviour is more consistent with that of a status quo power, 
as integration with the current system is crucial to its continued economic development. 
Goldstein (2005: 213) noted that uncertainties for the future remain, with no guarantee as to 
whether its behaviour amounts to “an unhappy accommodation to reality that will be forsaken 
if a more prosperous and powerful China has the chance to choose more freely”. Ikenberry 
(2008) argued that China was more likely to join, than attempt to overturn, the established 
system. Foot and Walter (2010) asserted that China has grown more accepting of global norms 
and international order, indicating a lack of revisionist tendencies. Etzioni (2011: 657) argued 
that the US “can safely continue to seek to turn China into a partner before concluding that a 
course of confrontation is unavoidable”, but saw US behaviour as evidence of containment 




It is evident that there is still lively debate amongst scholars as to what drives the US’ policies, 
with a variety of perspectives adopted to look at decision-making processes and the trends in 
the relationship. My contribution is to move the debate forward by offering a new perspective. 
Those that examine the US’ response to the rise of China often pay more attention to what 
might happen in the future. Although the various critiques of PTT’s applicability to US-China 
relations are valuable contributions, they could also consider the fact that PTT’s logic has 
infiltrated policy discourse. By highlighting the problems associated with PTT’s influence, I 
present a critical reflection on how US-China relations are considered within the existing 
literature and offer an alternative perspective which I claim has greater analytical grasp on the 
driving factors on the US’ side.   
   
 1.4 EU-China Relations 
 
EU-China relations have received comparatively less scholarly attention than US-China 
relations. This can be at least partially attributed to the EU’s still-developing international 
presence, as well as the relatively recent development of its political relations with the 
(re)emergent China. Some might contend that there are fewer potential ‘flashpoints’ in the 
relationship, which makes it less interesting for IR scholars. Kay Möller (2007: 181) suggested 
that “perhaps because of the implicit demotion of their own continent, most European scholars 
hesitated… to embrace wholeheartedly the notion [of China’s rise]” unlike their US 
counterparts. However a wealth of new literature advancing a range of approaches has 
appeared in recent years. Considerations of a ‘China threat’ are exceptionally rare within EU-
centric scholarship, which is telling as it essentially reflects the discourse on China’s rise 
within the wider European policy community. In turn, this then mirrors the distinct policy 
discourses on China on the two sides of the Atlantic.   
 
Studies of the importance of perceptions in EU-China relations are scarce; through historical 
analysis Rupert Hodder (1999) argued that Europeans largely accepted China’s self-image and 
consequently the engagement policies largely deferred to this. Kay Möller (2002) presented a 
general overview of EU-China diplomatic relations and ‘mutual strategic perceptions’ 
although did not consider their impact on policy preferences. Gill and Wacker’s (2005) edited 
collection of short papers identified diverging perceptions between the US and EU on China’s 
rise and considered the arms embargo; however, there was no systematic analysis drawing 
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together the various contributions within. These contributions were not structured around 
FPA/EFP approaches, but rather more general studies of developments, thus provide useful 
information but leave room for further analytical development.   
 
There are few contributions on European perspectives of a ‘China threat’. Joachim Glaubitz 
(2004: 118) stated that “it goes without saying that in a strict military sense, Europe does not 
perceive a direct threat from China”. Glaubitz (2004) claimed that European governments 
were concerned about the potential for China to emerge as a hegemonic power in East Asia, 
although provided no supporting evidence. For Glaubitz (2004) the greatest source of concern 
in the EU is in the political dimension, particularly in relation to human rights issues but 
notably absent from his chapter was any consideration of an economic threat. In the same 
volume, Brian Hook (2004: 145-7) found that British ‘China threat’ perspectives were, up 
until 1997, confined to future treatment of Hong Kong. Emergent concerns thereafter were 
related to human rights and commercial concerns, but these were limited and not associated 
with China’s rise as a threat to the current international order. Jean-Pierre Cabestan (2011: 87) 
claimed that “the political elite, the think tanks, the media and the public opinion are all more 
critical of China since this country's authoritarian rise has become more obvious and 
dramatic”. Yet he conceded that these concerns were not focussed on China’s rise per se, but 
rather its authoritarian government (Cabestan, 2011: 89).  
 
The reality is that most scholarship on EU-China relations focusses on the EU-level policy to 
encapsulate the state of play in the development of broad relations, thus there is a wide 
consensus on the existence of EU foreign policies towards China. More often than not, there 
are nods to the continued importance of Member States, but space limitations and/or a pre-
determined scope curtail substantive analysis of their input. Over the past decade or so, 
scholars have increasingly adopted the EFP approach of treating the EU as an international 
actor (Griese, 2006; Callahan, 2007; Glen and Murgo, 2007; Geeraerts, 2011) and this has 
been particularly prevalent in studies of the strategic partnership (Casarini, 2006; Scott, D., 
2007; Smith, MH and Xie, 2010). The ‘Normative power Europe’ concept has been utilised by 
some scholars, even if they are somewhat critical of the effectiveness of the policies developed 
(Mattlin, 2012). Yet few of these approaches incorporate extensive decision-making analysis 
and consequently do not engage with questions regarding the importance of perceptions at this 
level. Cognitive FPA approaches have so far been essentially non-existent in the EU-China 
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literature, although the normative/civilian/ethical power Europe models have some parallels 
with societal FPA approaches.  
 
The increasing importance of the EU as an international actor has had an unintended side-
effect: Member State relations with China now receive less attention, with the notable 
exceptions of British (de Burgh, 2005; Eisel, 2007; Brown, K, 2011), French (Wellons, 1994, 
Wong 2006) and German relations with China (Möller, 1996, 1998) or combinations thereof 
(Weske, 2007), though these analyses inevitably reference the EU context. Yet the lack of 
extensive studies is somewhat surprising given the close political relationship between France 
and China (Wong, 2006: 59), and the tendency for the UK to prioritise “its bilateral 
relationship with China over European channels” (Fox and Godement, 2009: 25). This trend 
simply reflects the growing importance of the EU as a vehicle for Member States’ preferences 
towards China.  
 
Although the output of EU think-tanks is taken up in the next chapter, there is one standout 
contribution which deserves consideration here in part because it forms an important part of 
my analysis. This is John Fox and François Godement’s (2009) A Power Audit of EU-China 
Relations, from the European Council on Foreign Relations. This is uniquely interesting due to 
its categorisation of Member States’ China policies. Their central thesis was that the creation 
of an EU policy towards China has been complicated by the diverging approaches of the EU 
Member States in response to China’s rise. Consequently, they categorise the Member States 
into four groups based on their attitude: Assertive Industrialists, Ideological Free-Traders, 
Accommodating Mercantilists and European Followers (Fox and Godement, 2009: 4-7). The 
groups are of uneven sizes, differing influence within Europe and fluid rather than fixed. Fox 
and Godement’s (2009) categories essentially pinpoint the differentiations between Member 
States in terms of the interpretations of China’s rise which define their preferences for EU-
level policies, which make them useful in the context of my analysis. 
 
William Callahan’s (2007) examination of EU-China relations employed an analytical focus 
which shares similarities with that adopted here. His close reading of both EU and China 
policy documents led to an argument that the political narrative on the relationship was 
confined to “a specific narrow range of topics” (Callahan, 2007: 781). These are also, 
according to Callahan (2007: 790) aspirational in content rather than reflecting the current 
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state of relationships. Although Callahan incorporated consideration of the output of European 
think tanks, he did not relate his findings to the wider policy discourse on China in the EU and 
concentrated heavily on anti-American sentiments in the EU from 2003 onwards. This 
removes his analysis from the context of the EU’s discourse on China’s rise which I argue has 
been shaped by consistently positive interpretations over the timeframe of analysis. Roland 
Vogt (2009a: 62) briefly discussed “competing narratives” of China’s rise within the literature 
through a simple threat/opportunity dichotomy, rather than examining the presence of these 
views in policy discourse. These approaches are influenced by discourse-based FPA 
frameworks, but have not reconciled this with decision-making analysis, missing out on the 
intersection between the two. Thus, there is room for further study here.   
 
Recent contributions have provided expert analyses of a breadth of issues in the EU-China 
relationship, particularly David Kerr and Liu Fei’s (2007) The International Politics of EU 
China Relations and David Shambaugh et al’s (2008) China-Europe Relations: Perceptions, 
Policies and Prospects, both of which concluded by looking to the future direction of the 
bilateral relationships. Edited volumes from Ludlow (2007), Gaens et al (2009), Vogt (2009b) 
and Men and Balducci (2010) take different perspectives on the development of the strategic 
partnership and looked to future prospects in light of recent issues and events. There was little 
consideration of how the preference for a strategic partnership emerged in the first place. 
Given that these volumes all ponder future relations, there is a parallel with some of the US 
scholars identified above; although on the European side there is less concern about China’s 
potential to disrupt the current international order. These volumes add to collective 
knowledge, but leave open the door for further development of FPA/EFP approaches to the 
study the EU’s response to China’s rise.  
 
Van der Putten and Chu’s (2011a) China, Europe and International Security volume brought 
together European and Chinese scholars to understand the bilateral security relationship and its 
impact on global security. Ultimately, from the various analyses the editors concluded that 
while there were greater prospects for cooperation than conflict, the relationship had no 
“significant effect on international security” yet (van der Putten and Chu, 2011b: 198-200). 
The consensus appeared to be that the EU’s response to China’s rise was not driven by 
security concerns, but the book’s scope prevented the authors uncovering what the driving 
factors actually were. These works examined policy development and provide interesting 
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insights, but opted not to apply analytical frameworks to explore further the factors driving 
policy. Due to scope limitations, such volumes tend to steer clear of decision-making 
processes in any great detail, thus how policy discourse and specific preferences have 
developed are in turn not featured in their analyses.  
 
Others tend to focus on the historical development of EU-China relations, alongside the 
continued popularity of economic issues, particularly since this is one of the main areas for 
cooperation and conflict (see for instance, Heron, 2007; Leal-Arcas, 2009; Kong, 2012). For 
the most part, these forgo explicit analytical frameworks designed to illuminate factors that 
shape the EU’s foreign policies. Santos Neves and Bridges (2000a) brought together a number 
of scholars to consider relations with China and the two Special Administrative Regions from 
both Member State and EU-level perspectives. The conclusion drawn was that policies were 
primarily driven by economic interests, although the political dimension was particularly 
important for the likes of the UK (with its connection to Hong Kong) and was generally 
becoming more salient at the EU level (Santos Neves and Bridges, 2000b). A special edition 
of The China Quarterly in 2002 endeavoured to assess the development of the relationship 
since 1978, covering a broad range of issues amongst which economic relations (Algieri, 
2002) and human rights (Baker, 2002) stood out as the most important. Kay Möller (2002) 
scrutinised diplomatic relations and mutual strategic perceptions although took a different 
approach to the one presented here, leaving aside analysis of the factors which shaped these 
perceptions and their impact on policy preferences. In short, the contributions offer 
explanations of what happened, although leave open the opportunity for more research into the 
‘why’ behind these outcomes.  
 
The 2008 special issue of The Current Politics and Economics of Asia on EU-China relations 
provided yet more perspectives on recent developments. For example, Nicola Casarini (2008) 
surveyed the growing importance of EU-China relations for the region, while Benjamin Zyla 
(2008) examined the EU’s engagement of China since the end of the Cold War and Reuben 
Wong (2008) offered analysis of the development of common economic, diplomatic and 
human rights policies towards China. Across these two collections, lively and interesting 
debates on the state of relations were presented, though there was little consideration of the 
underlying factors which contributed to the way in which the EU has responded to China’s 
rise. The factors they identified as influential – economic interests, competition between 
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Member States, etc. – were not reconciled through a clear analytical framework. Again, there 
is space to build upon the existing literature here.   
 
May-Britt Stumbaum (2009) sought to address the deficiencies in other contributions by 
employing an EFP framework based on the assumption of rational actors seeking to maximise 
their preferences through particular structural constraints and institutional frameworks. Thus, 
the “outcome depends on the preferences of the actors and the institutions involved” 
(Stumbaum, 2009: 18). Stumbaum (2009: 216-7) found that business interests had the greatest 
impact on the Council’s decision-making process, followed by external actors whilst the 
national parliaments, media and public had much less impact. Nicola Casarini (2009) provided 
a more detailed analysis of the economic, technological and political dimensions of the 
evolving relationship. This represented another step forward in analytical approaches, with the 
argument that the relationship’s development has comprised “material (realist), idealist 
(liberal), and ideational (constructivist) elements” (Casarini, 2009: 8) consistent with what we 
see in most sets of bilateral relations in the international arena. Casarini’s (2009: 9) key insight 
was that the EU’s foreign policies under the rubric of ‘engagement’ are aimed at ensuring that 
“Beijing’s expectations concerning its economic development would be as positive as possible 
and the costs involved in engaging in an aggressive foreign policy prohibitively high”.  
 
However, I am less convinced that soft-balancing against the US was as prominent a factor in 
the development of the relationship as Casarini (2009: 192) suggested. Although perhaps a 
factor for some Member States in the logic of a strategic partnership at the time, I will argue in 
later chapters that the EU’s policy discourse on China has often developed absent of explicit 
consideration of the US, as highlighted by the arms embargo case. Casarini (2009: 18) 
explicitly excluded examination of “differences among various European actors” which, I 
think, is why we arrive at different conclusions on the motivations behind certain policies. The 
evolution of the EU-China relationship as a form of soft-balancing against the US has been 
explicitly addressed and rejected in the literature by Terry Narramore (2008) who discounted 
the idea of an emergent EU-China ‘axis’ on the basis of both sides largely accepting US 
preponderance.   
 
The range of analyses of EU responses to China’s rise is limited, in stark contrast to the US 
literature. This arguably reflects the fact that the issue is not as openly debated within the EU 
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and the general lack of divergent interpretations which stoke the arguments propounded by 
American policymakers and scholars. Jonathan Holslag (2006: 578) contended that the EU’s 
policies were driven by a desire to “mould China to its own perceived model”, but that this 
project had largely been “a failure”. However, Holslag’s (2006) aim was to examine the 
impact of policies, not the underlying motivations. Generally, analyses tend to be 
introspective, examining the limitations of the EU’s ability to engage with China, as 
highlighted by the likes of Glen and Murgo (2007) who argued that the EU’s approach has 
been guided by economic considerations. There is substantive work on the strategic 
partnership (e.g. Smith, MH and Xie, 2010), but most analytical contributions tend to be 
interested in the degree to whether this is truly strategic, rather than the larger issues of what it 
says about the EU’s response to the rise of China.  
 
Consideration of EU-China relations from mainstream IR theories remains limited; in terms of 
PTT-perspectives, I can only find one contribution which takes the EU seriously. The aversion 
to applying mainstream IR theories appears to stem from a view that these are fundamentally 
unsuitable to the case of the EU; since it is not a state, it is problematic to conceptualise within 
these state-centric frameworks. Yet it is not impossible: Hubert Zimmerman’s (2007; 2008) 
analyses of the EU’s negotiations on China’s accession to the WTO and the Doha Round 
apply realist concepts. However, Zimmerman’s work offers relatively restricted views of the 
EU’s external relations and gives only superficial insights into the decision-making process, 
which is arguably one reason why realism has been avoided by other scholars of EU-China 
relations who tend to engage more with FPA/EFP. Elsewhere, realism has been applied to the 
EU’s international presence more broadly; Barry Posen’s (2006) structural realist account of 
European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and Adrian Hyde-Price’s (2006; 2008) realist 
critiques of the ‘ethical power Europe’ and ‘normative power Europe’ concepts are prominent, 
but rare, examples.  
 
The starting assumption amongst realist scholars that states are the predominant actors in 
international relations and that without statehood the EU cannot have ‘real’ foreign policies 
limits its utility for those of us who contend otherwise. Others, such as Karen Smith (2005), 
are dissatisfied with the debates over what the EU ‘is’ and have argued that we should pay 
more attention to what it does in international relations. For Smith (2005: 81), the EU, as with 
other international actors, is situated “somewhere along a spectrum between two ideal-types of 
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civilian and military power”. There are many contributions to the literature which take 
seriously the idea of the EU as a unitary actor: Andrew Moravcsik (2009) labelled it a (quiet) 
superpower with both hard and soft capabilities. Others continue to dispute such 
characterisations, arguing that the EU should not be considered as such so long as Member 
States retain sovereignty over foreign and security policies (Foot, 2010: 212-3). However, as I 
show below, there are PTT scholars who now take the EU seriously as an actor in its own 
right. Here, I take the EU to be a unitary actor, subscribing to Bretherton and Vogler’s (2006: 
22) description of it as a “multifaceted actor”, as definitions based around types of ‘power’ are 
too restrictive. In this view, the Member States are effectively key ‘policymakers’ even though 
simultaneously retaining their own independent capacity for action on the global level. 
 
There has been a virtual absence of attempts to apply a PTT framework to EU-China relations. 
The one exception is Yeşilada et al’s (2006) consideration of potential implications of future 
EU enlargement and its impact on global power transitions; yet their analysis was preoccupied 
with the future rather than recent history. It would appear that power-transition theorists 
previously took a dim view of the EU’s impact on the international arena, with Organski and 
Tammen (1996: 341) stating that security questions were “beyond [Europeans’] abilities for 
the time being”. However, PTT’s scope was broadened in the 1990s to look beyond the 
dominant power and its closest competitor to include the power relations between other actors 
in the system (DiCicco and Levy, 1999: 691). PTT analyses have prioritised states as the key 
actors, but even this has been relaxed. Kugler et al’s (2004: 169) analysis of the impact of the 
war on Iraq for the international system treated the EU as a unitary actor, in line with 
“increasingly common practice… [a] united EU is accepted as one of the near absolutes today 
in world politics”. Thus whatever original theoretical barriers in PTT might have prevented 
consideration of EU-China relations have already been removed by the theory’s proponents.    
 
The literature on EU-China relations which advances arguments of the basis of rigorous 
analytical frameworks is still in development, with recent contributions – namely Stumbaum 
(2009) and Casarini (2009) – pointing the way ahead. FPA and EFP approaches, while 
increasing in number, seem to still be outweighed by more general overviews of the state of 
relations. Even the various, ever-popular models of the EU as an international actor have very 
rarely made their way into examinations of specific cases and virtually not at all in 
longitudinal studies. Within EFP, it is possible to conceptualise the EU as an international 
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actor more readily than classic FPA and yet studies adopting the former remain scarce. As 
Möller (2007: 181) commented, “explicit attempts to organize research in a theoretical 
framework remain the exception”; I intend this thesis to be one of the pieces of research going 
against the trend. By drawing on elements of Stumbaum and Casarini’s work, I contribute to 
efforts to present systematic analyses. It is possible that the continued uncertainty over what 
type of international actor the EU is will remain a key obstacle to the development of robust 
frameworks, but that is not to say that without resolution of this question we cannot move 
forward.  
 
1.5 The Arms Embargo Debate and US-EU-China Relations 
 
The Arms Embargo Debate 
 
The arms embargo debate has been referenced in most work on EU-China and EU-US 
literature from 2005 onwards. There have been a number of prescriptive arguments which 
encourage greater transatlantic dialogue on East Asia and for Europe to take a more proactive 
role in the region (e.g. van der Putten, 2009). In the academic literature on EU-China relations, 
there are often passing references to the debate with simplified evaluations of the outcome – 
the EU dropped the idea when the US objected. As I contend in Chapter Five, this position 
obscures the fact that US opposition was set out in 2004 and yet the EU almost arrived at 
consensus in 2005 even as US rhetoric intensified. Neither does it account for why the US and 
the EU ended up so far apart in terms of their preferences on a policy which they imposed at 
the same time for the same reasons. There are in fact only a few studies which have examined 
the arms embargo debate closely. For the most part, these are Euro-centric and tend to treat the 
US as an external actor impacting on the EU’s decision-making process, rather than 
concentrating on the transatlantic debate itself.  
 
Stumbaum’s (2009) case study of the arms embargo issue in her analysis of EU decision-
making towards China examined a wide range of government and societal actors, finding that 
external actors – namely the US and China – had a significant impact on the EU’s paralysis on 
the issue, with both attempting to pull the EU in different directions. Stumbaum (2009: 199-
200) argued that business interests were important in influencing the UK’s position; the 
European Parliament had only “symbolic influence” overall, while the media and public 
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opinion had virtually no impact. What Stumbaum did not investigate was how the policy 
discourse over China’s rise created a permissive environment for the EU to consider lifting the 
embargo in the first place. The focus on the EU’s internal decision-making also draws 
attention away from the transatlantic debate to some extent. Stumbaum did not link the EU’s 
consideration of the arms embargo into its wider response to China’s rise – this is to be 
expected given the main aims of Stumbaum’s project, but leaves room for further research.    
 
Nicola Casarini (2007) argued that the arms embargo’s relevance went beyond the EU-China 
relationship as it took on a transatlantic dimension and emerged as an issue relevant to the 
whole of East Asia. Although acknowledging that the EU and US have different views of 
China, Casarini generally concentrated on the strategic/security side rather than broader 
aspects of the respective relationships. Although the US’ opposition is considered, this was 
mostly attributed to regional security issues rather than considering how this related to the 
wider context of the US’ response to China’s rise. Casarini’s (2009) assessment essentially 
refined the arguments from his article, and while set up to examine the perspectives of the 
various sides in the debate was primarily Euro-centric and, in keeping with the theme of his 
book, focussed on the technical provisions which regulated EU arms sales to China. The 
analysis of the US’ position was relatively brief and, as with Stumbaum (2009), concentrated 
on the arguments put forward in opposition to the EU for the most part. For Casarini, the 
arguments boil down to regional security interests whereas I argue that the arms embargo case 
provides a window into the wider interpretations of China’s rise than has been realised in the 
literature.   
 
Elsewhere, the arms embargo case has been employed to provide insights into a variety of 
issues in EU foreign policy (EUFP) and relations with the wider world, highlighting that the 
issue is crucial not just in the context of EU-China or even EU-US-China relations, but relates 
to wider concepts of the EU’s identity, values and role in the world. Some have focussed on 
how the arms embargo issue presented (and continues to present) problems for the 
development of the EU as a security/strategic actor (Kreutz, 2004) or its strategic partnership 
with China (Men, 2007). Umbach (2004: 50) suggested that the EU needed to “establish clear 
rules and criteria for all future sales of military equipment and… the transfer of dual-use 
technologies” as well as a transatlantic strategy for dealing with “new and global security 
challenges”, preferably via dialogue mechanisms. Kayte Rath (2006) considered the impact of 
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the issue on the concept of the UK government’s ethical foreign policy. Pascal Vennesson 
(2007) argued that the proposal was intended to send a positive signal to China, but the 
symbolic significance for the US varied and raised concerns, although did not link their 
significance to the wider divergences in interpretations of China’s rise. Mykal (2009) 
suggested that unlike the US and Japan attempting to uphold unilateral world order, the EU’s 
proposal was part of a strategy to balance against this and develop a multilateral world order.   
 
Little academic analysis of the US’ role in the debate has been conducted to date, which I 
contend is a significant oversight given that the major debate was not within the EU but across 
the Atlantic. Some American scholars such as David Shambaugh (2005a) and Bates Gill 
(2010) have produced work which reveals more about the American perspective than their 
European counterparts, but do not go as far as to explain what caused divergence in policy 
preferences in the first instance, or why the US’ initial efforts to influence the EU’s 
preferences were unsuccessful. Another feature of their work is that there seems to be an 
implicit acceptance that the US was ‘in the right’. Indeed, in one discussion paper Shambaugh 
(2005a) explicitly argued for the US’ position. What I hope to present in this research is a 
more detached analysis of both sides. For a paper on US-China strategic considerations and 
the role of European soft power, Sebastian Bersick (2006) conducted interviews with some US 
policy officials in 2005 in which the issue came up, but there is not much detail on the 
motivational factors, just restatements of the US’ position.    
 
I contend that a systematic analysis of US preferences and how these were shaped by 
interpretations of China’s rise is necessary to produce a better understanding of what the arms 
embargo debate tells us about the US reaction to China’s rise. For instance, in an examination 
of Western policies on China’s human rights record, Randall Peerenboom (2005: 158) argued 
that the US’ response to the EU’s proposal was part of a wider containment strategy and that 
human rights was used as an “excuse” by some to justify the continuation of arms embargoes. 
Guo Xiaobin (2007: 191) depicted President Bush as “resigned” to the EU’s decision and it 
was Congress that was opposed. Ross et al (2010c: 288) concluded that “US security interests 
in East Asia required the European states to change their China policies” but did not explain 
why there was a transatlantic debate lasting over a year. In stark contrast to Mykal’s (2009) 
‘balancing’ claim (above), Zhu Feng (2008: 43) attributed EU “reluctance” to lift the arms 
embargo as evidence of bandwagoning with US hegemony and pressure from the latter 
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resulting in accommodation of its interests. This account completely disregarded the actual 
dynamics of the transatlantic debate in 2004-5. It is illogical in this specific case that the EU 
was simultaneously balancing against and bandwagoning with US hegemony
3
.   
 
Despite the various perspectives employed in the literature, there is a notable pattern that they 
have discussed the origins of the embargo policies with reference to the Tiananmen crackdown 
of 1989 and then taken 2003/4 as their starting point for the analysis of the debate itself. The 
arms embargo case offers a significant opportunity to understand the substantive similarities 
and differences between interpretations of China salient within the US and the EU and why 
these came to be. By exploring how the different domestic political discourses over China’s 
rise shaped preferences on the embargoes, I am able to make a contribution to the literature by 
exploring the case in a new light. The other main contribution is a more systematic exploration 




There are few studies of US-EU-China or even of US- and EU-China relations, which is 
perhaps surprising, since it has “emerged as one of the most important strategic trilateral 
relationships in the world” in the early twenty-first century (Gill, 2010: 259). The lack of such 
studies is arguably responsible for limitations in accounts of the arms embargo debate. Ross et 
al’s (2010a) edited volume presented wide-ranging analyses of important issues and dynamics 
within the relationships. The starting position was that the three powers were all interested in 
“preserving aspects of the contemporary international order” but observed that there was 
“simultaneously lack of consensus” on certain components of this (Ross et al, 2010b: 1).  
Within this volume, Foot (2010) argued that the US and EU differ in their approaches to China 
because they are unequal powers with different attitudes towards international relations. I 
contend that this is not the full story as it does not account for how behaviour has been shaped 
by the debates (or lack thereof) within the policymaking processes, thus does not encapsulate 
shifts in the individual behaviours of the two powers.    
                                                 
3
 In this sense, I am referring specifically to what the EU’s consideration of lifting the arms embargo entails, 
while acknowledging that in the broader context of EU-US relations, simultaneous balancing/bandwagoning is 
indeed possible. An interesting analysis of the EU’s management of US power by Michael H Smith (2005: 131) 
evinces a number of “co-existing tendencies”, including positive reactions to US demands (reflex) whilst 




Foot (2010: 212) also claimed that the US and EU hold “differing conceptions of world 
order”, which might cause problems for categorising both as status-quo oriented. Wong (2009) 
also indicated that the EU and China were both challengers to the US which was preoccupied 
with maintaining its position. Yet Foot (2010: 221) acknowledged that both want to see China 
integrate with the established order; what becomes clear is that it is not so much that they 
disagree on the international order itself, but how to behave within it. As the editors noted in 
their final analysis, the EU seeks to “work within the current international order to establish 
multilateral mechanisms that can enhance cooperation and integration” (Ross et al, 2010c: 
283). Their assessment did not cast China as a dissatisfied, revisionist power in the sense that 
its preference is for multipolarity over unipolarity but “no longer rejects the international 
order” (Ross et al, 2010c: 282, 286). The book argued that all three powers will be central to 
the future of international order, but since it was not the intention to systematically compare 
the evolution of US- and EU-China relations, it leaves a gap in our knowledge over how the 
established powers have responded to China’s rise.  
 
David Shambaugh’s (2002) short paper on US and EU approaches to China largely 
concentrated on identifying points of divergence and convergence in policies and objectives, 
finding more of the latter. Shambaugh (2002: 1) stated that some of the differences were 
“simply reflective of the history, geography, and strategic context that shape the respective 
approaches and policies”. I do not disagree, but would add that how these play out in policy 
discourse is the missing aspect of Shambaugh’s (2002) summary. Following a conference on 
US and EU approaches to China, Shambaugh and Wacker (2008) produced an edited volume 
of the various contributions to consider how the two sides can advance common agendas. 
While the various chapters presented considerable insights into specific issues, there was no 
overarching theoretical framework thus no clear picture emerged as to the factors which 
contributed to the US and EU responses to the rise of China. Some of the authors touched 
upon the importance of policy discourse within the US and the EU, but this was not rigorously 
scrutinised. A chapter by Wong (2009) gave a general overview of European and American 
perspectives on China, but presented the analysis as though there was just one view in each 




Contributions to this subfield of the literature have often appeared in journal articles, although 
none have yet addressed the questions this research asks. Bruce Weinrod (2006: 17) 
acknowledged “a variety of historical, cultural, geopolitical and economic reasons” shaped 
approaches to China but concentrated on security issues, attributing behaviour to differing 
levels of regional security involvement and concluded with a set of policy recommendations. 
The article (by necessity) skimmed over many important developments and provided no clear 
answer as to why the divergence between the US and the EU on security issues in relation to 
China had gone unnoticed (examined in Chapter Five). Griffin and Pantucci (2007) focussed 
on the transatlantic tensions in the wake of the arms embargo debate but did not analyse their 
origins in depth, instead concentrated on ways to ameliorate them.  Elsewhere, they tend to 
pop up as single chapters within edited volumes (e.g. Chu and Chen, 2011), precluding 
systematic analyses of the driving forces behind their policies. Although I do not analyse a 
‘triadic’ relationship between these actors or provide a comprehensive account of the differing 
relationships, my approach does provide insights into why patterns of behaviour in their 
respective foreign policies have varied with greater clarity than elsewhere in the literature.     
 
There is substantive scope for this thesis to make a contribution to this area of study by 
presenting a systematic analysis of how interpretations of China’s rise within the US and EU 
have evolved and how this impacts upon policy discourse and the preferences which 
policymakers advance in the decision-making process. The arms embargo case is the perfect 
test for this approach, given that both the US and EU initially imposed similar policies at the 
same time for the same reason, but their positions diverged over time. Although many have 
looked at US- and EU-China relations separately, so far there has been little research into their 
responses to China’s rise in a single project via FPA or EFP. Further, existing studies have not 
featured substantive analysis of perceptions/interpretations, despite the disparities evident 
through everyday discourse. My arguments open up a new front in the study of these relations 
as well as the arms embargo case by utilising an innovative framework which tackles issues 
previously not addressed in the literature.  
 
1.6 Perceptions and Policymaking 
 
As I established in the Introduction, I investigate the responses of the established powers to 
China’s rise by engaging in Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA). Christopher Hill (2003: xix) 
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described the FPA project as “an attempt… to draw out deeper meanings than appear on the 
surface, and to understand action in terms of the way actors constantly redefine themselves 
through interaction with others”. FPA is a common approach in studies of US- and EU-China 
relations (e.g. Garrisson, 2005 and Stumbaum, 2009 above). I contribute to this body of 
research, but rather than focus on one set of bilateral relations, I consider both. My approach 
has been influenced by Valerie Hudson’s (2005: 2) assertion that “human decision makers 
acting singly and in groups are the ground of all that happens in international relations” and 
that FPA has the capacity to reconnect IR with this ground. I also identify FPA’s stated need 
for actor-centricity; that is, the assumption that policymakers cannot be treated as 
“interchangeable generic rational utility maximizers… equivalent to the states that they 
[serve]” (Hudson, 2007: 6). The tendency to rely on structural, state-centric models – such as 
PTT – for answers has allowed the logic of these to pervade how we think about and discuss 
such issues, producing deficient explanations.  
 
The core assertion of FPA is that examining foreign policy at the decision-making level is 
vital to generating explanations of behaviour at the international level. This analysis attempts 
to move beyond the restrictions of concentrating on the reactive element of foreign policy in 
order to look at how policy is influenced by factors endogenous to the decision-making 
process at specific instances but also across a longer period of time. To develop my approach, 
I draw on the strengths of various strands of FPA scholarship, incorporating elements of 
‘classic’ decision-making analysis and European Foreign Policy (EFP) which developed 
distinct analytical approaches and tools to gain better understanding of the EU’s unique 
characteristics.  
 
This thesis concentrates on how the competing interpretations of China’s rise held by 
policymakers shape the preferences which determine policy responses. The contribution which 
bears greatest relation to this research is David Shambaugh’s (2005b) article which addressed 
the concept of the ‘strategic triangle’ of US-EU-China relations – as noted above, one of the 
few studies in this area. Shambaugh (2005b: 8) argued that the arms embargo debate had 
revealed the “significantly different prisms through which Europe and the United States view 
China’s rise” and addressed how these had strained relations within the ‘triangle’. However, 
the analysis of these ‘prisms’ was brief – due to the publication format – and presented them 
as though there are single perspectives for each of the US and the EU, rather than considering 
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competing interpretations within these polities. I go further in terms of the depth of 
understanding by examining competing perspectives within the two polities to understand how 
the discursive elements shape the decision-making process. Nevertheless, Shambaugh’s article 
highlighted the utility of understanding how different interpretations of China’s rise led to 
divergent policy preferences between the two sides. Given the insights from this relatively 
brief article, it is somewhat surprising that no-one, including Shambaugh himself, has applied 
a similar approach in a larger research project. 
 
A key text which informed the analysis was Jean Garrison’s (2005) Making China Policy: 
From Nixon to GW Bush, which was included in the summary of US-China relations literature 
above and represents a ‘classic’ FPA approach. Garrison’s (2005) analysis attempted a 
comprehensive analysis of issues and events over the time period, while here only certain 
events are selected. Although as stated above, I do not contradict Garrison’s findings, the 
differences lie in our analytical approaches and what we are trying to explain. I concentrate on 
understanding how competing interpretations of China’s rise influenced policy responses, 
whereas Garrison (2005) concentrated on building an explanation of the constraints on actors 
produced by the decision-making processes. Nevertheless, I consider my analysis to reinforce 
some of Garrison’s (2005) arguments but also expand upon them to examine broader 
questions about the response of the established power to the rise of a potential challenger.    
 
On the EU side, Stumbaum (2009, mentioned above) studied decision-making in the EU’s 
policies towards China, including the arms embargo. Stumbaum focussed on determining what 
led to decisions and ‘non-decisions’ in policymaking, but does not engage with wider 
questions about how the EU is responding to the rise of China in the international arena. 
Stumbaum (2009) followed Brian White’s (2001) model of tracing the development of EU 
foreign policies through distinct foreign policy subsystems, thus revealing their utility as a 
guide to understanding whose preferences mattered in particular cases. This reinforces the 
applicability of this approach for examining EU foreign policymaking towards China; I also 
go on to analyse US foreign policy via its subsystems. I also differ from Stumbaum by 
developing my analysis around policy discourse over China’s rise amongst key policymakers 
rather than a wider range of actors within the EU. This narrower focus permits closer analysis 




The tradition of examining perceptions and interpretations is well established in the IR and 
FPA literature. Robert Jervis’ (1976) seminal Perceptions and Misperceptions in International 
Politics essentially laid the groundwork for this area of research. Jervis’ (1976: 14-5) central 
argument was that the differences in policy preferences can be traced to the differences in 
perceptions of ‘reality’ held by decision-makers; an argument which is echoed within this 
research although I do not attempt to determine what constitutes the ‘true reality’ of China’s 
rise. The assumption here is that how the external environment is perceived is always 
subjective and dependent on the individual actor; for as Jervis notes, “normal human 
behaviour often does not fit even a loose definition of reality” (Jervis, 1976: 24). Even realists 
such as Stephen Walt (1987) and Randall Schweller (2006) have acknowledged the 
importance of perceptions in their work, although they continue to prioritise power-based 
explanations of international relations. Herrmann (1986: 843) defined perceptions as 
interpretations of external reality which guide the thoughts and actions of individuals within 
foreign policymaking structures; following this, I use the terms ‘perception’ and 
‘interpretation’ interchangeably as they are generally taken in FPA to be equivalent: Voss and 
Dorsey (1993: 8) argued that “perception and interpretation are interwoven processes”.  
 
Perceptions have often been considered within cognitive FPA approaches, where individual 
policymakers’ views of the world are taken to be of crucial importance to explaining 
decisions. This has been particularly prominent within the development of political 
psychology FPA (e.g., Herrmann, 1986, 1988a, 1988b; Hermann and Hermann, 1989; 
Vertzberger, 1990; Voss and Dorsey, 1993) and continues in more recent work (Castano et al, 
2003; Duelfer and Dyson, 2011). This approach incorporates insights from the field of 
psychology and looks not only at individual decision-makers but also at group decision-
making dynamics (Hudson, 2007: 22-3). Besides cognitive FPA models, others have 
attempted to incorporate perceptions into approaches which could enable explanation of 
foreign policy behaviour across different states, such as Walter Carlsnaes’ (1987) model. 
Elsewhere, studies of how decision-makers respond to ‘threats’ in the international arena have 
commonly focussed on the importance of perceptions (Meyer and Miskimmon, 2009: 625). 
Works which incorporate perceptions into more general assessments of relations between 
international actors (e.g. Fernández Sola and Smith, MH, 2009) have also appeared, moving 
towards reconciliation between FPA and mainstream IR approaches. However, as noted 
above, there is a gap in the literature on both US- and EU-China relations to be filled by 
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developing an in-depth analysis of the competing interpretations of China’s rise and how these 
have shaped responses. 
  
Moving beyond state-centric analyses of foreign policymaking, I examine how policymakers’ 
preferences are shaped by the various interpretations of China’s rise salient within discourse 
during each case. Not all policymakers are involved in every instance of decision-making, thus 
I examine the process within policy subsystems to concentrate on those actors whose 
preferences mattered. Subsystems are “made up of those institutions and actors that are 
directly involved in the policymaking process in a specialized policy area” (Jenkins-Smith et 
al, 1991: 852). Hence, subsystems are effectively ‘shortcuts’ to identifying the relevant 
processes and actors, meaning that we can identify whose preferences mattered most. The 
subsystem concept emerged in US public policy scholarship (Jenkins-Smith et al, 1991; 
Baumgartner and Jones, 1991). However, this has not translated into foreign policy studies, 
arguably because classic FPA – developed in and for the US – is still widely considered as 
applicable. I would not disagree that it is applicable to the US, but it is not for the EU. To 
generate explanations which are comparable across the two, we need a single approach.  
 
EFP is drawn into the analysis here, as scholars working in this field (e.g. White, 2001; 
Stumbaum, 2009) have utilised the concept of policy subsystems while treating the EU as an 
international actor in its own right, although the idea has been under-utilised in the literature to 
date. This emerged as a consequence of dissatisfaction with ‘traditional’ FPA approaches 
which, despite their agent-centric analyses, were tied to the concept of foreign policy as the 
product of the state (see White, 2001: 32). Subsystems have been incorporated into studies of 
EFP; the existence of an EUFP is commonly accepted to be beyond doubt, but since the EU 
itself is not a state, a new set of analytical tools are required if understandings are to be 
generated. As Carlsnaes (2006: 546) noted, “to the extent that the nature of the EU remains 
conceptually contested, the nature of its foreign policy system – however conceived – will also 
remain an issue of conceptual contention”.  
 
I identify with White (2001) and Stumbaum’s (2009) treatment of foreign policies as the 
product of specific subsystems rather than of the state/polity as a whole. The use of 
subsystems in the study of EUFP has been relatively rare, considering the potential analytical 
leverage. To my knowledge, only Stumbaum (2009) has employed them to study EU-China 
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relations, thus my research provides further support for the utility of subsystems and goes a 
step further by demonstrating that they can be employed in significantly different polities – the 
US as the archetypal state actor and the EU as a unique entity. Perceptions/interpretations have 
been examined in certain parts of the literature, yet commonly without a supporting analytical 
framework. By drawing on the various strands of FPA and EFP literature – particularly those 
which incorporate perceptions in the analysis – I offer an explanation of responses to China’s 
rise which have generally been. Following Hudson’s (2005) lead, the intention is to reconnect 




The outline of PTT sets the stage for understanding how it has informed perceptions of 
China’s rise. Although threat interpretations have increased in salience – mostly in the US – 
there is little evidence to suggest that such logic shapes actual policies. PTT creates a 
framework through which China’s rise can – and, according to its proponents, should – be 
interpreted, as well as expectations for how the dominant powers will respond. The 
implications of China’s rise are contested within the literature, much as they are within policy 
discourse. The US-China literature has predominantly focussed on the strategic competition 
between the two whilst PTT has been employed directly by some, although making little 
headway in terms of developing persuasive explanations for behaviour. No study tackling PTT 
examined how factors at the decision-making level affected behaviour. My approach draws on 
decision-making FPA scholarship and the literature on perceptions of China while retaining a 
focus on the relationship at the international level. Thus, I combine the strengths and insights 
from different branches of existing work to move the analysis of US-China relations forward, 
facilitating a contribution to ongoing debates over the importance of perceptions in foreign 
policy, both at the decision-making and international levels. 
 
The economic relationship and, more recently, the nascent strategic partnership dominate the 
EU-China literature, with few scholars utilising EFP/FPA approaches to explore the impact of 
perceptions on the response to China’s rise. Accounts of relations are largely based around 
conceptualisations of power, but there is still no consensus on how China’s rise should be 
analysed or the factors driving the EU’s response. Further, there is a lack of reflection on how 
interpretations of China have contributed to policy debates and subsequently shaped 
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preferences at key junctures in the relationship. I demonstrate the utility of my analytical 
approach for the explanation of EU-China relations and address these gaps, presenting a new, 
systematic account for what has driven the EU’s decision-making. I side with the EFP 
approach of treating the EU as an international actor in its own right, adding to analyses of EU 
foreign policymaking in the context of its relationship with China.  
 
I engage the ongoing debate over the arms embargo case by shifting perspective from what 
has come before. The Euro-centric focus of the existing literature leaves room for gaining 
further insight into what the debate tells us about the divergence in American and European 
interpretations of China’s rise. In Chapter Five, I argue that it is necessary to link in the 
developments of the interpretations of China’s rise within both the US and EU in the 
intervening fourteen years to fully understand why their preferences diverged and why the 
debate lasted well over a year. The US-EU-China literature is still thin on the ground, with 
only small steps towards analytical frameworks suitable for assessing the development of 






















This chapter queries which interpretations of China’s rise featured in the policy discourse of 
the US and the EU from 1989 to 2009. What ‘China’s rise’ signifies varies amongst 
policymakers and shifts over time, in policy discourse it has become a contested notion with 
significant impact on the evolution of the US and EU’s responses. The review of the 
perceptions literature in the previous chapter illustrated that although their importance has 
been acknowledged, their potential analytical leverage has not been fully recognised in studies 
of responses to China’s rise. Generalised ‘threat’ versus ‘non-threat’ characterisations are 
oversimplified as they do not specify what aspects of China’s rise are threatening (or not).  
 
Through examination of patterns within the discourses in both the US and EU, I isolate six 
overarching interpretations relating to specific areas of China’s rise and its impact. Perceptions 
of China in military (threat versus non-threat), economic (threat versus opportunity), 
normative (threat) and political (opportunity) terms have attracted the most attention in the 
policy discourse and academic literature, warranting consideration here. These are analytically 
useful as they contextualise the arguments within the discourse around key junctures in the 
US- and EU-China relationships and indicate which factors shaped decision-makers’ 
preferences. Incorporating evidence from the debates in the policy community, I show that 
there are real differences of opinion over China’s rise, influencing the responses of the two 
established powers since the end of the Cold War. These insights ‘ready the ground’ for the 
analysis in the subsequent empirical chapters by unpacking the qualities of the different 
interpretations of China that are identified in the analysis of US and EU policy discourse.    
 
The argument that there are various interpretations of the data relating to China’s rise poses a 
problem for a key power-transition theory (PTT) assumption that policymakers operate in 
environments of complete information and can be expected to act on the basis of a clear, 
single understanding of the external situation. I argue that attempting to establish an 
‘objective’ view of the ‘reality’ of China’s rise is redundant as it is clear that policymakers 
react to how they perceive their external environment. Perceptions are the basis of their 
interaction with the external environment and their actions in response change that 
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environment. As such, I do not use the term ‘misperception’, as the perception is correct to 
those who hold it. PTT has scope for exploring differences at the decision-making level. 
Policymakers utilise evidence in different ways to support their arguments and/or discredit 
rival interpretations. The salience of particular interpretations within discourse varies over 
time. Threat perspectives have been virtually absent from EU discourse, thus the reader will 
note that certain sections are predominantly US-centric. There are some nuances within the 
interpretation categories: for instance, although actors in both the US and EU promulgate 
views of China as a political opportunity, these interpretations are not identical. This 
necessitates discussion of the major discrepancies. Although I expand upon this in later 
chapters, it is worth pointing out that interpretations are not necessarily mutually exclusive: for 
instance, China might be seen as an economic opportunity but also a military threat. When it 
comes to the analysis of how they shaped preferences we need to identify which were 
dominant at that time to understand their impact upon the response.  
 
The following sections take each interpretation and outline its main precepts, bringing in data 
from a variety of sources
1
 to illustrate how these interpretations are justified by their 
proponents. Policymakers and commentators often utilise information selectively and 
concentrate on different measures to suit their purposes. The analysis draws in indicators of 
military and economic power, China’s human rights record and considers certain facets of its 
foreign policy behaviour. Sections 2.2 to 2.4 examine the ‘threat’ perspectives, divided into 
military, economic and normative categories. Sections 2.5 through 2.7 examine military ‘non-
threat’, economic and political opportunity categories. The final section provides a summary 
of the chapter’s main findings. We can see that the logic of PTT has influenced the reasoning 
behind American threat perspectives, particularly in relation to military issues. This tendency 
has been overlooked by much of the literature examining responses to China’s rise. This has 
not occurred in the EU; its policymaking community not invoked power-transition concepts, 




                                                 
1
 See methodology note in Appendix. 
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2.2 Military Threat 
 
Interpretations of China as a military threat commonly evince power-transition logic. This can 
be at either the regional or global level; more commonly, the immediate concern relates to the 
former, yet there are those who suggest that China’s trajectory will make it a global military 
threat and on the fringes there appear to be a few who believe it already is. Linkages are made 
between the two within the discourse; those who perceive China as a growing threat in the 
East Asia region have inferred that it intends to (and will) pose a challenge in the wider 
international system. However, some contend that the threat will probably remain confined to 
the East Asian region, signalling varied interpretations of the significance of China’s military 
rise. These ‘levels’ signify differences in the extent of concern harboured by actors, as 
although the source of the threat is the same – China’s expanding military capabilities – the 
implications inferred from this development will differ. There is also a difference between 
immediate and future threat perceptions: some are more concerned with what China’s power 
means at present, versus those who are concerned about what it will do when it becomes even 
more powerful. The latter view has still often created preferences for acting in the present to 
prevent China from achieving its threat potential.    
 
Connections are often made between China’s possible future intentions and military spending 
patterns and the acquisition of certain capabilities. William Cohen (2007: 683) argued that 
China was destined to behave as other emerging powers had in the past; specifically, China 
will “resume its place as East Asia’s hegemonic power and extend its influence wherever it 
can in the rest of the world”. Hard power alone is insufficient to confer ‘great power’ status 
(Kim, 1998: 6) but some assume that China is boosting its military capability so that it may 
emerge as a great power regionally, and eventually globally, that would be capable of 
confronting the US. In this sense, China’s rise is understood as inherently threatening. Further, 
aspects of China’s foreign policy have led some to conclude it holds revisionist, if not outright 
hostile, intentions prompting arguments that China must be contained and that the US needs to 
maintain its military advantage.  
 
Studies of China’s rise proliferated in the early 1990s, prompting debates between whether it 
was likely to increase tensions or even conflict (Roy, 1996). Concerns were compounded by 
the strategic dynamics of East Asia which Aaron Friedberg (1993/94) described as “ripe for 
63 
 
rivalry”. China’s post-Cold War foreign policy towards other Asian states has to some extent 
been guided by a desire to prevent the formation of an alliance which may threaten its interests 
(Breslin, 2009: 819). The US’ regional presence and links with Japan, South Korea and 
Taiwan has fostered wariness amongst Chinese policymakers, who at times view the US as 
attempting to contain China’s rise (Yong, 2001: 353). This has perpetuated something of a 
vicious circle, whereby concerns about US regional presence are voiced some sections of 
China’s policy community; this then reinforces interpretations amongst some in the US that 
China ultimately seeks regional – and possibly global – hegemony. China’s policies and 
actions toward Taiwan have done nothing to dispel ‘China threat’ interpretations, which the 
regime has consistently attempted to counter since the mid-1990s (Yong, 2006: 186). Such 
perspectives are damaging to China’s attempts to gain acceptance in the international arena, 
yet the domestic importance of Taiwan has resulted in China reiterating its resolve to use force 
if necessary to prevent Taiwan declaring independence (Goldstein, 2007: 671). 
 
PTT logic has shaped interpretations of China’s rise held by policymakers, academics, 
analysts, and the media. The range of materials on China’s rise is effectively immeasurable in 
terms of quantity; however a comprehensive study as well as being impractical is unnecessary. 
It is enough to show that there are prominent accounts which have evinced interpretations of 
China as a military threat. This encapsulates the concept of China as a military threat, but is 
more precise as it conceptualises the level at which China constitutes a threat. Public opinion 
data shows that concerns over China’s rise as a military power are not just confined to the US. 
The Pew Research Global Attitudes Project
2
 revealed that on the possibility of China 
becoming more militarily powerful than the US, most respondents thought this would be a 
negative development (Figure 2.1). In the case of the European countries, this is intriguing as 
military threat interpretations have not gained traction within EU-level policy discourse.   
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 Publicly available data on questions relating to opinions on China is only available from 2005 onwards. Further, 




The policy discourse in the US is littered with examples of interpretations of China posing a 
military threat, based on the expectation that its rise will bring it into direct confrontation with 
the dominant power. Since the mid-1990s, media and public commentators have propagated 
such threat perspectives; Charles Krauthammer’s essay ‘Why We Must Contain China’ in 
Time magazine is a case in point and was widely referenced in China debates thereafter. 
Krauthammer’s (1995) arguments of a growing China threat invoked power-transition logic, 
claiming it was “an old-style dictatorship, not on a messianic mission, just out for power”, 
comparing it to “late 19th century Germany, a country growing too big and too strong for the 
continent it finds itself on”. Pointing to the lessons of history of rising powers ending in world 
wars, Krauthammer (1995) warned that “we cannot let that happen with the emerging giant of 
the 21
st
 century” and argued for containment strategy. 
 
This article was followed by books which expounded threat perspectives by utilising power-
transition concepts. Gary Schmitt (2009: ix) of the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) noted 
that “history suggests rapidly rising powers often bring uncertainty, instability and competition 
with them as they begin to assert themselves on the international scene”, which has 
underpinned the concerns over China’s rise. Bernstein and Munro’s (1997: 24-6) The Coming 
Conflict with China flagged China’s expanding military capabilities as indicative of aggressive 
intentions both regionally and globally. They argued that American policy, previously mixed 
and ambiguous, should be oriented to contain China’s rise (Bernstein and Munro, 1997: 31). 
Edward Timperlake and William Triplett (1998: 1) accused the Clinton administration of 
turning “a deliberate blind eye to… threats to our national security” to gain campaign 
contributions from China. In their follow-up work, Red Dragon Rising: Communist China’s 
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Military Threat to America, they critiqued the administration’s policies and warned that the 
“democratic countries are about to be unpleasantly surprised by the emergence of a hostile, 
expansionist, nondemocratic superpower armed with the most modern weapons… and it will 
be our fault” (Timperlake and Triplett, 1999: 12).  
 
Washington Times writer Bill Gertz’s (2002:2) book The China Threat described a new Cold 
War waged by China and insisted that the US needed to “maintain and build up its military 
power” to counter the ever-increasing threat, pointing to the success of such a strategy in the 
case of the USSR. Gertz (2002: 199) claimed that China sought to undermine the US “around 
the world”, establish itself as the “dominant international political and military power”; this 
threat was so serious that it risked the US’ “very national existence”. Peter Navarro (2008: xv) 
contended that China’s “extremely rapid and often chaotic industrialization” placed it “on a 
collision course with the rest of the world”. Navarro (2008) argued that the US must confront 
China’s attempt to challenge the status quo and gain world dominance. China’s hostile 
intentions, Navarro (2008: 149-50) claimed, were evident from its massive military-build up.  
Navarro and Autry (2011: 1) claimed ‘death by China’ was a “very real risk… as the world’s 
most populous nation and soon-to-be largest economy is rapidly turning into the planet’s most 
efficient assassin”. Their arguments covered imports of unsafe toys to developing capabilities 
to “drop virtually untrackable nuclear bombs from space” (Navarro and Autry, 2011: 1, 6). 
The authors associated China’s development of a blue-water navy with hostile intentions 
(Navarro and Autry, 2011: 111-2) and repeatedly warned that China’s rise comes at the 
expense of the US and more needed to be done to counter the growing threat.  
 
Constantine Menges (2005: xvi) of the Hudson Institute claimed that “[a]n increasingly 
assertive and wealthy Communist regime in China intends to dominate the nine-tenths of Asia 
Beijing has historically claimed as its sphere of influence, then use that as a springboard to 
global dominance”. Menges (2005: xxi) cautioned that “[h]istory suggests that a nuclear-
armed Communist regime in China is likely to be more aggressive and assertive as its armed 
might grows to match its ever increasing economic strength”. Menges (2005: 472-3) was 
optimistic that the US could remain preponderant through stringent restrictions on the volume 
of Chinese imports, the development of a missile defence system and financial assistance for 
pro-democracy groups. Harsh Pant (2011:2) asserted that China has engaged in expansionist 
behaviour and harboured revisionist intentions. Pant (2011: 2-3) claimed that “all great powers 
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seek hegemony and China is no different”, and since US policymakers remain committed to 
retaining primacy “will do their best to prevent the emergence of China as a great power”. 
 
Under PTT, the expansion of the rising power’s military is considered indicative of preparing 
for the (effectively inevitable) conflict with the status quo power (Lemke and Werner, 1996). 
Accounts emphasising China’s threat potential often focussed on spending trends, acquisition 
of power-projection capabilities, and China’s lack of transparency over what it has, how much 
it spending, and why it is doing so. At the publication of the DoD’s 2005 China military power 
report, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld asked “since no nation threatens China, one must 
wonder: Why this growing investment? Why these continuing large and expanding arms 
purchases? Why these continuing robust deployments?” (cited by Gertz, 2005a). Rumsfeld’s 
questions reflect concerns that China’s military buildup is designed to allow it to confront the 
US. Representative Randy Forbes
3
 (2008) has argued that cases of Chinese espionage would 
not only allow China to “be an equal” to the US, “but also to possess a dangerous set of tools 
that – given the right circumstances – pose a significant threat”. Forbes cited budget increases, 
cyber warfare and blue-water navy as reasons for reassessments of policy.   
 
 Capabilities and spending are two crucial components for determining the relative power 
distribution. While expenditure is a measure of input, its trends can signify shifts in priorities 
and capabilities (Sköns and Stålenheim 2008: 242). Military expenditure can “reveal much 
about a country’s strategic intentions and future military plans”, thus serving “as a gauge of a 
nation’s defence commitment and resolve, or its potential to threaten others” (Bitzinger, 2003: 
164). Despite China’s relatively low starting-point, spending has been a key area of concern 
due to the pattern of double-digit increases year-on-year. It is widely accepted that China 
consistently publishes figures which fall well short of the true total which creates concern on 
the basis that a benign power would have no need for secrecy – thereby fuelling ‘uncertainty 
of intentions’. China’s official figures routinely omit “defence investment, weapon and 
equipment production or funds for weapons purchased abroad” (Stålenheim et al, 2006: 310-
311) which leaves open the possibility of considerable variations in estimates.  
 





Figure 2.2 compares China’s official budget releases with the Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute’s (SIPRI) estimates, and Figure 2.3 is taken from the US Department of 
Defense’s (2009) China military power report. These reveal significant discrepancies between 
China’s declared spending and third-party estimates. Thus the rapid increases in spending and 
the high-end estimates have contributed to a growing concern that China presents a military 
threat to the US. For instance, following China’s 2007 military budget announcement and in 
light of its anti-satellite missile test in January that year, Tkacik (2007a) claimed that its 
intention was “to challenge the US as a military superpower” and questioned the purpose 
behind “assembling a military machine worthy of a superpower other than to have the strength 
to challenge the United States’ strategic position in Asia”.     
 
In relation to capabilities, US commentators emphasise China’s capabilities – current and in 
development – with a predisposition to interpret this as directed at them. The US’ 2009 report 
drew attention to the modernisation of nuclear strike capabilities with the introduction of 
mobile land-based intercontinental and submarine-launched ballistic missiles capable of 
reaching the US (DoD, 2009: vii). The report also noted China’s increasing focus on 
developing “electronic warfare, computer network operations, and kinetic strikes [that] disrupt 
battlefield network information systems” to “support… warfighting and power projection 
capabilities” (DoD, 2009: 14). While the US’ strategic forces vastly outnumber China’s, the 
shift since 2000 from a vulnerable strategic force to a “more survivable and flexible strategic 
nuclear force” has produced a “credible sea-based deterrent” and enhances China’s capacity to 












Even if China is not nearing parity with the US, certain developments flagged by threat-
perspective proponents clearly indicate that there is substantive concern about China’s 
capabilities and what these mean for its future intentions. Richard Fisher of the International 
Assessment and Strategy Center stated that the “post-Cold War peace is over… we are now in 
an arms race with a new superpower whose goal is contain and overtake” the US (cited by 
Gertz, 2005b). China’s ability to implement asymmetrical warfare tactics was highlighted in 
January 2007 with its launch of an anti-satellite missile (ASAT)
4. China’s development of 
such capabilities and tactics fuelled questions over its intentions in the US, as it is the only 
realistic target of these developments.  
 
Prospects for a Chinese blue-water navy are also highlighted, as this would allow the PLA 
Navy (PLAN) to operate well beyond China’s shores, creating the potential for offensive 
operations. PLA and PLAN doctrines have been constructed around hypothetical conflict with 
the US, with emphasis on asymmetric tactics that would be necessary to offset technological 
                                                 
4
 The US’ response is examined in Chapter Three. 
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superiority (Goldstein and Murray, 2004: 187-188). This in itself has been sufficient to fuel 
threat-perspectives within the US. Although the PLAN lacks an aircraft carrier – generally 
considered a mainstay of power projection (You and You, 1991: 145) – China’s military and 
political leaders have held extensive discussions over the need for such a capability, fuelling 
much speculation among observers (Storey and You, 2004: 125-126). China had already 
purchased one ship which could be refurbished (DoD, 2009: 40)
5
 and several out-of-
commission carriers to be examined by naval engineers to develop understanding of their 
construction, possibly to facilitate production of its own ‘blueprint’ (Storey and You, 2004: 
128). Acquisition of – even plans to acquire – such capabilities raised concerns amongst some 
in the US, since an aircraft carrier is arguably surplus to defensive requirements or the 
protection of shipping lanes (Goldstein, 2007: 652).  
 
US analyses of China’s military clearly indicate persistent concern that China is developing 
capabilities specifically designed to enable it to fight the US, fuelling the ‘threat’ narrative. I 
could find no evidence of military threat perspectives in the work of major think tanks or 
European-based analysts that suggest China’s rise should be interpreted in such a way. Even 
some European books with seemingly provocative titles – e.g. James Kynge’s (2006) When 
China Shakes the World – contain little evidence of threat interpretations. To the extent that 
China’s regional or global military threats ever come up in media reports in the UK or France6 
the general pattern was for discussion of threats perceived by the US (and occasionally other 
Asian states such as Japan), rather than indicating that there was a threat perception within the 
EU. As with the US, the discourse within the decision-making environment in the EU is 
effectively a microcosm of the wider public policy discourse. 
 
Considerable interest in China’s military expansion has emerged in policy discourse, depicting 
spending patterns and capability procurement as inherently directed at the US and its interests 
in the region and globally. Moreover, these interpretations commonly articulate such 
developments in terms of power-transition logic, whereby the purpose behind the development 
is to challenge the US’ dominance regionally and ultimately globally. Combined with 
pessimistic interpretations over China’s intentions (although some claim ‘uncertainty’ or 
                                                 
5
 In 2011 – two years after the timeframe of analysis’ cut-off date – China did indeed initiate tests with this ship. 
It will take some time (measured in years) before the PLAN is able to fully integrate this with its existing forces.  
6
 The two Member States whose media reports I use throughout the thesis.  
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‘realistic’), the evidence can be harnessed to support such arguments. As subsequent chapters 
show, this interpretation is a perennial feature of US policy discourse, perpetuated by a vocal 
minority of actors. This has also overlapped into the interpretations of China in other 
dimensions and to some extent is treated as overriding other issues because of the negative 
implications anticipated. That is, economic and political opportunities drop out for proponents 
of the military threat perspective because of the danger posed to the US’ security. In the EU, I 
find no evidence that military threat interpretations have entered the discourse, much less 
shaped policy. As such, when security-related issues have emerged, the salience of these 
opportunity interpretations has prevailed unchallenged.   
 
2.3 Military Non-Threat 
 
Despite the seeming prominence of threat interpretations of China’s rise, there are 
interpretations of its rise that China’s rise does not inherently pose a military threat. This 
pertains not only to the immediate scenario, but some claim that it will remain so in the future. 
On relevant issues, this is the dominant interpretation within the EU. Arguments have been 
advanced that China is more likely to favour stability in the regional and international systems 
precisely because its main objectives are delivering economic prosperity and maintain the 
government’s position in power – which are widely understood stood to be in interconnected: 
one requires the other. Thus China will continue to support the status quo arrangements to 
continue along its developmental path. This interpretive framework dismisses concerns over 
China’s military build-up by highlighting the relative power advantage the US continues to 
enjoy. Trends in military spending do not cause alarm as they are seen as a by-product of a 
rapidly expanding economy and a natural pattern of behaviour for a rising power.     
 
Proponents of non-threat interpretations – particularly academics – claim that fears of power-
transitions are misplaced due to a failure to appreciate the current international context. 
Rosecrance (2006: 35) argued that international conditions in the post-Cold War world did not 
look like those of 1914; consequently China would not “disrupt essential economic 
arrangements” central to its development. Zhu Feng (2008: 53) saw the unipolar configuration 
as a systemic constraint which limited opportunities to challenge the US. Combined with 
China’s domestic political and economic change, hard-balancing behaviour would be unlikely 
to arise. Babones (2011: 88) concluded that China’s rise does not threaten US hegemony or 
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the current international order due to extensive domestic challenges, cautioning against “hype 
and panic” and urging recognition of China as a “large but ordinary country”. 
 
Avery Goldstein’s (1997/8: 73) examination of the gap between US interpretations and the 
reality of China’s military power chastised alarmist accounts, warning that these had the 
potential to create “a self-fulfilling prophecy of rivalry”. Goldstein (2005) rejected 
comparisons between China and Nazi Germany, arguing that fears of an impending power-
transition were misplaced. Acknowledging that the ideas of PTT had infiltrated  that US policy 
debates Goldstein (2007: 640-1) compared PTT with institutionalist theories to consider 
China’s likely behaviour as it continued to rise, finding that overall there was mixed evidence 
as to whether either of these had predictive utility. Fravel (2010) pointed out that PTT missed 
the fact that the purported benefits of aggressive behaviour – specifically territorial expansion 
in Asia – may be outweighed by costs. Fravel (2010) argued that China’s rise was more likely 
to be peaceful and would not pose a regional military threat.  
 
Non-threat perspectives assume that China’s rise will lead it to integrate with – rather than 
attempt to overturn – the established system, (Ikenberry, 2008), leading its proponents to argue 
that engagement is the appropriate response. Due to its rapidity, China’s rise may cause 
instability irrespective of intentions, thus Rex Li (1999) contended that the best way to ensure 
stability was for other powers to encourage its integration with the international community. 
Some power-transition theorists (e.g. Tammen et al, 2000) have argued that engagement is 
necessary so as to avoid their theory’s expectations, but there is evidence from the discourse to 
suggest that there is a sincere normative value attached to this approach to international 
relations, especially from EU policymakers. In an interview in 2005, EU High Representative 
Javier Solana argued “throughout history, new arrivals or new competitors have often been 
regarded as threats, but the reality is that a stronger and more confident China is good for the 
world” (cited by Xinhua, 2005a). For Solana, engagement was justified as “our goals [are] 
converging ever more closely, it makes sense to work together ever more closely” (cited by 
Xinhua, 2005a).  
 
There are few – if any – US policymakers willing to declare that China will indefinitely 
remain unthreatening. However, there is support for arguments that the level of threat has been 
exaggerated. Analysts frequently point to the substantial relative power gap between the US 
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and China when it comes to military capabilities and readiness (Bajoria, 2009) and/or argue 
that there is a shared interest between the two for regional and global stability which reduces 
the prospects for confrontation (Shambaugh, 2008; Cossa, 2009). There have been conscious 
efforts to disregard inferences that China’s military expansion equates to hostile intentions. 
Former Secretary of State Colin Powell contended in 2005 that “threat comes from the 
capability to execute… [military] plans and the intention to do so… my analysis in the last 
four years is that China has no such intention. China wishes to live in peace with its neighbors 
and the US” (cited by Xinhua, 2005b). 
 
Richard Bush of the Brookings Institution observed that “there's no question that China is 
building up its capabilities, but China has displayed no intentions of using those capabilities” 
against the US (cited by Pan, 2006a). The Cato Institute’s Ted Carpenter contended that there 
was a lack of “definite evidence that their military ambitions go substantively beyond 
Taiwan” (cited by Pan, 2006a). Despite the DoD’s reports often being seized upon by threat 
proponents to support their claims, others have noted that the assessments also highlight 
China’s weaknesses and some positive steps, such as participation in joint exercises with the 
US and contributions to international peacekeeping missions (Pincus, 2008). Ivan Eland 
(2003: 12) of the Cato Institute suggested that the US “should accept that [China], like other 
great powers, will want more influence over its region. If kept within bounds, that increased 
sphere of influence should not threaten vital US interests”.  
 
 In the EU, military non-threat interpretations of China are effectively undisputed. The EU is 
not directly involved in East Asia’s regional security and is not a global security actor – 
although the powerful Member States arguably could fulfil such roles. Examining European 
rhetoric suggests that the non-threat interpretation is not just a consequence of the absence of 
power: there is a genuine interpretation of China’s rise as a positive development. Some have 
argued that China’s rise will enhance the prospects for greater multilateral coordination and 
cooperation on the world stage by the system’s great powers. For Charles Grant (2008), the 
EU’s role in the promotion of multilateralism is crucial because it is the only “big power” 
which can be relied upon to do so. The notion of closer EU-China relations was a particularly 
attractive notion around 2003 when EU Member States such as France and Germany openly 
questioned US unilateralism. In turn, the non-threat interpretation has been reinforced by 
China’s stance that it regards the EU as a possible pole in a multipolar world order to mitigate 
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the presently unbalanced unipolar configuration (Holslag, 2011: 295). The UN also features in 
China’s vision of a ‘democratised’ international order which protects the interests of a number 
of states rather than just the dominant power (Foot, 2006: 91).  
 
Whereas threat proponents focus on China’s military expansion in absolute terms, data on 
relative trends highlights the US’ continued predominance. Figure 2.4 illustrates trends in 
China’s military expenditure compared to the US7. Since expenditure is a measure of input 
rather than capability, that China has increased its spending faster than the US does not 
immediately signal a shift in relative power. The US had been spending more on a vastly 
qualitatively superior force for decades; thus even though China has modestly reduced the 
spending disparity the US’ dominance in spending allows it to increase the gap in capabilities 
even if at a reduced rate. The EU’s combined defence expenditure dwarfs that of China, yet 
these resources are being committed independently by Member States and thus 
compatibility/interoperability remains low. Figure 2.5 shows that France and the UK – the 
EU’s two leading military powers – have already been surpassed by China in spending terms. 
Yet there has been no emergent threat discourse around China’s military expansion within the 
EU. As resources have not been diverted to the establishment of an EU-level military, it is 
clear that the Member States do not consider China’s rise to constitute a threat to their security 
or international status.  
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 US defence spending post-2001 increased substantially to fund operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Since SIPRI 
examines all defence expenditure, the exclusion of spending on ‘global war in terror’ (GWoT) operations was 
necessary because resources committed to these cannot be used elsewhere. By subtracting budgetary allocations 
for the GWoT (based on SIPRI reporting), the remaining total could be described as the ‘normal’ defence budget. 










Goldstein (2006: 135) argued that the primary short-term objective for military modernisation 
and planning is preventing Taiwanese independence through force (if necessary) and 
combatting US military support. Following the 2006 DoD report on China’s military power 
Kurt Campbell, a former State Department official, argued that China was “primarily 
interested in increasing conventional options in regional contingencies and vis-a-vis Taiwan” 
rather than threatening the US (cited by Tyson, 2006). Analyses of China’s capabilities 
continue to emphasise technological and training weaknesses (Goldstein and Murray, 2004: 
195). Even with substantial modernisation of its air-force, Lewis and Xue (2006: 241) stated 
that capabilities fall considerably short of matching its main potential adversaries. China has 
long depended on Russia as its main source for military technology imports (Weitz, 2006). 
Since Russian technology lags far behind that of the West, the extent of modernisation China 
has achieved remains limited and illustrates weaknesses in China’s defence industries 
(Lampton, 2008: 6).   
 
US analyses often focus on what Avery Goldstein (1997/98: 44) termed “pockets of 
excellence” whereby the PLA has successfully modernised a narrow range of capabilities 
whilst comprehensive modernisation of its forces remains a long way off. Observers may be 
prone to overestimating China’s threat potential by concentrating on specific capabilities. One 
interviewee commented that China’s investment in capabilities like aircraft carriers would 
divert resources from asymmetric capabilities which could pose a threat to the US, without 
ever being able to challenge its qualitative supremacy
8. Another factor is that China’s 
priorities closer to home, notably regional territorial disputes with other powers in the South 
and East China Seas and the need to defend national interests within its Economic Exclusion 
Zone may be the main catalysts for military expansion. Holmes and Yoshihara (2008: 367) 
argued China’s naval expansion is likely to be oriented towards the Indian Ocean’s sea lines of 
communication which are vital for access to energy supplies. From this perspective, China’s 
growing power reflects a desire to protect its interests rather than aggressive intentions.  
 
The Chinese leadership has repeatedly stressed the benign nature of their policies, as evinced 
by the 2003 document ‘China's Independent Foreign Policy of Peace’ which insisted that 
issues should be resolved peacefully and that China did not seek to interfere with other 
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countries and was “opposed to hegemonism” (MoFA, 2003a). Although military threat 
proponents dismiss these efforts as rhetoric, there is some evidence that others take China 
seriously. Kenneth Lieberthal commented that “the presumption is that if [China] take[s] on 
America frontally [they] aren't going to grow wealthy and strong because there's such a chasm 
in terms of capacity, economic and military” (cited by Economist, 2004). According to David 
Denoon
9, China has moved away from “the very aggressive and violent [regional] policy of 
the 1970s and 1980s, where it was quite willing to use force, to a much more diplomatic route 
in the 1990s” (cited by Pan, 2006b). 
 
China’s actions and regional policies have often been used to suggest it favours stability over 
confrontation and does not seek to present a threat. Wang Fei-Ling (2005) argued that China is 
risk-averse and favours the status quo precisely because it is focussed on (in order of 
importance) political preservation, economic prosperity and the pursuit of prestige. China has 
attempted to play a constructive role on the North Korean nuclear issue: in response to 
developments in 2003 it “stepped into the fray, suspending crucial oil shipments to North 
Korea, sending high-level envoys to Pyongyang, and shifting troops around the Sino-Korean 
border” (Medeiros and Fravel, 2003: 22). As China’s future development is reliant on 
continued regional stability (Goldstein, 2006: 136), it seeks to avoid a regional arms race, US 
intervention in the Korean peninsula, or even simply greater defence cooperation with states 
which perceive North Korea as a threat (Moore, 2008: 14). While China reprimands North 
Korea, it has remained its main source of aid and trade; although a nuclear armed North Korea 
is potentially destabilising for the region, the regime’s collapse would equally present another 
set of problems (Moore, 2008: 2-3).  
 
Another goal has been the protection of territorial integrity through continual emphasis on the 
importance of state sovereignty, especially in relation to Taiwan. At the same time, China has 
attempted to emphasise its desire for peaceful cooperation with the US (Levine, 1998: 99; 
Wang, J. 2005: 39) and engaging in bilateral dialogue mechanisms to promote cooperation 
(Economy and Segal, 2009: 15). China has increased its regional activism, aiming to reassure 
others that it has become or is at least moving towards becoming a “good neighbour, a 
constructive partner, a careful listener, and a nonthreatening regional power” (Shambaugh, 
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2004/5: 64). Its regional diplomatic efforts have included settling border disagreements with 
Russia and Vietnam, providing assistance during the Asian financial crisis and actively 
pursuing a Free Trade Agreement with Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
(Garrison, 2005: 26). Hempson-Jones (2005: 718) identified China’s embrace of regional 
dialogue as evidence of a trend towards more cooperative foreign policies.  
 
Chinese policymakers have sought to address threat interpretations head-on, with the hope of 
preventing policy changes (particularly in the US) that would have potentially negative 
implications (Callahan, 2005). Since the late 1990s, the Chinese leadership had stressed that 
China was a “responsible power” (Richardson, 2011: 288) however ‘peaceful rise’ was 
intended as an extension and clarification. Premier Wen Jiabao first articulated this concept in 
December 2003
10
, claiming that unlike the rise of the European and American powers, China’s 
rise would be peaceful, using “scientific and technological progress to solve the problems of 
resources and the environment” (cited by Callahan, 2005). This concept has been argued for 
and supported by the findings in Chinese scholarship (Zheng, B., 2005; Choo, 2009) and 
linked to China’s aspirations for the construction of a harmonious world (Liu, J., 2009) in 
which it would not seek hegemony (Zheng, S., 2006: 172). De Castro (2007: 131) argued that 
the concept contains acceptance of US hegemony as its power is so ingrained in the 
international system. 
 
Although considerable attention in policy discourse is given to perceived threats stemming 
from China’s rise, there is also a strong dissenting view which sees China’s rise as relatively 
benign, either because the power gap remains too large or because its leaders are not thought 
to harbour hostile intentions toward the established powers or the international system they 
maintain. Under such views, engagement and cooperation are seen as not only feasible but 
positive. These perspectives have been effectively unchallenged within the EU’s policy 
discourse, whereas in the US there is considerable debate between the rival interpretations of 
the threat (or lack thereof) posed by China. The persistence of this perception has strengthened 
the political and economic opportunity perceptions, as arguably an overriding threat of an 
actual or potential military threat would curtail their influence on policy responses.  
 
                                                 
10
 This was later rebranded to ‘peaceful development’, but substantively little changed (Bergsten et al, 2008: 49). 
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2.4 Economic Threat 
 
Economic power is often linked into assessments of a growing military threat due to its 
centrality to the expansion and maintenance of hard capabilities, as emphasised by PTT 
scholars who treat it as the main component of national power (Levy, 2008: 18). Neorealists 
such as Mearsheimer (2001a: 61) and Walt (1987: 22-23) also argue that economic power is a 
necessary precursor to expanding military power. However, economic power in its own right 
can present a threat: it creates the potential to wield economic and political power in the 
international arena, effectively buying influence. The ‘soft’ component of economic power 
will challenge the economic and political dominance of the established powers. There are also 
more nuanced facets of economic power: a substantive trade surplus, ownership of foreign 
governments’ debt and manipulation of its own currency are issues which are often presented 
as evidence of a Chinese economic threat. Cheap Chinese labour and a weak currency present 
a challenge to Western domestic manufacturing industries, reducing the capacity of the 
established powers to maintain their own standing in the international order.   
 
Evidence for the economic threat perspective is plentiful. American journalist Ted Fishman 
(2006) reasoned that China’s economic rise will be at the expense of the established powers 
through its manufacturing strength and weak intellectual-property regime. Fishman (2006: 
287-288) expressed concern that the development of an EU-China political axis could be 
detrimental to the US’ international standing. Fishman conceded that China’s “military and 
geopolitical ambitions” are beyond the scope of his work but, tellingly, drew on 
Mearsheimer’s (2001a) assertions that China’s rise will lead to a contest for supremacy11; with 
no reference to alternative perspectives, it becomes clear that Fishman’s concerns over 
China’s economic rise are rooted in assumptions that it will allow it to dominate the world. 
Accepting that conflict is not inevitable, Fishman (2006: 293) argued that China will 
eventually be able to prevent the rest of the world from forcing it to play by the system’s 
established rules due to its economic power.      
 
Peter Brookes (2005) of the Heritage Foundation told the House of Representative’s 
Committee on International Relations that “China is using its burgeoning economic power to 
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 See Chapter One. 
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gain political and economic influence internationally, at America's expense wherever possible, 
in an effort to succeed the US as the world's most powerful nation”. Such concerns were 
evident in the US’ domestic debate over the possibility of the China National Offshore Oil 
Corporation (CNOOC) bidding for US firm Unocal in 2005
12
, with clear threat interpretations 
of China’s economic development surfacing. It was reported that policymakers in “Congress 
and the Pentagon think it may hasten an inevitable clash between the US and China for 
economic and political leadership in the world” (Ip and King, 2005). Members of Congress 
railed against the bid on the basis that it was effectively violating the rules of “fair trade” on 
the basis that CNOOC received considerable governmental subsidies (White, 2005). Tkacik 
(2005) called on the US to wake up to the “threat [posed] to American national security”. 
Allowing the sale to go ahead would give the “unintended message to Southeast Asia… that 
America is on the wane”, with a resultant loss of political influence (Tkacik, 2005). This has 
been linked by the Chairman of the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission to 
China’s mercantilist policy of “lock[ing] up attractive energy supplies wherever it can” 
(D’Amato, 2005: 6); at some point in the future as resources dwindle, this will be to the US’ 
detriment and Chin’s gain.   
 
The notion of a ‘Beijing Consensus’ conveys threat interpretations of China’s rise. This posits 
that China’s economic growth facilitates a challenge to the liberal international order, blurring 
the lines somewhat between the economic and normative threat categories. The basic idea is 
that while China presents its approach as “progressive engagement” with the current system, it 
is simultaneously “the protagonist in a clash of values, governance and two versions of 
modernity in the twenty-first century” (Halper, 2010: 2). The ability of “non-Western market 
converts… which have learned to extract the best from both market capitalism and one-party 
government” shatters “the illusion that capitalism begets democracy” (Halper, 2010: 2). This 
leads to negative interpretations because its combination of economic prosperity with 
authoritarian rule is putatively attractive to some developing countries; adherence to such a 
model holds the potential to undermine Western influence globally and challenge the status 
quo.   
 
                                                 
12
 The bid was eventually withdrawn by CNOOC following Congressional opposition. 
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Gross domestic product (GDP) is commonly adopted as the main indicator of national 
economic power (Chan, S. 2008: 13). Figure 2.6 displays the GDPs of the three polities in 
purchasing-power parity (PPP) terms and Figure 2.7 represents the annual growth rates. The 
data illustrates that China has been able to close the gap in overall GDP terms and that its 
growth rates have remained consistently high over the timeframe. The rapidity of economic 
growth is concerning under PTT-logic precisely because it leads to a situation in which neither 
the established nor rising power are ‘prepared’ for the impending transition, thus increasing 
the prospects for instability and conflict. It is clear that this has been taken up in the US policy 
community whereby China is seen as a growing economic threat. This is exacerbated as it is 
not only rapid growth that has unsettled some observers, but also China’s resilience during 
periods such as the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998 (Shirk, 2008: 20) and slowing 
expansion in more advanced economies circa 2000-2001. Consistently high growth rates have 
transformed China’s economy and other global economic players increasingly take China’s 
















China as an ‘economic threat’ perspectives have been substantiated and reinforced by 
estimates of its future standing. A widely cited paper from Goldman-Sachs identified China as 
one of the four main large developing economies which – if high growth rates persist – will 
become some of the largest economies in the world (Wilson and Purushothaman, 2003: 3). 
The report’s significance lay in its projections for China’s growth which were laid out in such 
clear terms that it would be difficult for the international community to dismiss the apparent 
inevitability of its ascendancy as a key economic player in the near future. Specifically, it was 
anticipated that China would become the world’s second largest economy by 201613 and 
overtake the US by 2041. More recent estimates from the IMF suggest that China could 
become the world’s largest economy (in PPP terms) by 2017 (The Economist, 2012). Such 
changes have been interpreted by some as zero-sum and as a result fuelled threat perspectives.  
 
Proponents of the economic threat perspective also concentrate on China’s unfair trade 
practices, which they see as a challenge to the rules of the international economic institutions 
created and maintained by the West. Despite acceding to the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) in 2001, China’s willingness to comply with its rules has persistently been an issue for 
both the US and the EU. Glaubitz (2004: 127) noted “cautious optimism” that WTO accession 
was evidence of China’s integration with the current international order. The explicit argument 
made by many Western proponents of China’s accession (as we will see in Chapters Three and 
Four) was that it constituted a further step in integrating China with the established system, 
encouraging it to play by the rules and increasing prospects for domestic economic and 
political reform. Continued intransigence on China’s part has created a belief amongst 
proponents of threat-perspectives that their arguments were vindicated; China will use the 
WTO to its own advantage without abiding by the rules. To them, the West undermined its 
own interests by helping China further enhance its economic strength, challenge the 
established rules and remain authoritarian while deriving the benefits of membership. 
 
Economic threat perspectives are often predicated on the established powers shifting from 
small trade surpluses in the 1980s to large and expanding trade deficits, creating concerns over 
job losses to and growing dependence on China. One commentator referred to the trade deficit 
as “an unacceptable transfer of wealth from America to China” (Hawkins, 2005). The pattern 
                                                 
13
 Although outside the timeframe of analysis for this project it is worth adding that China’s became the second 
largest economy happened in late 2010 (BBC News, 2011), ahead of estimates. 
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has been the same for both the US and the EU, although the latter’s has remained somewhat 
smaller than the former’s (Figure 2.8, above).The speed of China’s economic transformation 
compounds the worries over the size of the deficit: for instance, China was the US’ second 
largest trading partner by 2008 (largest source of imports, third largest export market) whereas 
thirty years before it was outside the top thirty (Morrison, 2009: 1) The West is typically 
dependent on cheap Chinese imports of consumer products such as computers, apparel, and 
audio and visual equipment, which can pose a threat to domestic manufacturing industries. 
Robert Scott (2007) of the Economic Policy Institute argued that the growing trade deficit with 
China had cost the US over two million jobs between 1997 and 2006. The concern expressed 
by some commentators (e.g. Gaffney, 2005; Hawkins, 2005) is that since China seeks to 
become the predominant world economic power, trade deficits and increased Western 
dependency give China significant economic (and potentially political) leverage.  
 
China is a major global economic player with the ability to “affect world currency values and 
related trade flows” (Sutter, 2003/4: 79). This has increased its global influence, which is seen 
to have a negative impact on the influence of the Western powers, in keeping with the ‘Beijing 
Consensus’ outlined above. China’s increasing economic influence in Africa has, more 
recently, posed certain challenges to the established actors. Liu Lirong (2011: 7) noted that 
since 2007 the EU has sought to engage with China in dialogue as its “policy choices [toward 
African nations] affect the interests of the EU with regard to energy and natural resources, 
external trade, as well as the dissemination of its norms and values”.   
 
Of the threat interpretations of China’s rise, it is the economic one which is most evident 
within EU discourse. However, the perceived threat is in relation to disruption for domestic 
economic interests rather than fears that China will displace the EU as an economic power in 
the international order. Specifically, Member States such as France, Italy, Spain and Greece 
are concerned about harm to their manufacturing sectors (Fox and Godement, 2009: 26). 
These states tend to adopt protectionist trade preferences, but avoid critiquing China on 
political issues to avoid retaliation – thus have been labelled as “Accommodating 
Mercantilists” (Fox and Godement: 2009: 26). Eastern European States hold similar fears 
“since they compete directly with many new Chinese manpower industries”, although this is 
somewhat offset by prospects of foreign direct investment (FDI) from China (Godement, 
2008: 67). Overall, however, the economic threat perspective in the EU has not been as 
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pronounced in the US in the sense that EU policymakers do not express concerns that China is 
seeking to displace the EU in the international economic order.   
 
The threat perspective of China’s economic rise is partly rooted in the link between growing 
wealth and military power, but there are distinct arguments that the former is intrinsically 
problematic in a zero-sum situation where China’s economic prosperity comes at the expense 
of the West. Thus, like the military threat perception, the economic threat can relate to the 
immediate and/or future context. The speed of China’s rise, the closing gap in GDP figures, 
and increasing trade deficits have fostered interpretations of a threat to the international 
standing of the established powers. Increasing economic might enhances China’s political 
influence and this has been interpreted by some as inherently detrimental to Western powers’ 
political influence. Linkages with other threat interpretations – military and normative – reveal 
that China’s economic power underwrites its ability to pose threats in these dimensions.  
 
2.5 Economic Opportunity 
 
Rejecting zero-sum conceptualisations of China’s expanding economic power, other actors 
have interpreted China’s rise as presenting an opportunity. Even in the CNOOC/Unocal case 
(above), threat perspectives were not unchallenged. Sebastian Mallaby (2005) argued that “it's 
hard to paint a plausible scenario in which Chinese control of Unocal would hurt us – despite 
loud exclamations to the contrary from Congress. For one thing, Unocal's oil output accounts 
for a tiny fraction of US consumption”. To illustrate why China does not present a threat, 
proponents of this view highlight increased interdependence between China and the 
established powers and the necessity of stability in the international economic system which 
has been central to China’s growth over the past few decades. China’s economy is heavily 
dependent on exports to the West. Some actors have argued that China is simply a non-threat 
in the economic realm, but others have made substantive arguments that China’s economic 
development presents a significant and positive opportunity from the position that their own 
economies will stand to gain, but also that China will increasingly participate in – and 
maintain – the established international economic institutions and their rules. Thus, this tends 




China’s potential as an economic opportunity gained prominence in the early 1990s (Cable 
and Ferdinand, 1994). Positive assessments were based not just on expectations of China’s 
market potential, but also its behaviour: Acharya (1999: 7) and Clegg (2009: 59) have argued 
that China’s resilience in – and response to – the Asian financial crisis of 1997 demonstrated 
its development as a responsible power, dampening threat perceptions of its rise amongst its 
neighbours. Studies of China’s role and prospects for continued economic development 
(Bergsten et al, 2006; Wang, L., 2012) tend to distance themselves from threat perspectives, 
signalling (implicitly or explicitly) that China will not seek to overturn the system it has come 
to rely on due to ever-growing interdependence with those very international structures. This 
is supported by arguments that while China’s importance on the world stage is increasing, its 
economic power is not as great as suggested by others who focus primarily on the power of 
the state with insufficient regard to the global political-economic context (Breslin, 2005: 753). 
 
Analysts such as Alvin Rabushka (2007) of the Hoover Institution have highlighted the current 
opportunities, noting that China’s interdependent economic relationships have generated 
shared interests in “global economic and political stability”, creating an “enormous 
opportunity” for cooperation. Daniel Ikenson (2006) of the Cato Institute argued that “China’s 
economic success is something to celebrate and embrace, not to fear and oppose. It is a 
testament to the potential of engagement and globalization, and an indictment of isolationism”. 
In the US, low-cost Chinese imports have helped restrain inflation and interest rates, increased 
consumers’ purchasing power and boosted demand for other products (Elwell, et al, 2006: 1). 
This has helped production to shift into areas where it has a comparative advantage (Elwell, et 
al, 2006: 1) as well as spurred faster economic growth and job creation (Bergsten et al, 2006: 
10). China is not only dependent on Western markets for exports, but also dependent on 
imports from other Asian nations, thus is part of the global-supply chain, rather than being 
able to sustain its economic growth independently. Andreas Freytag (2008) argued that such 
“processing trade” has grown in importance for China’s exports. To that end, it has been 
argued that China depends on the continuity of and stability in this system and is more likely 
to work with than against other powers (Johnston, 2005: 32).  
 
Actors within the EU have been key proponents of the economic opportunity interpretation of 
China’s rise. Although following the Tiananmen crackdown of 1989 interpretations of China 
as a human rights violator were salient within the EU, this was quickly superseded by 
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interpretations of China as an economic opportunity. With most of the economic sanctions 
imposed in the wake of Tiananmen lifted relatively quickly, bilateral relations continued along 
a path of mutual cooperation with no further ‘upsets’ in economic relations in the early 1990s 
(Ash, 2008: 191). Economic ties dominated the relationship as China’s market presented a 
significant opportunity for goods and services from the EU (Reuter, 2007: 173). The formal 
establishment in 1995 of the human rights dialogue and the EU’s first Communication paper 
marked the increasingly political nature of the relationship, yet the economic dimension 
served as the platform upon which these developments were possible.   
 
 Godement (2008: 67) noted that in Scandinavian countries and the UK, increasing Chinese 
imports are “not seen as a threat, but more often as an opportunity for consumers to avail 
themselves of lower prices”. These “Ideological Free-Traders” (Fox and Godement, 2009: 6) 
advocate free trade with China but simultaneously apply pressure on political issues. For 
Germany, the largest “Assertive Industrialist”, China is a significant market for its industrial 
exports such as machine tools and equipment – a dependency which “tends to insulate 
Germany from long-term political reprisals” for its criticisms of China on economic and 
political matters (Fox and Godement, 2009: 24). Even though “Accommodating Mercantilists” 
view China’s economic rise as threatening in some respects, they still prioritise good 
economic relations as rival interpretations have pushed the opportunity narrative. European 
actors link China’s economic development to its role as a great power; President of the 
European Central Bank, Jean-Claude Trichet (2007), argued that  
 
there is no doubt that the global economy has benefited enormously from the 
emergence of China and that this new giant has brought new opportunities as well 
as challenges to Europe. In order for both China and the world economy to 
continue to reap these benefits, it is essential that China increasingly assumes the 
global responsibilities that inevitably accompany its growing economic clout. 
 
The purported negative implications of trade deficits with China are contested under this 
interpretation, because the raw data masks the benefits to Western economies. Daniel 
Griswold (2006: 9) of the Cato Institute noted that most of the US’ imports from China are 
“consumer goods that improve the lives of millions of Americans every day at home and in the 
office”. As Hughes (2005: 94) pointed out, “almost 60 percent of Chinese exports to the 
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United States are produced by firms owned by foreign companies, many of them American”. 
Nicholas Lardy (2007) argued that while there were challenges associated with China’s 
growing economic power, the opportunities presented outweighed these, as he illustrated with 
a specific example:  
 
China is the world’s largest importer of semiconductors and microprocessors—of 
the total global semiconductor output in 2005, about 60 percent were sold to 
China. Most of these go into cell phones, DVD players, laptops, etc. These 
products are then shipped back to Europe and the US.  
 
The data in Figure 2.9 reveals that China has become an increasingly important destination for 
American and European exports, especially from 2000 onwards. This would seemingly 
support the opportunity interpretation of China’s rise and puts the trade deficit data (Figure 
2.8, above) into perspective; it is not a one-directional shift of increasing imports from China, 
but also exports to China. As noted above, China became the US’ third most important export 
market; for the EU, it was the fourth most important by 2008 (Gambini, 2009: 3).  
 
China’s leadership regards economic development to be locked in a symbiotic relationship 
with political stability and their continued rule, which has shaped its foreign economic policies 
(Miller, 2010: 97). For instance, its “non-ideological attitude” to the Pacific Economic 
Cooperation Council was argued by Harris (2008: 138-139) as critical for acceptance to its 
successor – the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC) – and facilitated its ability 
to cooperate with the neighbouring advanced economies. Economic development has also 
perpetuated a conceptual shift of interests as associated with those of developing nations to the 
great powers, promoting bilateral relations with the latter to the key focus of policy (Medeiros 
and Fravel, 2003: 32). Hempson-Jones (2005: 704) argued that shifts towards cooperation in 
China’s foreign policy were most pronounced in economic issues – highlighted by its 
“sovereignty-bending admission” to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) which went beyond 
self-interest. WTO membership and participation in some G8 meetings have encouraged 
China to “expand its definition of the national economic interest beyond the very short term” 
(Leonard, 2006). While participation in such institutions is undoubtedly necessary for China’s 
continued economic growth, proponents of the economic opportunity perspective also see its 
















Embedded within opportunity perspectives is the rejection of the threat interpretation, 
primarily on the basis that China is not powerful enough to seriously challenge the West. 
While data related to overall GDP (Figure 2.6 above) paint a picture of national economic 
strength, China remains relatively poor in GDP per capita terms (Figure 2.10) – a measure of 
the population’s productive capacity frequently used by power-transition theorists (Levy, 
2008: 13). Figure 2.11 shows that annual growth in GDP per capita closely follows the pattern 
observed for overall GDP growth (Figure 2.7 above) and is expanding faster than the US or 
the EU – which is to be expected given China’s weaker starting point. Yet the vast majority of 
those that promote threat interpretations of China’s economic rise frequently focus on national 
and not per capita measures of GDP. When this is taken into consideration, there is greater 
scope for arguing that China is less likely to harbour revisionist intentions because it is 
dependent on stability in the current system to deliver economic prosperity for its population.  
 
Trade levels as a percentage of GDP can be utilised as an indicator of the extent to which a 
country is integrated into the global economy (Kim, 2006: 285). Figure 2.12 shows that China 
has become progressively integrated over time – hence its economic growth is increasingly 
fuelled by international trade. China falls between the EU
14
 and the US in terms of dependence 
on trade but witnessed the greatest degree of change over the timeframe. This was facilitated 
through exports of cheap manufactured goods to the West (Lardy, 2002: 6) resulting in China 
being dubbed by some as the “workshop of the world” (Martin and Manole, 2004: 1). 
Production of these goods is dependent on imports of materials and intermediary goods from 
other countries, positioning it as a link between Asian economies and industrialised markets 
(Story, 2005: 104) and fostering interdependence with the global supply chain. Again, this 
contributes to interpretations of China as an economic opportunity rather than threat as China 
needs not only stability in the international economic order, but also political stability in East 
Asia if it is to continue pursuing domestic economic development.  
 
The economic opportunity interpretation has become so prevalent in both American and 
European policy discourse that some commentators have lamented the apparent displacement 
of human rights concerns (more on this in the next section). This interpretation entails China’s 
                                                 
14
 As a caveat, the EU’s figures would appear to include intra-EU trade, which then inflates the figures if we 
wanted to look simply at trade to the rest of the world. However, from the World Bank’s (2012) database, it is 
impossible to disaggregate these figures, therefore I decided to use what was available rather than exclude the EU 
from this altogether.  
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growth is positive not only for bilateral trade relations, but for the global system more 
generally as China as expected to continue on its integrative path. Under this logic, there are 
fewer concerns that China’s economic prosperity is allowing it to expand its military power – 
mostly because it is assumed that China will not seek to destabilise the region through 
aggressive behaviour as this would disrupt its economic development. However, as we will 
see in subsequent chapters, although there is a tendency for those who view China as primarily 
an economic opportunity to also consider it unlikely to be a threat in the military dimensions, 
some actors do not rule the latter out entirely. Nevertheless, the importance of this perception 
is clear, as it remains salient even under discussion of non-economic issues in the bilateral 
relationships, although more so in the case of EU discourse than in the US.  
 
2.6 Normative Threat 
 
Power-transition accounts presuppose that in a hierarchical order dominated by a democratic 
power other rising democracies are likely to be satisfied with the system that benefits them. 
Non-democracies, however, cannot be guaranteed to be satisfied; precisely because the 
dominant power imposes its values on the international order, these powers are more likely to 
be dissatisfied and seek to revise the rules of the game. Immediately, we can see that the rise 
of authoritarian China should pose problems for the US and EU. China may pose a threat to 
the norms and rules of the established order, even if it does not engage in direct military 
confrontation. Yet, despite the importance of regime type in this sense, PTT actually has little 
to say about normative issues – such as human/democratic rights – as they are not relevant to 
power calculations. However, it is clear that many actors do pay attention to these aspects of 
China’s international behaviour and invoke power-transition logic to contend that it harbours 
revisionist intentions towards the status quo.   
 
Robert Sutter (2003/4: 75-6) noted that the Tiananmen crackdown of 1989 had a significant 
impact on some US actors’ perceptions of China as “economically alluring and reforming” 
with that of “an oppressive Communist dictatorship”.  For Keidel (2007) “value differences 
between China and the US and its allies underpin concerns that China’s military and other 
foreign policy intentions will eventually lead it to harm US interests”. Edward Friedman 
(2011: 20) argued that China’s character was essentially that of a revisionist power, for three 
central reasons: its apparent belief that the current international order is “immoral”; that China 
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is a better centre for “a moral world order”; and its behaviour which allegedly show it to be 
“already acting on the basis of the first and second points, lending credence thereby to power 
transition theory”. One statement from an unnamed ‘senior defense official’ cited by Gertz 
(2005b) invoked historical analogies in outlining the threat: 
 
We may be seeing in China the first true fascist society on the model of Nazi 
Germany, where you have this incredible resource base in a commercial economy 
with strong nationalism, which the military was able to reach into and ramp up 
incredible production [emphasis added]. 
 
This is the only example I could find of any official/observer referring to China as a fascist 
state. Evidently, it is not commonplace in policy discourse but the fact that Gertz – a key 
proponent of threat interpretations – included it in his article hints at the concern over the 
Chinese system. 
 
Commentators such as Timperlake and Triplett (1998), Gertz (2002) and Menges (2005) 
worked normative issues into their arguments regarding China’s military threat. For Gertz 
(2002: 2), China’s quest to supplant US power was motivated by its communist nature, ruling 
out peaceful coexistence. Menges (2005: 8-9) identified China’s “drive toward domination” to 
be partly driven by “Marxist-Leninist-Maoist thought” in conjunction with the view “that 
domination is the ultimate guarantee of security for the… regime”. Thus China’s threat is a 
combination of expanding hard power and (inferred) intentions based on support for an 
oppositional ideological and normative structure. This has also been reflected in Congressional 
discourse, where critics frequently utilised the prefix ‘communist’ when discussing China. As 
Chapter Three demonstrates, this was evident at the time of the US’ deliberations over a 
bilateral trade deal between 1999 and 2000. Notably, policymakers did not use it in relation to 
China’s economic system; rather, to distinguish China as authoritarian, as a human rights 
violator and also as a growing threat to the region and the US’ national security. This arguably 
invokes Cold War-era narratives of the communist threat which were used to distinguish the 
identity of the US from that of its perceived enemies (Campbell, 1998: 169).   
 
Yee and Storey (2004: 2) pointed out that threat interpretations of China’s rise frequently link 
hegemonic aspirations to its “authoritarian socialist political system” in addition to its “rapid 
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economic growth and historical role as a great power”. During the Cold War, Soviet 
Communism was the “chief threat to freedom” which the US saw itself as having “an 
incontestable obligation to combat” (Hunt, 2009: 153). Undoubtedly, the Cold War hangover 
of innate distrust of communist regimes is evident in the threat rhetoric propounded in the US; 
one interviewee stated that this was embedded in the American mentality with regard to China 
and other communist regimes
15
. Newspaper columnists and some members of Congress 
consistently refer to “Communist China” to underscore their point about the challenge posed 
(examples are explored in Chapter Three). While China undoubtedly remains authoritarian, its 
commitment to communist ideals is rhetorical at best; this has hardly passed American 
policymakers by and they appear to use the ‘communist’ prefix to denote authoritarian. 
 
John Tkacik (2006) of the Heritage Foundation argued in a report that China’s political regime 
contributed to the threat posed: while acknowledging that “by itself, the rise of a new power in 
Asia need not be alarming”. Tkacik (2006: 1) saw reason to be concerned in the emergence of 
“a new superpower that works against the interests of freedom, free trade, and global 
stability”. Tkacik (2006: 2) identified China’s goal as not just balancing US power, but to 
“reclaim [its] ancient place as the preeminent power in Asia, replacing the [US]”. In an 
editorial piece, Tkacik (2007b) warned that the US may not be able to promote democracy 
beyond its own shores because “we face a Chinese Superpower intent on legitimizing illiberal 
forces lurking in the shadows of Asia's fragile new democracies”. While the authors of the 
AEI’s 2009 report An American Strategy for Asia acknowledged that what sort of power China 
would become was still unclear, they still expressed a belief that “an authoritarian China’s 
efforts to restore what its leaders see as their country’s “rightful place” at the apex of an Asian 
and possibly a global hierarchy could undermine the critical US objective of preserving an 
Asia prosperous, peaceful, and free” (Blumenthal and Friedberg, 2009: 7). 
 
Hans Maull (1997) argued that China was not satisfied with the status quo for a variety of 
“historical and socio-psychological” factors related to the ‘century of humiliation’ inflicted by 
Western powers in the 19
th
 Century, thus its growing power would be directed towards these 
powers and the system they have constructed. Callahan (2008: 759) observed that “an 
idealized version of China’s imperial past is now inspiring Chinese scholars’ and 
                                                 
15
 Interview with Congessman Eni Faleomavaega (D-American Samoa), former Chair of the Foreign Affairs 
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, Washington DC, 14/07/10.  
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policymakers’ plans for China’s… and the world’s future”. Callahan (2008: 758-60) argued 
that this trend revealed that China might seek to establish a new hegemony in the event of 
surpassing the US as the dominant power, rather than a post-hegemonic arrangement. In a 
policy paper for the Centre for European Reform, François Heisbourg (2001: 6) cautioned that 
“Europeans are well advised not to underestimate the legacy of the ‘unequal treaties; which 
the forces of European imperialism inflicted on China”, indicating that nationalist sentiments 
may influence China’s foreign policies.  
 
Whilst policy may no longer contain ideological dimensions or features of “hostile, militant, 
xenophobic, anti-Western or isolationist nationalism” (Chen, Z. 2005: 52), the perceived need 
to regain China’s “rightful place” in Asia (Roy, 1998: 1) and regain great power status in the 
international arena (Breslin, 2010: 52) arguably conveys a desire to change the status quo. 
Lampton (2001: 251) referred to China’s “victim complex” which created a “sense of 
entitlement”. This has contributed to the characterisation of China in some sections of Western 
discourse as dissatisfied with the current international order. Indeed, now that China’s foreign 
policy objectives do not centre on the export of revolution, the main basis for threat 
interpretations has been the influence of nationalism on policy direction. Such concerns persist 
in the face of Chinese protestations to the contrary. The American Enterprise Institute’s Gary 
Schmitt (2006) tackled China’s self-proclaimed ‘peaceful rise’ in a Weekly Standard article, 
alluding to parallels between its stance on Taiwan and rising Nazi Germany’s claims over 
Alsace and Sudetenland. Schmitt (2006) argued that China’s authoritarian system inevitably 
fuelled distrust; by contrast, India’s rising power did not cause concern. 
 
Nationalism in Chinese foreign policy has also garnered much attention from academics 
(Whiting, 1995; Friedman, 1997; Callahan, 2004; Carlson, 2009). Some Western analysts have 
viewed this as a negative factor, anticipating that China will exert its influence abroad to 
satisfy nationalist sentiments at home. Peter Gries (2001: 26) cautions that the Chinese have 
not forgotten about the ‘Century of Humiliation’ at the hands of the West; Chinese responses – 
both from the government and public – to the bombing of its Belgrade embassy conveyed 
anger at the continued hostility towards China.   As such, China’s historical treatment at the 
hands of Western powers is often taken by Western observers to be important to contemporary 
understandings of China’s national identity (Yuan, 2008: 213). Atanassova-Cornelis (2012) 
noted that America is the predominant ‘significant other’ in the construction of Chinese 
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nationalism and often in a negative light, which is picked up on by some US observers. 
Carlson (2009: 31) found that opposition to US hegemony is a core feature in Chinese 
nationalism but simultaneously critiqued other scholars’ oversimplified views of it. 
 
China’s human rights record is of great concern for the US and the EU, as well Western non-
governmental organisations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch as part 
of the wider policy community. Table 2.1 presents a summary of the annual human rights 
reports from these four actors
16
. While noting some improvements over time, the reports have 
consistently asserted that these are incremental, only partially implemented or ignored in 
practice; thus overall improvement has been minimal. The expansion of human rights 
violations into new areas of life – such as the internet and increasing repression in Tibet and 
Xinjiang – contributed to assessments of China’s human rights record worsening in some 
areas. These critiques of China are used by some commentators to underpin normative threat 
interpretations both in terms of its domestic situation but also in the international arena, 
especially in the US Congress and the European Parliament. There, policymakers often make 
linkages between China’s human rights record and its regime type, arguing that as a 
consequence China’s rise inherently challenges the values system of the Western powers. For 
certain EU Member States – such as the Scandinavian countries and the UK – their “benign 
vision of China’s economic rise” is balanced by their critical views on China’s human rights 
situation Godement (2008: 67). 
 
Beyond China’s own poor human rights record, Sceats and Breslin’s (2012: 1) report for 
Chatham House observed increasing international anxiety over the implications of China’s rise 
for the international human rights system, due to its regular opposition to “interference on 
human rights grounds in its internal affairs and those of other states”. They contended that 
other international actors assume that China’s ascendancy as a global power is “threatening to 
this part of the international system” (Sceats and Breslin, 2012: 1). The authors cite concerns 
that the international human rights system “will be corroded in the long run if other 
developing states choose to follow China’s path” even if China does not actively promote its 
own norms abroad (Sceats and Breslin, 2012: 41). China also undermines “Western sanctions 
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 See methodology note in Appendix. 
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and arms-control measures” against other human rights violators (Sceats and Breslin, 2013: 
43).  
 
These normative threat interpretations recur frequently in political discourse, particularly in 
conjunction with the military threat interpretation or as a counterargument against the 
economic and political opportunity perspectives. Normative issues and controversies could be 
used by the established powers – who view themselves as upholders of the rules of the current 
system – to delegitimise China in the international arena to maintain their overall political 
dominance over the revisionist power. Beyond a merely instrumental value, however, it is 
clear that there are significant sections of the policy community that view China’s 
authoritarian government and explicit opposition to some international norms as a cause for 
concern. It appears that as China grows in power, this perception has diminished somewhat, or 









2.7 Political Opportunity  
 
There is no evidence within the discourse of ‘normative opportunity’ interpretations of 
China’s rise – that China is becoming more democratic or fully acceptant of the established 
international norms. That said, it is not espousing opposition to democracy and has not ruled it 
out for its own future; instead its leaders contend it will develop along its own path (Legro, 
2007: 518). While there was optimism in both America and Europe in the early 1990s that 
engagement could eventually lead to political reform, no timeframe could be specified. Yet 
some actors view China as more than a ‘non-threat’ to the status quo system; they see 
opportunities for integration into the international system and hence, as a political opportunity. 
Rather than focussing on specific issue-areas, these take a more comprehensive view of 
China’s rise. Some commentators see China as a potentially responsible player which could 
help to maintain the Western-constructed international system; China’s active support would 
renew the system’s legitimacy. Seema Desai (2006: 2) argued that international economic 
institutions are widely understood to be “in need of reformation and repair” and for a new or 
reworked system to have credibility, China would need to have input into the process.  
 
China assuming the role of a responsible power is also seen as vital to dealing with a range of 
global issues. Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick (2005) argued that “it is time to take 
our policy beyond opening doors to China’s membership into the international system: We 
need to urge China to become a responsible stakeholder in that system” [original emphasis]. 
Elaborating this concept, Zoellick (2005) explained that responsible stakeholders “recognize 
that the international system sustains their peaceful prosperity, so they work to sustain that 
system”. In 2007, US Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson (2007) asserted that the “the 
economic and geopolitical landscape of the 21
st
 century will be greatly influenced by the way 
in which the United States and China work together”. Paulson (2007) pointed to the US-China 
Strategic Economic Dialogue
17
 established in 2006 as a mechanism which had allowed to two 
sides to begin writing “the next chapter of our strategic economic relationship”.  
 
The successes of the engagement approach lead to a self-reinforcing interpretation of China as 
a political opportunity. The Independent Task Force (2007: 7) – composed of former 
                                                 
17
 In 2009, the Obama administration changed this to the ‘Strategic and Economic Dialogue’ – denoting the wider 
agenda of the dialogue from that point onwards.  
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policymakers, academics and commentators – established by the Council of Foreign Relations 
asserted that “growing adherence to international rules, institutions, and norms – particularly 
in the areas of trade and security – marks China’s global integration”. The report also 
acknowledged that China was increasingly assertive as its power grew, recommending that US 
policymakers “should not be satisfied with the state of US-China relations or indifferent to the 
economic, security, and political challenges presented by China as an emerging great power” 
(Independent Task Force, 2007: 7-8). The core recommendation was that “integration of China 
into the global community represents the best strategy to encourage China to act in ways 
consistent with US interests and international norms” (2007: 74).  
 
Glaser (2006) highlighted that the promotion of bilateral cooperation and China’s more active 
role in the international system has been a common theme in US foreign policy: the Clinton 
administration’s aim of building a “constructive strategic partnership” was continued by the 
Bush administration’s advocacy of the “responsible stakeholder” role for China. Although the 
term ‘political opportunity’ is not used explicitly in the articulation of these concepts, this 
label encapsulates the ideas conveyed. For instance, during a visit by President Hu Jintao to 
the US, President GW Bush (2006) stated that: 
 
The [US] welcomes the emergence of a China that is peaceful and prosperous and 
that supports international institutions. As stakeholders in the international system, 
our two nations share many strategic interests. President Hu and I will discuss how 
to advance those interests and how China and the United States can cooperate 
responsibly with other nations to address common challenges. 
 
Glaser (2006) cautioned that there are limitations to how extensive the relationship can be, as 
for the US, “in the absence of a greater convergence of values and agreement on the normative 
underpinnings of the international system, a comprehensive strategic security partnership with 
China is neither feasible nor desirable”. Nevertheless, a key theme in US foreign policy 
discourse has been to emphasise the prospects for cooperation in the international arena across 
a range of issues given common interests between the two.  
 
Within EU policy discourse, the political opportunity interpretation emerged in the mid- to 
late-1990s; although arguably still subservient to the perceptions of economic opportunities, 
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the two are complementary and facilitated the emergence of the ‘strategic partnership’ concept 
in 2003. Hackenesch and Jin (2009) provide an apt summary of the core of this interpretation: 
“the EU needs China not only with regard to economic and security interests, but also in order 
to promote and implement its conceptions of international relations”. Grant and Barsych 
(2008: 9) suggested that the EU can harness the strategic partnership to “integrate China more 
fully into multilateral global governance”. As Chapter Four reveals, for some actors there was 
also a view that China presented an opportunity as a potential ‘pole’ in a multipolar, 
multilateral order (Grant and Barsych, 2008: 5). The political opportunity interpretation has 
gained prominence in part because military threat perceptions have not manifested within 
policy circles; thus there are fewer obstacles in the relationship to good political relations. In 
the EU, there is not the same hesitancy on the concept of a ‘strategic partnership’ as there is in 
the US; although it is commonly argued that the relationship is not currently strategic, it is 
nevertheless the clear aspiration for many within the EU.   
 
For the most part, discussions of the EU-China partnership have concentrated on its limited 
nature as truly ‘strategic’; yet there are few dissenting voices that disagree with the aspiration 
of a more strategic relationship – indeed, many of the critiques offer up recommendations for 
how to attain this (e.g. Casarini, 2006; Grant and Barsych, 2008; Hackenesch and Jin, 2009; 
Geeraerts, 2011). Though critical of the EU’s unconditional engagement approach to China, 
Fox and Godement (2009: 52, 65) see potential for a more effective relationship based on a 
strategy of reciprocal engagement which will require European policymakers to “persuade 
China that listening to the EU on major strategic issues pays, while ignoring it carries a cost”. 
Ultimately, their analysis and recommendations suggest that a stronger EU-China relationship 
is in the interests not only of these two parties, but the world.  
 
The other political opportunity is that China can offer the EU recognition as an important 
international actor. The EU is still developing its own international presence, and such 
recognition from other important international players is a facet of its developing foreign 
policy. The US, by contrast, has no such concerns. The high-level contacts between the two 
sides – especially the annual EU-China summits – serve as manifestations of the importance 
accorded by each side to the relationship. Thus the opportunities for the EU are not just about 
the international system, but about its own international presence. A report by Lerais et al 
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(2006: 139) for the European Commission’s Bureau of European Policy Advisers18 contended 
that “the EU should assist China in overcoming the challenges of transition and reform… to 
anchor China firmly in the international system and continue to engage in an ongoing dialogue 
of where the system should be heading and defend views that we hold dear”. This logic is 
frequently employed in arguments that the EU has an opportunity to play a constructive role 
by shaping China’s development on the international stage (see Barsych et al, 2005: pp51-2).   
 
China’s foreign policy behaviour and attitude towards the international system have been 
crucial to the development of political opportunity interpretations. As Sutter (2003/4: 87) 
noted, “in sharp contrast to Mao’s messianic vision and provocative behavior, Chinese 
reformer Deng Xiaoping and succeeding leaders have been prepared more to deal with the 
world as it is”. Rather than attempting to rail against the established system by exporting 
communist revolution (Broomfield, 2003: 284) or promoting “alternative 
ideological/economic/political/social models for others to emulate” (Shambaugh, 2008: 303), 
China’s policy objectives have been relatively restrained and pragmatic. Charles Grant (2008) 
argued that the trend in China’s foreign policies suggested it was on track to emerge as a 
“responsible stakeholder” as envisaged by Zoellick. That China stresses its peaceful rise and 
participates in bi- and multilateral dialogue – including with the US and the EU – has 
apparently served to reinforce these perceptions. Proponents of political opportunity 
perspectives argue its foreign policy has remained relatively consistent over time, with the 
primary objective of furthering national interests without upsetting the status quo.  
 
Following the Tiananmen crackdown, China’s policies did not evince anti-Western or anti-
American sentiments despite the intense reaction to what the Chinese leadership ostensibly 
regarded as an internal affair (Kim, 1998: 21). Instead, China accepted that closer relations 
with the West were inevitable given the collapse of communist regimes elsewhere (Segal, 
1991: 162). The end of the bipolar system meant that China’s international relations were no 
longer defined by the overarching US-Soviet relationship and the waning of the Cold War’s 
ideological schism had also presented an opportunity to develop a non-ideological 
international identity, a task it approached via adopting policies of engagement and 
cooperation with the rest of the world (Yahuda, 2008: 26). This was evinced through acts such 
                                                 
18
 It is necessary to note here that the report explicitly states that the views expressed within are those of its 
authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission (Lerais et al, 2006: ii).  
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as signing of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1991, the normalisation of relations with a 
number of neighbouring states and participation in ASEAN summits (Clegg, 2009: 55).  
 
Breslin (2010) argued that China will increasingly push to change the rules and norms of the 
international order but in ways that would not cause instability or instigate global crises 
precisely because such outcomes would endanger economic growth and domestic political 
stability. In this sense, China is largely supportive of the status quo, and any revisionist 
intentions are moderate and unlikely to provoke conflict. A report from the Center for 
American Progress claimed that “Beijing is deeply engaged in international institutions and 
initiatives. The Chinese show up, they are serious, and they often contribute to policy 
discussions in a constructive manner” (Hachigian et al, 2009: 2).  
 
Despite its authoritarian character, Mark Leonard (2006) observed that China “is surprisingly 
susceptible to outside pressure on foreign policy”. Thus at least in this dimension, there are 
prospects for China internalising international norms and playing by the rules. The ‘China 
threat’ interpretation, to the extent it has manifested in the foreign policies of others (or to the 
extent China thinks it has) has meant that the “fear of foreign attribution of a threat reputation 
has shaped… foreign orientations” such as seeking accession to the WTO (Yong, 2006: 201). 
The ‘threat’ label may erode the status of China as a legitimate international actor (Yong, 
2006: 204) which has been a mainstay of its post-Cold War foreign policy goals. China has 
consistently downplayed accusations that its ‘rise’ poses a ‘threat’ to the established powers or 
system. Evidently, some Western policymakers and observers take this seriously.  
 
Sceats and Breslin’s (2012: 47) report was not entirely pessimistic, noting China’s behaviour 
within the UN Security Council was “more nuanced and flexible than is often assumed”. 
However their main examples were more recent, such as its constructive role in Sudan’s 
acceptance of a UN-African Union peacekeeping mission in 2007. Hempson-Jones (2005: 
704) argued that China’s “attitude toward UN peacekeeping missions in Cambodia, Somalia, 
and East Timor” revealed a “more pragmatic stance that sanctions a certain level of 
interference into other states’ affairs”. Ratification of some international human rights treaties 
and participation in the Human Rights Council “demonstrate[d] that [China] wishes to be 
perceived as accepting the legitimacy of the international human rights system and, broadly, 




While China’s behaviour remains mixed, there is scope for those who interpret China’s rise as 
a political opportunity to argue that this will continue to evolve and that the established 
powers can play a positive influence on its direction. Indeed, Sceats and Breslin (2012: 55-6) 
postulated that: 
 
if its leadership is able to steer it through its many domestic challenges, it is 
conceivable that China will begin to adopt a less defensive attitude towards human 
rights both at home and abroad and that new possibilities will open up for joint 
working with Western states on international human rights issues. 
 
Albeit with a cautionary note that it was too early to conclude that China’s behaviour had 
changed and that the international human rights system remains “a peripheral concern” for the 
leadership (Sceats and Breslin, 2012: 56).    
 
Above, I noted the tendency for normative threat proponents to define China as ‘communist’ 
in order to support their argument regarding the challenge its rise poses. This terminology has 
not been utilised in the arguments who interpret China as a political opportunity. Indeed, 
arguments that China presents a political opportunity implicitly play down the concept of 
China as a normative threat. Additionally, proponents of this perspective disagree – explicitly 
or implicitly – that the historical patterns of power-transitions are bound to be repeated as 
China becomes more powerful in the international arena. Instead, due to China’s substantial 
interest in global stability and provided that the established powers continue with strategies of 
engagement and facilitate an increased role for China in the international system, its rise will 
support, rather than challenge, the status quo. As a result of the persistence of military non-
threat and economic opportunities, this interpretation has been able to gain traction in both the 
US and the EU. However, it would appear in the US that when threat perceptions in those 
other two dimensions gain salience, the political opportunity interpretation becomes less 
prominent in policy discourse. In the EU however, the political opportunity perceptions are 
reinforced by the inception and perpetuation of the notion of China as a strategic partner. As I 




2.8 Conclusion  
 
The six interpretations outlined above are to be found in the policy discourse over China’s rise 
in the two polities examined, where they are utilised in justification of preferences advanced 
by the relevant policymakers. The analysis here shows that the extent of China’s rise – let 
alone the implications for other actors – is contested in policy discourse. This is important in 
the context of how their responses to this have evolved. In short, exploring the content of each 
interpretation here sets the scene for considering how these differing interpretations influence 
the decision-making process in the following chapters. Each of the threat interpretations – 
military, economic and normative – contained elements of power-transition logic, whereas the 
non-threat/opportunity interpretations tend to deny the expectations generated by the former.  
The economic threat interpretation is crucial as it underwrites the military and normative 
threats perceived by observers. These observations provide linkages between the theoretical 
framing of the thesis developed in the previous two chapters and the empirical analysis of 
policy formulation in the cases examined subsequently. 
 
This chapter indicated that the distinctions between interpretations made in the empirical 
analysis are grounded in the wider discourse over China’s rise. However, the necessary 
breadth of the analysis here reduced the possibility of closely examining the evolution of these 
interpretations over time. This is remedied in the following chapters, where  we see that the 
economic and political opportunity perceptions have grown over time, although in the US 
there appears to be a drift towards greater perceptions of China as a military threat, and not 
just prospectively, but immediately. Distinguishing between these various interpretations 
provides greater insight into specifics of policy discourse than standard threat/opportunity 
binary models. Combinations of these interpretations are possible: China could be viewed as 
an economic opportunity but a normative threat, for instance. These typologies will be used to 
define the interpretations which were salient at the time of policymaking in response to the 









3.1 Introduction  
 
China presents one of the greatest challenges for the US in the post-Cold War era. Henry 
Kissinger, former Secretary of State and National Security Adviser, observed that 
 
[s]ignificant groups in both countries claim that a contest for supremacy between 
China and the United States is inevitable and perhaps already under way… even 
though China’s absolute military capacities are not formally equal to those of the 
United States, Beijing possesses the ability to pose unacceptable risks in a conflict 
with Washington and is developing increasingly sophisticated means to negate 
traditional US advantages (Kissinger, 2012: 44-5).   
 
As the predominant global and regional power, the US has extensive interests which China’s 
rise will directly and/or indirectly impact. Addressing whether China was a dissatisfied power, 
Kissinger (2012: 52) noted that since “[t]he current world order was largely built without 
Chinese participation… [it] sometimes feels less bound than others by its rules”. Even if 
China’s rise is benign, it will fundamentally alter the global balance of power presently 
stacked in the US’ favour. China’s closed, authoritarian regime adds another layer of 
complexity as it makes reading intentions difficult and stokes distrust among some observers. 
Some conclude that China’s objective is to correct the power imbalance in East Asia created 
by the US’ presence. China occupies much of the US’ attention in the international sphere and 
security issues are increasingly prominent in the domestic consideration of China policy. It is 




Kissinger references a view held by some within the US that China’s rise signals an 
impending power-transition. This is rooted in power-transition theory (PTT) which creates 
particular expectations for the interaction between China as a rising power and the US, the 
dominant power. As China’s material power increases, the US’ foreign policies should reflect 
greater concern that China has revisionist, hostile intentions and seeks to attain the 
predominant position in the international system. Due to these factors, the US should be an 
easy case for PTT to explain. By definition, under interpretations of an impending power-
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transition, China’s rise is inherently against the US and will likely result in conflict. The 
general drift in US foreign policy would perhaps suggest that arguments based on power-
transition interpretations have indeed gained traction. Yet bringing China into the world has 
been the goal of US policy from President Nixon onwards
1
, pursuing policies of engagement 
even when debates over the implications of China’s rise have intensified.  
 
This is puzzling, given China’s growing power and the apparent increasing salience of 
characterisations of its rise as an impending power-transition. How can we explain the 
continued pattern of engagement which characterises US foreign policy decision-making 
toward China? By addressing this question, the chapter adds to the main objectives of the 
thesis: developing explanations for how China’s rise is being interpreted by the established 
powers’ policymakers and how this impacts upon policy debates and formulation. The 
findings feed into the examination of the transatlantic arms embargo debate (Chapter Five) 
and the consideration of the differences between the US and EU in their responses to China’s 
rise (Chapter Six). Rather than a single interpretation coming to dominate the discourse, there 
has been a persistent divergence in the conclusions drawn by various groups of policymakers 
and analysts regarding the implications for US interests and the international system broadly.  
 
The six interpretations identified in Chapter Two are evident in the US’ policy discourse to 
varying degrees during the specific periods analysed, generating distinct preferences which 
policymakers attempted to translate into policy. At times, these interpretations and their 
implications for the US were explicitly stated; in other instances they were inferred from the 
justification of the preference advanced in the decision-making process. These events provide 
an opportunity to examine how these debates developed along with the changing reality of 
bilateral relations and, consequently, how the rival explanations influenced the creation of 
policy responses. The events selected are interesting not just because they represent a 
significant development in the relationship but also because they subsequently became part of 
the wider on-going debates on China’s rise, therefore their importance extends beyond the 
immediate impact in a specific timeframe.  
 
                                                 
1
 Interview with Banning Garrett, Asia Program Director, Atlantic Council, Washington DC, 09/03/11. 
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The analysis also demonstrates that policymaking is not simply a contest between rival 
interpretations but is also constrained by the particular policymaking structures through which 
responses are developed. Utilising foreign policy subsystems, it is possible to determine the 
actors involved in the creation of policy on specific issue-areas related to an event which 
provides insights as to why some interpretations appear to be more ‘influential’ in shaping 
policies despite the increasing visibility of rival interpretations within policy discourse. 
Proponents of the latter are not generally in policymaking positions where they are able to 
translate their preferences into policy while ignoring others. In some instances, compromises 
between preferences are necessitated by the ability of one set of actors to block another.    
 
The second section defines the US’ foreign policy subsystems before we move to examine the 
decision-making processes in six cases to determine how different interpretations of China’s 
rise influenced the outcome (section three). The fourth section reflects on the key findings of 
the empirical analysis and further develops the explanation for the pattern of engagement in 
the US’ China policies. The final section relates the analysis to the main questions driving the 
research. Over the timeframe of analysis, China’s rise has been a strongly contested notion and 
the resultant debates within the US’ policymaking structures have had an impact upon the 
preferences and decisions of policymakers. The most important finding is that despite China’s 
growing power and vocal sections of the US policy community interpreting this as a growing 
threat, interpretations which characterise China as a potentially responsible player and 
downplay threat concerns have not only persisted but also been key to the determination of the 
US’ responses and policies at key points in the relationship.   
 
3.2 US Foreign Policy Subsystems 
 
The US’ policy subsystems are arranged around the executive and legislative branches of 
government. The executive subsystem is the primary venue for foreign policymaking across 
all issue areas. The Constitution grants the President the greatest prerogative over foreign 
policy (Powell, 1999: 259) and in practice has remained dominant (Peterson, 1994: 217). All 
decisions are taken in the name of the President, thus they assume ultimate responsibility for 
the actions of the various executive agencies (Tan, 1992: 19). Delegation of policy 
formulation increases the scope for policymakers to advance their own preferences, but 
require Presidential approval. However, the President’s personal level of involvement in 
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policy formulation, the agencies/actors they prefer to delegate responsibilities to, and the 
political acumen of these actors will vary over time and across administrations. For instance, 
Ross (2001) and Tucker (2001) paint very different pictures of the George HW Bush and 
Clinton administrations: the former was heavily involved in foreign policymaking and had a 
keen interest in relations with China. Clinton’s personal interest in foreign policy generally 
and China specifically was considerably lower, initially leaving executive agencies to compete 
with each other for influence.  
 
Under the Constitution, Congress has authority for trade policy although has the power to 
delegate to the presidency, a mechanism which was used extensively in the 20
th
 Century and 
resulted in growing presidential power on specific decisions (O’Halloran, 1994: 6-7). There is 
no area of policy under consideration where Congress enjoys exclusive prerogative, as it relies 
only passing legislation which requires Presidential approval unless there is a two-thirds 
majority in both Houses to override a Presidential veto. Even then, the President continues to 
influence policy through control of the bureaucratic agencies responsible for implementation 
and also through the use of Executive Orders, national security directives, proclamations or 
executive agreements (Canes-Wrone et al, 2008: 4). Consequently, Peterson (1994: 217) 
deigned Congress a “secondary political player” in foreign policy. Congress pays intermittent 
attention to foreign policy issues – let alone China – and does not act as a unified body, 
therefore its ability to influence the decisions varied considerably depending on the case and 
the level of interest generated.  
 
Congress’ main powers in the executive-legislative subsystem relate to foreign economic 
policy – alongside the constitutional requirement for the Senate to ratify treaties with third 
countries. Congress has some shared powers over foreign policy under the Constitution, and 
often has the impetus to challenge presidential policy under pressure from the public (Myers 
and Shambaugh, 2001: 3-4). Congress’ major sources of power over military/security policy 
are the ‘power of the purse’ and the War Powers Act, which are effectively utilised in 
response to the President’s actions. The President also enjoys informational advantages, 
particularly in terms of diplomatic information and state secrets (Powell, 1999: 561). In most 
cases, because the President enjoys a first-mover advantage (Canes-Wrone et al, 2008: 6), they 
are often able to act unilaterally and put Congress in a position where they are only reacting to 
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presidential decisions rather than directly formulating policy. Nevertheless, Congress is 
arguably the key venue for debate, giving policymakers a platform to voice their views.   
 
3.3 US Responses to Key Events in the Bilateral Relationship 
 
Before turning to examine specific cases, the way in which the US’ stated policies towards 
China have evolved since the end of the Cold War provides a useful starting point for 
understanding how interpretations of China’s rise have evolved over time. While the US does 
not produce public documents on China policy, the National Security Strategy (NSS)
2
 
documents highlight the state of relations and US objectives. Table 3.1 gives an overview of 
key quotes from these, providing insights into trends of the salient interpretations. The most 
important trend across the documents was the consistent emphasis on engagement against the 
background of China’s increasing power. The justifications for this approach evinced 
interpretations of China’s rise as a positive development which created opportunities for the 
US and the international system more widely. Frequent references were made to the US 
welcoming China’s emergence as a peaceful actor and contributor to the global system.  
 
Although China’s expanding power received increasing attention this was paired with 
consistent emphasis on the determination to engage China to ensure its emergence as a 
responsible, peaceful power. The GHW Bush and Clinton administration documents 
articulated interpretations of China’s rise as more of an economic and political opportunity 
than any form of threat. The GW Bush administration’s documents are more ambiguous; 
subtle warnings regarding the ‘path’ China’s leaders intend to follow indicate that military 
threat interpretations in play but also reiterated that the US welcomed China’s peaceful 
emergence. Overall, the stated approaches are generally consistent with behaviour adopted – 
as I demonstrate below – rather than simply constituting empty rhetoric. While China often 
complains about a containment strategy, this is not part of the US’ stated intentions3 nor is it 
                                                 
2
 The NSS documents are produced by the executive branch. This is worth mentioning because there are often 
clear gaps between the interpretations of China’s rise in the administration and Congress (as well as between 
factions in Congress). No equivalent documents are produced by Congress or in collaboration between the two 
branches. Such documents would largely replicate the position of the NSS, otherwise this would potentially create 
two separate visions of foreign policy. There is no truly single ‘China policy’, but policymakers attempt to 
construct an outwardly coherent position to signal intentions to third parties. 
3
 Interview with Banning Garrett, Washington DC, 09/03/11. 
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reflected in its behaviour. The statements cited in Table 3.1 are, as the analysis below shows, 
insights into the perceptions which dominated the US’ discourse on China policy.  
 
To investigate how differing interpretations of China’s rise have influenced the preferences of 
US policymakers, this section examines six instances of decision-making. These cases have 
been examined extensively in the literature, but rarely in terms of what they tell us about the 
evolution of perceptions of China in the US. By examining a set of incidences which are not 
just about China’s military power, we are able to see how the different dimensions of China’s 
rise contribute to a policy discourse in which competing perceptions vary in salience over 
time. In debates over how to respond to developments in the relationship, policymakers 
advance their preferences which are predicated on their interpretations of China’s rise. Thus 
the policy debates are more than just reactions to events at a specific point in time, but also 
represent a wider contestation of the implications of China’s rise for the US. By understanding 
foreign policy decisions as the product of distinct policy subsystems, it is shown that these can 
facilitate or constrain the ability of particular actors to translate their preferences into policies. 
 
In effect, although debates over events often revealed diverging interpretations of China’s rise, 
I find that characterisations of China’s rise as a threat are rarely propagated by key decision-
makers within the administration. Consequently, the preferences of key policymakers were not 
guided by the logic of power-transitions, but instead interpretations of China’s rise as 
presenting opportunities (economic and political) and potentially contributing to regional and 
global stability have dominated. These interpretations are, however, conditioned to some 
extent by a remaining uncertainty as to where exactly China will end up, which has often 
manifested a preference for ‘managing’ the relationship in a way that is conducive to overall 











By tackling the cases chronologically, their influence on the evolution of the debates over 
China’s rise can be analysed. These cases are important not just because they represent 
significant junctures in the relationship but because they were marked by debates over specific 
policies and debates between rival interpretations of implications of China’s rise. The 
preferences which are successful in the policymaking process are predicated on particular 
interpretations of China’s rise, but are not necessarily the whole story. Therefore as well as 
establishing what interpretations were present at any given time, it is necessary to be able to 
identify whether subsystem arrangements contributed to the success of one over its rivals. The 
point is to show that not only is China’s rise a contested concept in US policy discourse, but 
also that there is a pattern in terms of which actors subscribe to particular interpretations and 
are in a position to act upon these. For each case, two central questions are used to structure 
the analysis. These are:  
 
 How did the differing interpretations of the rise of China inform policymakers’ 
preferences in relation to the issue(s) at hand?  
 Which actors were involved in decision-making and to what extent were their 
preferences mediated by the subsystem through which policy was developed? 
 
The first aims to establish the developments in the discourse over China’s rise and how the 
contestation between different interpretations conditions the political environment in which 
responses are formulated. The second question leads to an explanation of why certain actors 
were able to translate their preferences into policy at the expense of others and the way in 
which, at times, rival interpretations are effectively ‘shut out’ of the policymaking process. 
This approach facilitates an appreciation of the context of the debates over China’s rise and in 




The spring of 1989 witnessed mass protests – made up primarily of students – in Beijing, 
catalysed by the death of party dissenter Hu Yaobang and fuelled by the widening gap 
between the rich and the poor and high inflation (Dreyer, 2000: 617; Mason and Clements, 
2002: 164). After the failure of negotiations in the June, the government mobilised the army to 
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suppress the protesters with the death of hundreds as a result. This brought China into sharp 
focus in the US, undoubtedly contributing to conceptualisations of China’s rise as a potential 
threat – normative, but also militarily – and still casts a shadow over relations. As a result, 
Congress’ interest in the country increased dramatically which, as the analysis demonstrates 
below, has had a substantial impact on the China policies of the three administrations studied. 
Some concluded that China’s use of violence against its own citizens implies that it would not 
hesitate to do the same in the international arena. The first debates over the implications of 
China’s rise developed in the aftermath of the event. As such, Tiananmen is an ideal starting 
point for the analysis.  
 
Key power-transition theorists Tammen et al (2000: 117) gave no real account of the US’ 
response, simply stating that “sanctions in the wake of the Tiananmen Square massacre had 
little effect on events in China, as other satisfied nations demurred. From a Power Transition 
perspective, the effectiveness of trade sanctions is very limited”. Although arguably too early 
for power-transition interpretations of China’s rise to have taken root, Tiananmen arguably 
provided the first evidence of China as dissatisfied with international human rights norms and 
values and willing to use force to achieve political objectives. In this case, PTT’s expectation 
would be for the US to reinforce the system’s rules to guard against China’s potential 
challenge and punish this transgression. Tammen et al (2000) were incorrect to say that other 
satisfied powers balked from taking action – the EU and Japan amongst others imposed their 
own sanctions. More importantly, they failed to consider the significance of Tiananmen for 
US perceptions of China as it has become part of the policy discourse and invoked in 
arguments that China’s rise presents both a normative – and potentially military – threat.  
 
The schism between the administration – particularly President Bush – and Congress over the 
appropriate course of action was driven by differing interpretations of the event itself and, 
more widely, the importance of the US-China relationship. Both branches of government were 
clearly appalled and dismayed by the events; however Bush strove to maintain bilateral 
relations and pursue policies aimed at promoting China’s economic development and political 
reform, showing no signs of contemplating isolating China from the international community. 
The majority of Congress had a different perception of the importance of China and the 
appropriate response. The immediate reaction was shaped by the President in the executive 
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subsystem, but Congress’ power over economic policy meant that it was partly forged within 
the executive-legislative subsystem.   
 
Given that human rights were taken to be universal values, the immediate objective for both 
the administration and Congress was an end to the repression. Under presidential prerogative, 
sanctions were imposed across the political, military and economic dimensions including the 
cancellation of high-level meetings, cooperative projects and the cessation of arms sales. 
Beyond this, both branches sought to obtain better human rights protection in China but 
diverged in their preferences for how to achieve this. The administration evidently favoured 
engagement whereas Congress pushed for responses which would effectively have ostracised 
China. Human rights issues and concerns over Chinese citizens’ future immediately became 
more prominent expressions of a normative threat in discourse, particularly within Congress.  
 
In Bush’s (1989a) first press conference, he “deplore[d] the decision to use force” and could 
not “ignore the consequences for our relationship with China”. However, he also expressed a 
preference for continued engagement: 
 
This is not the time for an emotional response, but for a reasoned, careful action 
that takes into account both our long-term interests and recognition of a complex 
internal situation in China… It would be a tragedy for all if China were to pull 
back to its pre-1972 era of isolation and repression… I would argue with those 
who want to do something more flamboyant because… this relationship is vital 
to the [US] (Bush, 1989a) 
 
Throughout, Bush reiterated his desire to preserve the relationship as far as possible while 
condemning the violence. Days later, Bush (1989b), responding to criticism of his approach, 
argued that it was “in the interest of the [US] to have good relations” with China as it became 
a more important international actor. The underlying logic was that the best hope for reform 
was to encourage China’s engagement with the world rather than attempting isolation and 
allowing hardliners to suppress the population further. This suggested an interpretation not of 
a normative threat, but a political opportunity for the US to shape China’s development in a 
positive manner. As such, China’s re-emergence on the international scene itself was still 




In contrast, responses from Congress rarely cited the importance of the relationship, 
prioritising the promotion of democracy/human rights. While the President’s actions received 
support from many (see statements in Congressional Record, 1989: H2315-8 & S6129-30), 
others felt that it had not gone far enough. Nancy Pelosi
4
 called for a “full-scale economic 
embargo” (Congressional Record, 1989: H2319); recalling the US’ ambassador to send a 
signal to the Chinese government was also a popular preference. One letter to Bush from 
Members requested tabling a resolution at the UN Security Council condemning China’s 
actions for “reasons of regional stability and peace” (Ritter, 1989: 1). This indicates a 
perception of China as a regional military threat based on its behaviour. Congress supported 
Bush’s initial response, but many felt that it did not go far enough and preferences for more 
extensive sanctions emerged in the debates. Congressional Democrats personalised the issue 
by attempting to argue that Bush was ‘close’ to China5. The upswing in Congressional 
activism was remarkable; Tiananmen made China a more prominent foreign policy issue and 
fostered strong views amongst legislators. This subsequently complicated policymaking for 
the administration, particularly on issues such as China’s Most Favoured Nation renewal 
(Tucker, 2001: 450), as rival interpretations in the debates curtailed Bush’s ability to act upon 
his preferences into policies on issues where Congress had some say.   
 
The language employed by Congresspersons was notably more forceful than the President’s, 
with regular references to the “butchers of Beijing” (e.g. Congressional Record, 1989: H2502) 
and persistent emphasis on the brutality of the suppression of democratic aspirations. 
Although the administration repeatedly condemned the use of force, its language was more 
tempered as Bush saw this as vital to avoid isolating the Chinese leadership and preserving the 
relationship. Bush’s preference was based on his clear interpretation of China as an 
increasingly important player with which the US had to engage to shape its rise; Tiananmen 
did not alter this and Bush strove to ensure it did not derail his policies. Bush had a deep 
interest in China prior to assuming the Presidency, having served as Chief of the US Liaison 
Office. Daniel Reuther
6
 commented that Bush’s personal experience was advantageous as “he 
understood how important the whole issue [Tiananmen] was and secondly how crucial it was 




 Interview with former senior US administration official, Washington DC, 15/07/10. 
6
 Reuther served in America’s China Embassy, 1987-1989. 
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to maintain contact with the Chinese so that we didn’t lose contact with the reformers” (cited 
by Tucker, 2001: 446).  
 
Despite critical interpretations of China in Congress and the media, Bush continued with 
policies consistent with his own interpretation. His decision to dispatch diplomatic missions to 
China in July and December 1989
7
 to salvage relations demonstrates the importance he 
accorded the maintenance of the engagement policy. Secretary of State James Baker explained 
that the President did not want to “compound [the Tiananmen] tragedy by seeking to isolate 
China from the international community” (cited by Ignatius et al, 1989). Although couched in 
diplomatic language, Scowcroft’s description of the US as “friends” of China and the purpose 
of the visit as “to resume our important dialogue on international questions of vital interest to 
both our nations… [and] to reduce the negative influence of irritants in the [bilateral] 
relationship” (cited by Erlanger, 1989) provided insights into the administration’s 
interpretation: China was an emerging power with which the US needed to engage to 
encourage along a path of reform. When the visits became public knowledge, the 
administration was heavily criticised by members of Congress for undermining the response to 
Tiananmen (Sullivan, 1992: 11), fostering an image in Congress and the media
8
 of “Bush [as] 
‘soft’ on China” (Tucker, 2001: 438). The contrast between the administration and Congress’ 
preferences reveal a substantial division between their views on the importance of US-China 
relations and broader interpretations of China’s rise.  
 
Bush saw the trips as a responsible step in foreign policy and “the prudent exercise of 
presidential prerogative” (Lampton, 2001: 25); evidently less concerned about the potential 
risks domestically than he was about losing the gains in US-China relations of recent years
9
.  
Even in the immediate aftermath, diplomatic ties were maintained and officials supported the 
continuation of a working-level relationship. Bush vetoed Congress’ legislative attempt to 
extend Chinese students’ visas10, on the grounds that this would restrict his ability to be 
flexible in foreign policy matters and would likely alienate China’s leadership further 
(Skidmore and Gates, 1997). Yet Bush subsequently enacted its provisions, directing the 
                                                 
7
 National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft and Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger.  
8
 See op-eds from McGrory (1989), Hoagland (1989) and Lord (1989, former ambassador to China).  
9
 Interview with former senior US administration official, Washington DC, 15/07/10. 
10
 H.R.2712 – The Emergency Chinese Immigration Relief Act and S.1370 - Emergency Chinese Immigration 
Relief Act of 1989.  
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Attorney General to allow PRC nationals to remain in the country (Thornburgh, 1990: 1-3). As 
a result of Congress’ attempts to determine policy through the executive-legislative subsystem, 
the President was effectively forced to partially accommodate these preferences to curtail 
criticism. Another complicating factor for Bush was that Chinese officials often consider bills 
to represent the government position, but do not always take note of which ones actually 
pass
11
. The concern was that Congress would undermine the administration’s message, thus 
limiting domestic criticism was crucial for securing Bush’s main preferences.  
 
The divergence between Bush’s perception of the crackdown and the dominant view in 
Congress was not over Tiananmen in isolation, but was driven by their broader interpretations 
of the importance of China to the US and the international system. This forced the President to 
play a balancing act between maintaining bilateral relations and preventing domestic political 
fallout. There were also some divergences in preferences within the executive branch; James 
Baker and some other key players were initially eager to meet the political needs of the 
moment to show that the US was appalled at what had happened
12
. These were largely 
contained to the inter-agency process, with the general thrust being in the same direction, but 
there was a gap between the administration as a whole and the President who did not want to 
respond as strongly, due to progress in US-China relations
13
. The President had the ultimate 
prerogative to act upon his own preferences, and this was what he did.  
 
Bush’s activism and determination to control the policy response demonstrates the President’s 
pivotal role in both the executive and executive-legislative subsystems. This enabled Bush to 
directly pursue policy preferences based on his own interpretation of the events in the context 
of the developing relationship and with sufficient support from his own party in Congress 
block other actors from translating their preferences into policy. A less engaged President may 
have interpreted the implications of the events differently and developed alternative 
preferences or allowed a wider range of actors – such as Congress – to implement their 
preferences. Bush’s strong belief in his interpretation of the importance of China and ability to 
determine policy were central factors shaping the US’ response.  
 
                                                 
11
 Interview with Wayne Morrison, Specialist in Asian Trade and Finance, Congressional Research Service, 
Washington DC, 09/07/10 [NB: personal views, not representative of CRS]. 
12
 Interview with former senior US administration official, Washington DC, 15/07/10. 
13
 Interview with former senior US administration official, Washington DC, 15/07/10. 
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The massacre was argued by the Chinese leadership to be a domestic affair, and not the 
concern of outside actors. While it did not pose a direct threat to the US security, both the 
events and the PRC’s continued belligerence in the face of condemnation clearly created 
concern that China was a threat to its own people; conceivably, this could have fostered 
interpretations of an emerging revisionist power which sought to change the system’s rules. 
Accusations of weakness due to Bush’s engagement policies evinced concerns about China’s 
future behaviour, not just in terms of the treatment of its own citizens but also towards other 
international actors. This was evinced in Ritter’s (1989) aforementioned letter:  
 
when the leaders of a nation do not respect the human rights of their people 
during times of international peace, these leaders are much more likely to 
provoke war in periods of international tension – irrationally exploiting and 
expending their citizens.  
 
Thus the concept of China as a threat beyond its own borders actually emerged in the 
aftermath of Tiananmen; although not widely propagated the seeds were planted in the minds 
of some policymakers. It is evident however that an alternative interpretation persisted in the 
administration, producing a more moderate response than would have been the case under an 
interpretation of China as an emerging revisionist power.  
 
From a power-transition perspective, it might be argued that such an interpretation was 
actually present, characterising the response as an opportunistic attempt to curtail China’s 
development through the imposition of economic sanctions and the arms embargo; yet key 
PTT proponents have argued that such sanctions are ineffective.  Such an argument is 
incongruous with the evidence presented relating to interpretations of the events and China 
more broadly. Moreover, while the US sought to reassert the universality of human rights 
norms, it did not seek to ‘punish’ China particularly forcefully. Explaining the development of 
the response required examination of how preferences of key policymakers were shaped by 
their interpretations not just of the event, but of China’s importance and status as an emerging 
international player. The most significant outcome of the debate was the generation of 
differing interpretations of China’s character and the status of the bilateral relationship; the 
divergence between these have widened as China’s power has grown, leading to splits in 






After Tiananmen, China’s Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status became subject to annual 
contention, as Congress sought to exercise influence over some area of policy as punishment 
for human rights violations (Tucker, 2001: 450). Congressional critics argued that Bush was 
wrong to continue conferring the status upon a country which had so blatantly violated human 
rights, whilst Bush and his administration argued that MFN was not an appropriate instrument 
for attempting to influence China’s internal policies and behaviour. Power-transition 
perspectives would likely posit that China’s continued violation of human rights constitutes 
revisionist intentions towards international norms. Continued benefits from trade with the US 
would strengthen China, enhancing its ability to ignore human rights issues. The Clinton 
administration’s initial policy change was based on a concern that China posed a threat to its 
own citizens and for violation of international norms. However, it is evident that the 
administration’s interpretation of the importance of China as a political and economic 
opportunity changed within a year. The justification of ‘delinkage’ and Congressional 
reactions to this move indicate a divergence in interpretations. Although there was some 
support from Congress for delinkage, this was drowned out by its opponents. 
 
Rhetoric in the presidential campaign demonstrated the incongruity between Clinton’s 
interpretations of China and those of the outgoing administration, paving the way for policy 
change following inauguration. However, to explain why the policy of linking China’s MFN 
status to improvements in China’s human rights record was dropped within a year – despite 
minimal discernible progress – it is necessary to understand how the administration’s 
interpretations of the implications of China’s rise evolved. As noted above, Tammen et al 
(2000: 117) asserted that from a PTT perspective, economic sanctions are of limited use. Yet 
PTT would nevertheless expect the dominant power to avoid policies which were actively 
beneficial to the rising power. Its proponents would regard the linkage policy inconsequential 
at worst, but the subsequent reversal as detrimental to US interests since China had not shown 
any move towards a ‘satisfied’ disposition. The initial change, ‘MFN linkage’, was indicative 
of a general willingness to accommodate Congressional preferences, ostensibly to enable 
Clinton to pursue goals in other policy domains. The shift in the administration’s preferences 
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was prompted by developing perceptions of China amongst key players; the dominant 
interpretation which emerged was consistent with that of the previous administration.  
 
Winston Lord (cited by Tucker, 2001: 455) noted that “Clinton saw that Bush was vulnerable 
on [China], and it might play well before the American people” but at the same time “didn’t 
want to swing all the way over to isolation and containment. He genuinely was concerned 
about… human rights”. In this sense, Clinton’s initial preferences were not founded on a 
strong perception of China as a normative threat, but were tactical in the context of the 
election. Clinton’s criticisms of Bush effectively determined that he would have to take a 
different approach in office. The overriding concern was that policy was acceptable to 
Congress to avoid squandering political capital necessary for the domestic agenda (Lampton, 
2001: 34). However, as with GW Bush and the EP-3 incident (below), the interpretations of 
China conveyed through campaign rhetoric eventually gave way to alternatives which saw 
China as an increasingly important international actor with which the US needed to engage. 
 
The threat of revoking MFN represented a more coercive approach in China policy. This was 
consistent with Clinton’s heavy criticism of Bush’s policies, arguing that previous MFN 
battles between the administration and Congress had “divided our foreign policy and 
weakened our approach over China” (Clinton, 1993a: 981). At this time, the Taiwan lobby in 
Congress – then particularly strong – were opposed to MFN renewal. Congress had used the 
issue as a ‘valve’ to vent frustration over China’s human rights, the situation in Tibet and the 
status of Taiwan
14
 but placing these issues on the agenda also revealed interpretations of China 
as a human rights violator and a growing threat to international norms. Playing on Cold War-
era conceptualisations of ‘other’, Jesse Helms15 (amongst others) constructed an adversarial 
image of China by repeatedly employing the prefix “communist” (see Congressional Record, 
1993: S6336). This language, as noted in Chapter Two, has parallels to Cold War narratives of 
the communist threat, adding to the interpretation of China as a normative threat.   
 
In the case of delinkage, both the shifting preferences among key policymakers in the 
administration and the changing level of the President’s direct involvement in policymaking 
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were important factors. Formulating policies had previously been left to various administration 
officials while Clinton focussed on domestic politics; the absence of a well-defined China 
strategy and a multitude of actors with divergent preferences attempting to influence policy 
allowed for the changes to take place relatively easily once interpretations of China shifted. 
Although Clinton held prerogative over key issue-areas, he did not remain engaged with this 
issue after linkage, instead delegating responsibility to other administration officials. Clinton 
only became involved when there was a shift in other policymakers’ interpretations which 
prompted a debate within the administration as the deadline for a decision drew near.     
 
The linkage policy was enacted through an Executive Order
16
 in May 1993, making MFN 
renewal subject to improvements in human rights. The Executive Order also required China to 
adhere to commitments under the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty and the Missile 
Technology Control Regime. Although conditionality was not attached to these criteria, their 
inclusion arguably indicates wider concern about China’s behaviour internationally as well as 
at home in terms of violating the norms embedded within these treaties as well as the concern 
that it might actively arm other states which were of concern to the US. In Clinton’s (1993b) 
letter to Congressional leaders justifying linkage and the decision to renew for that year, the 
language suggested that China was had made minor improvements on human rights but still 
had some way to go. Clinton avoided extensive criticism of China, instead noting positive 
steps and highlighting areas of potential progress. Similarly, Clinton’s (1993a) statement on 
linkage stressed China’s importance, rather than defining it is a broader threat to US interests 
or security. 
 
Some Congressional Democrats advanced preferences for immediate revocation of MFN but 
lacked sufficient support or power to translate these into policy (Dittmer, 2001: 437). Edward 
Markey
17
 stated that a “straight, unconditional denial of MFN… is the only response” to 
China’s record on human rights and weapons proliferation (cited by McGrory, 1993). Senator 
DeConcini
18
 criticised China’s human rights record and also argued for revoking MFN on the 
basis of its military build-up which would potentially destabilise the region (Congressional 
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Record, 1993: S6855). Gerald Solomon
19
 argued that MFN extension was unwarranted given 
China’s lack of progress on human rights issues (Greenhouse, 1993). However, despite the 
linkage policy receiving majority support, there was no clear Congressional stance. For 
instance, Bob Dole
20
 criticised the conditionality policy on the basis of potential economic 
damage to the US and the need for good relationships with China which was “going to be a 
huge force in Asia” (Congressional Record, 1993: S6813). 
 
The administration’s failure to specify what would actually constitute sufficient progress to 
satisfy the conditions imposed was problematic as it contributed to a lack of consensus 
between administration policymakers on the policy’s efficacy: “[i]n the absence of decision by 
the President, each bureaucracy… [gave] amorphous presidential views the content they 
[preferred]” (Lampton, 1994: 621) to support their own position. One policy official was 
quoted as observing that “virtually everyone in the Cabinet and subcabinet has an opinion” 
(cited by Williams and Devroy, 1994). There were also growing divisions within Congress 
over linkage, with Clinton meeting Congressional leaders on both sides of the debate to 
consider options (Devroy, 1994). House Speaker Thomas Foley
21
 argued that linkage was “not 
the most effective way to advance human rights… it’s very public and challenging and 
confrontational” (cited by WSJ, 1994).  
 
The lack of consensus within the administration prompted Clinton to assume a proactive role. 
Growing recognition of China’s increasing power meant that its cooperation on issues such as 
North Korea’s nuclear programme would be vital (Lampton, 1994: 599), a factor given little 
consideration previously. An interviewee who was part of the decision-making process noted 
that Clinton’s intervention was decisive, as his consideration of the evidence changed his 
preferences
22. In discussions with administration officials, Clinton’s most pointed argument 
was that sanctions and embargoes against Cuba over fifty years had not resulted in democracy, 
concluding that there was little chance to bring about change in China through the linkage 
policy
23
. This shift in policy preferences was facilitated by the broader reinterpretation of 
China as an important global actor with which the US needed to engage, based on perceptions 








Interview with former high-level US policy official, Washington DC, 07/07/10. 
23
Interview with former high-level US policy official, Washington DC, 07/07/10. 
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of potential political and economic opportunities. Others in the administration shared this 
preference, such as the National Economic Council, as well as Congresspersons whose 
constituencies depended on trade with China (Lampton, 1994: 605-6); these actors’ 
preferences were based on their perception of significant economic opportunities from 
improved bilateral relations and no conditionality for MFN.  
 
Clinton (1994: 1166) announced in May that progress had been unsatisfactory due to 
continuing human rights violations; instead of revoking MFN it was renewed, with the linkage 
between its future status and human rights improvements ended. Clinton (1994: 1170) stated 
during a press conference that the decision “is not about forgetting about human rights. This is 
about which is the better way to pursue the human rights agenda”. Clinton (1994: 1166-7) 
argued that China was an important nation and that the decision would help China to become a 
more responsible player domestically and internationally. Articulating a preference for a 
policy of broad engagement (Clinton, 1994: 1168), the language revealed an interpretation of 
China’s rise presenting economic and political opportunities. Further evincing this 
reinterpretation of China’s growing importance as a political opportunity, Clinton (1994: 
1170) declared that he was “offering to build the basis of a long-term, strategic relationship” 
with China.  
 
Members of both parties in Congress argued that the US was turning its back on human rights 
in China, restating the normative threat presented. Attempts were made to revoke MFN 
outright
24
 and Pelosi introduced a bill
25
 for reinstating conditionality, although these did not 
pass (Li and Drury, 2004: 289). While there were strong advocates of continued linkage, 
others were less interested but went along with it for political reasons
26
. This suggests that the 
majority were not strongly committed to the preferences manifest in the legislation; as such, 
despite the rhetoric there was no definitive interpretation of China as a normative or economic 
threat driving their behaviour. Congress had scope to alter such policies within the executive-
legislative subsystem if there was sufficient support to first pass the legislation then overturn a 
presidential veto if required.  
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H.J. Res. 372 and H.J. Res. 373 (1994). 
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H.R. 4590 (1994). 
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Interview with former high-level US policy official, Washington DC, 07/07/10. 
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Policymakers’ views of the international context and their interpretations of China’s behaviour 
influenced their preferences on this issue (Lampton, 1994: 598). Clinton’s ‘hands-off’ 
approach to policy afforded the State Department and the National Security Council (NSC) 
considerable influence over policymaking, privileging their interpretations (Lampton, 1994: 
598-9). Jean Garrison (2007: 116-7) described Clinton’s decentralised advisory system as 
effectively allowing others to run China policy. This led to divisions within the cabinet, 
producing three distinct preferences. Some argued that human rights should be the touchstone 
of relations, whilst others argued that the linkage policy was ineffective and likely to be 
counterproductive. The final view – belonging to the business community and their supporters 
in the administration – contended that linkage was disadvantaging US exports due to China’s 
retaliatory imposition of tariffs
27
. These divergent preferences emerged from various 
interpretations not only of China’s domestic and international behaviour, but also its 
importance to the US. The on-going competition between these sets of preferences eventually 
forced Clinton to take a decision.  
 
Changing preferences in the administration were linked to an evolving interpretation of China; 
initially, this was relatively simplistic: China was a human rights violator (normative threat) 
which needed to be coerced into changing its behaviour. Arguments presented by key 
policymakers in the run-up to delinkage indicate that interpretations of China as both a 
political and economic opportunity had (re)emerged. Discussions within the administration 
and justifications for delinkage forwarded by Clinton were not just about human rights or trade 
relations; they were about how the US should respond to China’s emergence as a more 
powerful international player. Initially, the President and Congress were in harmony with 
respect to their policy preferences and interpretations of China. Over time, more 
administration actors concluded that sacrificing the broader relationship on the basis of human 
rights concerns was irrational. This position was rejected by many in Congress, who continued 
to prioritise human rights issues
28
. That the Chinese government did not simply accede to US 
demands forced the Clinton administration to revaluate its position not because it was 
powerless, but rather because their calculus of the relationship’s importance had changed.   
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The linkage policy was essentially a delayed reaction to Tiananmen; Clinton’s interpretation 
of China as a normative threat prompted him to utilise policymaking powers to effect a policy 
change advocated by Congress since 1989. This is consistent with PTT expectations, except it 
cannot explain timing of such behaviour when variations in individual policymakers’ positions 
should not matter. While the ascendancy of Clinton to the White House explains the shift in 
policy, the subsequent reversal requires understanding why the preferences of administration 
actors changed. Arguments advanced in the spring of 1994 reveal a shift in interpretations of 
China as an economic and political opportunity as it continued to rise, altering the parameters 
of the policy discourse. China’s rise was seen as too important by administration officials to be 
subject to such sanctions. PTT does not allow for this, as the importance of China’s rise is 
fundamentally rooted in the challenge to the US it presents. The impact of the administration’s 
reconsideration of its approach to relations with China was evident in later policy 
documentation – specifically the 1995 NSS which set out an engagement strategy (White 
House, 1995). The reaction of some in Congress to delinkage and continued attempts to 
revoke MFN indicate that their interpretations of China as a normative threat were unchanged.  
 
Taiwan Strait Crisis 
 
This significant test of Sino-American relations in 1995 and 1996 was catalysed by the US 
granting Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui a visa following Congressional intervention after 
the application had initially been rejected (Dreyer, 2000: 619). During his visit, Lee referenced 
“the Republic of China on Taiwan” in a speech which was considered provocative towards 
China (Lord, cited in Tucker, 2001: 481). In response, China recalled its US ambassador, 
delayed its agreement to the nomination of James Sasser as the new US ambassador and 
cancelled numerous bilateral meetings (Kissinger, 2011: 473). The following month, China 
launched missiles into the Taiwan Strait in an apparent attempt to intimidate Taiwan’s 
leadership (Cooper, 1997: 200). The tests were followed by larger training exercises in August 
and November. China’s aggressive actions intensified in early 1996 in the build-up to the first 
democratic Taiwanese presidential election; influencing the outcome of this was China’s 
primary objective. The crisis is a crucial case because the US response – the dispatch of two 
aircraft carrier groups to the region – can be construed as the closest the two sides came to 
conflict over the timeframe of analysis. Yet following the peaceful resolution of the crisis, the 
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administration continued with its policies of engagement and downplayed threat perspectives 
which had gained salience in Congress. 
 
This crisis was arguably the first real demonstration of China’s increasing military strength 
and potential willingness to employ it for political ends. Tammen et al (2000: 37) noted that 
the Taiwan issue has “significance well beyond its geographical context” because China is a 
potential challenger. The US “cannot afford to allow the China-Taiwan dispute to polarize US-
Chinese relations or poison the relationship to the extent that China becomes an aggressive, 
dissatisfied power”. The crisis presented a challenge to the US’ defensive commitments to 
Taiwan and its wider regional commitments. In this context, those interpreting China’s rise as 
part of an impending power-transition would see China’s behaviour as indicative of 
increasingly hostile intentions and confidence in its abilities as it rises. One possible 
interpretation of the 1995/96 crisis was that of China challenging the status quo of cross-Strait 
relations, which it had accepted since 1949 under the “cover” of the ‘one-China’ principle 
(Ross, 2002: 54). PTT would expect a strong reaction to this growing military threat, to ensure 
that the US’ regional dominance remained unchallenged. Unchecked aggression on China’s 
part would only invite more in the future.  
 
Threat interpretations were prevalent in some commentary: the New York Times labelled 
China as “bellicose and uncompromising towards its adversaries” (Tyler, 1995a). Former 
China ambassador, James Lilley, claimed “they are beginning to take us on in international 
waters, and that is pretty dangerous” (cited by Tyler, 1996). Charles Krauthammer (1996) 
accused the administration of “craven diplomacy” and ending with a warning that if “you wait 
for war, you invite war”, heavily implying a growing regional military threat. Yet the 
administration did not conceptualise the event as a direct threat either to Taiwan or US 
interests. Nevertheless, China’s behaviour was widely regarded as irresponsible as it risked an 
accident on miscalculation which might inadvertently instigate conflict. The absence of a 
strong threat interpretation contributed to a restrained response consistent with established 
policy. The executive branch’s control of military/security policies excluded preferences 
generated by rival interpretations – from the decision-making process.  
 
The eventual dispatch of two aircraft-carrier groups to the region was the chosen response not 
because policymakers anticipated an impending conflict over Taiwan, but rather because it 
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signalled continued commitment to its security alliances and broader regional stability. That 
the US did not attempt to contain China’s growing military capabilities – either during the 
crisis or in the following years – contravenes expectations under a power-transition 
interpretation of China as a rising challenger. Yet the concept of engagement with China was 
subsequently reinforced, not diminished. This in itself is interesting because the evidence 
suggests that the crisis did not dramatically shift the dominant interpretation of China’s rise 
towards a growing regional military threat, despite the fact that it has been described as a 
“turning point” (Lampton, 2001: 46) and supposedly “brought the biggest change in American 
goals and means since 1972” (Nathan, 2000: 95). 
  
While the response marked a departure from normal interactions with China in the region up 
until that point
29
, the decision to dispatch aircraft-carriers with the implicit threat of force did 
not result from a significant shift in interpretations of China’s rising military power. The 
potential use of force was established under the existing policy framework of the Taiwan 
Relations Act which committed the US “to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion 
that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system” of Taiwan (US 
Congress, 1979: §2.2.6). Administration actors did not conclude that the crisis required such 
action, as a result of the prominence of interpretations of China’s rise which prioritised 
regional stability, i.e. China was considered a military non-threat at least in terms of its 
intentions. This facilitated strong preferences amongst key administration players for avoiding 
confrontation. 
 
The language used in the 1995 NSS indicated that China as a potential regional military threat 
was one possible interpretation of its rise (White House, 1995: 29); however, the language in 
the document around the aims of the US’ engagement with China and the positive aspects of 
its increased economic and political power indicated that the threat interpretation was not 
dominant. The extent to which China’s rise was considered as potentially threatening was 
restricted to its impact upon US regional interests. The NSS was published in February that 
year so provides insights into the administration’s interpretation of China’s rise heading into 
the crisis. Thus, actors within the administration were arguably predisposed to interpret the 
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crisis within this framework; as the analysis below demonstrates, this was not sufficiently 
disruptive to force a reconsideration of their ideas about China.  
 
At the time, Congressional support for Taiwan was high with generally negative attitudes 
toward China and lingering resentment over the MFN/human rights linkage issue. However, 
Congressional input in shaping the response was limited by three factors. First, 
military/security issues fall under the control of the executive subsystem. Second, Congress 
had less information on the crisis, with only select members serving on intelligence and armed 
service committees briefed
30
. Finally, Congressional actors refrained from voicing their 
preferences too much since their demands for Lee to be granted a visa was a contributing 
factor to the onset of the crisis
31
. So while pro-Taiwan forces favoured a stronger response on 
the basis that China represented a threat (see below), they were unable to influence policy.  
 
Administration responses to China’s missile tests were initially restrained, noting that the 
actions were not conducive to regional stability but not going as far as condemning them 
(Suettinger, 2003: 226). However, defence officials on a China delegation in November 
appeared to interpret these as threatening. One official was stated that “China is brushing off 
military plans and operational contingencies that they haven’t thought about since the 1950’s. 
This is an issue we are very concerned about” (cited by Tyler, 1995b). Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for International Security Affairs Joseph Nye warned against the use of force, but also 
noted that policies of engagement through military contacts would continue (Tyler, 1995b). 
Thus although there appears to have been a growing interpretation of a regional military 
threat, the broader policy of engagement to influence China’s rise had not been altered as the 
dominant military non-threat and political opportunity interpretations still outweighed it.  
 
The given justification of the dispatch of the ACGs to the region did not define China either as 
a revisionist power or an immediate threat; a State Department press briefing in March 1996 
noted that they served as “a signal meant to convey the strong interests that we have in a 
peaceful outcome” in the situation (cited by Ross, 2002: 56). This is not to suggest that 
commitments to Taiwan were not real or that it would not intervene in a conflict, but rather 
that such an eventuality was not likely. Administration officials concluded that the prospects 
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of China attacking US forces in the region were considerably smaller than the potential of an 
attack on Taiwan (Ross, 2002: 80). Additionally, there was a concern in the administration 
that Taiwan’s response to China’s actions might result in an accident, creating an escalating 
situation which would potentially involve the US
32. Consequently the administration’s 
understanding of the crisis’ precarious nature was more complex than simply China 
threatening Taiwan.   
 
The administration’s response indicated that threat interpretations were not particularly 
influential; had this been the case, we would expect stronger criticism and a more forceful 
reaction. China became increasingly aggressive in early 1996 in the run-up to the Taiwanese 
election, conducting numerous missile tests and exercises in the waters around the island 
(Chen, 1996: 1055). From then NSC Director of Asian Affairs Robert Suettinger’s (2003: 253-
6) account, the NSC and Departments of Defense and State
33
 shared responsibility for shaping 
the response. Secretary of Defense William Perry was not usually ‘hot-headed’ on China but 
considered this situation to be very serious
34
, commanding significant attention within the 
administration. The consensus was that the US had to take steps to prevent rash action but 
avoid destabilising the situation (Suettinger, 2003: 255). The group’s interpretation was 
clearly that China did not present a direct threat to regional security at that time.  
 
Preferences for engagement and non-confrontation remained stable; it was an important 
distinction that China was displaying force but not actually threatening or using force at that 
time
35. This view was consistent across the administration: Perry’s statements indicated that 
the situation was not interpreted as imminent danger to Taiwan (Ross, 2002: 80). Had threat 
interpretations prevailed, there would have been a greater propensity to conceptualise the 
display of force as a precursor to its use. However, documentary evidence indicates that the 
exercises were seen as primarily an attempt to influence Taiwan’s first democratic presidential 
election (Office of Naval Intelligence, 1996: 1). That is not to say that China’s actions were 
acceptable simply because they were not a direct threat to Taiwan’s security; rather the 
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response was mediated by this interpretation of China’s motivations. The actions of both sides 
have been described as “shadowboxing” (Blechman and Wittes, 1999: 24), however power-
transition interpretations would still advocate a response to China’s hostile intentions, 
irrespective of the actual limitations of its capabilities.  
 
Congressional responses illustrate a mixture of interpretations of the events and by association 
China’s rise. Republicans in particular took a hard stance; Rep. Solomon referred to China as a 
nuclear armed giant growing “more adversarial by the day” (Congressional Record, 1996: 
E482). Senator Frank Murkowski
36
 wanted the “Senate to… go on record deploring the 
military threat” of China, although continued that he did not see an attack on Taiwan as 
imminent (Congressional Record, 1996: S2623). Dissenting views were also expressed: 
Dianne Feinstein
37
 effectively attributed blame to Taiwan for provocative actions 
(Congressional Record, 1996: S2628). The House resolution on the crisis
38
 implied that 
China’s behaviour was a threat to regionally stability, with a clear preference that US “military 
forces should defend Taiwan in the event of invasion, missile attack, or blockade” (US 
Congress, 1996). Further references were made to China’s attempts to “intimidate the [US] 
with veiled threats to launch a nuclear attack against the [US mainland] should the [US] assist 
Taiwan in defending itself from attack” (US Congress, 1996). It appeared that such a remark 
had been privately made by a Chinese official to a US official
39
 but the administration did not 
take this as indicative of China’s actual intentions. The preamble was amended by the Senate, 
removing the commitment to actively defending Taiwan and references to the nuclear threat 
which suggested that the prevailing interpretation of China as a military threat was relatively 
more moderate in the upper chamber. 
 
Despite China’s actions and the massing of military capabilities directly across the Strait, US-
China relations did not deteriorate in the crisis’ aftermath. Instead, officials continued to 
advance preferences for policies of engagement as the best way to deal with China
40
. Some 
have suggested that the crisis resulted in considerable change in policy (Dickson, 2002) but 
the evidence suggests continuity in interpretations of China’s rise amongst administration 
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policymakers. Revisions to the US-Japan Defense Guidelines which came after the crisis were 
rooted in concerns over North Korea
41
 – even though references to cross-strait stability were 
made – rather than a direct response to this crisis. Continued preferences for engagement can 
be attributed to the absence of interpretations of China’s rise as inherently threatening; this 
limited the impact of the crisis on policy in ways that we – or rather, power-transition theorists 
– would otherwise anticipate. In Congress, the crisis does appear to have reinforced 
interpretations of China’s rise as a threat, based on calls for an end to strategic ambiguity and 
greater arms sales to Taiwan (O’Hanlon, 2000: 52). 
 
The response was predicated on a perception of China engaging in irresponsible behaviour, 
with a limited goal of influencing Taiwan’s election rather than challenging the status quo and 
threatening conflict. Crucially, PTT does not allow for such nuances: behaviour is taken on 
face value at the international level. Two broader concerns also contributed to the response: 
the need to reassure regional partners that it was still committed to regional stability and 
specific security commitments
42; and also the “domestic front in Congress” (Lord, cited by 
Tucker, 2001: 486) – a lack of response would perhaps have emboldened China and led to 
stronger Congressional criticism of the administration. Taiwan’s immediate security was not 
considered to be directly at stake (Ross, 2000: 108), thus sending the aircraft-carriers into the 
Strait was deemed unnecessary. The administration’s preference for engagement was 
predicated on calculations that the balance of power was not directly at stake. That the crisis 
did not escalate further and US-China relations were able to effectively return to normal 
thereafter reinforced the administration’s interpretation that China was not guaranteed to 
emerge as a threat. The extent to which China was viewed as presenting a threat was confined 
to regional security, but based more on its capabilities rather than its intentions.  
 
WTO Accession & PNTR 
 
WTO entry has been suggested to denote a change in China’s international behaviour from an 
ideological basis to the recognition of international rules and norms (Chan, G. 2004: 48; 
Clegg, 2009: 128). WTO accession would allow it to sustain rapid economic growth (Adhikari 
and Yang, 2002: 1-2), offer protection from discrimination through the rule-based trading 
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system (Ikenberry, 2008: 107) and grant recognition as a member of the “club of rule-abiding 
countries” (Shirk, 2008: 132). Gerald Chan (2004: 68) argued that it may be “the most 
significant peaceful change in the global political economy in the post-Cold War world”. 
WTO accession would also give China greater say in the making of international rules, which 
would increase its power. Between 1999 and 2001 debates became more intense over China as 
an emerging power and the implications for the US. These were exacerbated by a number of 
events: the Cox Report on Chinese espionage; the Chinese reaction to the US’ accidental 
bombing of the China’s Belgrade Embassy; and the tenth anniversary of the Tiananmen 
crackdown. Relations were also affected by Taiwan’s President Lee’s apparent rejection of the 
‘one China, two systems’ model, increasing cross-strait tensions in the summer of 1999 
(Suettinger, 2003: 380-5). Each of these was linked into the larger debate over China’s 
accession to the WTO and granting Permanent Normal Trade Relations
43
 (PNTR) status. The 
debate itself had greater importance for US-China relations than has generally been recognised 
in the literature. Despite the aforementioned events and vocal opposition to China’s WTO 
membership from some legislators, the administration played a leading role in integrating 




Tammen et al (2000) variously indicated that China was, around that time, a dissatisfied power 
and its growing economic strength would present a challenge to the US.PTT anticipates the 
US should maintain its relative advantage by doing nothing that will accelerate the already-
rapid rise of a potential challenger. Especially against the background of deteriorating 
relations and a sense of a growing military threat, PTT would expect that the US would not 
pursue policies which would allow China to expand its economic power as it would in turn be 
used to bolster its military power further. Throughout the WTO/PNTR debates, those who 
argued that China was a growing threat – whether economically, normatively or militarily – 
were the most vocal opponents of further integration. Those who argued that China’s rise was 
an economic and/or political opportunity were the main proponents of assisting China’s WTO 
entry. The wider context of relations around that time (Cox Report, Belgrade Embassy) further 
problematizes US behaviour for PTT.   
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Divergence between Congressional and administration preferences was a significant obstacle 
as the former could veto a proposed deal. Clinton saw China’s WTO accession as part of his 
legacy (Bhala, 2000: 1511) which reinforced his desire to secure a deal. This alone cannot 
explain the administration’s perseverance in the face of substantive opposition; an important 
factor was the persistence of Clinton’s interpretations of China’s rise having potentially 
positive implications in both the economic and political dimensions, as developed during the 
MFN delinkage process. The debates illustrated the contestation between different 
interpretations of China’s rise and their impact on policymaking. Despite China threat 
proponents – predominantly in the House – seeking to block WTO accession/PNTR, they were 
defeated by policymakers whose preferences were based on interpretations of China as an 
opportunity and an emerging great power with which cooperation was necessary.  
 
The administration argued that China’s membership would be mutually beneficial for 
respective national interests, bilateral relations and the global system (Lampton, 2001: 177). 
Amongst administration players, it was thought that China would become a more responsible 
stakeholder
45
 and adopt the WTO’s norms in its own interests, thus there was a “get them into 
the tent” attitude46. This line of argument reflects the interpretation of China’s rise as 
presenting both political and economic opportunities. By contrast, sections of Congress argued 
that Chinese WTO membership could undermine economic interests or its continued human 
rights violations should preclude admission
47
; views consistent with the economic and 
normative threat interpretations of China’s rise. Some supported WTO membership but 
opposed PNTR on the grounds that some form of leverage should be retained. 
  
Congressional opponents to the deal would reference China’s military threat to support their 
position
48
, warning that the trade deficit funded PLA modernisation, demonstrating overlap 
between the economic and military threat interpretations. Congressman Rohrabacher
49
 argued 
that US military power was “in decline”, while China was “building a massively repressive 
military regime that threatens the United States” (Congressional Record, 1999: H326). 
Rohrabacher went on to allege that China harboured revisionist intentions, citing similarities 
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to Nazi Germany (Congressional Record, 1999: H329-30) and asserting that the US should 
“defang this emerging dragon before it is ready to strike” (Congressional Record, 1999: 
H331). Discussing the revelations of the Cox Report
50, Rohrabacher described China as “a 
regime that hates everything America stands for and is determined to dominate the 21
st
 
Century… [and] is militaristic and expansionist” (Congressional Record, 1999: H1062). 
Rohrabacher went further than almost any other threat proponent, but nevertheless these 
concerns were reflected to varying degrees by others.    
 
Evidently, the trade debates were not taking place in isolation but in the midst of debates over 
China’s growing military and normative threats, and what this meant for the US. Congressman 
Burton
51
 claimed that the “the Chinese Communist government is advancing their nuclear 
technology... if they are not on a par with us yet, they are getting very, very close; and we are 
going to be in jeopardy if we ever have a conflict” (Congressional Record, 1999: H2909). 
These debates and obvious bipartisan concern over the developments in 1999 contributed to a 
wider consideration of China’s rise than simply a cost/benefit analysis of its WTO 
membership. This was not a partisan issue, as opponents and supporters hailed from both 
parties, divided by their interpretations of the implications of China’s rise in terms of 
economics, politics and security. 
 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jesse Helms (1999) invoked power-transition 
logic in the Wall Street Journal, contending that “Beijing’s paramount goal is to displace US 
influence in the Asia-Pacific region”. Helms (1999) called for a tougher stance on China as 
engagement policy – now being conducted from a position of weakness – had failed. John 
Hayworth
52
 argued that the Cox Report necessitated reconsideration of China’s WTO 
accession, recalling a Chinese official’s observation that America cared more about Los 
Angeles than about Taiwan in relation to its defence commitments. Hayworth appeared to treat 
these comments as indicative of hostile intentions and China’s rise as inherently threatening  
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(Congressional Record, 1999: H1065) despite administration officials concluding that it was 
“empty bluster… or a calculated bluff” (Suettinger: 2003: 248) rather than a direct threat.   
 
While representing extreme positions rather than the ‘mainstream’, these examples indicate 
the range of views and arguably contributed to the delay of the deal. The tenth anniversary of 
Tiananmen was also used as a reminder of the Chinese government’s authoritarian character. 
Tom Lantos
53
 likened Tiananmen to the Chinese reaction to the Belgrade Embassy bombing
54
, 
arguing that the government had not changed in a decade (Congressional Record, 1999: 
H3530). Although Congressional critics were not united on the kind of threat China posed, a 
clear preference emerged from their disparate interpretations: to deny a deal on WTO 
accession and later PNTR. This was diametrically opposed to administration preferences and 
threatened to derail the process. Yet after the summer, the administration pressed ahead with 
the negotiations for the deal. Following extensive negotiations led by US Trade Representative 
(USTR) Charlene Barshefsky in Beijing that November, the deal was secured. Clinton 
addressed the logic of the deal in the context of China’s rise: 
 
it is in the strategic interest of the United States. One of the great questions of the 
next several decades… is whether China and the [US] will have a constructive 
relationship or be at odds. I believe that just as we work together in the United 
Nations, even though we sometimes disagree, we will work together in the WTO 
(cited by NYT, 1999). 
 
The reaction in Congress was predictably mixed. One prominent WTO accession supporter – 
House Rules Committee Chairman David Dreier
55
 – argued that China’s integration with the 
rules-based system would “go a long way toward improving stability in the [Asia Pacific] 
region” (cited by Davis and Taylor, 1999). Others, such as Rohrabacker, Helms and Ernest 
Hollings
56
 remained opposed, with the former claiming that the deal amounted to “putting our 
stamp of approval on having a gangster regime coming into yet another international body” 
with the possible consequence that “the organization itself will be corrupted by having the 




 American explanations that this was a tragic error and subsequent apologies offered were rejected by China, 







world's worst human rights violator in its midst” (cited by Stevenson, 1999), once more 
invoking normative threat interpretations of China’s rise.  
 
Although the deal was secured, PNTR status still had to be conferred: although a negative vote 
from Congress would not impede WTO accession, it would prevent US companies benefitting 
from China’s commitments (Lardy, 2000: 6). Clinton argued in his 2000 State of the Union 
address that despite some uncertainty over China’s trajectory, it was by no means pre-
determined or beyond influence. Calling for Congress to grant PNTR, Clinton stated that 
China’s integration with the international system would benefit US interests and “advance the 
cause of peace in Asia and promote the cause of change in China” (Congressional Record, 
2000: H33). Explaining his preference for dealing with China’s rise, Clinton stated: “No, we 
do not know where it is going. All we can do is decide what we are going to do. But when all 
is said and done, we need to know we did everything we possibly could to maximize the 
chance that China will choose the right future” (Congressional Record, 2000: H33).  
 
In order to block PNTR, the loose coalition between conservative Republicans and liberal 
Democrats of the MFN debates re-emerged (Sutter, 2001: 90). Congressman Barr
57
 claimed 
that it was an “undisputable fact that Communist China is a real and growing threat” 
(Congressional Record, 2000: H120). Another worried about “trading with a country that 
holds Americans hostage every day by maintaining nuclear weapons targeted” at the US 
(Congressional Record, 2000: H2349). These arguments explicitly invoked both normative 
and military threat interpretations of China’s rise. The economic threat perspective was also 
salient, as some were concerned about exacerbating the trade deficit (Faux, 2000: 2). 
Congressman Traficant
58
 claimed that the deficit was financing “an army that someday may 
come after us” (Congressional Record, 2000: H578). Human rights and labour forces generally 
wanted to retain some kind of ‘check’ over China59 through annual renewal of NTR. Granting 
PNTR was argued to signal that the US “condones [China’s] inexcusable religious 
persecutions and human rights abuses” (Congressional Record, 2000: H2349).  
 






 Interview with former US policy official, Washington DC, 08/03/11. 
145 
 
PNTR supporters concentrated on economic opportunities; Congressman Knollenberg wanted 
Congress to “avoid the temptation to give in to the protectionist forces” (Congressional 
Record, 2000: H2254). These views were often derided as economically opportunistic and 
inattentive (or outright unsympathetic) to human rights; Congressman Brown
60
 claimed that 
the US would be “accepting the outrageous treatment of laborers in China” (Congressional 
Record, 2000: H3410). These critiques pointed to questions of legitimacy, attributing PNTR 
approval as signalling that China’s authoritarian regime was acceptable. This was then linked 
to the military and normative threats presented by China’s rise; Dan Burton claimed that the 
trade deficit was 
 
more money with which to buy rope to hang us with… They are building the 
largest army in the world… We are going to pay for it, and all the while our 
defenses are being lowered and lowered… They are an enemy of the free world…  
[and] a threat to the entire world (Congressional Record, 2000: H3685).  
 
Positions on PNTR were not simply divided along lines of interpreting China’s rise as a 
military or normative threat or not; some generally disposed to this view voted in favour of 
PNTR on the basis of economic benefits (for instance, see Kyl’s61 remarks, Congressional 
Record, 2000: S10129). Neither was it divided along partisan lines, as many Republicans in 
the House supported PNTR; it was some Democrats the administration needed to persuade. 
The vote eventually passed in the House in May 2000 – following this intensive administration 
activism
62
 – and then comfortably in the Senate that September (Suettinger, 2003: 397). This 
was important since had the result been close, PNTR status would likely be revisited by 
opponents with potentially negative implications for relations
63
. The underlying interpretations 
of China for many legislators had not changed; one interviewee noted that there were still 




The policymaking process carried over from the final days of Clinton’s administration into the 
new GW Bush administration. During the campaign, Bush strongly criticised Clinton’s 
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policies and identified China as a strategic competitor. While evincing a strong interpretation 
of China as a potential military threat, Bush nevertheless made clear he supported WTO 
membership and PNTR (Scobell, 2002: 359) on the basis of his perception of significant 
economic opportunities from China’s rise and integration with the international economic 
system. Bush also had to contend with Congressional attempts to revoke PNTR and reinstate 
annual renewal, which resulted in the President utilising a waiver to renew NTR (Jones, 2002: 
7-8). The continuity between the two administrations’ preferences was facilitated by similar 
beliefs relating to the US’ ability to shape China’s rise despite disagreement on its character.   
 
PTT is essentially at a loss when it comes to explaining this case, as the US’ behaviour goes 
against its assumption that the dominant power will seek to maintain its relative advantage. 
Appreciating the contribution of rival interpretations of China’s rise to vociferous policy 
debates is vital to understand the development of policy on WTO membership. However, the 
evidence does not indicate that interpretations of China as an economic and political 
opportunity won over previous critics; rather, these interpretations prevailed because they 
were held by key players in the administration and a sufficient majority of Congress. Those 
who interpreted China as an economic/normative/military threat invoked power-transition 
logic, marking a new stage in the debate over China’s rise where such a threat was given 
explicit consideration. The appearance of such arguments also indicated the presence of wider 
military threat interpretations within the policymaking community, whereas previously it had 
largely been considered threatening in the regional context. Thus the nature of the China threat 
was shifting in discourse to some extent. China’s normative threat was the most frequently 
cited but not a smokescreen for a containment strategy; rather it was based on a genuine belief 




In April 2001, the collision between a US EP-3E surveillance (‘spy’) plane and a Chinese F-8 
fighter jet resulted in the death of the Chinese pilot and the US crew making an unauthorised 
emergency landing and subsequently being held on Hainan Island. China argued that this was 
detrimental to national security interests given that the collision took place over its Exclusive 
Economic Zone (Slingerland et al, 2007: 53). Both sides blamed each other for the incident 
(Donnelly, 2004: 28-9); President Jiang Zemin and Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan’s call for 
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an apology initially went unanswered (Gries, 2006: 327). China held firm – despite US 
insistence that fault lay with the Chinese pilot – arguing that the US harboured hostile 
intentions. Its policymakers also viewed America as unconcerned by the death of the pilot, 
leading to demands for the US to show “respect” (Yee, 2004: 66). China’s intransigence and 
accusations of US hostility initially appeared to reinforce the new Bush administration’s view 
of China as a strategic competitor. As argued above, 1999-2001 was a critical period for the 
debates over China’s rise in the US and this incident could conceivably have contributed to the 
deterioration of bilateral relations. Instead, after eleven days, an apology letter was finally 
issued, although avoided making a direct apology (Zhang, H. 2001: 385).  
 
China’s response to the collision should have reinforced military and normative threat 
interpretations: its apparent belligerence and growing assertiveness, as well as violation of 
diplomatic norms, suggest an emerging challenger with revisionist intention. The incident was 
the first real foreign policy test for Bush – intuitively, China’s behaviour should have 
reinforced his perception of China as a competitor as it demonstrated willingness to stand up 
to the US, symbolically challenging its dominant position in the region. PTT says little about 
isolated diplomatic incidents, but it would expect the dominant power to assert its authority 
and the rules of the international diplomatic system. However, this was not the case; the 
outcome actually suggests that threat interpretations were side-lined in the determination of 
policy despite a rhetorical shift in the early days of the GW Bush administration. 
  
The outcome – the temperance of rhetoric and maintenance of amicable relations (Dickson, 
2002: 651) – was influenced by Bush’s decision to delegate responsibility to policymakers in 
his administration, consistent with his hands-off approach to foreign policy matters at this 
time. However, these policymakers’ interpretations of China’s rise were moderate relative to 
Bush’s, and their understanding of the event was more nuanced. A significant concern for 
administration hawks and some in Congress was that China was not willing to play by the 
rules of the game, often linked to other examples of its alleged belligerent behaviour. For the 
most part, the administration did not engage with this debate, although some statements after 
the resolution indicated continued misgivings about US-China relations. Bush’s immediately 
response was consistent with his interpretation of China as a challenger, yet this changed 
relatively quickly once Rice and Powell assumed responsibility for policy formulation. While 
148 
 
the incident did reinforce interpretations of a rivalry for some
65
, the administration re-
established ‘engagement’ as the basis of relations thereafter, predicated on political 
opportunity and military non-threat interpretations.   
  
During the 2000 election campaign, Bush promised a more ‘realist’ foreign policy which 
would be oriented towards defending national interests including the construction of theatre 
missile defence in East Asia (Gries, 2005: 402). References to China as a ‘strategic 
competitor’ evinced an interpretation of China’s rise markedly different to that of his 
predecessor and closer to the military threat perspective. Presidential candidates are able to 
make such statements without bearing responsibility for policy; what they say and do cannot 
make a difference and, importantly, their interpretations are not conditioned by the 
responsibility of managing relations. Presidents regularly criticise their predecessor’s policies, 
but once in office recognise that there are certain interests at play, and go with the “current”66. 





At the time, there was also a notable shift in how the administration viewed the relationship 
more broadly, recognising China’s increasing importance internationally and that an 
adversarial relationship was not in the in the US’ – or the world’s – interests. For the duration 
of the negotiations the administration cut off contact between officials and their Chinese 
counterparts with the exception of those involved in discussions
68
. The logic behind this – and 
the lead role assumed by Powell and Rice – was that it was a diplomatic issue which required 
extensive discussions between the two sides. The Department of Defense was not publicly 
involved since, as a Pentagon spokesperson noted, “there is a diplomatic solution to this 
incident and not a military one” (cited by Sanger, 2001a).  
 
The State Department – with White House support – was responsible for formulating the 
response. Thus there was little scope for cross-departmental debate and largely kept policy 
hawks – particularly those in the Department of Defense such as Rumsfeld – out of the 
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process. The range of perceptions of the situation articulated by key policymakers was 
relatively narrow given the lack of contrasting interpretations of China’s rise among them. 
Secretary of State Colin Powell and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice (the key 
actors) successfully convinced the President that the initial policy line would have negative 
implications for bilateral relations. This prompted a shift to a more pragmatic view of the 
situation (Garrison, 2005: 170-2). Although there was some debate over the implications of 
the event and what it meant within the context of China’s continued rise, statements from the 
administration thereafter indicated that threat interpretations had been diminished – not 
reinforced – by the experience.   
  
Bush’s (2001a) immediate response was to declare China’s behaviour as “inconsistent with 
standard diplomatic practice, and with the expressed desire of both our countries for better 
relations”, demanding the immediate release of the crew69. Bush (2001b) cautioned that the 
“accident has the potential of undermining our hopes for a fruitful and productive 
relationship” with China, but emphasised that he wanted to “keep this accident from becoming 
an international incident”. Once Rice consulted with other officials and experts, it was 
revealed that the Chinese had complained about that flight for months and was an accident 
waiting to happen. This shaped Rice’s own view of the event and interpretation of China’s 
behaviour. In turn, Rice’s briefings to the President influenced Bush’s interpretations of the 
situation
70
. Other policymakers often considered ‘hawks’ also recognised need for a pragmatic 
response; a member of Vice President Cheney’s staff had indicated that Cheney wanted 
“rational management of the relationship” to avert a crisis and resolve the situation71. 
Consequently, the advocated approach of the key players had sufficient support to avoid 
protracted debates within the administration.  
 
A diplomatic resolution was still relatively slow which allowed for some debate to play out 
within the US policy community. China’s main demand – an apology – was initially 
unacceptable to the US, although they eventually issued in a letter (Avruch and Zheng, 2005: 
344-5) which was worded in such a way that allowed Powell to contend afterwards that they 
had not directly apologised (Yee, 2004: 80). This was important as the administration 
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attempted to avoid appearing weak or as though they had bowed to China’s wishes, ostensibly 
because Congress had called for a tougher response. Although Congress had limited scope to 
influence the response, some aired their preferences in response to the administration’s 
decisions and the justifications of the response. Thus, rival interpretations of China’s character 
and the implications of its rise persisted in policy discourse.  
 
Discussions of China’s rise were often framed in relation to whether it was a strategic partner 
or competitor. Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman Richard Shelby
72
 argued that China’s 
behaviour demonstrated that it was “not our strategic partner, and never was” (cited by 
Mufson and Pan, 2001). John McCain clearly linked the event to a growing regional military 
threat when he stated that he “would be more inclined to make sure that Taiwan has the ability 
to defend itself given this intransigence” (cited by Mitchell, 2001). Rohrabacher went further, 
claiming that it “opens the door for… providing weapons to countries like the Philippines who 
may also be threatened by Communist China” (cited by Mitchell, 2001). This response is 
unsurprising from China threat proponents such as Rohrbacher, but the event’s magnitude is 
reflected in the apparent impact on those previously less hostile, such as Senator Joseph Biden 
who cautioned against a “meltdown” in relations but acknowledged that although he had “not 
been very supportive of upping the ante on Taiwan”, that view “could be overwhelmed by 
events” (cited by Mitchell, 2001).    
 
While some within the administration still held concerns about China as a “partly-emerging 
competitor” and saw the relationship as a rivalry – consistent with the military threat 
interpretation – the antagonistic rhetoric was largely dropped and military contacts were 
resumed (Dumbaugh, 2002: 16). Following the release of the crew, Bush (2001c) stated that 
both sides “must make a determined choice to have a productive relationship that will 
contribute to a more secure, more prosperous and more peaceful world”. The administration’s 
approach was shaped by interpretations of China as an increasingly important power with 
which the US had to cooperate, reflecting the political opportunity interpretation embraced by 
the Clinton administration. There was an emergent understanding amongst administration 
policymakers that while China posed challenges, amicable relations were of greater strategic 
and political importance. As such, the dominant perception of China in the administration was 





arguably that of both a competitor and partner of the US
73
, rather than a simple either-or 
distinction. The response to the incident defied expectations in light of the administration’s 
previous rhetoric which would have suggested a more confrontational response.  
 
The persistence of varied interpretations within the administration helps explain the general 
drift towards a general hedging strategy and occasional references in policy statements to the 
potential military threat presented by China. Bush appeared to evince a threat interpretation 
when he declared later that month that the US would do “whatever it took” to defend Taiwan 
(cited by King, 2001). This represented a stronger policy commitment than made by previous 
presidents
74
 and a break from the concept of strategic ambiguity. The State Department 
immediately insisted that policy had not changed. Bush also confirmed that policy had not 
changed, but the earlier statement had already created confusion (King, 2001). However, 
subsequent actions and statements appeared to reaffirm the more moderate position that had 
emerged during the EP-3 incident; the administration’s enthusiastic support for renewing NTR 
was – according to one official – due to the “need to counter some of the impressions of the 
past few months” (cited by Sanger, 2001b).    
 
This ‘damage-limitation’ led by the State Department further highlights the central role of key 
policymakers in shaping China policy. If the President’s interpretation of a military threat had 
been clear-cut, it is likely that the State Department would have been overridden on this issue. 
The general tone of statements and the resumption of high-level contacts indicated that policy 
was driven by preferences for closer relations with the rising power. The administration’s 
policies following the event were also evidently influenced by the recognition of China’s 
potential influence on the issue of North Korea’s nuclear programme75, which was seen as 
more of a threat. In this sense, China’s rise was perceived as conducive to US interests and 
regional stability, rather than as detrimental and destabilising. Such a perception is consistent 
with both the political opportunity and military non-threat interpretations.      
    
Early rhetoric seemed to indicate that interpretations of China’s rise as a military threat would 
form the basis of policy and this incident could easily have accelerated this shift. Indeed, this 
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would have been consistent with PTT’s expectations. In reality, the response was dominated 
by an interpretation of China as an increasingly important international actor with which the 
US needed good relations. Threat interpretations, while expressed by some over the course of 
incident, did not underpin the preferences of the small number of administration officials 
involved in policy formulation. Rice and Powell’s perceptions of the event and China’s rise 
produced a clear preference for engagement which was successful due to the President’s 
relative detachment from foreign policymaking early in his administration. The strength of 
Bush’s commitment to the interpretation of China’s rise initially espoused was evidently 
limited, allowing alternative interpretations to guide policy.   
 
Interpretations of China as a political opportunity and the general engagement strategy were 
reinforced after the terrorist attacks in September 2001. The post-9/11 period witnessed an 
increasing frequency of high-level contacts and bilateral exchanges (Shambaugh, 2002: 245). 
Randy Schriver stated that Bush’s views of China did not change much over the 
administration’s duration, but rather references to a strategic partnership were predicated on 
the necessity of cooperation, or at least to marginalise Chinese opposition to US action
76
. In 
this sense, engagement policies were reinforced by a broader interpretation of China’s 
importance to the international system rather than of China’s character directly. The 
prevalence of China threat interpretations in administration rhetoric was diminished post-9/11, 




China conducted a successful anti-satellite (ASAT) ballistic missile test against its own 
satellite in January 2007. This was criticised internationally for the creation of debris in low-
orbit due to potentially negative implications for other satellites, the International Space 
Station and future space missions (Johnson-Freese, 2007: 20). It has been suggested that the 
missile launch was an attempt by China to signal its capabilities and to project its power 
around the world (Economist, 2008: 23-24). The exercise demonstrated China’s ability to 
disrupt the US’ satellite network thereby offsetting its advantages in military and nuclear 
capabilities (Tellis, 2007: 42). This development was directly relevant to assessments of 
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China’s military capabilities. Despite the US retaining qualitative superiority, capabilities 
employed in asymmetric strategies can offset this advantage by rendering much of the US’ 
sophisticated technology redundant in a crisis situation – such as over Taiwan.  
 
Contrary to PTT’s emphasis on the need for the rising power to obtain near-parity with the 
dominant power, these advances increased the threat potential without closing the relative gap 
in overall power. There was a parallel concern over China’s failure to communicate in 
advance its intention to conduct the test, its subsequent silence followed by initial denial once 
the story broke internationally (Tellis, 2007: 42). The lack of transparency relating to its 
activities should have provided ammunition to proponents of threat perspectives; yet the US’ 
response was arguably relatively muted, with little discernible increase in perceptions of China 
as a military threat amongst key administration policymakers. Of all the developments 
examined, this incident should have provoked a greater shift towards threat interpretations of 
China’s rise as it presented the clearest indication of the potential challenge to the status quo.    
 
Military build-up has become more prominent in PTT scholarship since Lemke and Werner 
(1996), but more importantly has become an integral part of arguments which postulate that 
China’s rise signals an impending power-transition. Indeed, the ASAT capability became an 
important reference point for those arguing that China’s rise presented a military threat. 
Although the administration repudiated China for violating international norms of conduct in 
outer space, the response did not overtly treat China as a military threat even though it 
presents what should be an easy case for PTT. The demonstration of capabilities which could 
severely hurt the US in conflict should prompt a strong response. Discussion of ‘hedging’ 
emerged as a result of the increased attention to China’s military developments over the Bush 
administration. With the apparent proliferation of military threat interpretations, the 
demonstration of a sophisticated asymmetrical capability may have provided a catalyst for a 
significant downturn in relations. However, the administration’s policy preferences were 
driven by the continued prevalence of perceptions of China’s importance to regional and 
global security questions and as a growing power which the US needed to integrate into the 
international system.    
 
The executive subsystem was the venue for the formulation of the response, given that the 
incident was a military/security issue. The State Department (Barnes, 2007) and NSC rather 
154 
 
than the DoD were central to policymaking (Milowicki and Johnson-Freese, 2008: 5); at that 
time, the State Department and NSC were populated with policymakers who were keen to 
minimise disruption to the wider relationship, based on their interpretations of political 
opportunities presented by China’s rise. Their views of the event were thus conditioned by the 
wider context of the importance of China’s rise. Bush’s involvement was minimal, although 
he consented to the formulated response. Although policymakers considered ASAT 
capabilities to be directed at the US
77
, they did not see it as an urgent threat to national 
security. Instead, after initial repudiation, other issues resumed prominence in the bilateral 
agenda. This was illustrated by Cheney (2007) questioning China’s commitment to its stated 
policy of a “peaceful rise” in light of the ASAT test and military build-up more widely, but at 
the same time praising China’s contributions to the Six-Party Talks on North Korea, 
emphasising the need for continued cooperation. 
 
The DoD’s (2006: 29) Quadrennial Defense Review reported that “of the major and emerging 
powers, China has the greatest potential to compete militarily…and field disruptive military 
technologies that could over time offset traditional US military advantages”. The 2006 NSS 
had stipulated that the US sought to engage China but would also “hedge” against the 
possibility that its rise did not result in the “right strategic choices for its people” (White 
House, 2006: 42). Although both reports had explicitly reaffirmed the objective of 
encouraging China’s growth as a responsible player, the ASAT test demonstrated that China 
had substantial disruptive capabilities, which could easily have diminished the belief that 
promoting its emergence as a ‘responsible player’ was realistic. Evidently, there was genuine 
concern over the military implications and China’s possible intentions78 and confusion over 
who had initiated the launch, raising questions over whether the PLA had acted 
independently
79. China’s initial silence following the test served to exacerbate worries over 
both capabilities and intentions. The lack of transparency added to the uncertainty over 
China’s rise, yet the prevailing interpretations in the administration were largely unchanged.     
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Until this point, the US had not faced a potential opponent in space, as the Cold War had 
ended before the contributions of space capabilities to warfare were understood
80
. This 
development represented unchartered waters, presenting an opportunity for interpretations of 
China as a threat – either to regional and global security or as a potential challenger and 
revisionist power more broadly – to gain greater traction in policy discourse. China’s ASAT 
capabilities undoubtedly added a new dimension to the debate over its rise but military threat 
interpretations, although promoted by some, did not produce a shift in the preferences of the 
key decision-makers in relation to the fundamental approach to China’s rise. Had such 
interpretations prevailed a more confrontational response would have been forthcoming based 
on the expressed preferences of those who saw the event itself as indicative of the broader 
threat presented by China’s rise.  
 
As the US had carried out such tests previously and since the move did not violate any 
international treaties
81, criticism focussed primarily on the creation of debris and China’s 
apparent unwillingness to conform to international norms of behaviour, particularly the non-
weaponisation of space. These factors led the administration to emphasise China’s 
irresponsible behaviour, arguing for greater communication, transparency and adherence to 
international standards of behaviour on China’s part. However, policymakers frequently 
reiterated preferences for continued engagement and the repudiation of China’s behaviour was 
relatively short-lived. This suggests that the event had not fundamentally altered 
interpretations of China’s rise. In contrast, Congressional actors continued to cite the test as 
evidence of China’s growing military power and hostile intentions towards the US (see for 
instance, Stearns’82 warnings over Chinese cyber-attacks, Congressional Record, 2007: 
H10323). 
 
The test could have been interpreted as part of China’s efforts to push the US out of the Asia-
Pacific region, as anticipated by John Mearsheimer (2006: 162), providing evidence of (at a 
minimum) an impending regional power-transition. If Zhang Baohui (2011) is correct to 
hypothesise that the US-China space relationship is the quintessential embodiment of the 
security dilemma, it is surprising that there was not a stronger response or deterioration in 
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military and even political relations. This indicates that the threat of an impending power-
transition was not the dominant concern within the US policy community; rather the 
administration’s focus was on small powers with disruptive capabilities and (perceived) 
hostile intentions. At least on this specific issue, China was apparently identified as a status 
quo power – hence on the same ‘side’ as the US – while it was North Korea that harboured 
revisionist intentions, despite its status as a small power lacking the potential to disrupt 
regional or global hierarchies.  
 
The incident did, however, influence the views of the military
83
 in a negative direction. One 
DoD official claimed that the test “showed they are not following us [militarily] but trying to 
leap ahead” (cited by Gertz, 2007). One former administration official noted that the strike 
was considered as an impressive technological feat for China
84
. A number of policymakers 
saw the test as indicative of a growing military threat and consequently intensified their 
arguments over China
85
, although they were not in positions to directly translate their 
preferences into policy. Concerns over the ASAT test echoed many of those raised in the 
2004-5 debate over the EU’s China arms embargo86, since space technology is dependent on 
dual-use technologies – those with both civilian and military applications (Hagt, 2007: 3).  
 
Although the response was determined by actors within the executive subsystem, 
Congressional actors vocalised concerns and attempted to initiate policy change through the 
executive-legislative subsystem. Senator Kyl advocated funding to improve space defence 
capabilities and hearings to determine whether China’s capabilities were derived from US 
technology, “shared or stolen” (Milowicki and Johnson-Freese, 2008: 12). However, there was 
no clear consensus in Congress, as the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
Joseph Biden warned against fostering an arms race (Butler, 2007). With no definitive position 
emerging, Congress’ ability to influence the deliberations in the administration was limited. 
 
Preferences for continued military-to-military exchanges were part of the administration’s 
desire to continue engaging China; there was also the advantage that these exchanges provided 
an opportunity to put across America’s concerns. Commander of the US Pacific Command, 
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Admiral Keating, personally delivered a message to the PLA that the ASAT test was 
inconsistent with China’s proclaimed peaceful rise but also reiterated the principles of the US’ 
engagement policy, declaring an interest in more “extensive and sophisticated” bilateral 
military exchanges and exercises (Yardley, 2007). These exchanges facilitate dialogue in an 
attempt to influence China’s future behaviour through positive inducements. Deputy Assistant 
Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Thomas Christensen (2007) conveyed the 
administration’s views on China’s rise to a Congressional committee:  
 
Rather than trying to contain China, we are trying to help shape its choices as it 
rises in influence so that China plays a responsible and stabilizing role in the 
international system. Despite some areas of real friction, US-China relations are 
far from a zero-sum game, and if we manage the relationship well on both sides of 
the Pacific, we should be able to keep it that way.  
 
Administration officials frequently pointed to China’s positive steps on the North Korean issue 
as evidence that it was stepping up its efforts to be a partner of the US
87
, evincing continued 
prevalence of the political opportunity interpretation of its rise. The envoy handling the North 
Korean nuclear issue, Christopher Hill, stated that the Six-Party Talks would not be disrupted 
by the ASAT test as they were “on a different track” (cited by Lanfranco, 2007). In this 
context, the logic behind administration preferences for a relatively restrained response to the 
ASAT test becomes evident. These preferences were translated into policy as a result of the 
administration’s prerogative of controlling the diplomatic relationship. Despite the 
intensification of debates over China’s rise, which had been less prominent on the foreign 
policy agenda since 9/11, an engagement strategy based on interpretations of China’s 
presenting both a political and economic opportunity has continued to underpin US policies.  
 
Writing in the Washington Post, Elizabeth Economy (2007) of the Council on Foreign 
Relations argued that debates over the specifics of the ASAT launch risked “obscuring [its] 
real message… rhetoric notwithstanding, China’s rise will be as disruptive and difficult as that 
of any other global power”. Economy (2007) claimed that “China, with its rapidly growing 
economy and large population, already exerts an unsettling and often negative impact on the 
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world”. While not claiming that China was overtaking the US, Economy (2007) implied that it 
may happen in the future, especially by reference to the need for continued US global 
leadership to uphold the current system. As noted in Chapter Two, Tkacik (2007a) argued that 
between China’s increasing military budgets, development of threatening capabilities and the 
ASAT test, there was a clear “intent to challenge the US as a military superpower”. Tkacik, 
like other threat proponents, assumes that the US’ own power is regarded as benign; a premise 
which Jervis (1976: 62-4) warned can lead to a spiral of insecurity.   
 
Such commentaries were frequent in the media and their arguments were repeated by some in 
Congress, bringing China’s rise back to the top end of the foreign policy agenda which had 
largely been dominated by the global war on terror. However, the test did not just fuel the 
debate over China’s rise; there was also considerable discussion over the US’ role in the lack 
of an international agreement that would prevent a space-based arms race with some observers 
viewing the test as an attempt to prompt the Bush administration to rethink its position on such 
a treaty (Holmes, 2007). There was also a view that the test revealed the vulnerabilities of the 
US’ system and that this was a problem the US should address, rather than looking at an 
international agreement or blaming China.   
 
The ASAT test had no discernible negative impact on the prevailing interpretations of China’s 
rise amongst key administration officials, outwith the DoD. By extension, there was little 
change in policies that signalled the deterioration of the relationship. Administration 
policymakers’ preferences for engagement appeared to be intensified rather than diminished 
despite the salience of military threat interpretations in the revived debate over China’s rise. 
This contravenes PTT expectations of the dominant power seeking to curtail the expanding 
power of the rising challenger. While acknowledging the challenges posed by its behaviour, 
administration officials continued to advance preferences based on interpretations of China as 
an increasingly important international actor and contributor to regional/global security. The 
implications of the test were secondary to other issues: North Korea, overall regional stability 
and continued engagement with China (despite the oft-cited hedging strategy). In on-going 
debates over China’s rise, the administration continued to reference the hedging element of its 
strategy, but placed emphasis on engagement. Thomas Christensen’s (2008) statement to the 




it is possible that in spite of the benefits that have accrued to China in the current 
US-led international system, China will at some point in the future attempt to use 
its growing military power and political and economic influence to undermine this 
system and be able to inflict severe damage to US interests. We must prepare for 
this contingency without allowing that preparation to become the core of our 
China strategy. Rather, we need to recognize that it is in the US national interest to 
support the rise of a China that is prosperous and at peace with itself and the 
world. 
 
3.4 Interpretations of China’s Rise and Decision-Making in the US’ Foreign Policies  
 
The US’ response to China’s rise has been strongly conditioned by the rival interpretations 
held by policymakers and the debates which arise between these. These shape policymakers’ 
preferences for particular courses of action, often with considerable gaps between these 
competing sets of preferences; the Tiananmen, MFN and WTO/PNTR cases illustrated this 
clearly in terms of divisions between the executive and legislative branches. One interviewee 
commented that such divergent views exist simply because the US has never dealt with a 
country like China before
88
. Although Congress was never fully united, there was a consistent 
trend of vocal elements expressing preferences which indicated the various threat 
interpretations of China’s rise, often framed in power-transition terms. Decisions made in the 
executive-legislative subsystem were marked by intense competition for influence amongst 
preferences derived from the rival interpretations. The consequence of these varied 
interpretations and institutional constraints on policymakers acting upon their preferences has 
been that US policies are not ‘objective’ responses to the changing reality of China’s power.  
 
Although concerns of an impending power-transition were evinced through the various threat 
interpretations of China’s rise, these views were only embraced by a minority of 
policymakers. Further, the key policymakers within the executive branch did not appear to 
hold these. Nevertheless, these ideas recurred in the discourse around these key events, with 
proponents of such views often pointing to the historical record of previous transitions to 
substantiate their claims. Despite China’s growing power, these views did not come to 
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dominate policy discourse; as Kissinger (2012: 46) noted, although “the rise of powers 
historically often led to conflict with established countries… conditions have changed”. One 
interviewee commented that many policymakers understand that “China is not the Soviet 
Union, which posed clear, unambiguous threats”89. Arguably, it is consistently recognised by 
the majority of policymakers that a policy of engagement is the “only course” of action since 
treating China like an enemy would bring about that very result
90
.Yet this has not precluded 
sharp debates over the implications of China’s rise.   
 
These debates in the early 1990s were generally dominated by economics and human rights, 
although we saw occasional references to a potential military threat at the regional level (and 
even beyond) despite China’s then relative weakness. After the delinkage of MFN from 
China’s human rights record, Congress did not attempt to push on human rights issues so 
vigorously
91
 although concerns were frequently invoked in discussion of other issue-areas. 
From the mid-1990s the military and security dimension became an increasingly important 
part of the debate. As I argued earlier, 1999-2001 witnessed extensive debates over the 
implications of China’s rise before being supplanted by the war on terror in the minds of US 
policymakers. The response to the EU’s proposal to lift its China arms embargo – the missing 
piece of the puzzle in this chapter – and the ASAT test refocused attention on China and 
revealed continued uncertainty within the US as to where China was headed. Despite this, the 
US saw an ongoing need for cooperation and remained committed to policies of engagement.   
 
The US’ policies did not reflect increasing concern over an impending power-transition, but 
rather demonstrated a largely constant approach of engagement with an objective of 
influencing China’s rise in ways conducive to US interests, regional and global stability and 
mutual prosperity. Perceptions of threat within the administration and some members of 
Congress were focussed on China’s threat to regional security interests, but these concerns 
were sometimes extrapolated and used to bolster the interpretations rooted in power-transition 
logic by some policymakers. Although there was a general drift in foreign policy towards 
hedging under GW Bush, dominant interpretations of China’s rise posited that its emergence 
presented political and economic opportunities as it could rise peacefully through integration 
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with the established international system, which seemed to be underway. The US – guided by 
the administration – has attempted to pursue a “pragmatic” relationship with China, which has 
prevented strong action being taken
92
. This continuity is often overlooked in analyses of the 
relationship due to high-profile events being examined in isolation, over-emphasis on the 
extent of policy change and the framing of the relationship as an impending power-transition. 
 
The durability of the non-threat/opportunity interpretations of China’s rise which generated 
preferences for engagement helps explain why the responses observed were not consistent 
with what would be expected if policymakers were guided primarily by interpretations based 
on power-transition logic. Across the various cases, some members of the policymaking 
community advanced preferences for alternative responses but were largely unsuccessful in 
getting their way. The persistence of these competing interpretations in itself is an interesting 
phenomenon given that the general drift of foreign policy and apparent proliferation of the 
various threat interpretations would increase the latter’s scope for greater impact on decision-
making. Yet what we see is in each case, the response established was not only based on 
preferences derived from interpretations of China’s rise as a potentially positive development, 
but came through a domestic debate in which threat interpretations were presented by some 
and rejected by the administration. Focussing on policy responses alone without considering 
the wider context of policy discourse would miss out on these dynamics.  
 
Even though the executive branch has greater overall prerogative in foreign policy, it was not 
always the case that the preferences advanced by its key players were implemented directly; 
due to some responses being formulated in the executive-legislative subsystem compromises 
had to be made when a gap between interpretations transpired – as demonstrated by some of 
the policy initiatives implemented by Bush in the wake of Tiananmen. As noted above, 
Congress pays attention to China-related issues intermittently, very rarely acting as a unified 
body, thus its influence on decisions varied depending on the case, the level of interest in the 
latter and the internal contest between different interpretations. The divisions within Congress 
in the WTO/PNTR case highlighted that despite vociferous opposition from some legislators, 
there was also support for the administration’s position which ultimately allowed the President 
to enact his preferences.    
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Congress represents a diverse range of interests which helps explain the array of 
interpretations of China’s rise. Representatives from states with very little trade interaction 
with China are less likely to interpret it as an opportunity. Others have substantial trade 
relations and even send their own trade delegations to China
93
. As such, foreign policies can 
have an impact on electoral fortunes for members of Congress who, consequently, “may find it 
politically costly to yield to the president’s foreign policy concerns” (Milner and Tingley, 
2011: 38). Congress also picks and chooses which issues it deals with whereas the 
administration is continuously responsible for the formulation and execution of policy
94
. 
Consequently, the starting points for administration and Congressional actors for interpreting 
China’s rise are substantially different. Congress often exhibits a wider range of perceptions in 
comparison to the administration
95
. Legislators in Congress are generalist – foreign policy is a 
very small part of what most members deal with – thus there is a tendency for more simplified 
views of China
96
 which has led to the development of preferences often at odds with those of 
the administration.  
 
As we saw, the right- and left-wings have a tendency to unite against the centre (as in the 
MFN and WTO/PNTR cases); disagreements are often within parties rather than between 
them
97
. The implication is that left/right ideological divisions are of little help in anticipating 
preferences for China policy. The same can also be said for the administration, in that despite 
their campaign rhetoric of both Clinton (Democrat) and GW Bush (Republican), they found 
themselves in the situation where their initial interpretation of China and the importance of the 
bilateral relationship had shifted. Although the GW Bush administration took a more sceptical 
view, both Presidents pursued policies of engagement and formulated responses to events in 
the bilateral relationship on the basis of interpretations of China’s rise as an opportunity in 
terms creating economic benefits and also as a partner for cooperation on other key issues. 
This was facilitated by limited perceptions of China presenting a military threat regionally or 
globally. Ultimately, their approaches were not much different from that of GHW Bush.    
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 Interview with John Park, Washington DC, 09/07/10.   
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 Interview with Richard Bush Washington DC, 09/03/11. 
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 Interview with Richard Bush, Washington DC, 09/03/11. 
96
 Interview with China analyst, Alexandria VA, 02/07/10; interview with Policy Analyst, Washington DC, 
13/07/10. 
97
 Interview with Richard Bush, Washington DC, 09/03/11. 
163 
 
Members of Congress’ arguments often raised concerns from other issue-areas in the 
justification of their preferences in particular cases. This was especially evident on trade 
relations, where interpretations of China as a normative threat due to continued human rights 
violations (MFN case) and as a growing military threat due to its expanding power 
(WTO/PNTR case) were bound up in the policy discourse, gaining almost as much 
prominence as perceptions of China’s rise as an economic threat. The administration arguably 
did the same in some cases, although going the opposite way; its justification of more 
moderate responses to particular incidents – such as the Taiwan Strait crisis and EP-3 incident 
– saw arguments which placed each event in the wider context of bilateral relations. These 
arguments invoked concepts consistent with interpretations of China’s rise as a political and 
economic opportunity in the sense that it potentially had positive implications for US interests 
– namely stability in the East-Asian region. Again, the low salience of military threat 
interpretations was instrumental in allowing these interpretations to hold sway.    
 
The dominant interpretation within the administration across the timeframe of analysis was 
that of China as a rising power which presented political and economic opportunities, thus 
necessitating engagement. This created the need for the administration to manage the 
relationship at the domestic as well as the international level
98. In the latter, the executive’s 
prerogative generally enables it to secure particular goals and interests with the intent of 
shaping China’s rise. In the former, the administration exercises considerable effort 
negotiating its position with Congress and discouraging it from taking legislative action that 
could be interpreted by China as a change of policy. This is necessitated by the variety of 
interpretations of China which are readily apparent within Congress. On any issue, the White 





The administration must also regulate the extent to which its different agencies can voice their 
preferences to prevent sending mixed messages, thus rival interpretations within the 
administration can sometimes be supressed. For example, DoD policymakers tend to take a 
harder line in their views of particular developments, but as one interviewee pointed out their 
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 Interview with Chris Nelson, Washington DC, 07/03/11. 
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remit is to consider the worst case scenario
100
 thus are primed to interpret China’s growing 
power as a potential threat to US interests and security. While the President can control for 
this, the same is not possible – or indeed desirable in American political culture – in the case 
of Congress. The management of the China relationship is not as simple as saying something 
has to be done; policymakers have to ask what can be done and what tools are available to do 
something
101
. The cases demonstrated a tendency for moderate approaches with a strong 
preference for favouring the status quo and stability in relations, based on interpretations of 
China’s rise as not inherently presenting a threat to the US’ interests or position in the 
international arena. Thus, policies anticipated under PTT-based threat interpretations of 
China’s rise did not materialise. The divergence between interpretations also contributed to 
disagreement over what constituted ‘national interests’ in most of the cases. Generally, it is the 





This chapter demonstrated that the contestation between rival interpretations of China’s rise 
have shaped the development of the US’ foreign policies in response to the shifting situation 
in the international arena. In doing so, it revealed the limitations of insights to be gained from 
considering the relationship from a PTT perspective, since its expectations failed to match up 
to the reality of how the US responded even as China grew stronger. The US does not have a 
coherent, singular policy towards China but multiple policies which can change independently 
of each other depending on which interpretations prevail in the policy debates. Over the cases 
examined, there was a clear pattern that perceptions of China’s rise as an economic and 
political opportunity were consistently influential amongst key policymakers; the extent of 
China’s military threat was more hotly contested, although for the most part, it appeared that 
policy decisions were predicated on the perception that China favoured stability both 
regionally and globally, rather than challenging the US and the established system.  
 
Although there was a trend toward the proliferation of interpretations of China’s rise as a 
military threat, these were not the basis of preferences advanced by key policymakers within 
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 Interview with China analyst, Alexandria VA, 02/07/10. 
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the administration who had the greatest degree of responsibility over policy. These prevailed 
precisely because they were dominant amongst key administration policymakers, who had 
significant influence in both the executive and executive-legislative subsystems. For PTT, the 
trends in the US’ responses are problematic since it should have been an easy case. 
Policymakers’ interpretations consistently focussed on economic and political opportunities 
and the potential for China to emerge as a responsible player which contributed to the 
maintenance of the current international system. However, the realities of policymaking did 
not allow administration policymakers to always get their way, opening up scope for 
competition between divergent sets of preferences.   
 
The US’ executive subsystem is dominant in foreign policymaking and although debates in the 
wider policy community can be influential, interpretations and preferences of administration 
actors – particularly the President – were often crucial. However not all actors were equally 
involved in different cases as the nature of the event would privilege certain actors; for 
instance, the Department of Defense had limited input on policy in the EP-3 incident because 
it was considered by top officials to require a diplomatic, not military, response. This case also 
highlighted the President’s capacity to directly engage in policymaking or delegate 
responsibility, with implications for how important their own interpretations were. Usually 
when they did not have strong preferences they delegated responsibility – as Clinton did with 
the conditional MFN policy between 1993 and 1994. The response to Tiananmen 
demonstrated the impact of a highly-involved President with a well-developed interpretation 
of China; by contrast, the response to the EP-3 incident contravened the precepts of Bush’s 
putative China threat perceptions precisely because he did not dominate the process.  
 
It is well established that the President is the primary foreign policymaker; this research 
concurs with the caveat that we must understand how the President’s preferences are 
conditioned by policy discourse. Overall, the importance of the contested nature of China’s 
rise within US policymaking illustrates the weaknesses of purely institutional analyses. 
Limitations of theoretical perspectives which deal with international-level factors are even 
more obvious as they cannot account for either the institutional or ideational factors which 
influenced responses, overlooking how international-level factors are interpreted and 
processed by policymakers and the constraints imposed by the decision-making setting. The 
processes of response-formulation are not identical, even within the same subsystem. 
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Competition between different sets of preferences – and by extension interpretations of 



































As with the US, China’s rise has been widely recognised by academics and policymakers alike 
to pose a number of challenges and opportunities for the EU. Its rapid development not only 
creates new issues in the bilateral relationship or changes the nature of existing ones, but also 
creates challenges and opportunities for the EU’s still-developing foreign policy project itself. 
At a basic level the EU has long benefitted from – and helped shape – the current international 
order which China’s rise may challenge. The political project of European integration was – at 
least initially – possible in part thanks to support from the US as its security guarantor. The 
transatlantic alliance is central to the current international order and thus the EU would be 
expected to be resistant to challenges to this system. The literature on the EU’s international 
relations has shied away from engaging with power-transition theory (PTT) and, in reverse, 
proponents of the latter appear largely uninterested with the EU. Yet in the context of its 
relationship with a rising China, there is no inherent reason as to why power-transition 
interpretations would not emerge amongst policymakers.   
 
The problem is that PTT is indeterminate with respect to how the EU will behave in response 
to China’s rise. Although, as I noted in Chapter One, Kugler et al (2004) treated the EU as a 
unitary actor from a PTT-perspective, they did not expound their reasoning for doing so. PTT 
is state-centric and does not inherently expect non-state entities such as the EU should behave 
like states. The point is that, contrary to Kugler et al’s (2004) assumption, it would be equally 
plausible to argue that since the EU is not a unitary state actor then PTT is an inappropriate 
analytical lens. This presents two possibilities: either the EU is a power in the system and will 
behave in accordance with PTT precepts as China rises, or it is not equivalent to a state actor 
and therefore will ignore the impact of China’s rise on the status quo order. In other words, 
perceptions of China’s rise as part of a power-transition do not produce a specific set of 
preferences as we would expect in the case of the US. This elasticity provides scope for 
accounting for any outcome but comes at a cost as it is essentially unable to explain the 
specific development of EU-China relations along one path versus another. Since I am treating 
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the EU as a unitary actor, it is useful to consider the value of PTT’s expectations in parallel to 
my analysis.  
 
Looking at the trends in the EU’s foreign policies towards China, it is clear that a 
confrontational approach has not been adopted. Some have described the approach as largely 
an unconditional form of engagement (Fox and Godement, 2009), however I suggest that in 
some instances this is an oversimplification and that despite persistent differences between 
Member States, there is an EU foreign policy towards China. The EU has not acted on the 
basis of military or normative threat interpretations or, for the most part, an economic threat. 
Consequently, there is no evidence to suggest that the EU regards the rise of China as an 
impending power-transition which threatens to destabilise the current international order. 
Instead, the EU has actively sought to engage with China to integrate it with the established 
system. While PTT might allow for this insofar as it reduces revisionist tendencies, the EU has 
actively promoted the concept of China as a responsible player in a multilateral world order 
and latterly, a strategic partner. Both of these concepts are rooted firmly in a perception of 
China’s rise as presenting political and economic opportunities. Yet the EU has not completely 
ignored the challenges that are presented by China’s rise.  
 
As such, the EU’s response to the rise of China does not conform to either of the two extremes 
mentioned above, though power-transition perspectives cannot tell us where it falls between 
these. This chapter establishes why the EU has not acted consistently with expectations of a 
status quo power in response to the development of China on the international scene. Through 
analysis of how China’s rise has been interpreted and debated within the EU, this chapter 
contributes to the thesis’ main objectives, namely, developing explanations for how China’s 
rise has been interpreted by the established powers’ policymakers and how these 
interpretations impact upon policy debates and formulation. The findings feed into the 
examination of the transatlantic arms embargo debate (Chapter Five) and the consideration of 
the differences between the EU and the US in their responses to China’s rise since the end of 
the Cold War (Chapter Six). 
 
I contend that within the EU, a limited range of interpretations of China’s rise has emerged 
and the differences between these are relatively narrow. To the extent that threat perceptions 
have surfaced, these tend to be in relation to the economic and normative dimensions and are 
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held by a very small number of actors who are peripheral to the policymaking processes. The 
consequence of this lack of divergent interpretations of China’s rise has been that there have 
been no significant debates over its implications within the EU. The clear preference at the 
conceptual level of the relationship has been for an engagement strategy, and differences 
thereafter tend to be between different preferences for how best to conduct this engagement. 
Interpretations of China’s rise as a threat rooted in concerns of an impending power-transition 
are essentially non-existent in policy discourse. The development of foreign policies has not 
been constrained by protracted debates over the implications of China’s rise which has 
allowed for the policies of engagement to persist with little deviation over time.  
 
To demonstrate this, the chapter proceeds as follows. Section two outlines the EU’s foreign 
policy subsystems, paving the way for section three in which I examine the decision-making 
processes in six cases, focussing on how the dominant interpretations of China’s rise 
influenced the responses adopted. The selected events are interesting in their own right as 
significant developments in the bilateral relationship but are also part of the wider struggle in 
the EU to determine its own international presence and how it should approach relations with 
other significant actors. Some of the events fed into the wider discourse over China’s rise and 
thus had a more extensive impact than their immediate consequences in the relationship; 
however the nature of this impact was qualitatively different than in the US. From there, in 
section three I assess the implications for the development of the EU’s policy responses to the 
rise of China, reflecting on the key findings of the empirical analysis and further developing 
the explanation for the persistent pattern of engagement in the EU’s China policies. 
 
4.2 EU Foreign Policy Subsystems 
 
While the US is the model state actor with significant military power with considerable 
foreign policy power vested in the head of state, the EU’s international presence stands in 
contrast to this. Its policymaking structures do not conform to the standard ‘state’ model; it 
lacks combined military power and does not have a single individual with substantive 
authority over foreign policies. In the Introduction and Chapter One I expounded the reasoning 
behind treating the EU as a unitary actor within this project. Within this context, the EU has 
identifiable foreign policies distinct from the policies of its Member States – as is widely 
accepted within the literature – produced through unique subsystems. In order to identify 
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perspectives on China’s rise, I rely on the positions expressed in EU-level policy debates by 
the relevant actors – the Member States, the Commission and the European Parliament – as 
indicative of their perspectives on China’s rise. Here, I treat individual Member States’ 
policies as revealing their preferences for EU-level policies as it is reasonable to assume that 
they hold consistent preferences for policies constructed at the national and intergovernmental 
levels. In other words, the EU’s foreign policies towards China are the output of the 
intergovernmental and supranational subsystems.     
 
As there is no EU ‘government’ continuously responsible for the formulation of policies, it is 
crucial to have a clear understanding of how the policymaking process operates. I draw on 
EFP scholarship to define the EU’s foreign policy subsystems. White’s (2001: 40-1) initial 
contribution was to disaggregate types of European Foreign policy, whereas Stumbaum (2009: 
48-9) concentrated on the decision-making structures of the intergovernmental, supranational 
and national subsystems. Here, the national foreign policy subsystem – that is, the independent 
policies of Member States – is left aside because it does not constitute EU-level foreign policy. 
Concentrating on the intergovernmental and supranational subsystems, I am then able to 
examine the EU’s collective response to the rise of China.  
 
The intergovernmental subsystem is comprised of the Member States coordinating external 
action through the European Council and the various incarnations of the Council of Ministers 
(the Council). This is the primary venue for EU foreign policymaking in the majority of policy 
areas, with the exception of foreign economic policy. Within the intergovernmental 
subsystem, representatives act on behalf of Member States as the key policymakers. For 
brevity, I will simply refer to ‘Member States’ when discussing the intergovernmental system. 
In foreign policy, decisions are taken by unanimity which should imply equal weighting. In 
practice, the larger Member States carry more influence, particularly France, Germany and the 
UK; commonly labelled as the ‘EU3’ to denote their centrality to the determination of EU 
policies. One interviewee explained their importance in terms of their capacity to formulate 
and follow through on policy
1
. Without their consent and participation, little can be achieved 
with EU-level policies.  
  
                                                 
1
 Interview with French foreign policy official, Paris, 21/05/10.  
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The supranational subsystem comprises the European Commission as the primary actor, 
although the Council exerts influence by setting the policy agenda to which the Commission 
adheres. Nevertheless, the Commission enjoys substantial power over implementation of 
policies and effectively has developed an independent set of preferences in relation to China. 
The Commission, as the executive arm of the EU, has multiple internal agencies which do not 
need to be detailed here but are drawn into the analysis where necessary. Stumbaum (2009) 
identified the European Parliament and European Court of Justice as part of the supranational 
subsystem. However, the latter is excluded on the grounds that in the cases examined it did not 
contribute in any meaningful way, thus had no relevance to the analysis. The European 
Parliament is retained in the analysis as it was a key contributor to policy discourse on the rise 
of China, even though it had no ability to actually formulate policies independently or to block 
the preferences of other actors despite passing resolutions which outline the majority 
preference in an attempt to influence the decisions of the Council and Commission. The 
European Parliament ends up being a forum for the expression of varied interpretations of 
China’s rise, but its members are not active policymakers.  
 
4.3 EU Responses to Key Events in the Bilateral Relationship 
 
In contrast to the US, the EU has specific policy documents on China – the ‘Communication’ 
papers – that illustrate the evolution of interpretations of China’s rise. The Communications 
were drafted by the Commission in close coordination with the Member States and then 
approved by the Council. This process has been important, as there have not been significant 
debates over the process, at least in the public domain. These documents have readily been 
accepted by Member States as the basis for EU policies towards China.  Unfortunately – from 
the perspective of this analysis, at least – the EU did not produce specific policy papers on 
China prior to 1995
2
. Table 4.1 draws on key passages in the five Communications published 
since then
3
 to highlight how China’s rise was contextualised within these.  
 
                                                 
2
 With the exception of the 1985 Trade and Cooperation Agreement which formed the basis of EU-China 
relations. Given that this predates the timeframe under examination, it is not included in the analysis. 
3
 The 2006 Communication paper is the most recent in the series; the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement – 
under negotiation since 2007 – was expected to produce a new document which would take the place of the 
Communications. At the time of finalising this chapter (April 2013), the PCA was still under negotiation.  
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The obvious trend observable across the various documents was that interpretations of China 
as an economic and political opportunity were consistently dominant, alongside the 
introduction of the term ‘strategic partner’ from 2003 onwards. Constructive engagement – a 
term borrowed from America’s China policy (Shambaugh, 1996: 1) – was repeatedly 
advanced as the best way to respond to China’s rise. The 2006 Communication was the alone 
in addressing China’s expanding military power, noting that the lack of transparency had 
caused some concern. Nevertheless, the overall interpretation of China’s rise in the document 
did not vary from previous documents. The approach advanced across the Communications 
has been reflected in the EU’s behaviour towards China, as the cases below demonstrate.   
 
This section examines the EU’s responses to six major events in its relationship with China 
since 1989. This provides an opportunity to study the circular process by which interpretations 
of China’s rise have influenced the preferences of EU policymakers and, in turn, how these 
developments themselves shape interpretations. In contrast to the US cases, not all of these 
have featured prominently in the literature – despite their significance in the context of the 
EU’s response to China’s rise, the Taiwan Strait crisis and the human rights resolutions at the 
UN Commission on Human Rights have received virtually no attention. Even those which 
have been considered – particularly the strategic partnership – have not been utilised to 
explore the evolution of perceptions of China. Moving beyond the preoccupation with EU-
China economic relations, we can analyse how perceptions related to different issue-areas 
contributed to the evolution of perceptions of China’s rise and, in turn, the evolution of policy 
discourse at the EU-level. 
 
To reiterate the point made in Chapter Three, the responses to these events are treated as more 
than an isolated reaction at the time in which they unfolded, but also provide insights into the 
broader consideration of the implications of China’s rise for the EU. What we see is that the 
formulation of responses evinced occasional diverging preferences, but the various actors 
involved held remarkably convergent interpretations of the implications of China’s rise. There 
were slight deviations depending on what aspects of the relationship certain actors prioritised, 
but there was little evidence of depictions of China’s rise constituting a threat to EU interests, 
and no references to power-transition concepts. Overwhelmingly, policymakers focussed on 
the growing economic and political opportunities, including the putative strategic partnership. 
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Policymakers rarely questioned whether China might follow another path – or at least, such 
concerns were not expressed in public discourse or through policy documentation.    
 
The impact of the events on the evolution of the EU’s interpretations of and policy discourse 
on China’s rise is traced chronologically. The cases are intriguing because despite representing 
significant junctures in the EU-China relationship, only one – the UNCHR resolutions – 
resulted in anything like a ‘debate’ within the EU between competing preferences. This was a 
consequence of the significant degree of convergence between actors’ perceptions of China’s 
rise; while there was not complete consensus around one single interpretation the distance 
between them was generally quite narrow, standing in stark contrast to what we saw in 
Chapter Three. That different preferences emerged within the scope of two essentially 
overlapping and complementary interpretations – China’s rise as an economic and political 
opportunity – requires further investigation and highlights the complexity of EU foreign 
policymaking towards China. To understand this latter point fully, it is necessary to question 
why certain actors held greater sway over decisions than others. For each case, two central 
questions inform the analysis. These are:  
 
 How did the differing interpretations of the rise of China inform policymakers’ 
preferences in relation to the issue(s) at hand?  
 Which actors were involved in decision-making and to what extent were their 












The first establishes developments in discourse relating to China and how the interpretations 
of its rise have shaped the political environment in which responses to these events were 
formulated. The second question sets up an examination of why particular actors were 
successful in translating their preferences into policy ahead of others and considers the 
relationship between the intergovernmental and supranational subsystems given that the 
Council and Commission were both involved in the development of policy responses in some 
cases. Through this two-stage analysis, the intention is to uncover the context of 
interpretations of China’s rise at specific points in time and how these influenced preferences 
and subsequently why particular decisions were arrived when there was, at times, 
disagreement between actors’ preferences. In some cases, actors outwith the key subsystems 
held discrepant interpretations and made these known within the policy discourse but were 
unable to translate these into policies. In this sense, these actors – particularly Members of the 
European Parliament (MEPs) – were not key decision-makers but part of the discourse taking 
place. Bringing them into the analysis highlights the divergence between interpretations within 
the EU even when within the relevant subsystems there was a tendency towards homogeneity, 




The Tiananmen crackdown occurred “at a time when [bilateral] cooperation… was being 
strengthened”, resulting in a “sudden deterioration in the political climate” (Commission, 
1990: 348) and brought human rights issues onto the EU’s agenda for China. Although 
criticism of China’s human rights record has faded as attention turned to economic 
opportunities and the potential for a stronger political relationship, Tiananmen nevertheless 
had a lasting impact on some perceptions of China’s rise, as demonstrated in various cases 
below and in the arms embargo debate (Chapter Five). The EU Member States immediately 
issued individual repudiations followed by various collective responses, finalised at the 
Madrid Summit. At this stage, China’s development had not reached a point at which we 
would expect economic or military threats to have emerged in discourse; however, a 
normative threat interpretation was evident in some quarters, as China appeared dissatisfied 
with international human rights norms and values and willing to use force for political ends. 
The violation and eventual cancellation of certain sanctions a relatively short space of time 
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later demonstrates that Tiananmen had not fundamentally altered the interpretation of China as 
an economic opportunity at that time. 
 
Since PTT is indeterminate in relation to how the EU will respond to China’s rise, it struggles 
to anticipate which response will be adopted: the two extremes would be a harsh response to 
the normative challenge (when the EU is taken as a unitary actor) versus a very limited 
response. The EU’s actual behaviour was more nuanced: a range of sanctions were adopted 
following strong repudiation of China’s actions but subsequently dropped the majority of them 
relatively quickly. I argue that understanding how Tiananmen impacted upon perceptions of 
China and policymakers’ preferences offers a clearer explanation of this outcome. At this 
stage, the EU’s external relations were conducted through European Political Cooperation 
(EPC), an intergovernmental policymaking process which represented a distinctive foreign 
policy subsystem in its own right by the 1980s. To respond to the Tiananmen crackdown via 
the intergovernmental subsystem, agreement had to be achieved between the (then) twelve 
Member States on the substance of the message and actions. The contents of their individual 
responses to the events are treated as indicators of their preferences for the EU-level response. 
 
Although the policy decisions taken by the EU through EPC were not binding, the 
commitment to undertake an EU-level response is indicative of the growing sense that this 
form of cooperation was “an important addition to, but not a replacement for, national foreign 
policy competence” based on “a balance of nationally defined interests” (Allen, 1996: 290). 
The decision to have an EU response to Tiananmen reveals that the Member States’ 
interpretations of the events and of China’s character at that time were largely congruent, 
despite slight differences evident prior to the joint statement. Their actions in the following 
months and years however, illustrated that policies would be subject to competition between 
rival preferences for which aspects of the relationship to prioritise.   
 
The UK was worried by possible implications for Hong Kong, particularly in relation to 
human rights protection following retrocession scheduled for 1997 (Baker, 2002: 48). On June 
5
th
, Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe stated that no sanctions were under consideration at that 
point, leading backbench MPs to criticise the government’s lacklustre response (Independent, 
1989). Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher took a harder stance the following day, expressing 
“utter revulsion and outrage” at the killings (Hansard, 1989: Vol.154 Col.14). One former 
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policy official noted that Thatcher was concerned about the Communists in China (with an 
emphasis on their ideology, indicating a normative threat) and as such the potential 
implications for Hong Kong in addition to the reaction of the British media and public shaped 
her response to the killings
4
. Thatcher also initially invoked concerns of a military threat when 
she claimed that “[the crackdown] shows that Communism stands ready to impose its will by 
force on innocent people and we must take that into account in our views on defence” 
(Hansard, 1989: Vol.154 Col.14).  
 
Calls for complete cessation of all exports were rejected by Howe who identified with GHW 
Bush’s response, arguing that “it is important to maintain diplomatic, commercial and other 
human contacts… in order to try and retain the opportunity for recreating [China’s] previous 
open disposition” (Hansard, 1989: Vol.154 Col.33). While repudiating China’s behaviour, the 
government maintained a policy of engagement in the hope of exerting influence, not least 
because the arrangements of Hong Kong’s handover still had to be finalised – government 
officials were concerned that China could not be trusted to adhere to the existing agreement. 
Ahead of the group of seven leading economies (G7) meeting in July, it was reported that the 
UK would press for no further sanctions to avoid isolating China (McEwen and Pomery, 
1989). Prominent politicians including Labour leader Neil Kinnock and Liberal Democrat 
leader Paddy Ashdown called for stronger diplomatic responses and the imposition of 
economic sanctions (Hansard, 1989: Vol.154 Col.14; Lynch, 1989). Thatcher and Howe 
defended their position, countering that the best approach for ensuring Hong Kong citizens’ 
freedom post-retrocession was engaging China to encourage better behaviour and adoption of 
international rules and norms, rather than risk isolation which would turn the country inwards.  
 
France immediately froze official relations with China and was a key player in the push for a 
common European response (Stephens, 1989). President Mitterrand declared that “a regime 
that is reduced to firing on its youth to survive, when the youth it has educated rises up in the 
name of freedom, has no future” (cited by CWS, 1989); which in Bullock’s (1992: 619) 
assessment constituted the harshest response of all Western leaders. Tiananmen stirred up 
“collective memories of the French revolutionary past and the student demonstrations in 1968” 
(Stumbaum, 2009: 86); indeed, 1989 marked the bicentenary of the French revolution. The 
                                                 
4
 Interview with former British policy official, London, 07/05/10. 
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strength of the French reaction was evident when the government insisted on the addition of 
the arms embargo to the list of sanctions (Wong, 2006: 82). The debate in the Sénat on June 
5
th
 heard references to the need for support of protesters against “Communist totalitarianism” 
(JORF, 1989: 1086). However, there was little criticism of the government’s immediate 
response, unlike in the UK. The government’s early response seemed to suggest a significant 
shift in how its policymakers interpreted China’s character.   
 
While the EU’s response was determined within the intergovernmental subsystem, actors 
within the supranational subsystem also voiced their reactions despite limited ability to 
determine policy; these were largely consistent with Member States’ perceptions. The 
Commission deplored the “brutal repression of the people” and warned that “cooperation 
between China and the Community can only suffer as a result and would risk being 
permanently affected if the policy of the Chinese government were to start on a course which 
would put at risk the policy of openness and reform” (Commission, 1989).  The Commission 
took what limited action it could by cancelling meetings between China’s Minister of Foreign 
Economic and Trade Relations Zheng Tuobin and Commission President Jacques Delors 
(Agence Europe, 05/06/1989). The European Parliament (1989) passed a resolution
5
 which 
condemned the “brutal liquidation” of protestors and called for the Council to “consider severe 




 of June, an initial, albeit brief, EU response “strongly condemn[ed] the violent 
repression” and warned that “continuing repressive actions, in violation of universally 
recognised human rights principles, will greatly prejudice China’s international standing” 
(cited by Agence Europe, 08/06/1989). This was followed by an agreement at the Luxembourg 
Council meeting to attempt to coordinate national-level responses where possible and although 
not imposing joint sanctions at that point, warned that normal relations could not continue 
(Agence Europe, 12/06/1989). The language employed characterised the events as 
incompatible with Western conceptualisations of human rights and China itself as a human 
rights violator, behaving inconsistently with European expectations. However, there was no 
indication of an emerging interpretation of China harbouring revisionist intentions towards 
established international norms.  
                                                 
5
 This came in the September, as the previous session had ended prior to the 4
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The Conclusions from the Madrid European Council (26-27
th
 of June) condemned the “brutal 
repression” and called on China to “put an end to the repressive actions against those who 
legitimately claim their democratic rights” (European Council, 1989). Respect for human 
rights and democratic aspirations “is an essential element for the pursuit of the policy of 
reforms and openness that has been supported by the European Community and its Member 
States” (European Council, 1989). The declaration went on to list the measures adopted, 
including engaging China on human rights issues in the “appropriate international forums”, 
suspending military cooperation and the imposition of an arms embargo, suspension of 
“bilateral ministerial and high-level contacts” and reducing other forms of cooperation 
(European Council, 1989). The declaration itself did not convey any particular characterisation 
of China beyond that of a human rights violator. 
 
The Declaration was non-binding, leaving considerable scope for deviation from the declared 
policies at each Member State’s discretion. While the objective of obtaining more robust 
human rights protection was maintained within EU policies thereafter, the repudiation of 
China’s behaviour was relatively short-lived ostensibly as certain Member States did not 
consider this approach conducive to positive change. Yet it is significant that the Member 
States agreed on a joint position given that the political dimension of external relations was 
not particularly well-developed at that time and relations with China were dominated by trade. 
The other interesting aspect was that many of the EU’s sanctions were brought to an end 
relatively quickly (with the exception of the arms embargo). One factor which apparently 
contributed to this was that for some, particularly France, once the initial furore had died 
down, perceptions of China as an economic opportunity returned to the forefront of policy 
considerations. Consequently, the strength of the economic opportunity interpretation was 
demonstrated when France – followed by others – opted to break ranks over the sanctions, 
rendering them unsustainable.    
  
The UK’s primary incentive for normalising relations was the ongoing negotiations over the 
Hong Kong handover, with the Joint Liaison Group resuming meetings in September 
(Mauthner, 1989). France’s overt concern for further human rights abuses was apparently 
short-lived, as it breached some sanctions within six months of their imposition and sought to 
re-establish ties (Wellons, 1994: 342). However, France continued to push the issue of human 
181 
 
rights in dealings with China, as it was one of the few countries which placed conditionality 
on the resumption of high-level bilateral contacts; Prime Minister Dumas asked Beijing in 
April 1991 to accept a human rights delegation as part of the renormalisation of relations 
(Cabestan, 2011: 197). Yet France breaching the sanctions was effectively the catalyst for the 
EU eventually lifting most of them; the common position lasted only approximately ten 
months (Wellons, 1994: 342). There was consensus that the sanctions were of limited use in 
effecting behavioural change and that progress would only be made through engagement 
(Wellons, 1994: 343). By October 1990 the Member States had collectively agreed to 
“progressively normalize” relations (Commission, 1991: 295), in part influenced by economic 
considerations (Algieri, 2002: 76).  
 
However, as of 1990 the EU collectively pursued a resolution on China at the UN Commission 
on Human Rights and successfully maintained this common approach until 1997 (more on this 
below). China was clearly perceived as a human rights violator in the immediate aftermath of 
Tiananmen, however the normative threat interpretation of China was offset by the continued 
salience of the economic opportunity view of its rises and clearly shaped policymakers 
preferences as the initial shock of Tiananmen wore off. Thus power-transition perspectives 
cannot account for the nuances of the EU’s response: an initial hard-line stance which soon 
softened and was eventually replaced by economic and political engagement. The evidence 
suggests that the imposition of economic sanctions and the arms embargo were not an 
opportunistic attempt to curtail China’s development, but rather rooted in understandings of 
the ‘appropriate’ response required. Explaining the development of the response required 
examination of how preferences of policymakers (particularly the Member States) were 
shaped by perceptions of the event and also, more widely, of China’s importance as an 
emerging international economic player.  
 
Taiwan Strait Crisis 
 
The EU’s engagement with the Taiwan Strait crisis was minimal despite some Member States’ 
regional security interests which could have prompted more extensive involvement. In the EU-
China relations literature the crisis has generally been overlooked, presumably because the EU 
was not an active player. Yet it is precisely because the EU did not respond to the crisis and 
how relations developed after this that makes it so interesting in relation to the EU’s evolving 
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interpretations of China’s rise and overall character: China’s behaviour had barely any impact 
on EU policy players’ perceptions. Those focussing on relative military power might explain 
the EU’s non-involvement as simply consequential of its lack of power, but thereby overlook 
the specific context of EU and bilateral Member State relationships with China and the 
dominant interpretations of the latter therein.  
 
Power-transition perspectives of this event would conceptualise China’s behaviour as 
indicative of a growing military threat, which should concern the EU (from the perspective 
that it is a unitary actor) as it has repeatedly asserted that the Taiwan issue must be resolved 
peacefully. But the indeterminacy problem for PTT again presents alternatives for the EU: its 
response could take the form of military integration to allow it to take on greater 
responsibilities in East Asian security. Alternatively, the EU could simply ignore the crisis. 
That the former did not occur suggests that power-transition logic was not at the core of 
European perceptions of the crisis. If the EU did nothing, power-transition proponents could 
explain this by citing two grounds: first, the EU lacked power-projection capabilities and a 
regional presence in East Asia that would have enabled it to play a more active role. Second, 
as a result of the EU’s non-involvement in regional security, China’s actions did not 
contravene EU interests. Under a PTT-based perspective in which the EU does not respond to 
the rise of China, the problem of attempting to understand the EU’s reaction falls away. 
However, the EU’s response did not match either of these scenarios; understanding the genesis 
of the actual response requires consideration of the broader interpretations of China’s rise at 
that time. The response was conditioned by interpretations of China’s rise as presenting 
political and economic opportunities. However, that the crisis did not result in reconsideration 
of these interpretations requires explanation.  
 
Although the EU’s regional security interests were marginal (in comparison to the US), they 
were nevertheless real. The EU has continually reiterated commitment to regional stability –
because of the impact instability would have on its economic performance – and promoting 
China’s peaceful emergence. Additionally, the EU has participated in the Association of South 
East Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum (ARF) since its inception in 1994, created to 
facilitate “constructive dialogue and consultation on political and security issues of common 
interest and concern; and to make significant contributions to efforts towards confidence-
building and preventive diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region” (ARF, 2011). The EU sought to 
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expand its engagement strategy through agreeing in 1994 to launch the Asia-Europe Meeting 
which would increase its political visibility in the region. This gave the EU some stake in 
regional stability, which the crisis threatened to upset.  
 
Due to their continued governance of Hong Kong and Macau, the UK and Portugal bore the 
greatest stake in regional security at the time. Accordingly, we might expect they would push 
for a strong EU response, or failing that, pursue strong independent responses. The UK’s main 
priority was Hong Kong’s impending retrocession in 1997 – although an issue from which the 
EU was detached
6
. At the height of the crisis, HK Governor Chris Patten voiced concern that 
China would “tear out the roots of democracy” (cited by Walker and Reguly, 1996). Michael 
Yahuda (1993: 246) observed that “the British military and political presence… small as it 
may seem, contributes to Britain being recognized as a factor in the Asia-Pacific region”. 
However, Hook (2004: 147) stated that “there was little the UK could do on its own” and its 
only realistic option would have “involved a joint response with EU partners alongside the US 
and Japan”. However, policymakers conveyed no preference for such a course of action.  
 
France exported various military items to Taiwan between 1990 and 1994, driving a wedge 
between it and China. From China’s perspective, these sales of predominantly advanced 
weapons technology were highly controversial (Shambaugh, 1996: 20) as they constituted 
interference in domestic affairs. However, France’s actions were not based on preferences for 
arming Taiwan against China or influencing the regional balance of power; rather, the sales 
should be seen in the context of purely economic calculations. Taiwan was a willing customer 
for advanced technologies and French defence companies needed new markets as Western 
demand dropped following the end of the Cold War. The new government under Prime 
Minister Édouard Balladur ended these sales in 1994, followed by Foreign Minister Alain 
Juppé’s attempts to repair Franco-China relations (Shambaugh, 1996: 20). The election of 
President Jacques Chirac in 1995 ushered in an era of greatly improved bilateral relations. 
 
In the initial stages of the crisis (summer and autumn of 1995) the EU was essentially silent. 
The EU was still cosponsoring resolutions on China’s human rights record at the United 
Nations Commission on Human Rights (see below) but beyond this, there were few points of 
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 Interview with Leon Brittan, former External Relations and Trade Commissioner of the EU, London, 05/05/10. 
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tension in the relationship. In July, the EU’s China ambassador, Endymion Wilkinson, had 
confirmed that the upcoming Communication paper conveyed a preference “to play a more 
active role in bringing China into the mainstream of world economic and political life” (cited 
by Walker, 1995) which indicated perceptions of the EU as an economic and political 
opportunity. In early 1996, the EU continued to pursue policies of engagement with no 
evidence of emergent threat perceptions, even as tensions in the Taiwan Strait continued. UK 
Foreign Minister Malcolm Rifkind visited China in January, commenting that “when you are 
dealing with a country of 1.2 [billion] you don't need me to tell you the potential purchasing 
power of this nation” (cited by Higgins, 1996). One of the clearest indicators of the lack of 
military threat interpretations amongst EU players was the revelation that a Spanish shipyard 
was exploring the possibility of building China’s first aircraft carrier. This would mark the 
“first time any country has built an aircraft carrier for a foreign navy” (White, 1996) and, 
moreover, significantly bolster China’s blue-water capabilities7. In the end the deal did not 
progress; yet its timing and even very consideration suggest that not only was China seen as 
predominantly an economic opportunity, but that some considered it a non-threat in the 
military dimension.   
 
As China’s military exercises intensified the Council Presidency (1996) declared on March 8th 
that the EU “deeply regrets” China’s missile tests, warning that the planned exercises “could 
lead to further tension in the region and increase the possibility of any miscalculation 
eventually leading to confrontation”. The EU called on China “to refrain from activities which 
could have negative effects on the security of the entire region and urges an early resumption 
of the cross-strait talks” (Council Presidency, 1996). This was the single collective EU 
response; despite the intensification of China’s exercises to coincide with Taiwan’s election 
later in the month, no further reaction was presented. While the response conveyed a clear 
preference for a peaceful resolution – consistent with established policies – there was 
evidently no willingness within the EU to become involved. On the same day as the EU’s 
response, a Foreign Office spokesman outlined the UK’s position, remarkably similar to that 
of the US administration:  
 
                                                 
7
 Of course, possessing an aircraft carrier and being able to deploy it effectively are not the same thing.  
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We are concerned the missile firings were so close to Taiwan and we believe this 
will further heighten tensions in the region. We don't believe there is an imminent 
threat to Taiwan but... there is a real possibility of miscalculation, leading to 
confrontation (cited by Poole, 1996).   
 
 The Commission attempted to play down the significance of the crisis while maintaining 
engagement with China (Möller, 2007: 180). Then External Relations Commissioner, Leon 
Brittan, recalled that “we weren’t going to interfere in [the crisis], obviously we hoped it 
wouldn’t escalate too much but it was something that we kept well out of… I wouldn’t want to 
say the EU absolved itself of [responsibility], but it did not consider that it could be useful to 
intervene”8. Taiwan has not been generally perceived by policymakers as an important issue in 
EU-China relations, resulting in – with the exception of the European Parliament –support for 
China’s position (Mattlin, 2009: 108-9) or, at a minimum, an aversion to rocking the boat. 
Gerald Segal (1996), British scholar and political commentator argued that “to hold China to 
its fragile pledges about personal freedoms for the people of Hong Kong” then the UK “must 
help the Americans convey the same tough message: that China cannot do whatever it wants 
just because it claims sovereignty over other people”. This was not the perspective taken by 
the UK; Malcolm Rifkind noted that although the crisis had caused some concern over Hong 
Kong’s security within the policy community, views of China as a threat remained low9. 
 
Soon after the Taiwanese election and the cessation of military exercises, France hosted a visit 
from Premier Li Peng; Chirac reportedly wanted better diplomatic relations as well as trade 
deals (Webster, 1996). It was reported that in private unnamed French officials had said that 
“the stand-off between America and China… could work in their favour” in terms of 
developing closer political and economic ties with China (Sage, 1996). The French 
government’s positive disposition towards China did not enjoy complete domestic support, 
with over two hundred French deputies using the visit as an opportunity to call on China to 
pull out of Tibet (Webster, 1996). Opposition MPs claimed that Chirac was overlooking 
human rights issues and several thousand Parisians protested Li’s visit (Dejevsky, 1996). 
Chirac’s overtures towards China set the standard for the remainder of his presidency, as we 
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9
 Interview with Malcolm Rifkind, former British Foreign Secretary, London, 17/06/10. 
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see in the following case of the UNCHR resolutions and, in the transatlantic arms embargo 
debate (Chapter Five).   
 
Members of the European Parliament had a strong interest Taiwan-related issues and reacted 
forcefully to the crisis (Möller, 2002: 27), at least rhetorically. The Parliament passed two 
resolutions which evinced strong interpretations of China as a threat to Taiwan’s security and 
also its nascent democratic system. The first established a clear preference for a strong EU-
coordinated response, calling for  
 
the Council to exercise its influence… to prevent such acts of aggression against 
Taiwan and to persuade them to refrain from all intimidation aimed at interfering 
with the elections… requests the Council to obtain such an assurance from the 
[Chinese] government (European Parliament, 1996a). 
 
The Parliament sits outwith the intergovernmental subsystem, thus although it made its 
preferences known in policy discourse, the resolution had no discernible impact on the 
position of the Council. The second resolution, passed as China’s military exercises 
intensified, urged “China to stop all preparations for any military action directed against 
Taiwan… to renounce the use of force as a means of settling disputes… refrain from further 
provocative actions… [and] expresses its support for the people of Taiwan” (European 
Parliament, 1996b). Möller (2002: 27n) observed that the language of this resolution was in 
contrast to the Council’s statement on the crisis, which appeared to adopt a more diplomatic 
tone, ostensibly to avoid provoking a negative reaction from China. Here we see the military 
threat interpretation of China’s rise gaining traction in the Parliament, but limited capacity to 
translate preferences into policy.   
 
If the EU’s interpretations of China’s rise were predicated on power-transition logic – under 
the assumption that it is a unitary actor – we would expect to see a stronger response in this 
crisis given the regional interests of some Member States. However, the actual response of 
condemning China’s behaviour was conditioned by a strong preference to avoid provoking a 
reaction which would aggravate the situation or lead to a negative turn in EU-China relations. 
In short, the EU did not ignore the crisis but did not involve itself directly. Looking solely at 
Member States’ interests – the UK’s responsibility for Hong Kong and France’s apparently 
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close relationship with Taiwan (at least for part of the early 1990s) – fails to explain the 
response adopted. Perceptions of the crisis itself have to be placed in the wider context of the 
EU’s interpretation of China’s rise as presenting economic and political opportunities; against 
this background, good bilateral relations were as much an end in themselves as means to other 
objectives. Which interpretations particular actors prioritised varied, but the consequence was 
a strong preference for non-involvement. Only the EP, which had minimal impact on policy, 
expressed views which conveyed perceptions of China’s rise as a military threat.    
 
Human Rights Resolutions at the UNCHR 
 
Following the Tiananmen Square crackdown, the EU collectively tabled annual resolutions on 
China’s human rights record at the UN Commission on Human Rights10 (UNCHR). This is the 
main intergovernmental forum through which members of the UN (at least theoretically) hold 
each other to account for human rights behaviour in accordance with the UN Declaration on 
Human Rights. The EU was a key player in the process of drafting and tabling the resolutions 
against China, thus arguably presenting evidence for the conceptualisation of China as a 
normative threat through its continual violation of human rights. While the resolutions never 
passed, their significance lay in signalling that the EU viewed China as a human rights 
violator. Normative threat interpretations were salient within policy discourse in the early 
1990s; however, China’s rising power prompted a shift whereby perceptions of political and 
economic opportunities came to dominate, resulting in diminished preferences for 
confrontational stances on normative issues amongst the Member States. Further, the EU’s 
internal debates on the resolutions became preoccupied with presenting a united front, rather 
than critical reflection on the implications of China’s rise and the continued problems with its 
human rights situation. Member States coordinated their policies within the intergovernmental 
subsystem, at Council meetings ahead of the annual UNCHR sessions. The Member State 
which held the rotating Presidency tabled the resolution to be cosponsored. The Commission 
and EP could not directly influence policy although MEPs often vocally supported continued 
joint resolutions. The increasing salience of the economic and political opportunities presented 
by China’s rise allowed the EU-level preference to change relatively easily with minimal 
internal debate.   
                                                 
10




PTT says little about normative issues beyond their utility as indicators of (dis)satisfaction 
with the status quo. Since PTT can accommodate – but not specify – any EU response, tabling 
resolutions could be explained as the EU as a unitary actor enforcing the set of rules and 
norms supported by the dominant powers. Equally, a break in policy would matter little since 
it has no impact on the material basis of China’s rise. However, as we saw in Chapter One, 
power-transition theorists have also argued that the established powers should attempt to 
integrate the rising power into the established system to diminish revisionist intentions. In this 
light, we would expect to find evidence that policymakers realised that treating China as 
‘outside’ of the accepted responsible actors would be counterproductive; to prevent a power-
transition China would need to be treated as an equal. While the evidence shows a clear 
preference for integrating China into the international arena throughout the 1990s (and 
beyond), the policy discourse did not reflect power-transition logic. Rather, the EU’s 
motivation was based on perceptions of China as an economic and political opportunity and 
consideration of its own positive influence on China’s re-emergence. The alternative PTT 
perspective is that the EU is not a unitary international actor and thus is not expected to 
conform to patterns of behaviour expected under conditions of an impending power-transition. 
However, this understanding effectively precludes the possibility of PTT explaining 
developments in which the EU acts in a unitary fashion at all. 
  
The 1995 Communication located a “commitment to human rights and fundamental freedoms” 
at the “heart of EU policy” (Commission, 1995: 6)11. It also foreshadowed the end of the joint 
resolutions, warning that “relying solely on frequent and strident declarations will dilute the 
message or lead to knee-jerk reactions from the Chinese government” (Commission, 1995: 6). 
Still, the document stressed the importance of “the involvement of the international 
community” in the UNCHR, noting that the 1995 vote on a resolution suggested the approach 
was “bearing fruit” (Commission, 1995: 7). The 1998 Communication made no reference to 
the end of cosponsored resolutions, instead emphasising the positives of engagement through 
bilateral human rights dialogue (Commission, 1998: 6). Its resumption (after cancellation in 
1996) demonstrated China’s “new-found willingness to engage in a serious and results-
oriented dialogue” (Commission, 1998: 9). The document concluded that China’s “growing 
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strength has been matched… by a growing sense of responsibility” and that its “increasing 
assertiveness on the world stage… deserves a positive response” (Commission, 1998: 25). The 
language throughout identified China as an increasingly important international actor; against 
this background, the end to cosponsored resolutions was considered appropriate.  
 
Until 1994, China used a non-action motion
12
 to circumvent votes on resolutions – the one 
vote took place in 1995 but did not pass (Whitaker, 1995). That same year, the EU and China 
agreed to establish a bilateral human rights dialogue and in 1996 the EU’s (final) joint 
resolution was once again defeated. Following this, the rhetoric on engagement over 
confrontation emerged, particular from France. French diplomats told the Financial Times that 
although the outcome of dialogue remained uncertain, it was nevertheless advantageous to 
have a joint position (Buchan, 1996). The UK and Nordic states had backed stronger 
condemnation but eventually came round to supporting dialogue; one French official stated 
that “at least we are now all walking the same tightrope in dealing with Beijing” (cited by 
Buchan, 1996). In 1997, a number of Member States broke ranks. France, Germany, Italy, 
Spain and Greece opted not to co-sponsor the resolution. A French Foreign ministry 
spokesman accepted that “the rule of law is far from being established in China” but stressed 
that “a choice must be made between a confrontation that is cut off from reality and a 
constructive dialogue” (cited by Mirsky, 1997). China’s threats over trade relations, according 
to some commentators, influenced President Chirac’s preferences given his impending visit to 
China during which he would secure contracts for Airbus (Barber, L. 1997). The line on 
human rights subsequently taken by senior French diplomats in Paris and Brussels was that 
“private persuasion should take place over public posturing” (cited by Palmer, 1997a).  
 
This shift in preferences led to strong criticism from the Netherlands and Denmark – both 
Ideological Free-Traders willing to challenge China on sensitive political issues – who 
strongly backed the resolution. One diplomat told Agence Europe (04/04/1997) that Dutch 
Council President Hans van Mierlo regarded the inability to agree on a resolution as “a serious 
setback for the Union’s foreign policy prospects” and threatened “the essence of the EU’s 
human rights policy”. The main Council debate was not explicitly over the opportunities of 
China’s rise versus its continued human rights problems, but focussed inward on the EU’s 
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 “a procedural device designed to avoid a vote on a resolution and to cut short any debate on an embarrassing 
issue” (Buhrer, 2003: 11).  
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inability to develop a common position. The Commission weighed in on the issue: President 
Jacques Santer’s spokesperson stated that policy was “in complete disarray” and the 
Commission viewed the decision of some not to back the resolution “with very great concern” 
(cited by Palmer, 1997a). These views were repeated parallel to the UNCHR meeting: 
External Relations Commissioner Leon Brittan lamented that “the lack of consensus… [is] a 
weakness… Some Member States… could have been able to rally to the broad consensus of 
other Member States” (cited by Agence Europe, 16/04/1997) – an apparent reference to France 
and Germany. Notably, Commission officials refrained from commenting on China’s human 
rights directly and spoke only to Member States’ preferences, reflecting its limited capacity to 
shape policy.  
 
The UK supported the Netherlands’ resolution rather than assume the lead due to concerns 
over Chinese threats of retaliation, and with the impending handover of Hong Kong in July 
wanted to maintain stable relations (Capella, 1997). Ahead of the UNCHR meeting, Foreign 
Secretary Malcolm Rifkind stated that “it is important that international attention is focussed 
on the need for improvement in China’s human rights situation” (cited by Binyon et al, 1997). 
A majority of Member States supported the resolution, yet French Foreign Minister Herve de 
Charette argued that “China has to be treated differently than other less important states” 
(cited by Palmer, 1997b). For France and the others who abstained, China was not just another 
country culpable of human rights violations but an increasingly important political and 
economic player. At any rate, the outcome was another blocked resolution.  
 
Chirac’s visit to China the following month was condemned by MEPs, accusing him of 
putting economic gains ahead of principles and citing a lack of respect for the EP’s resolution 
condemning China’s human rights record (Agence Europe, 20/05/1997). Yet Chirac was not 
only interested in economic gains, but sought to establish a comprehensive bilateral 
partnership. During the visit the two sides signed a statement pledging to “engage in 
reinforced co-operation, to foster the march toward multipolarity” and to “oppose any attempt 
at domination in world affairs” (cited by Walker, 1997). These points were clearly aimed at 
the US – consistent with Chirac’s well-documented anti-American sentiments (see Meunier, 
2007). Chirac’s interpretation of China’s political opportunity focussed on its potential as a 
‘pole’ in a multipolar system; rather than being concerned about the rising power, Chirac 
seemed to actively welcome a change to the status quo. Under Chirac, France was an 
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Accommodating Mercantilist which interpreted China’s rise as an economic opportunity; thus 
the government’s preference on the resolutions was consistent with expectations that it would 
not push China on sensitive issues, instead prioritising good political relations
13
.     
 
The EU and China agreed to resume the human rights dialogue in September 1997, with the 
EU emphasising that it wanted to conduct this in a “constructive spirit” (Agence Europe, 
20/09/1997). At the start of 1998 the UK held the rotating presidency and pushed for a 
common line. Robin Cook argued ahead of his January China visit that it would be “very 
valuable to have a common position” on human rights (cited by Buchan and Kynge, 1998). 
Cook did not explicate a preference on the resolution, instead concentrating on the need for a 
united front. Agence Europe (22/01/98) reported that the UK had actually joined the 
resolution’s opponents – on this basis, it can be inferred that Cook wanted a common position 
of silence. France’s European Affairs Minister, Pierre Moscvici, articulated a preference for 
dialogue over resolutions that would make the EU appear “both aggressive and ineffective” 
(cited by Agence Europe, 28/01/1998).  
  
The February General Affairs Council (1998) concluded that “in view of the first encouraging 
results of the… human rights dialogue… neither the Presidency nor Member States should 
table or co-sponsor a draft Resolution”. At the launch of the new Communication, Leon 
Brittan stated that “the EU needs to do more to recognize China as a global power” and on 
human rights concluded that “the question is simple – whether to discuss the issues which are 
of concern to the EU or whether to take actions which register criticism and even 
condemnation to the point where dialogue is no longer possible” (cited by Agence Europe, 
04/02/1998). Here we see interpretations of China’s rise as changing the nature of bilateral 
relations filtering into discourse over how to respond to its human rights situation. 
Consequently, the collective decision was taken to not co-sponsor a resolution (Baker, 2002: 
56). One Beijing-based European diplomat attributed this to the “realisation that our policy of 
confronting China on human rights was not necessarily the most effective method… dialogue 
may actually achieve more meaningful progress” (cited by Harding and Kynge, 1998).  
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 It is interesting that although Chirac came to power in May 1995, France supported the 1996 resolution. There 
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amongst other Member States in 1996 and b) the preference shift representing another step in Chirac’s efforts to 




Cook continued to argue that a common position was the more important aspect and the 
outcome in 1997 did not “do a service to human rights by showing an EU which was deeply 
divided” (cited by The Independent, 1998). Prime Minister Tony Blair sought closer relations 
with Europe than his predecessor and decided not to back a joint resolution; despite Cook’s 
declarations of an ‘ethical foreign policy’ upon taking office. This move was criticised by 
Rifkind and others in the opposition who claimed there was no evidence to justify the policy 
change
14
. Blair further distanced himself from the previous government during a visit to China 
in April for the inaugural EU-China Summit, when he claimed that he was “in no doubt that he 
was in the company of a fellow moderniser” with Premier Zhu Rongji (cited by Binyon, 
1998). Here, Blair’s emphasis on the similarities between himself and the Chinese leader was 
consistent with the broader context of the EU’s engagement policies and set the tone for 
summit which the EU had pushed for to further advance bilateral political relations.  
 
In subsequent years, human rights issues became less visible on the EU-China agenda; 
bilateral dialogue effectively provided China with a means to avoid further resolutions (Baker, 
2002: 57). However, the EU continued to oppose China’s use of the non-action motion 
procedure to avoid a vote and indicated that it would vote in favour of any resolution 
successfully tabled. This suggests a tension between concerns for human rights and the 
increasing preference for good political (and also economic) relations with China. In early 
1999, there was extensive Parliamentary debate over the issue, with substantial criticism of the 
failure to back resolutions and a call for the reversion to the previous strategy (Agence Europe, 
29/01/1999). In March, the General Affairs Council (1999) confirmed that there would be no 
joint EU resolution; no joint resolution has been tabled since.  
 
While there is no evidence that Member States held wildly different views of China’s human 
rights situation, it is apparent that the issue lost ground to interpretations of China as a 
growing political and economic opportunity. This case witnessed genuine debate over policy 
direction, yet not one between rival interpretations of China but rather competing preferences 
for how the EU should behave. This resulted from the convergence of Member States’ 
perceptions of the opportunities presented by China’s rise. The stated objectives of the 
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different parties were the same, but were separated by their considerations of the appropriate 
policy direction. To the extent that China was discussed, the discourse did not reflect power-
transition logic. Rather, China as a normative threat was played off against China as an 
economic/political opportunity, too big and important simply to be rebuked. Within the 
intergovernmental subsystem, the preferences of the larger states dominated; without France’s 
backing from 1997 onwards, a joint resolution became impossible. The UK’s subsequent 
alignment with France meant alternative interpretations held by other, smaller Member States 
had less scope to influence policy; these shifts cannot be accounted for by PTT-perspectives 




The EU played an important role in China’s WTO accession as its own growing importance 
allowed it to act as a “counterweight to US negotiating influence” and “easing political 
tensions” of the accession process (Eglin, 1997: 493-4). That there was no extensive debate 
over China’s rise contributed to the EU’s strong support for accession, as the perceived 
political and economic opportunities for the EU were translated into policies. The EU 
continually put the goal of integrating China into the global economy front and centre in its 
foreign economic policies with clear objectives of opening China’s market and enforcing 
institutional rules. Trade Commissioner Leon Brittan stated in October 1997 that EU support 
was not unconditional (Agence Europe, 15/10/1997), but required economic rather than 
political concessions. Contrary to Zimmermann’s (2007) examination of the EU’s motivations 
detached from the wider story of the response to China’s rise, I argue that the convergence of 
interpretations of China’s rise as an economic and political power created consensus around 
supporting accession. 
 
PTT could be used to suggest that either the EU will be unaffected by China’s rise since it is 
not an international actor – thus WTO accession is inconsequential – or that as a unitary actor 
it will respond as other established powers would, in which case the issue does matter. 
However, what PTT anticipates here is ambiguous, creating two contrasting approaches to 
China’s WTO membership from a European perspective. Tammen et al (2000) argued that the 
established powers should encourage the rising power’s integration with the international 
system to increase its stake in the established order and attenuate revisionist intentions. Yet as 
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I argued earlier, their recommendations are designed to avoid the expected outcomes that are 
generated by applying PTT to China’s rise; the evidence does not suggest that EU support for 
accession was based on such reasoning. The alternative is that WTO membership should be 
opposed as it would increase China’s economic power, hastening its rise and the power-
transition with the EU. However, such interpretations were not salient within the EU 
policymaking community. The EU’s support for China’s accession was driven by 
interpretations of significant economic and political opportunities; the various threat 
perceptions did not come into play.  
 
Here, policymaking involved negotiations carried out through the supranational subsystem and 
ratification within the intergovernmental subsystem. This was important since, as 
Zimmermann (2004: 77) pointed out, there is an “absence of easy institutional entry points for 
interests which disagree with the strategy set by the member states and the Commission”. 
However, this case was interesting precisely because of what was missing from the EU’s 
internal policymaking environment: any level of dissent from the agreed policy between 
Member States, or the Member States and the Commission, and the virtual lack of discussion 
of human rights issues despite the so-called democratic clause (see below). Leon Brittan 
recalled that in his negotiating role he had to “carry along the Member States” to maintain a 
united position, as “what the EU can do when it is united and agreed is infinitely more than 
what any individual member state – even the largest and most powerful – can achieve”15. 
 
Policy rhetoric – especially from Commission negotiators – conveyed a perception of this 
stage of China’s rise as a political opportunity: it would benefit from exposure to the system’s 
rules and norms, contributing to domestic political and economic reform and enable it to play 
an international role commensurate with its size. In short, economic engagement would 
contribute to “peace, security and prosperity” (Leal-Arcas, 2009: 22). However, human rights 
issues rarely featured in the discussion, which might have been expected given that the EU 
had, since 1995, a “so-called democratic clause which ha[d] to be included in international 
trade agreements”, the purpose of which is to promote democratic principles through its trade 
policies (Zimmermann, 2008: 258-9). With no positive developments in China’s human rights 
record, the simple answer might be that economic opportunity interpretations of China’s rise 
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overrode this normative policy component. However, the Member States and Commission 
shared a “strong ideological commitment… to a policy of multilateral engagement” which was 
seen as the most effective way of improving human rights (Zimmermann, 2004: 74).    
  
The end of the UNCHR resolutions could be construed as paving the way for pursuing closer 
economic relations without strong focus on human rights. The EP did not host vociferous 
debates on China’s membership and the human rights issue; resolutions were passed calling 
for the Council and Commission to push for human rights improvements before accession, but 
these had little demonstrable impact on the approach to negotiations. Overall, there was little 
evidence of threat interpretations along military or economic dimensions or that it would seek 
to change the rules of the system in its favour. The EU’s working premise was articulated by 
Pierre Moscovici
16
 (2000) in response to a question for the Council in the EP: 
 
the process leading to China’s admission… is not the appropriate forum for 
tackling issues relating to human rights… [An] increase in trade transactions 
would support [EU] efforts with a view to guaranteeing respect for human rights, 
democracy and the rule of law, values which form the very foundation of Europe. 
 
This reflects the popular view amongst Western policymakers that trade liberalisation would 
(eventually) entail political liberalisation, although proponents of the ‘Beijing Consensus’ 
have subsequently argued that China has taken what it wants from the international capitalist 
system while resisting the expected political reforms.   
 
The Parliament’s opinion on the agreement was sought, but had no impact on the Council’s 
acceptance of the eventual deal with minimal debate (Zimmermann, 2004: 76). The EP 
critiqued the lack of human rights consideration and some MEPs also called for mandatory 
Parliamentary assent (e.g., Clegg, 2000) although apparently there were several (unnamed) 
Member States unwilling to agree to this (Cabeza, 2000). The Commission’s responsibility for 
trade policy through the supranational subsystem enables it to pursue policy objectives without 
being bound by the EP (Elgin, 1997: 497). Within the Commission, the key official 
responsible for dealing with China’s accession was the Trade Commissioner – initially Leon 
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 Minister for European Affairs, France. 
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Brittan and then Pascal Lamy after September 1999 – who enjoyed consistent backing from 
the Council. Although Member States had varied economic interests, the consensus around the 
economic opportunity presented by China’s rise coupled with the Commission’s lead 
negotiating role contributed to a united stance. Brittan commented that  
 
China’s growing economic and political self-confidence is an overwhelmingly 
positive development. It should serve as an incentive for the EU to engage the 
country more fully, not as a threat from which to retreat. I believe Europe has 
everything to gain and nothing to fear from a strong, open and prosperous China 
(Europa Press Release, 1998a). 
 
Brittan later linked engagement to the growing importance of both China and the EU globally, 
considering them “united by the fact that the world depends heavily on both of us, in a time of 
global economic uncertainty, for economic leadership and security” (Europa Press Release, 
1998b). Bilateral negotiations were disrupted in the wake of the bombing of China’s Belgrade 
Embassy by NATO
17
 in the spring of 1999 and did not resume until October (de Jonquières, 
1999). The Chinese reaction to the bombing was mostly directed toward the US, but not 
exclusively as the UK embassy was targeted by protesters (Economist, 1999)
18
. Brittan argued 
that since the EU separated politics from the accession process China should do the same as 
“important commercial issues should not be determined emotionally” (cited by Abrahams, 
1999), although to no avail. Yet there was no discernible concern amongst EU policymakers 
that China’s reaction was indicative of hostile attitudes towards the West.  
 
By January 2000 the EU was under pressure as US-China negotiations had already concluded 
(Algieri, 2002: 75). The main stumbling point appeared to be whether China would be willing 
to make the required concessions and then the Commission’s attempts to determine whether 
proposals were acceptable. Consequently, the delays in the conclusion of the EU-China deal 
were due to technical rather than political factors. There was no opposition to China’s 
accession to the WTO between or within Member States (Zimmermann, 2004: 81). The UK’s 
support for accession was consistent with its Ideological Free-Trader status but the lack of 
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 Ten EU states participated in Operation Allied Force under NATO, including France and the UK. 
18
 Interestingly, when British newspaper, The Observer, reported in October 1999 that the bombing had been 
deliberate (a charge strongly denied by NATO) (Sweeney, 1999) this did not derail EU-China negotiations.    
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human rights concerns was not. Malcolm Rifkind noted that the preceding Conservative 
government sought “to support China wherever its emergence as a global economic power 
could be directed in a responsible way… the more that China would become involved in 
global organisations like the WTO, the more its transformation into a global superpower will 
be a responsible transition”19.  
 
During the negotiations, there was some marginal criticism of the UK government’s focus on 
economic opportunities over human rights. The House of Commons’ foreign affairs committee 
argued that it would be “utterly unacceptable if there were to be… a trade-off between 
improved economic and commercial relations and a less forceful approach to human rights” 
(SCFA, 2000). However, the Committee did not challenge the government’s policy stance, 
recognising that China was a “significant market”. In response, Robin Cook disagreed  
 
that there is a trade-off between the pursuit of our commercial interests and a 
forceful approach to human rights… the integration of China into the world 
community in general, including China’s accession to the [WTO], is the most 
powerful external factor likely to strengthen the rule of law and lead to an 
improvement in the human rights situation (SSFCA, 2001: 3).  
 
France strongly favoured reaching a deal as soon as possible, since its trade relationship had 
previously been highly politicised by issues such as arms sales to Taiwan (Taube, 2002: 86). 
Chirac had consistently pushed for closer relations between Europe and Asia generally and 
aimed to increase France’s exports to the region20. Chirac’s enthusiasm for China’s WTO 
membership was evident when he stated in 2000 that a final deal on accession was imminent 
within a matter of days and that technical matters were minor (Calle, 2000a), which was 
inaccurate; a senior EU diplomat stated that Chirac was “out of step” with the Commission 
(cited by Irish Times, 2000). One journalist wondered whether Chirac’s statement, rather than 
being naïve, was designed to appease the Chinese as his upcoming visit would be “difficult” 
due to the sale of a satellite to Taiwan (Calle, 2000b). Analysis of the French press during the 
negotiations suggests that there was no strong opposition to the government’s preferences 
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 Interview with Malcolm Rifkind, former British Foreign Secretary, London, 17/06/10. 
20
 Interview with François Godement, Head of China Programme and Senior Policy Fellow at the European 
Council on Foreign Relations, Paris, 20/05/10. 
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based on rival interpretations of China. Chirac was thus able to pursue his preferences – which 
were consistent with the Accommodating Mercantilist characteristics – unencumbered.   
 
Economic self-interest on the part of the EU was a significant factor, but does not fully 
account for the preferences of the Member States and Commission. Economic opportunity was 
just one component of the EU’s motivations – the perception of China’s rise as a political 
opportunity reinforced the commitment to the engagement strategy, with the objective of 
promoting China’s emergence as an international player with a stake in the established order. 
Zimmermann (2004: 74) argued that it was “striking how much the member countries and the 
Commission pushed industry” by leading trade delegations and promoting the concept of 
China as an economic opportunity, effectively shaping “the agenda for Europe's China 
policy”. Following the agreement, Pascal Lamy told participants of the EU-China Business 
Dialogue he was “convinced that the geopolitical shifts in the century ahead will see China 
playing an increasingly pivotal global role… [thus] it is worth investing heavily in building a 
good relationship” (Europa Press Release, 2000). The European Parliament (2000) had not 
given up on the human rights argument, passing a resolution which called for accession to be 
linked to improvements to the human rights situation “in accordance with international 
standards”; however no such conditionality was implemented.  
 
As well as the aversion to tying human rights issues into negotiations, there was no real debate 
within the EU over potential negative implications of China’s increasing economic power. 
From a PTT perspective in which the EU is considered a unitary actor, we would have 
expected such perceptions to emerge. Policymakers recognised that the EU had already 
benefitted – and would continue to do so – from the opening up of China’s market21. The EU’s 
preferences on WTO accession were derived from a set of largely convergent interpretations 
of China’s rise as an economic and political opportunity, reinforcing the need for an 
engagement strategy to ensure China would fulfil its potential and play by established 
international economic rules, integrating further with the system. Policy discourse did not 
evince interpretations of China presenting an economic threat predicated on power-transition 
logic. Military threat perceptions were completely absent, and normative concerns restricted to 
the EP which unsuccessfully attempted to direct the EU’s policy discourse. While differing 
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economic interests are central to Fox and Godement’s (2009) Member State categorisations, 
on the WTO question these were less pronounced, allowing for a common position to emerge 
based on an overriding interpretation of China as a significant economic opportunity.  
 
The EU-China Strategic Partnership 
 
China had not documented its EU policy until 2003 when it began to pursue a strategic 
partnership – although this was initiated by the EU. China’s policy paper called for closer 
relations between the two sides but did not make explicit reference to a strategic partnership 
(MoFA, 2003b). Still, this was seen as significant by European policymakers given that it was 
the first such policy paper China had ever produced for a third party. The launch of the 
partnership in itself constituted an ‘event’, but its true significance lay in the development of 
bilateral relations thereafter, particularly when considering of the Market Economy Status case 
and the EU’s consideration of lifting its arms embargo. Undoubtedly, the perceived 
importance of the strategic partnership was greater on the part of the EU than for China, as the 
former expected this to facilitate greater discussion of key issues, while the latter anticipated it 
would result in less discussion (Mattlin, 2009: 104), shielding the PRC leadership from 
pressure on sensitive topics.  
 
The European Security Strategy identified China as one of the global powers with which the 
EU should pursue strategic relations in light of the “increasing degree of interdependence and 
the necessity of cooperation in strategic international affairs” (Men, 2008: 3). Since the launch 
of the ‘strategic partnership’ it has become a central theme in European policy discourse. Most 
of the related literature is preoccupied with assessing whether the relationship is to be 
considered ‘strategic’ or not (e.g. Berkofsky, 2006; Holslag, 2011) – one interviewee referred 
to a “whole theology around degrees of strategic partnership with China”22. Interviewees 
consistently reflected that there was no consensus on strategic priorities or how to actually go 
about making the relationship more strategic. I am more concerned with how the ‘strategic 
partnership’ concept came about and has subsequently shaped interpretations of, and debates 
over, China’s rise within the EU. I argue that ‘strategic partner’ effectively has become a 
manifestation of the political opportunity interpretation in its own right.  
                                                 
22




If starting from the PTT assumption that the EU, as a non-state entity, is unconcerned by rising 
powers the strategic partnership presents a problem. Under this logic, the EU is insignificant 
internationally and China’s rise has little impact – thus the formation of a strategic partnership 
would not be anticipated. In the alternative PTT perspective where the EU as a unitary actor is 
expected to behave as a status quo power, preferences for integrating the rising power into the 
current international system can be accommodated when they are driven by a desire to assuage 
revisionist intentions. However, European rhetoric on the partnership does not suggest that this 
was the motivation. If anything, the EU should have been working to reinforce its strategic 
partnership with the US to protect its position in the international order. The evidence does not 
indicate that power-transition logic was at play, but simultaneously does not suggest a purely 
accommodationist approach. Instead, an interpretation of China’s rise as presenting a political 
opportunity is evident through the policy narrative. In some ways, the strategic partnership 
itself is more than just a descriptor; it has become an interpretation of China’s rise in its own 
right. This is not necessarily all-pervasive; various actors have put different weight on the 
concept over time but nevertheless it became the dominant way to reference what China 
represented to the EU.    
 
The strategic partnership has not been codified in a single document, thus just what exactly it 
entails remains unclear; this provided the EU flexibility to characterise new dialogue and 
cooperative efforts as evidence of the growing strategic partnership, giving substance to its 
stated objectives of helping China emerge as a responsible actor. According to the 2003 
Communication, the EU sees the partnership as a vehicle for encouraging China to integrate 
with the established international system, particularly in multilateral settings (Commission, 
2003: 5-8). The EU identified with “China’s concerns for a more balanced international order” 
(Commission, 2003: 23) which could be read as critical of the unipolar arrangement. The 2006 
Communication reaffirmed commitment to the strategic partnership, with greater need for 
cooperation on the basis of their increasingly “active and responsible international roles” 
(Commission, 2006: 2). As noted in Table 4.1, one of the most significant statements was that 
“China’s re-emergence is a welcome phenomenon” (Commission, 2006: 12). Interestingly, 
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although the ESS (European Council, 2008) set out the need for strategic partnerships the 
review of its implementation (European Council, 2008) barely made any reference to them
23
.     
 
The strategic partnership required backing from the European Council and General Affairs and 
External Relations Council (GAERC), hence the initial policymaking process was located 
within the intergovernmental subsystem. No arguments that China was a strategic competitor 
rather than partner emerged from (or within) Member States. Although some already had 
strategic partnerships with China (France and the UK), these were notional rather than actual. 
One former UK policy official commented that “there was a lingering suspicion in the UK 
about the [EU’s] strategic relationships” on the basis that they might imply “some kind of 
military relationship”24, yet this did not create a preference against an EU-China strategic 
partnership. What is interesting about the Member States’ positions is that the prospects were 
not particularly favourable just a few months previous. Divisions over the Iraq war had raised 
questions over the viability of a common foreign policy (Lee, 2005: 165); some commentators 
saw the ESS and the strategic partnership concept as propagating a multipolar world which 
Chirac promoted but the UK opposed; a  difference which would be difficult to overcome 
(Hughes, 2003). Others have questioned the commitment to the strategic partnership, claiming 
that although the EU pushes to enhancing the relationship, there has at times been “a sense 
that individual member states do not really mean it” (The Guardian, 2005). Yet this has not 
prevented the ‘strategic partner’ interpretation dominating and reshaping policy discourse 
since its emergence.  
 
The Commission was also a key proponent in making the case for, and shaping, the strategic 
partnership through its responsibility for drafting the Communications as well as its role in 
trade policy, routinely referred to as the core of the strategic partnership. Key Commission 
officials actively pushed the concept in public discourse; Commission President Romano 
Prodi identified in April 2004 “a comprehensive, robust and enduring relationship” as “one of 
the EU’s top foreign policy priorities for the 21st Century” (Europa Press Release, 2004: 6). 
Since 2007, the negotiations of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement – widely expected 
by European policymakers to deepen the strategic component of the relationship – have been 
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led by the Commission indicating the relevance of both the intergovernmental and 
supranational subsystems here. The convergence between the Member States’ and 
Commission’s interpretations of China’s rise presenting economic and political opportunities 
combined with a distinct lack of rival views precluded substantive debate on the issue.   
 
The rhetoric at the launch of the partnership was illustrative of these positive interpretations. 
The General Affairs Council’s (2003: 6) October conclusions stated that both sides had an 
interest in cooperation “in light of their prominent international role and their increasing 
political and economic weight”. The conclusions drew on China’s cooperation in the six-party 
talks on the North Korean nuclear issue – although the EU itself was not a participant – to 
argue that the role assumed by China “illustrates how its perception of the world is changing 
as it gets further integrated into the global community” (General Affairs Council, 2003: 7). 
This view of China’s rising power and behaviour on the international scene was used to justify 
deepened bilateral relations in the document, which reiterated the positive contribution the EU 
could play through its strategy of engagement. Ahead of the sixth EU-China summit, 
Commission President Prodi commented that “as the EU enlarges and China continues to 
emerge on the world stage, our bilateral and international agenda is more challenging than 
ever” but was optimistic that the meeting was “a major opportunity to move forwards 
together” (cited by Europa Press Release, 2003a: 1). 
 
The initial momentum behind forging the partnership was relatively short-lived (Taneja, 2010: 
372). The failure of the EU to lift its arms embargo as well as non-movement on the Market 
Economy Status issue (see below) contributed to this cooling off. China’s request for an end to 
the arms embargo arguably served as a ‘litmus test’ for the strategic partnership, especially the 
extent to which the EU was able to develop a foreign policy independent of US influence. 
Despite the disappointment for China, this apparently had little negative impact on the EU’s 
interpretation of China as a strategic partner. In testimony to the House of Lords’ European 
Union Committee, Charles Grant argued precisely the opposite: following the arms embargo 
debate, “more European governments started to understand that China was not just a market, it 
was also a strategic actor, a rising power and that they needed to consider those factors as well 




This was manifest in subsequent rhetoric and behaviour; from mid-2005 and into 2006, the EU 
continued to emphasise the importance of advancing the partnership. In July 2005, 
Commission President Barroso stated that the EU’s challenge was to 
 
understand China’s dramatic re-emergence, to learn to work better with this 
tremendous country and seize the opportunities provided by its unprecedented 
growth. It is in China’s and Europe’s interest to build a partnership strong enough 
to deal with the global challenges we face (Europa Press Release, 2005b: 2).  
 
Barroso’s argument appeared to be that there were more commonalities than differences 
between the EU and China, tying the economic opportunity interpretation to the ‘strategic 
partner’ interpretation. In a speech commemorating the 30th anniversary of bilateral relations, 
External Relations Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner argued that as “global players”, the 
EU and China had “a responsibility to work together to address the most important challenges 
facing our world today” (cited by Europa Press Release, 2005c: 2).   
 
To update the basis of their relationship, the EU and China have been negotiating on a 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) since 2007. Due to continued problems with 
defining what objectives and interests constitute the ‘comprehensive strategic partnership’ this 
has not yet been finalised. The EU sought to move the relationship to a level where it would 
not be “so easily soured” by trade disputes (Hall, 2005). In 2008, Commissioner Mandelson 
argued for more high-level dialogue to enhance “engagement with China that focuses on our 
joint strategic interests and deepens the trust required to raise and resolve trade differences 
constructively and quickly” (cited by Europa Press Release, 2008). Here, the emphasis is 
placed on the convergence of interests which positions China not just as an economic 
opportunity, but also an important political partner. An EU official told the Financial Times 
that the EU recognised the need to deal “at the highest political level, with the active 
participation of senior commissioners” as a “true reflection of China’s importance in the world 
and… for Europe” (cited by Barber, T. 2008). 
 
The resilience of the concept of China as a strategic partner has been remarkable, even with 
significant obstacles such as MES, the arms embargo, various other trade disputes and 
occasional political disagreements such as China’s cancellation of the 2008 joint summit. In 
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many ways, the EU’s rhetoric on the strategic partnership has intensified; statements from 
high-level policymakers frequently accorded the EU and China significant global importance 
and emphasised the positive aspects of China’s rise. Ahead of the November 2007 summit, 
Commission President Barroso stated that “as the two main global actors, we not only have 
bilateral interests… but also shared responsibilities to meet global challenges such as climate 
change, a dynamic and far-reaching multilateral trade system and development cooperation” 
(cited by Europa Press Release, 2007 [emphasis added]).  
 
While the strategic partnership has not developed as far as the EU would have liked, this has 
not resulted from internal debates between rival interpretations of China’s rise. Whitman 
(2010: 29) noted that policies are hampered by “a lack of Member State consensus over the 
nature and scope of co-operation; a disconnect between Member State bilateral relations and 
EU bilateralism; and weak EU diplomacy in the face of [a] powerful [state] espousing a 
fundamentally different world-view”. Yet while these issues stand in the way, one interviewee 
pointed out that “most EU countries have similar positions, their interests coincide” in relation 
to the “broad picture”25, which provides the basis for a more strategic approach to relations. 
Therefore the lack of progress is due to the complexities of the intergovernmental 
policymaking process and the tendency for Member States to focus on short-term, “small 
issues where they may have different interests”26. 
 
Although the concept of the strategic partnership received much criticism from the academic 
community for its lack of definition and questionable results, there was little in the way of real 
debate at the EU-level prior to its formation. In part this was down to the general optimism 
about the current state and future direction of relations at the time. However since its 
inception, the Commission and Member States have not queried the appropriateness of the 
designation of China as a ‘strategic partner’ but rather taken this as the starting point for 
considering relations. Even within the European Parliament – which, as noted in other cases 
examined, has tended to take a more critical view of EU-China relations – has accepted this 
characterisation of the relationship. I found just one instance where an MEP called the 
strategic partnership into question due to concern over China’s treatment of Tibetans, asking 
the Commission whether the partnership should be frozen in response (Borghezio, 2008). The 
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reply from Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner (2008) addressed the Tibetan issue but did not 
engage the strategic partnership question, seemingly too far removed from mainstream 
discourse to warrant attention.     
 
The development of a strategic partnership contravenes PTT-based expectations from both 
possible conceptualisations of the EU’s status as an international actor. Further, the EU’s 
policy discourse reveals that since its launch, it has become the reference point for framing 
issues and developments within the relationship. The convergence of key actors’ perceptions 
has meant that rival interpretations of China as an economic, military or normative threat 
predicated on power-transition logic have not surfaced, allowing the ‘strategic partner’ 
concept to attract considerable support with no critical reflection.  As we will see in the 
following chapter, the ‘strategic partner’ interpretation of China was a key factor which 
facilitated preferences for lifting the arms embargo to gain traction. While others question 
whether the relationship is truly strategic, they have overlooked the fact that the very 
emergence of the concept has had an impact on the way that EU policymakers understand the 
implications of China’s rise and how they seek to act in response to this development.   
 
Market Economy Status  
 
China’s Market Economy Status (MES) was tied into its WTO accession agreement with the 
EU. China accepted to be treated as a non-market economy (NME) until 2016 unless it could 
prove that it was a market economy (Kastner, 2009: 7). Without MES, the EU can use trade 
defence instruments against ‘dumping’ of products, in other words selling them below 
production costs. For China, withholding MES is discriminatory treatment which leaves it 
vulnerable to protectionist measures (Green, 2004: 1). Since June 2003, China has proactively 
sought early MES recognition from WTO members as a “matter of national pride” which 
would represent a “stamp of national approval” (Green, 2004: 2). As such, while the NME 
versus MES designation might appear rather technical and far removed from the ‘big picture’ 
of China’s rise, it actually carries considerable political importance for China. It is no 
coincidence that MES was requested in the same year that China published its EU policy 
paper, agreed to the strategic partnership and requested the lifting of the arms embargo. This 
arguably indicates that the Chinese leadership attributed political value to gaining MES, given 
that it would not result in significant economic benefits; rather, by refusing MES approval, the 
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EU was seen to be treating China not as an equal.  The case appears then to be something of 
an anomaly for the EU’s relationship with China, as it could be construed as a deviation from 
its strategy of engagement – indeed, undermining the concept of ‘unconditional engagement’ 
as touted by some (e.g. Fox and Godement, 2009). 
 
Here, decision-making falls into the supranational subsystem as the Commission’s 
responsibility for external trade policies allows it to define MES criteria and analyse progress. 
If China fails to meet the criteria, then MES cannot be granted easily
27
 even if some Member 
States supported conferral. Member States’ preferences are nevertheless important as the 
Council decides the overall policy objectives (Woolcock, 2010: 387-8). Informally, the 
Commission needs the backing of a number of the Member States – pressure from powerful 
states could override the Commission’s preferences. Unanimous backing is unnecessary – as 
we will see below – so long as at least a plurality of powerful Member States shares the 
Commission’s preferences. The case reveals interpretations of China’s rise as presenting an 
economic threat amongst some Member States; albeit relatively restrained and narrowly 
defined. Policy debates were fairly minimal since the Commission’s leading role on this policy 
meant that disagreements between Member States were not played out in the public arena. 
Economic threat perceptions were also aired by some MEPs but with negligible impact. 
Instead, the MES issue has been caught up in wider debates on moving the relationship 
forward; in some ways, it is an extension of the strategic partnership case.  
 
PTT perspectives have little to say about MES, since it is a small component of the overall 
relationship. From the perspective of the EU as a unitary actor which responds as a status quo 
power, the manifestation of economic threat interpretations could be taken as evidence of 
power-transition logic. Yet is difficult to make this argument persuasively, as the wider 
context of policy discourse paints a different picture; even if we look at the economic 
dimension, MES applies to only a small portion of bilateral trade
28
 and beyond this, the 
economic opportunity perception dominated. The case may alternatively be construed as 
indicative of China’s unwillingness to play by the established rules of the system by 
requesting MES early without meeting the required criteria and reneging on previous 
agreements. Yet the EU has constantly reiterated that MES will be granted once these criteria 
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are met, holding it out as a ‘carrot’ to encourage economic reforms and further integration 
with the international system. Simultaneously, the EU has continued to emphasise the 
opportunities presented by growing bilateral trade relations rather than resorting to rhetoric of 
a growing economic or normative threat. Understanding this case in the context of the wider 
relationship illustrates the complexities of attempts to develop a strategic partnership with 
China whilst pursuing policies of engagement designed to shape its behaviour.  
 
The Commission maintained a clear preference throughout, although this was challenged by 
some who wanted to strengthen EU-China political relations and by academics who consider 
the criteria “vague and arbitrary” (Messerlin and Sally, 2007). Others argued that the 
Commission’s position was questionable given Russia (a non-WTO member) was granted 
MES in 2002 for political reasons. China also pointed to others including Singapore, Australia 
and New Zealand which had conferred MES (Rémond, 2007: 348, 351) to challenge the 
validity of the Commission’s assessment. European policymakers were evidently aware of the 
political sensitivity of MES for China: trade officials told the Financial Times that China was 
motivated by a desire to eliminate its “pariah status” which stemmed from Tiananmen and that 
the “stamp of respectability matter[ed] enormously” (cited in Buck and Dempsey, 2004). 
Another report cited EU officials claiming Chinese policymakers believed that MES 
recognition would put them on “equal footing” with the western powers (Buck and Dickie, 
2004), at least in terms of its status as an economic power. Yet this did not prompt a shift in 
policy preferences despite the wider context of the nascent strategic relationship; thus the 
impact of the political opportunity interpretation was constrained by other factors.  
 
Early signs painted a promising picture for China: in October 2003 Chirac indicated that he 
wanted the EU to confer MES and lift the arms embargo (Barsych et al, 2005: 14). Reference 
to these two issues at the same time appeared to present the decision as primarily political, at 
odds with the Commission’s stance. Yet Trade Commissioner Lamy also signalled the 
growing closeness of the two sides, describing the relationship as a “honeymoon”, although 
did caution that MES was still being studied (cited by Agence Europe, 17/03/2004). He 
followed this up with talk of the “growing maturity and strength of the EU-China trade 
relationship” (cited by Dombey, 2004) which seemed to indicate a good environment for MES 
to be granted. Generally, rhetoric on bilateral relations from late 2003 into mid 2004 was 
overwhelmingly positive, evincing perceptions of China as a ‘strategic partner’ as well as 
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presenting economic and political opportunities. The Commission’s June 2004 decision to 
withhold MES (Agence Europe, 29/06/2004) contravened this trend. Recognition of China as 
a ‘transition economy’ was taken as an intermediate step to acknowledge progress towards 
market reform, although the designation did not “carry much weight” (Filippini, 2009: 238). 
 
As an ‘Accommodating Mercantilist’, France supported withholding MES despite enthusiasm 
for extensive engagement on other issues, as shown in the UNCHR, WTO and arms embargo 
cases (Chapter Five). However, temporary ‘deviations’ in French preferences reveal that 
perceptions of China’s rise as a political and/or economic opportunity have at times 
overridden the default position of opposition. Both Chirac and his successor Nicolas Sarkozy 
expressed preferences for conferring MES at times when they were attempting to enhance 
political relations. Chirac’s overtures in late 2003 suggested that, much like the finalisation of 
WTO accession and the lifting of the arms embargo, he aimed to create a favourable 
impression of France (and himself), disregarding other EU actors’ preferences. Chirac reverted 
to opposition as a consequence of the downturn in EU-China relations sparked by the 
indecision over the arms embargo, turning his attention to defending French economic 
interests. While Sarkozy took France’s China policy in a new direction and was more critical 
on political issues (Fox and Godement, 2009: 27), his perception of significant economic 
opportunities through prospective aerospace and civilian nuclear power contracts led him to 
declare (temporarily) support for granting MES in November 2007 (Nougayrède, 2007).  
 
The UK supported MES as it sought to reduce obstacles for Chinese imports to Europe, 
consistent with the traits of ‘Ideological Free-Traders’. Without significant domestic 
manufacturing interests no perception of China’s economic rise as threatening had emerged 
within the UK, thus its arguments were predicated on the economic opportunity interpretation. 
Additionally, the political opportunity interpretation came into play as the UK argued that the 
EU should recognise China as an important international player. The UK pushed this approach 
in 2005 under its Council Presidency, with Minister of State for Trade Ian Pearson arguing 
that Russia had already been awarded MES, thus “we think the rise of China should be 
similarly recognised” (cited by Lau and Minder, 2005) with no reference to the requirement of 
meeting the technical criteria. However, European officials argued around this time that aside 
from the technical criteria, the political climate was not conducive to an agreement on MES 




Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson rebuffed these calls to grant MES “for the sake of 
strengthening [EU-China political] relations” (cited by Beattie, 2005). However, in a speech in 
Beijing, Mandelson stated that “attitudes in Europe … will be influenced by a broader 
perception of how China is developing, in its political, social and economic behaviour, both at 
home and abroad” (Europa Press Release, 2005a: 6). This signalled that MES might be 
decided politically if China conformed to the expected standards of an important player on the 
international scene. Under WTO rules, MES will automatically be conferred in 2016; EU 
policymakers have realised that the window of time for utilising MES as leverage on political 
or economic issues is closing
29
. However, the contestation between the economic/political 
opportunity and economic threat perceptions of China’s rise constituted a significant barrier to 
the creation of alternative policy options. The EU has attempted to avoid charges of 
protectionism by awarding MES to individual Chinese companies (Taneja, 2010: 383) but 
refusal of individual applications have still been met with the same blanket response from 
China that these decisions are unacceptable (Minder, 2006)
30
, perpetuating political tensions.   
 
The European Parliament could not directly influence policy, but debates between conflicting 
perceptions of China’s economic rise have often taken place. However, no definitive stance on 
MES one way or the other has emerged within the EP, precluding any attempts to influence 
wider EU discourse on the matter. The Committee on International Trade’s report on prospects 
for bilateral trade relations (Lucas, 2005) identified threats from China’s trade practices to the 
EU’s manufacturing industries but also emphasised the opportunities to be gained from the 
overall relationship. A debate on trade relations in July 2007 revealed the salience of both 
economic threat and opportunity perceptions amongst MEPs, and some contended that it was 
simultaneously both; a point which Mandelson – partaking in the debate – agreed with 
(European Parliament, 2007). MEPs readily expressed concerns over China’s economic threat, 
but beneath the surface rhetoric these were actually confined to specific areas of the trade 
relationship with particular emphasis on unfair practices. These concerns were not 
extrapolated to develop arguments that China was aiming to displace the EU as an 
international power or revise international trade rules.  
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non-market economies there is no basis to challenge the EU’s policy through WTO dispute settlement procedures 




It is interesting that MES had not been granted by the end of the timeframe of analysis
31
 as this 
indicates that not all of the EU’s foreign policies towards China can be characterised as part of 
unconditional engagement even though Fox and Godement (2009: 11) asserted that it was in 
the trade relationship where the “failure” of this approach was most obvious. Green (2004: 1) 
predicted that the EU would grant MES before the US
32, thereby creating “transatlantic 
tensions on how to deal with China”, yet this did not transpire. Political conditionality might 
advance other normative goals, however my arguments are not prescriptive; as the EU has 
imposed economic conditions for MES and stuck to them., this case is a prime example of 
‘conditional engagement’ which has not derailed relations or resulted in detrimental 
consequences for the EU. This fits with the broader discussion taking place in the EU since 
2003 – rather than debates between heavily contrasting interpretations of China’s rise, more 
consideration was given to how the EU could improve bilateral relations. 
 
Broader interpretations of China as an economic opportunity were constrained by the technical 
criteria which safeguarded the Commission’s preference, but also by some Member States’ 
protectionist reflexes – despite the Commission insisting otherwise (Europa Press Release, 
2006). Although refusal might be construed as deviation from the engagement strategy, it is 
clear from the context of policy discourse expressed in key documents (see Table 4.1) and 
surrounding the establishment of the strategic partnership – that engagement was very much 
still the modus operandi. Interpretations of China’s rise influenced by power-transition logic 
did not materialise within policy debates. Looking beyond whether policy changed or not, it is 
clear that the EU struggled with questions of how best to use available policy instruments to 
secure its broad objectives. Refusal to grant MES is a double-edged sword for aspirations for a 
more strategic approach: on one side, it protects the Member States’ economic interests but 
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4.4 Interpretations of China’s Rise and Decision-Making in the EU’s Foreign Policies 
 
The preceding analysis shows that the EU’s foreign policies toward China have been shaped in 
a political environment in which the non-threat/opportunity perceptions of China’s rise across 
the various issue-areas have consistently prevailed. Although at different times we saw the 
economic and normative threat interpretations surface within policy discourse, they were 
generally expressed by a minority of actors; as such, convergence rather than divergence in 
interpretations of China’s rise was a persistent theme within the EU. To the extent that there 
were deviations, these tended to be minor and confined to the context of particular issue-areas 
or even specific policies. In all, it is clear that the majority of the EU’s most important actors 





As a result, there has been no real substantive debate between rival interpretations taking 
place; thus the development of the bilateral relationship has not been subjected to intense 
consideration within the EU. As one interviewee pointed out, with the exception of trade, the 
EU has not thoroughly debated its collective policy towards China; rather “there is a 
Commission policy which is endorsed and modified by the collective decision within the 
European Council which then becomes EU policy”34. Although this is arguably an 
oversimplification by overlooking the fact that the Commission policy is developed with 
Member State preferences in mind, the lack of intense debate over China policy has been 
possible because there are no strongly conflicting interpretations amongst actors; we would 
expect divergent preferences to force greater debate during the policymaking process. 
 
 What emerges from the above analysis is that even with the lack of real debate there are clear 
interpretations of China which dominate policy discourse. These have evolved over time, but 
rather than shifting towards views of China as a threat as its power grows, what we see are 
increasingly expansive views of the opportunities China presents: initially, the dominant 
interpretation was that of an economic opportunity which was, as a result of Tiananmen, 
conditioned by a parallel perception of China as a human rights violator, in other words a 
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potential normative threat. As China became more powerful, the former took precedence over 
the latter and developed into an interpretation of China as a political opportunity as well as 
economic; as a powerful international actor, China could make a positive contribution to the 
international system – with help from the EU.  
 
The political opportunity interpretation posited that China’s emergence on the international 
scene was a positive development as it could potentially become a ‘responsible’ international 
player. This gave way to consideration of a strategic partnership from 2003 onwards, which 
then itself became the core of the EU’s interpretation of China, even though the ability to act 
upon this has not always matched expectations created by policymakers. One interpretation 
did not replace the other, rather the others still existed in parallel and thus we see multiple but 
overlapping interpretations in the EU, leading to divergences of preferences between the 
actors. Although we see differing preferences between the Member States from time to time – 
as well as the Commission having a clear set of preferences of its own – the ‘gap’ between 
these preferences was not particularly large in terms of their broad objectives. This has left the 
door open for the pursuit of a strategy of engagement without substantive reflection from the 
main policy players. The European Parliament was arguably the only source of distinct 
interpretations of the rise of China; its effective exclusion from the EU’s foreign policy 
subsystems meant that its ability to shape policies in response to the rise of China was 
essentially non-existent. Nevertheless, it contributed to the policy discourse, even if it was not 
directly engaged by the Council or Commission.     
 
Moreover, the analysis showed that the power-transition logic was absent from the 
interpretations of China’s rise within the EU’s policy discourse. Despite China’s growing 
power, the prospect of such a situation had not been entertained seriously – or at least publicly 
– by the EU’s policymaking community. This defies the expectation that as the rising state 
becomes more powerful, perceptions of an impending power-transition will emerge. This was 
aptly summarised by one interviewee who noted that the EU cannot afford to miss the train by 
failing to engage with China, given its increasing significance to the world
35
. Even 
policymakers from Member States which still see themselves as important international actors 
in their own right – namely France and the UK – have not embraced perceptions of China’s 
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rise as posing a military threat. To some extent, the lack of a true EU military/security 
presence in the world may have contributed to this; however the economic and political 
dimensions are also important aspects of the power-transition concept and even when 
economic and normative threat perceptions surfaced, these were not predicated on such 
concerns. One interviewee revealed that there were elements within national institutions that 
were concerned about China’s military expansion and the lack of transparency, but noted that 
this had not become part of public debates at the national level, much less the EU level
36
. The 
engagement strategy towards China has not been subject to challenge from dissenting voices; 
this has been part of the criticism from the academic community, particularly Fox and 
Godement (2009) that the EU’s engagement approach has effectively been unconditional.    
 
The problem with PTT in the case of the EU, as noted throughout the chapter, is its 
indeterminacy depending on how the EU is conceptualised as an international actor (or not). 
PTT can be manipulated in such a way to explain extremes of possible responses: a full-tilt 
reaction in which the EU responds to China’s rise as a state would – or attempting to become 
more state-like by integrating further – to preserve its place in the international order or at the 
other extreme, effectively do nothing. But it is inherently limited as it cannot explain why the 
EU pursues one path over the other or when its policies might begin to change. My approach 
of examining how interpretations of China’s rise informed policymakers preferences is able to 
explain the evolution of the EU’s foreign policy behaviour in each of the cases by placing the 
decisions taken in the broader context of how China was understood by policymakers at that 
given time and, in turn, how these events shaped policymakers’ interpretations. Despite the 
differences between the Member States in terms of their own power standings, economic 
interests and willingness to challenge China on political/normative issues, they have produced 
largely convergent interpretations of China’s rise over the timeframe of analysis.  
 
The EU’s foreign policy subsystem arrangements constrained how actors’ preferences were 
translated into policies towards China. The intergovernmental subsystem has been largely 
dominated by the most powerful states as the convergence of their preferences a necessary 
condition of producing acceptable policies. The Tiananmen case exemplified a case where the 
Member States acted constructively to produce a policy, however maintaining unity thereafter 
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proved challenging. In the early 1990s, the intergovernmental process worked well for 
producing UNCHR resolutions on China but this quickly fell apart when the preferences of 
some Member States shifted as their perceptions of China’s rise became fixated on the 
economic opportunities presented. Within the supranational subsystem, the Commission’s 
most significant contributions to the EU’s relations with China have been made through its 
responsibility for trade policy, enabling it to translate its preferences into policy. These 
preferences were based on largely constant interpretations of China as both an economic and 
political opportunity. The MES case presented something of a deviation here as arguably 
China was treated more as an economic threat, although Commission policymakers 
continually argued that the decision had to be based on technical criteria which were removed 
from considerations of China as either a threat or opportunity.  
 
When divergent preferences over certain policies emerged – such as the UK pushing for MES 
being awarded – the subsystems acted as barriers to policy change. Policy development 
through the intergovernmental subsystem formally required unanimity between all the 
Members, although when the most powerful Member States were in agreement, change was 
more likely. Policy coordination had always been complex even before enlargement to twenty-
seven, meaning that it tends to be at the lowest denominator
37
 although in broad terms their 
interests are largely similar
38
. Consequently, the convergence between interpretations of 
China’s rise has been a crucial condition for the development of policies over time – without 
this, it is reasonable to assume that the lowest common denominator would not have moved 
beyond economic interests.  
 
As one interviewee put it, the rationale is that if the EU is to have influence in the world it 
needs to integrate in foreign policy and that this project is “precisely to face up to new 
emerging powers” such as China39. Therefore examining institutional dynamics and policy 
responses alone would only provide part of the picture; the context of policy discourse and 
how individual actors arrive at particular preferences is key to understanding the evolution of 
the EU’s policies towards China over the timeframe of analysis. That the EU’s interpretations 
of China’s rise have consistently focussed on the opportunities presented is noteworthy against 
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the background of China’s increasing power, the increasing complexity of bilateral relations 
and, within this, issues which have the potential to cause friction. Interpretations of China’s 
rise presenting a threat along the economic and normative dimensions do exist within the EU 
policy community, but they are not widely supported and have had little impact on policy 
discourse or the EU’s actual policies towards China.  
 
These interpretations are not static; what we see is that they broaden to encompass a wider 
range of issue-areas as China’s power expands. There was continual emphasis of China’s rise 
as a positive development based on the opportunities presented; this view has evolved from 
defining ‘opportunity’ on the basis of economic partnership to incorporate the political 
relationship, which developed into an interpretation of China as a ‘strategic partner’. The EU’s 
policymaking is at times frustrated by the complexity of its foreign policy subsystem 
arrangements. Had EU actors held widely divergent interpretations of China, then it is 
plausible that in combination with the subsystem structures this would have precluded the 
emergence of any EU China policies beyond, perhaps, trade. Examining both the 
policymaking processes and how salient interpretations contextualised decision-making at 
specific periods of time provided considerable understanding into the factors behind the EU’s 




The analysis here demonstrates that the development of the EU’s foreign policies in response 
to the shifting situation in the international arena has been shaped by the largely convergent 
interpretations of China’s rise. These persisted over the various cases related to multiple 
dimensions of the relationship – that is, there was a high degree of consistency in 
interpretations across different issue-areas. Consequently, in policy discourse challenges to the 
prevailing views were rare. The cases analysed and the overall evolution of EU-China 
relations highlighted that, as is commonly asserted in the literature, there is no single ‘China 
policy’ but rather an overall approach which can be defined as ‘engagement’ which gives rise 
to multiple policies which can change independently of each other. Because there was only a 
narrow range of interpretations of China at play within the EU, the preferences which emerged 
across various issue-areas were often complementary rather than conflicting. This resulted in 
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consistency in the EU’s policies in that they almost invariably adhered to the principle of 
engagement, based on a belief that the EU can play a positive role in China’s emergence. 
 
Over the time period, normative threat perceptions gave way to interpretations of China’s rise 
as presenting considerable economic and political opportunities. Through the cases examined, 
we saw an increasing depth of conviction in these perceptions, particularly with the emergence 
of the strategic partner concept which effectively became the dominant lens through which the 
relationship was viewed. Tiananmen cast a shadow over European perceptions but clearly not 
to the same extent as in the US. While the episode continued to serve as a reference point for 
more critical Member States and MEPs in discussions over subsequent events, there were no 
sustained interpretations of China as an emerging normative or military threat. This allowed 
for closer economic relations, which in turn fostered perceptions of a significant political 
opportunity, culminating in the establishment of the strategic partnership. These 
interpretations have persistently influenced the preferences of key policymakers, with little 
explicit debate over whether China intended to challenge the EU’s position in the international 
order or change the international system’s rules and norms in its own favour. Taken as a 
unitary international actor, the EU’s responses were inconsistent with PTT’s expectations for 
how established powers react to the rise of a potential challenger. 
 
Understanding actors’ preferences and policymaking mechanisms is important because the 
ability to translate preferences into policies is substantially different from a normal ‘state’ 
configuration, particularly when Member States (increasing in number over the twenty year 
period examined) all technically have equal weighting as Council decisions required 
unanimity. As different actors push more on certain issues than others and the EU3 – France, 
Germany and the UK – have the greatest informal power, the decision-making process in each 
case was not identical. These factors lie beyond the analytical grasp of PTT perspectives, 
highlighting the latter’s limited utility for explaining the EU response to China’s rise. The EU 
committed itself to engagement as its main actors had the same objective – encouraging 
China’s development as a responsible international player (and later a strategic partner) that 
would integrate with and contribute to the existing international order. In this context, how 
actors prioritised economic and political opportunities relative to each other was a key factor. 




5.1 Introduction  
 
In the Chapters Three and Four, we found that the concept of ‘China’s rise’ takes on different 
meanings for different actors, with implications for policymaking. In the US, the presence of 
rival interpretations led to vociferous debates, yet threat perceptions only had a limited impact 
on policy. For the EU, the degree of convergence around economic and political opportunity 
interpretations meant that there was little true debate over the implications of China’s rise, 
resulting in an uncontested strategy of engagement across all policy areas. In this chapter, I go 
a step further and contend that understanding how China’s rise has been interpreted and 
debated also enables us to explain variations between US and EU foreign policies. To do so, I 
focus on the transatlantic debate on the EU’s proposal to scrap its China arms embargo. 
Although the US and EU imposed similar policies at the same time, for the same reason and 
with the same objective, ultimately they ended up diverging on their preferences for the future 
direction of their respective policies. Given that both are confronted with a rising China which 
continues to violate human rights it is initially unclear why this divergence occurred.   
 
From power-transition theory’s (PTT) perspective, the arms embargo case should be relatively 
clear cut. However, as I elaborate in the next section, there are significant problems with the 
insights that it might provide. If we start with the assumption that the EU is a unitary 
international actor, PTT still overlooks the variations within and between the established 
powers, on the assumption that status quo powers will respond in a similar fashion to rising 
challengers. However, if the EU is not to be considered as such, then the indeterminacy 
problem creeps back in, as there is no clear guide for how it will behave. The issue of the EU’s 
embargo is, as one interviewee noted, “not so much an EU-China problem as it an EU-US-
China problem”1, making it an ideal window into the way different understandings of China’s 
rise have shaped their respective reactions to China’s rise. A more satisfactory explanation is 
forthcoming through an examination of how differing interpretations of China’s rise allowed 
policymakers’ preferences with respect to the embargoes to evolve in different directions.  
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The case demonstrates a clear instance where the two sides had similar policies predicated on 
the response to the same event and justified on the same grounds, yet ended up in significantly 
different positions on the issue fourteen years later. The transatlantic debate reveals distance 
between the two established powers’ responses to the rise of China which cannot be explained 
by international-level factors alone. While the importance of factors such as regional security 
presence (or the lack thereof) cannot be dismissed, they do not fully account for the evolution 
in policy preferences, the EU Member States’ positions on the arms embargo and, moreover, 
why the debate played out as it did. In the next section, in addition to setting out PTT-based 
expectations, I set the stage for my analysis by briefly identifying the relevant subsystems. I 
then turn to develop my argument, by first recounting the origins and substance of the 
embargoes, referring back to the context of US-China and EU-China relations in the aftermath 
of the Tiananmen crackdown and then consider the development of the policies from until 
2003. This is followed by close examination of the transatlantic debate to determine the 
impact of the divergent interpretations of China’s rise the considerations of the arms embargo 
issue within the EU and the US and the content of the transatlantic debate itself. 
 
 The final section summarises the main findings and reiterates the argument, which is that the 
divergence between the US and the EU which opened up between 1989 and 2003 resulted 
from the different experiences of interpreting and debating the rise of China. Although both 
sides have largely adhered to strategies of engagement, in the US debates frequently arise 
from widely discrepant interpretations of China’s rise whereas this has not been the case in the 
EU. This created different contexts in which the status of the arms embargoes, once placed on 
the agenda, was reconsidered by policymakers. This was not a salient issue on the agenda of 
either side prior to 2003, thus the divergence of preferences went unnoticed. When it arrived at 
the forefront of policy considerations, the actors within the US’ executive-legislative 
subsystem collectively interpreted this in the context of China as an emerging military threat, 
producing a clear common preference for the embargo to remain. While for the most part, as 
demonstrated in Chapter Three, the political/economic opportunity interpretations have 
dominated in the US, in this specific case there was no ‘opportunity’ for the US – only 
negative outcomes. For the EU, perceptions of economic and political opportunities of China’s 




5.2 PTT Expectations and Subsystems 
 
The embargoes were initially imposed because the Western powers found it morally 
unjustifiable to sell weapons to a repressive regime. As China became more powerful but 
made little headway in improving its human rights situation, the embargo remained a useful 
tool both symbolically to remind China that it failed to live up to international expectations 
regarding conduct in domestic affairs and also prevented China from closing the relative 
power gap with the established powers – at least, quicker than it otherwise would. However, as 
we have seen, power-transition theorists are sceptical of the effectiveness of sanctions due to 
their limited impact on the changing power dynamics. The embargo has no impact upon 
China’s economic expansion, which is fundamental to PTT conceptualisations of threat. At the 
same time, maintaining the arms embargo would be no bad thing if a power-transition was 
anticipated
2
. It undoubtedly impacts China’s military expansion by denying it the most 
advanced systems, but threat proponents can point to data (see Chapter Two) which indicates 
that China’s military power has grown rapidly even with Western arms embargoes in place 
 
Since PTT is indeterminate as to how the EU will respond to the rise of China, the preference 
for lifting the arms embargo can be accommodated from the perspective that it is not a global 
actor and thus unconcerned by the changes in the international order. However, if we treat the 
EU as a unitary international actor which does pay attention to such changes – as some PTT 
scholars have done – then the move to lift the arms embargo is more difficult to explain. 
Further, from either perspective, the differences between Member States’ preferences and the 
sudden end to the momentum to lift in 2005 are problematic; PTT could only explain 
homogeneity in Member States’ preferences and behaviour towards China. Its state-centric 
basis precludes analysis of differing perceptions of China present within the decision-making 
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process. It is also worth pointing out that power-transition perspectives concentrate on 
relationships between two actors (the status quo and revisionist powers) which makes them 
unsuitable for exploring trilateral relations – the dynamics of which, as I will argue, were 
fundamentally important in this case. 
 
Before commencing our analysis it is necessary to identify which US and EU foreign policy 
subsystems were in play as, following on from the previous chapters, this is an effective route 
to locating whose preferences mattered most in the decision-making process. Although the US 
was not considering changes to its own embargo, I am interested the development of the 
response to the EU’s proposal which emerged through its foreign policy subsystems. The 
President’s predominance in foreign policy naturally meant that the government’s stance was 
determined through the executive subsystem. However, Congress expressed strong views on 
this issue and attempted to pressure the administration to respond more forcefully and also 
attempted to pass legislation intended to influence the EU’s decision. Thus, the US’ response 
to this event was a product of the executive-legislative subsystem. The EU’s consideration of 
lifting its arms embargo created a rare instance of convergence in preferences between 
executive and legislative actors, albeit not in relation to the US’ own policies towards China.  
 
The EU’s arms embargo was initiated by the European Council and although there was no 
legal commitment, it was to be lifted through unanimous consent within the Council. 
Therefore the intergovernmental subsystem was the key venue, with Member States the key 
decision-makers at all stages
3
. However, the Commission and Parliament had a role to play in 
the deliberations to varying degrees; the Commission largely sought to stay out of the debate 
but its principal foreign policy players spoke out on occasion, and were generally disposed to 
support lifting the embargo
4
. The Parliament, clearly the strongest opponent of lifting – even 
compared to some of the more reluctant Member States – attempted to shape the Council’s 
consideration of the embargo through frequent and vocal criticism based primarily on human 
rights concerns. Although policy change would take place through the intergovernmental 
subsystem and thus Member States’ preferences mattered most, an examination of the EU’s 
internal discourse needs to account for the input from actors within the supranational 
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subsystem given their efforts to influence the discussion taking place to a greater extent than 
in any of the other cases studied.       
 
5.3 The Origins, Substance and Development of the Embargoes, 1989-2003 
Establishing the origins and substance of the arms embargoes imposed on China and tracing 
their development from the Tiananmen crackdown up until the end of 2003 establishes the 
context of the transatlantic debate. Most of the literature examining the arms embargo issue 
pays lip service to its origins and then jumps to late-2003/early 2004, overlooking how 
American and European interpretations of China’s rise had diverged in the intervening period. 
As is demonstrated below, their respective experiences of interpreting and responding to 
China’s rise were central to the development and eventual outcome of the transatlantic debate. 
Here, I draw on the findings of Chapters Three and Four to establish how their preferences on 
the arms embargo issue fit into the wider setting of their response to China’s rise. I contend 
that the evolution of interpretations of China’s rise in the US (subject to constant debate 
between rival views, with a prominent ‘threat’ narrative emerging but largely not guiding 
policy) compared with the EU (virtually no debate or salient threat perspectives) was 
fundamental to the shift in preferences.  
 
The EU’s China Arms Embargo 
 
The EU announced the imposition of its arms embargo at the Madrid European Council in late 
June (see Chapter Four’s Tiananmen Crackdown section for details). Reportedly, France 
insisted on the adoption of the arms embargo as part of the sanctions package (Wong, 2006: 
82), predicated on a perception of China posing a continued threat to its own citizens. The 
arms embargo was established in the Council Declaration which outlined an agreement to the 
“interruption by the Member States… of military cooperation and an embargo on trade in 
arms with China” (European Council, 1989 [emphasis added]). The statement did not define 
what arms or related materials were subject to the embargo, or mechanisms for enforcement. 
As the embargo was a “very limited and abstract proposition”5, implementation was the 
                                                 
5
 Interview with François Godement, Paris, 20/05/10. 
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That the EU’s embargo was not reinforced as a Common Position following the inception of 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is significant because it would have in effect 
shifted the embargo from a political to a legal commitment and reduced the scope for selective 
readings by Member States (Kreutz, 2004: 46). Following its imposition, the Member States 
did not immediately clarify their respective understandings of the arms embargo (at least, not 
publicly). As a political declaration there was no particular requirement for clarification and 
most Member States had pre-existing national arms export controls in place. The implication 
is that there was no codified EU-level embargo, but rather a new political declaration against 
arms sales to China. However, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) 
has identified some Member States’ definitions of the embargo, providing insights into 
whether threat perceptions underpinned the continued necessity of the embargoes. 
 
In April 1997, France’s Defence Minister Charles Millon stated that “there is no question of 
going back on the decision about the arms trade” with China (cited in SIPRI, 2004a), although 
did not elaborate why this was the case. When Millon raised the prospects of greater 
cooperation with China, he noted that this would be “conducted within the framework of our 
European and international commitments” (cited in SIPRI, 2004b), implicitly including the 
arms embargo. The language employed was vague with little explanation of precisely how the 
embargo was interpreted, although SIPRI concluded that this is the closest to a definition as 
France has provided
7. The UK’s definition was expounded by Minister of State for Foreign 
and Commonwealth Affairs Alastair Goodlad in response to a Parliamentary question in 1995 
(SIPRI, 2004c). Goodlad emphasised that weapons which could be used for “internal 
repression” were prohibited and that applications for other transfers were considered on a 
case-by-case basis (Hansard, 1995: Vol.256 Col.842-3). The list of prohibited items did not 
include dual-use technologies: those with potential civilian or military application which 
facilitate the development of high technological warfare capabilities. There was no concern – 
at least at that time – about the potential implications for China’s military strength, suggesting 
an absence of perceptions of a (potential) military threat.    
                                                 
6
 Interview with former UK policy official, London, 28/04/11. 
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Although Member States would be reluctant to go against the political commitment of the 
embargo (Archick et al, 2005: 5), it was not impossible for them to do so depending on 
national export controls. Despite the embargo, SIPRI identified continued arms transfers from 
the EU (see Table 5.1)
8
. There is then a differentiation between the embargo as an actual 
barrier to arms transfers and its status as a commitment to EU norms and as a ‘message’ to 
China on human rights. These transfers occurred in spite of commitments to other export 
control regimes, such as the 1996 Wassenaar Arrangement
9
 which applied to conventional 
weapons and sensitive dual-use technologies. While this was not targeted at any particular 
state, it should have served as another constraint on exports to China (Grimmett, 2006: 4). 
From the interviews conducted in London, Paris and Brussels, there was overwhelming 
agreement that the embargo’s significance lay in its status as a symbolic reminder to China of 
Tiananmen’s legacy. However, even this was evidently waning among some Member States 
prior to the initiation of the embargo’s review.     
 
In the 1990s there was evidence of shifting positions on the embargo. Despite Millon’s 
statement (above), French policymakers indicated in 1997 that progress in human rights may 
allow for the embargo to go and allow consideration of exporting dual-use technologies 
(Godement and Serra, 2000: 17). However, the evidence does not suggest that the French 
government considered the original reasons for the embargo to have been eradicated. Within a 
year of its election, the Labour government in the UK reportedly circulated an internal paper 
which considered the possibility of the removing the arms embargo (Stumbaum, 2009: 171)
10
. 
Around this time, both the UK and France were attempting to forge closer political relations 
with China, as we saw in relation the UNCHR case in Chapter Four. While there were no 
national or EU level debates on the embargo’s status during this period, there were indications 
of shifting preferences well before China called for an end to the embargo in 2003, suggesting 
that the desire to lift the embargo was not purely driven by the latter. 
                                                 
8
 The SIPRI database indicates that only four Member States exported arms to China over the timeframe of 
analysis – France, Germany, Italy and the UK. 
9
 The Wassenaar Arrangement – which the EU Member States and US are party to – the successor to the 
Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) (Grimmett, 2006:1).  
10
 As far as it is possible to determine, no researcher has yet accessed this document, nor is there much evidence 
to suggest what the conclusions were. However, its existence is still significant. The paper’s subject was raised in 
interviews with British policy officials; however none could recall (or would admit to) any details of it, and 
suggested if such a paper had been written it would have been seen only by those most closely involved in the 
government’s decision-making. A Freedom of Information request relating to this document in 2010 was denied.    
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In the period between the embargo’s imposition and the move to lift it, the EU’s 
interpretations of China had evolved, with the ‘human rights violator’ perspective giving way 
relatively quickly to that of an economic opportunity. This in turn expanded to see China as a 
political opportunity in terms of contributing to a multilateral world order and upholding the 
international system, rather than seeing China as wanting to alter the rules of the game in its 
favour. Both France and the UK had started referring to China as a “strategic partner” in the 
context of their own bilateral relations by the late 1990s and this perspective was gaining 
traction at the EU-level, as articulated in the European Security Strategy (European Council, 
2003). The embargo stood as an obstacle to fostering closer relations through the new strategic 
partnership (Stumbaum, 2009: 171), a view which has persisted even after the 2004-5 
debate
11
. Its removal would symbolise that the EU wanted to deal “with China fairly and 
properly as a full scale, comprehensive strategic partner which is a fellow member of the 
UN”12. Lifting would also indicate an independent European foreign policy – that is, not 
informed by US preferences (Casarini, 2007: 385). 
 
China’s 2003 EU policy paper explicitly called for the embargo’s revocation “at an early date 
so as to remove barriers to greater bilateral cooperation on defence industry and technologies” 
(MoFA, 2003b). Subsequently, China ramped up its diplomatic campaign on the issue 
beginning with the October 2003 EU-China summit
13
 (Kreutz, 2004: 49). The issue was 
symbolically important to China’s leadership14, serving as something of a test for the strategic 
partnership. Thus, the promise of an even closer relationship was attractive to the EU within 
the context of the well-established political/economic opportunity interpretations of China’s 
rise and particularly in relation to the emergent interpretation of China as a strategic partner. It 
also allowed China to set the terms of the relationship’s agenda by concentrating on the arms 
embargo rather than on the broader issue of human rights
15. The embargo’s end would be the 
                                                 
11
 In interview with EU policy official, Brussels, 04/06/10, this was mentioned, noting that this logic still held.  
12
 Interview with former UK policy official, London, 28/04/11. 
13
 The joint statement (Europa Press Release, 2003b) did not actually mention the issue, but Kreutz (2004: 49) 
cited officials acknowledging that the issue was discussed.  
14
 Interview with EU-China analyst, Brussels, 26/04/11; interview with Stanley Crossick, Senior Fellow at 
Brussels Institute of Contemporary China Studies, Brussels, 01/06/10.  
15
 Interview with EU-China specialist, London, 18/04/11. 
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price the EU had to pay for increased cooperation from the Chinese, irrespective of human 
rights concerns – to the extent that they still featured on policymakers’ lists of priorities.    
 
The US’ China Arms Embargo 
 
The US’ embargo is a much more straightforward story. The cessation of arms sale was part of 
the package of sanctions which the GHW Bush administration imposed after Tiananmen. 
Bush’s embargo was later reinforced by law16 (Archick et al, 2005: 4),  which declared that it 
should be continually made clear to the PRC leadership that “resumption of normal diplomatic 
and military relations... will depend on the halting of executions of pro-democracy supporters, 
releasing those imprisoned for political beliefs, and increasing respect for human rights” 
(HoR, 1989). The legislation’s most specific reference to arms transfers placed the export of 
dual-use technologies under strict controls. The Act noted that Congress  
 
exempts from the suspension on the issuance of munitions export licenses any 
systems and components designed specifically for civil products and controlled as 
defense articles only for purposes of export to a controlled country, unless the 
President determines that the recipient of such items is the Chinese military or 
security forces (HoR, 1989).  
 
The legislative basis of the embargo also included a provision or the President to issue a 
waiver allowing for certain transfers (Stumbaum, 2009: 173-4). Table 5.2 illustrates that the 
US has been more consistent in adhering to its embargo than the EU, although some arms-
related transfers have occurred. The most significant use of the waiver prerogative occurred in 
1992 when Bush took the decision to finalise four previously suspended Foreign Military 
Sales with China which dated from the mid-1980s
17
, which were possible because they 
coincided with a relatively tranquil period in cross-Strait relations
18
. The interesting feature of 
this waiver was not the transfer itself per se, but rather how it was justified by Department of 
State spokesperson Richard Boucher (1992); initially, he declared that there would be no more 
arms sales agreements with China following the closing out of these programmes. Yet a later 
                                                 
16
 Section 902 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1990-1991. 
17
 Since they were already paid for prior to their suspension in June 1989, they do not show up as exports in 
Table 5.2. 
18
 Interview with Robert Sutter, former Congressional Research Service specialist, Washington DC, 29/06/10.   
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segment of the statement seemed to suggest that the administration’s position in relation to the 
efficacy of sanctions in the military sphere may have been changing: 
 
We have made our point. We now believe that continuing to hold aging items after 
a 3 [and a] 1/2-year suspension hinders rather than helps US efforts to promote 
cooperative PRC behaviour in a range of areas (Boucher, 1992).   
 
However, the timing of the statement – late December 1992 – was less than a month before 
Clinton took office. The change of key administration policymakers effectively ‘reset’ the 
government’s preferences to strong – albeit implicit – support of the arms embargo, given the 
strongly critical line Clinton’s campaign had taken on China (see Chapter Three) which 
evinced perceptions of China as a normative threat. The arms embargo is not definitive in that 
what is considered to constitute national security is subjective dependent on the situation and 
the individual who holds decision-making power. Although this seems to contradict the US’ 
position on the embargo’s importance, of more significance are the technologies that have 
been transferred and those that are not; the US has been primarily concerned about transfers of 
high-end dual-use technologies which are liable to have military end-users. The US has 
consistently refused to export such technologies under the conditions of the legislation 
imposing the ban. 
 
Beyond the reference to the arms embargo in 1992, it has not been an issue on the US’ China 
policy agenda. Clinton appeared ready to shift the direction of overall policy – as signalled by 
MFN linkage – yet as we saw in Chapter Three, this did not transpire. While there were 
instances of increased tension between the US and China – particularly the Taiwan Strait crisis 
– and different interpretations of China’s rise emerging within policy debates, the US has 
continually opted for policies of engagement at key instances. Although there has been a 
consistent narrative from some parts of the policymaking community that China’s rise poses a 
military threat, more moderate voices seem to accept that uncertainty remains. Despite 
growing perceptions of China as a potential political opportunity, the persistence of threat 
perspectives precluded any shift in preferences away from maintaining the embargo; if 
anything, the Taiwan Strait crisis and Cox Report would have reinforced commitment to the 





5.4 The Diverging Interpretations of the Rise of China in the Arms Embargo Debate 
 
The transatlantic debate over the EU’s embargo illustrated a clear gap between the US and EU 
in terms of their approaches to relations with China. Initially, this seems puzzling precisely 
because both had started off at the same point on this policy. The debate threatened to become 
a major schism in the transatlantic alliance which was already fragile in the wake of divisions 
over the Iraq war. Further, the debate dragged out for over a year, during which the two sides 
appeared to talk past each other when trying to communicate the logic behind their 
preferences. Throughout, the US and EU argued over the particular implications of lifting: 
whether this would lead to EU arms exports to China or not, and whether this was sending the 
‘right’ or ‘wrong’ message regarding human rights. Behind the arguments in the public 
discourse was a contestation between different interpretations of the implications of China’s 
rise. In this section, I argue that explaining the genesis of the EU’s consideration of lifting, the 
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nature of the US’ objections and the substance of the transatlantic debate requires 
consideration of the evolution of their interpretations of China’s rise. Specifically, the 
transatlantic debate was strongly shaped by the differing experiences of the US and EU in 
terms of their internal debates – or lack thereof in the case of the EU – between rival 
interpretations of China’s rise and its implications not only for their own polities, but the 
international system more broadly. 
 
To do this, I look at both the US and EU together as the interactions between policymakers are 
what produced the substance of policy discourse that is subjected to analysis. Although the 
transatlantic debate did not kick off properly until 2004, to capture what catalysed the EU’s 
proposal to lift I take late 2003 as the starting point for the analysis. Close examination of the 
development of preferences on both sides of the Atlantic – and responses to the other side’s 
arguments – reveals different interpretations of the implications of China’s rise. Here, I 
concentrate on the period up until the end of the substantive debate, but in the next chapter I 
consider how the embargo’s post-debate status figured in the context of US-EU-China 
relations. I also present a detailed overview of the debate, as other accounts – such as in 
Stumbaum (2009) and Casarini (2009) – are somewhat incomplete, particularly in terms of the 
US’ input. Consequently, there are missing details in the existing literature which are 
important to how the debate played out and revealed the importance of interpretations of 
China’s rise.  
 
As contended in Chapter Four, within the EU there have not been substantive debates between 
differing interpretations of the implications of China’s rise. Evidence from the public 
discourse revealed that the reason behind this was not lack of political space to do so but 
rather because the actors with greatest responsibility for determining the EU’s foreign policies 
– the Member States – have held relatively similar interpretations. This was underpinned by a 
strong interpretation of China as an economic opportunity that has expanded to conceptualise 
China’s rise as a political opportunity in the sense that it could play an increasingly active, 
positive role in the international arena. This then developed into a view of China as a strategic 
partner at a time when the establishment of a strategic identity was on the EU agenda. This 
context was crucial for the consideration of lifting the arms embargo and strongly informed 
the arguments put forward by proponents of lifting. However, interpretations of the US as the 
EU’s primary strategic partner were also influential, particularly in 2005 when the political 
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environment became less conducive to lifting. The debate did not just play out in the context 
of how the EU interpreted China’s rise, but also its perspective on relations with the US. 
 
The main consequence was that the EU’s internal embargo debate was more of a deliberation 
than any true contestation of rival preferences for keeping the embargo indefinitely versus 
lifting (whether as a short- or medium-term objective). To that end, the internal discussions in 
2004 and early 2005 were over the timing of the lifting and the improvements that the EU 
should look for in return, rather than substantive debates over whether it should actually be 
lifted or not. Dissenting voices were to be heard in the EP, but due to the decision being a 
purely intergovernmental one – deliberated at the level of the Council of the EU and European 
Council – the Member States opted not to engage with these rival perspectives in any 
meaningful sense. Lip-service was often paid by vague promises to take on board the EP’s 
concerns, yet there was no discernible impact on the EU’s stance or the deliberations over the 
embargo. This allowed the momentum towards lifting to develop relatively quickly.  
 
That is not to say however that there was unanimity from day one; indeed, certain Member 
States were opposed due to continued concerns over human rights, the need for a Code of 
Conduct on arms exports, and the appropriateness of sending a ‘positive’ signal to China at 
that time. However, internal disagreements did not prevent the EU moving from a proposal to 
review the embargo to a commitment to lift it in the space of a year. Indeed, right up until the 
day China adopted the ASL in 2005, it looked likely that consensus would be reached. Despite 
divergent preferences on particular issues, the underlying interpretations of China’s rise – as 
an economic, political opportunity and putative strategic partner – facilitated a political 
environment in which lifting was not only a real possibility, but almost a reality. The lack of 
formal conditionality – which received considerable criticism – was due to difficulties in 
getting the Member States to agree to the criteria
19
; yet the commitment to the general 
principle of lifting allowed the EU to proceed without a final agreement on conditions. For 
François Godement, this was an example of unconditional engagement, although not a “pure 
case” due to a degree of “bluff”: some Member States wanted to agree with everyone by not 
going against either China or the US
20
.        
 
                                                 
19
 Interview with EU policy official, Brussels, 01/06/10.   
20
 Interview with François Godement, Paris, 20/05/10. 
231 
 
Interviews with former US officials confirmed that for the Bush administration, security 
concerns took greater priority than human rights in the US-China relationship in the period of 
the transatlantic debate
21
. That is, it was the military threat perspective which took precedence 
over any view of China as a normative threat. Interviewees were keen to point out that this did 
not mean that human rights concerns were not of importance to the administration, but rather 
that the concerns were multi-faceted with some of greater significance than others. This 
indicated that the logic underpinning the embargo had shifted for policymakers: no longer was 
the embargo there to prevent China purchasing weapons with which it could harm its own 
citizens or as a symbol reminding the PRC that they were expected to respect human rights; it 
was now largely about US national and regional security interests. Because the US had never 
internally debated the status of its own embargo, there was no explicit acknowledgement that 
the embargo’s purpose had changed for the US.  
 
The focus on human rights was, however, strong in Congress. A number of those who led 
Congress’ response to the Tiananmen crackdown were still in office in 2004/5 and evidently 





 and Richard Lugar
24
 along with some of their colleagues wrote on several occasions to 
GHW Bush in 1989 to express their dismay over China’s actions and to urge the President to 
take a firmer stance against China
25
. During the 2004/5 transatlantic debate, these same 
individuals frequently criticised the EU for neglecting the human rights situation in China. In 
particular, the comments of Lugar and Biden in the Senate Foreign Relation Committee’s 
(2005) hearing on ‘the lifting of the EU Arms Embargo on China’ were focussed primarily on 
human rights issues. These revealed interpretations of China as a normative threat which 
resembled those in the European Parliament: a brutal authoritarian regime with little respect 
for human rights. In Congress, these interpretations were manifest from 1989 onwards and 
remained largely unchanged – and arguably reinforced – due to China’s intransigence in 
relation to improving human rights conditions.  
 
                                                 
21









 See discussion of Congress’ reaction to Tiananmen in Chapter Three. 
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There was little shared ground in terms of the EU and US’ positions on the issues, precluding 
the development of shared understanding precisely because their interpretations of China’s 
rise and its implications not only for themselves but the international system were 
considerably different. Even where there was consensus between some actors in the US and 
EU (specifically, the Parliament) that the embargo should remain their respective preferences 
were predicated on differing interpretations. Nevertheless, this allowed the US to attempt to 
build support for its preferences within the EU even if they had different reasons for 
promoting the embargo’s retention. The divergence in their interpretations was further 
compounded by the fact that the two sides had never had substantive dialogue on East Asian 
security
26
 which would have provided a forum through which concerns could be raised and 
differences identified. Following the transatlantic debate, the two sides agreed to establish an 
East Asian Strategic Dialogue, although only a few of these meetings ever took place.  
 
While the underlying logic of the embargo had changed for the US in such a way that it 
became more necessary, a similar process had not occurred in the EU. Instead, the embargo 
was only predicated on the original reasons for its imposition: censure of the Chinese 
government’s actions in June 1989. What had changed was the cost of maintaining the 
embargo relative to the benefits accrued: the main cost was that it presented – or at least, 
China claimed that this was the case – an obstacle to better political and economic relations; 
the possible benefits were minimal, as it had not resulted in significant improvements in the 
area of China’s human rights27 and, although not a major concern for the EU, had not 
prevented China’s military from developing. Thus the embargo’s effectiveness could easily be 
called into question from the EU’s perspective, especially in terms of its utility in relation to 
human rights
28
 which was the original reason for imposition.   
 
Chapters Three and Four demonstrated that despite the persistence of overarching strategies of 
engagement from the US and EU in their relations with China, these were in many ways 
qualitatively different and conditioned by their respective domestic political discourses over 
China’s rise, which was far more contested in the US. Specifically, although the US had 
pursued engagement, beneath the surface there was considerable tension between competing 
                                                 
26
 Interview with François Godement, Paris, 20/05/10. 
27
 Interview with French policy official, Paris, 18/05/10.  
28
 Interview with EU policy official, Brussels, 01/06/10.  
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perspectives on the implications of China’s rise. Following the EP-3 incident, the Bush 
administration’s foreign policy had not been directly determined by interpretations of China as 
a potential military threat. However, they still existed and the arms embargo presented an 
opportunity for them not only to resurface, but dominate policy discourse for a period. As one 
EU official recognised in March 2004, “the United States does not want to contribute to the 
militarization of a country they perceive as a potential strategic adversary, while the 
Europeans are in a partnership approach, in particular business”29 (cited by Zecchini, 2004).  
 
In this case, I deviate slightly from the approach in the rest of the thesis as the US’ policy 
responses were not directed at China, but rather the EU. Nevertheless, the intention of the US 
was to influence the policies of a third party towards China on the basis of preferences shaped 
by the salient interpretations of China’s rise within its policymaking community at that time. 
The transatlantic debate’s significance lies in the revelation that a wider range of policymakers 
acted on the basis of threat interpretations than had been the case in the events examined in 
Chapter Three. However, the analysis here shows that the US was not motivated by 
perceptions of an impending power-transition; rather, the threat interpretations were complex, 
involving a range of factors connected to the US’ regional security interests.   
 
 The EU’s actions, rather than any specific behaviour of China, had been the concern for the 
US and led to the threat interpretations of China’s rise gaining greater salience as 
policymakers pondered the potential implications of the removal of the arms embargo. An 
opinion piece appearing in the Washington Post by former US official Daniel Blumenthal and 
Thomas Donnelly (2005) of the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission
30
 
indicated that the EU had  
 
inadvertently kick-started the debate in Washington about China’s intentions. The 
truth is that beneath the rosy rhetoric there remains a great deal of tension… 
[a]lready, talk of a ‘China threat’ is re-emerging in the corridors of Congress, the 
Pentagon and inside the Bush administration.  
 
                                                 
29
 Original: “Les Etats-Unis ne veulent pas contribuer à la militarisation d'un pays qu'ils perçoivent comme un 
adversaire stratégique potentiel, alors que les Européens sont dans une logique de partenariat, en particulier 
commercial”.  
30
 At that point, both were also resident fellows at the AEI.  
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This had evidently not been the intent of European policymakers; having failed to consult with 
the US over the move they had not considered the potential ramifications
31
. European 
interviewees indicated that even if this had taken place, the US’ response – especially from 
Congress – would most probably have been the same32. My findings concur with this: the 
reaction was primed by their perceptions of China as a growing military threat; it was not 
simply in response to not being consulted on the issue. Another interviewee suggested that the 
debate wasn’t about arms exports to China, but that some in the US wanted to prevent a 
“normal relationship” between the EU and China33. Given Chirac’s disagreements with the US 
in 2003 and perception that it had been ‘weakened’, it is unlikely that he would have wanted to 
engage with the US at an early stage. However, it is surprising that other Member States – 
particularly the UK – did not attempt to push for greater transatlantic dialogue before 
supporting the initiative. The rhetoric from the EU as US objections intensified appeared to 
suggest that policymakers largely expected that the US would simply have to live with the 
EU’s decision.  
 
Proposal to Lift 
 
In late 2003, the emergent perception of China as a strategic partner – and China’s apparent 
reciprocal recognition of the EU as such – created a permissive environment in which the 
move to lift the embargo could receive real consideration. Although China’s pressure 
mattered, the positive political environment was essential for the proposal to gain traction. 
There was no simultaneous attempt to pressure the US on its embargo, as their bilateral 
relationship was not in a condition where it could realistically be considered. The proposal 
was advanced by France and Germany
34
 at the December 2003 European Council meeting 
where it was agreed that the foreign ministers in the General Affairs and External Relations 
Council (GAERC) should review the embargo over the coming months (European Council, 
2003: 19). The decision to review required unanimous agreement; even Member States which 
tended to be more politically critical of China gave their backing. UK Foreign Secretary Jack 
                                                 
31
 Interview with US policy analyst, Washington DC, 13/07/10.  
32
 Interview with EU policy official, Brussels, 01/06/10; interview with Stanley Crossick, Brussels, 01/06/10. 
33
 Interview with EU policy official, Brussels, 03/06/10.  
34
 Austria, Italy, Spain and Greece also supported ending the embargo (Agence Europe, 27/01/2004); with 
Finland and the Netherlands joining this group later (Casarini, 2009: 124).   
235 
 
Straw later revealed that he had supported the proposal “because, on the face of it, [the 
embargo] had run its course” (cited by SCID, 2005).  
 
The available evidence suggests that Member States’ positions were predicated on two distinct 
avenues of thought regarding the priorities in the bilateral relationship. The gap between their 
interpretations of China was relatively narrow and this was reflected in preferences on the 
issue. Yet while there was general consensus that China’s rise presented political and 
economic opportunities, the embargo’s origins – the Tiananmen crackdown – did bring about 
renewed attention to the specific human rights violations of 1989 and the contemporary human 
rights situation in China. The linkage between the two in discourse indicated perceptions of 
China as still possibly a normative threat. However, the consensus appeared to be that despite 
significant continued problems, China had made enough progress to render the original 
reasons for the embargo invalid
35
. Human rights concerns were further offset by appeals to 
China’s growing political importance as a strategic partner: it was inconsistent to have such a 
relationship and yet maintain the arms embargo. Zimbabwe and Burma were used as common 
reference points to underline the fact that China was ‘different’ in a positive sense.   
 
Those who strongly supported lifting the ban appeared to be driven by primarily by 
interpretations of China as a political/economic opportunity and as a strategic partner, at the 
expense of other issues in the bilateral relationship (human rights) and, to some extent, the 
EU’s relationship with the US which was already strained given the fallout over the Iraq war 
in 2003. Notably, the main proponents behind the proposal fell under the Accommodating 
Mercantilist group (Fox and Godement, 2009); France and Germany, as two-thirds of the EU3, 
were the drivers behind the embargo being placed on the EU’s agenda. Other early supporters 
such as Spain and Italy were also assigned to this group; since these Member States are less 
willing to push China on political issues in order to develop their political and economic 
relations, their support is to be expected. Member States termed as European Followers such 
as Luxembourg and Austria tend to go along with the consensus, and thus did not strongly 
object. Those Member States which acceded to the EU during the debate generally fell within 
these two groups but had indicated that they were willing to go along with the consensus of 
the other fifteen.  
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Chirac – who wanted an announcement prior to President Hu Jintao’s January visit to France – 
raised the issue himself after failing to convince Commission President Romano Prodi to bring 
it up (Patten, 2005: 281); although Prodi had declined, the Commission did not attempt to 
prevent France and other Member States from pursuing their preferences (nor could it). 
France’s move was foreshadowed by Defence Minister Michèle Alliot-Marie’s proposal to 
soften the embargo to facilitate sharing “sensitive military technology” with China (Evans-
Pritchard, 2003). On this basis, France appears – at least partly – influenced by a perception of 
China as an economic opportunity for its defence industry. This was consistent with France’s 
– and particularly Chirac’s – general pattern of engagement with China: as an Accommodating 
Mercantilist, France avoids challenging China on sensitive political topics such as human 
rights issues and operating on the premise that close political relations would produce 
economic benefits.  
 
One interviewee suggested that it might be possible to put a ‘question mark’ as to whether 
Chirac and Schroder really wanted to lift the embargo or whether they were paying lip-service 
to Chinese authorities
36
. Although it is beyond the scope of this research to prove/disprove 
this, the proposal soon gathered momentum either way. French, and specifically Chirac’s, 
interpretations of China as a significant economic and political opportunity were decisive 
factors in shaping the preference to act; Chirac’s assessment of the contemporary international 
political environment played a part in the timing. Another interviewee indicated that in late 
2003, Chirac perceived the US as a “weakened” international actor as a consequence of the 
disputes surrounding the invasion of Iraq
37
. Consequently, Chirac concluded that discussing 
lifting the arms embargo as a stepping-stone to stronger EU-China relations (spearheaded by 
France) was feasible. Chirac made early promises to China that the embargo would be 
removed quickly and raised expectations
38
; along with Schroder, he believed they could win 
over the Council and push lifting through
39
, underestimating the complexity of reaching the 
required consensus
40
. Chirac appeared to overestimate his political influence within the EU
41
 
and failed to anticipate the reticence of others to agree to a quick policy change. Chirac’s view 
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of the US also led him to underestimate its resolve and willingness to challenge the EU on this 
particular issue.   
 
What is perhaps most surprising is that the Ideological Free-Traders including the UK, 
Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark were not fully against. This group has generally been more 
willing to confront China on sensitive political issues, particularly human rights. Yet on the 
embargo although they were reticent to support lifting without positive steps from China on 
human rights issues, none fully opposed the lifting in principle. These states followed the 
second avenue of thought which focussed on the continued human rights violations within 
China (Glen and Murgo, 2007: 338), thus indicating slightly different interpretations of China 
compared to those strongly supporting. However, their interpretations of China were not 
defined along human rights issues completely; all of these Member States also viewed China 
as an economic opportunity as well and, to varying degrees, as a political opportunity. For 
instance, the UK was argued to have initially favoured lifting the ban on the grounds that it 
stood to lose out in other areas of trade with China if it took an adversarial stance on the issue 
(Stumbaum, 2009: 172).  
 
Following the December summit, Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi – then Council 
President – justified the proposal on the grounds of “the will, apparently sincere of the new 
Chinese political class to make progress on economic issues and political rights” (cited by 
Agence Europe, 13/12/2003). This conformed to the prevailing interpretations of China as an 
economic and political opportunity while downplaying the normative threat upon which the 
embargo was originally predicated. Throughout the 2004-5 debate, a constant refrain was that 
maintaining the embargo was inconsistent with the changing reality of China’s rise. In light of 
the contemporary setting of the relationship, the embargo was the only remaining obstacle to 
closer relations: maintaining an arms ban on a strategic partner does not represent a great deal 
of trust. The designation of China as a strategic partner allowed proponents of lifting to 
characterise China as part of an ‘in’ group versus other human rights violators such as 
Zimbabwe and Burma
42
 as an ‘out’ group. This component of the argument appeared to be 
influential on the preferences of those initially reluctant to support the proposal, particularly 
for those who were not likely to be looking for economic opportunities from China. Part of the 
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motivation behind these preferences was the desire for recognition from China of the EU as a 
strategic partner, especially since China had included its desire to see the embargo lifted in its 
EU policy paper.     
 
Despite lacking formal power, the European Parliament was active in its opposition to lifting 
(Stumbaum, 2009: 167). The EP clearly had little power to influence the intergovernmental 
policymaking process, but consistently made its preferences known and called on the Council 
throughout 2004-5 to act in accordance with these. Arguments were made by MEPs that the 
Parliament’s views should be taken into account since it was the only democratically-elected 
EU institution (for instance, McKenna in EP, 2004a); it was best placed to protect the 
human/democratic rights of the Chinese people and speak on behalf of the EU population. The 
EP immediately debated the initial proposal and adopted a resolution (EP, 2003a) which 
received overwhelming support – 373 in favour to 32 against with 29 abstentions (Kreutz, 
2004: 50) – revealing a dominant preference among the MEPs that the embargo should stay.  
 
The debate preceding the vote revealed that this preference was informed by interpretations of 
China as a human rights violator and as a growing threat to Taiwan (EP, 2003b) – in other 
words, both a normative and military threat. The views expressed were, in some ways, 
consistent with those of the US Congress: references to China as a “Communist dictatorship” 
– and even one to “Red China” – were used by those arguing that the proposal was untenable 
(EP, 2003b), terms absent from the rhetoric in the intergovernmental subsystem. However, the 
resolution did also seem to leave open the possibility that the EP’s position could change in 
the future by calling on the Council and Commission to “use the issue of the embargo as a 
unique opportunity to engender real progress in key areas of human rights” (EP, 2003a: 3). 
Given that the embargo had little impact in the first fourteen years of its existence, the 
message appeared to be that the EU could consider lifting as part of a political bargain to 
ensure compliance with international human rights norms. Yet as the debate intensified – and 
took on a transatlantic dimension – the EP’s opposition deepened.  
 
Following the January 2004 GAERC meeting, it was reported that all Member States except 
France were in agreement to maintain the embargo at that point (Evans-Pritchard and 
Broughton, 2004). The Council acknowledged that it would consider the issue again in the 
near future (GAERC, 2004a: 8) indicating opposition not to the principle but rather the timing, 
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a position confirmed by German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer (Smith, C. 2004).  
Following this meeting, the issue became more prominent in the China policy discourse due to 
individual Member States, particularly France, ensuring that it remained on the agenda. 
During Hu Jintao’s state visit to France, Chirac (2004) stated that the arms embargo “no 
longer makes any sense today. It’s obviously not likely to change the strategic balance of 
power. It will be lifted, I hope, in the coming months. I repeat: France is very much in favour 
of this”.  
 
Chirac’s statement indicated not only his preference but also his belief that the conditions 
under which the embargo was imposed had changed. France’s political system affords the 
president considerable autonomy in foreign policymaking (Risse-Kappen, 1991: 487), but 
Chirac was also strongly supported by Defence Minister Alliot-Marie. Internally, the defence 
ministry was not united on the issue
43, but the President’s prerogative effectively meant that 
divergent preferences at lower levels of government were inconsequential. The national 
governments of France and Germany saw improvements in China’s human rights record and, 
while accepting that they were still not excellent, had improved enough to render ostracising 
China along with the likes of Burma
44
 and Zimbabwe inappropriate due to its increasing 
international importance (Cabestan, 2007: 138; Feng 2007: 275). This fits with the growing 
interpretation of China as a ‘strategic partner’ for the EU, contributing to an environment in 
which the removal of the arms embargo could be considered. Although initially backing the 
review, the UK backed off in early 2004, only to shift stance a few months later (see below). 
Sweden and Denmark also had reservations, but notably no delegation had expressed clear 
opposition to the review procedure (Agence Europe, 27/01/2004). If Member States’ 
governments perceived China as a potential normative or military threat, opposition to the 
review process (frequently expressed in the EP) would have been expected to surface in the 
intergovernmental decision-making process.  
 
As argued in Chapter Four, threat interpretations of China’s rise are virtually non-existent 
within the EU; thus a general sense emerged through the policy discourse early on that an end 
to the embargo was inevitable. In February 2004, CFSP High Representative Javier Solana 
stated “I don't think lifting arms embargo is a big problem” (cited by People’s Daily, 2004). 
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Although Solana did not outline a timeframe the impression conveyed was that a decision 
would be reached soon, just as Chirac had suggested. At this early stage, it would appear that 
Chirac and Solana were either ignoring the US’ initial response (see below) to the proposal or 
underestimating the conviction behind it. One interviewee commented that at the very outset, 
French and German officials had been uncertain over how much US opposition they would 
face and hoped they could “get away with [lifting] without too much protest from 
Washington”45.   
 
The Beginnings of the Transatlantic Debate 
 
It was around this time that the US started to express its opposition to the EU’s proposal. For 
the US, the EU’s proposal was untenable from the outset. At the time, the government was 
undoubtedly preoccupied with the global war on terror and its military campaigns in 
Afghanistan and Iraq
46
. As such, relations with China were not a particularly high priority at 
that point. The rival interpretations of China’s rise (see Chapter Three) were still very much 
active, but at that point in the time not aired as frequently as they previously had been. 
However, when the EU’s arms embargo review came up, the military threat interpretation was 
the most widely invoked amongst policymakers from both the administration and Congress. 
From the US’ perspective, the move would mostly likely have negative implications for its 
interests; at best, these may be limited but there were certainly no positive aspects to the EU’s 
deliberation over the embargo. To some extent, that the US responded harshly to the proposal 
and stressed the potential problems of allowing China access to high-end military technology 
reflected the logic of power-transition perspectives. However, looking more closely at the 
arguments and the reasons behind these, we can see that the threat interpretation was more 
nuanced than this.   
 
The US considered the retention of the EU’s embargo as crucial for broader regional stability. 
Interestingly, this concern was not a significant part of the US’ public rhetoric in the debate; 
for obvious diplomatic reasons, US policymakers do not ‘yell’ about the situation they have 
been attempting to manage in East Asia
47
. Thus the arguments of some EU policymakers 
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indicated that this concern had evidently not been communicated clearly in the years leading 
up to the outbreak of the debate. Although US actors may have pressed the point in private, 
EU officials – including some who were closely involved in discussing this issue with the US 
– to identify this apparently failed to recognise this issue as one of the US’ major anxieties. 
What US officials failed to appreciate in return was that with little stake in regional stability, 
European interpretations of the implications of China’s rise had developed in a different way 
to their own, resulting in a significant gap opening up by 2003. This apparently led to 
communication problems during the debate, as the arguments being put forward by each side 
were effectively at odds with the respective prevailing interpretations of China’s rise, thus the 
claims did not impact the preferences of the others.  
 
Linked into concerns over China’s military expansion and regional stability was the matter of 
US credibility, in terms of commitments to regional allies
48
. The US has an enduring image of 
itself as an Asian Pacific country responsible for continuing to support security and stability in 
the region
49
. The US was already concerned in 2003 with the levels of tensions on the Korean 
peninsula
50
, thus the sensitivity of potentially negative developments – such as the EU 
removing its embargo – was high. Such concerns were evidently not shared by the EU; at least 
as far as US policymakers could see: the EU’s claims that lifting the arms embargo would not 
increase the quantity or quality of weapons technology available to China from the European 
arms industry was regarded as insufficient or even baseless by US officials
51. The US’ 
regional presence and self-identification as a critical player in ensuring regional stability and 
protector of allies has been an important point of interaction between it and China. The context 
of the EU-China relationship is much different, with no such role for the EU, nor its Member 
States in any real capacity. Following the Hong Kong handover in 1997, the US considered 
the UK to have dropped its security interest in the region – along with it went the wider 
European understanding of the geopolitical situation
52
, even though both France and the UK 
have held security dialogues with China since (Casarini, 2009: 124).  
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The main implication for the US was the potential negative impact on its security concerns
53
. 
With no arms embargo in place, the EU may end up providing the Chinese with technologies 
that could, hypothetically, be used against US soldiers in some future conflict in the Taiwan 
Strait
54
. There was also a concern that allowing China access to technologies that would 
expedite force modernisation could potentially lead to a destabilising arms race in the region 
involving the likes of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, which would change the security 
environment in which the US operated. One interviewee in the US indicated that it did not 
seem possible that this was what the EU actually wanted, thus the view in the US 
policymaking community was that the EU simply had not considered the security 
implications
55
. The conclusion was that the EU should not lift the embargo if it was committed 
to the concept of allegiance with the US. Even despite disagreements over issues such as the 
Iraq war, US policymakers expected that on the issue of China, European views would be 
close to their own. 
 
One other factor in relation to arms industries was the threat to the US’ arms/defence industry 
as the dominant force in the global industry (Wacker, 2005: 31). This was not explicated by 
US policymakers – for fear of undermining their other arguments – but was picked up on in 
some analyses of the debate (see Wacker, 2005) and suggests perceptions of a potential 
economic as well as military threat. Cooperation between European and Chinese firms may 
lead to innovation in technological developments and competitive pricing, whilst the size of 
the European arms industry might grow, decreasing the relative advantage of the US’ industry. 
The US also imports certain technologies from the EU, and would be unlikely to want 
competition from China potentially seeking similar systems. It is not particularly surprising 
that US policymakers did not forward such arguments as they would not only have had little 
impact, but would have potentially undermined the main arguments the US was making to the 
EU about why the embargo needed to be maintained.  
 
The Washington Post cited European diplomats reporting that the administration had “quietly 
lodged a series of formal protests” at both the EU and national levels (Pan, 2004).  Due to the 
embargo review being placed on the agenda with virtually no internal consultation, there had 
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been no official contact with the US. Some administration actors were aware that the issue was 
being considered at some level within the French and German governments
56
 with “rumours” 
circulating in early 2003 but the information took time to filter through the bureaucratic 
organisations which delayed the explication of the administration’s position57. The lack of an 
intense response from the US from the very outset was not indicative of a relaxed attitude on 
the matter. The US communicated concerns that it would send the wrong signal to China when 
it still violated human rights and, additionally, technology transfer could threaten US security 
(Pan, 2004). State Department spokesman Richard Boucher
58
 told the press that the 
administration believed “that the US and European prohibitions on arms sales are 
complementary, were imposed for the same reasons, specifically serious human rights abuses, 
and that those reasons remain valid today” (cited by Pan, 2004).  
 
In March, Secretary of State Colin Powell met with the European Ministerial Troika, stating 
afterwards that he had “voiced… concerns at a European lifting of the weapons embargo” and, 
repeating Boucher almost word for word, argued that the US and EU “imposed bans for the 
same reasons, in particular the serious violations of human rights … we [the US] believe that 
those arguments remain valid today” (cited by Agence Europe, 03/03/2004). Despite direct 
communication between high-level officials, the EU was not deterred although did attempt to 
allay US misgivings by qualifying its arguments. Solana told the press in mid-March that he 
hoped settling the issue would lead to improved relations with China but added that the EU did 
not want to “contribute to increasing arms in the region” (cited by Agence Europe, 
18/03/2004). The EU’s position was that this was a political gesture rather an economic 
decision in order to open up new markets, consistent with the purported strategic partnership 
between the two sides.   This reflected a perception of China as a political opportunity and also 
confirmed that the EU did not see its rise as a military threat. 
 
The Bush administration remained unconvinced and stepped up its diplomatic campaign 
through “making representations in European capitals and in Brussels” on the issue (State 
Department official cited by Spiegel, 2004). Although no agreement had been reached in the 
GAERC and European Council meetings of February and March, the issue was being pushed 
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by those Member States who wanted a decision sooner rather than later. As one French official 
put it, “the question is not that of the embargo, but of the consistency of the whole of our 
relationship with China”59 (cited by Zecchini, 2004). On the US side, a State Department 
official commented that “to the extent that we’ve told them [the EU] that this is a bad idea and 
they’re still considering it, that’s a concern to us” (cited by Spiegel, 2004). At this point, while 
both sides appeared to recognise that their preferences in relation to the embargo were 
premised on differing interpretations of the implications of China’s rise, the extent of the gap 
between these was not fully appreciated. The EU evidently did not anticipate that the US’ 
reaction would intensify over time while the US administration had apparently expected that 
the EU would drop the issue relatively quickly. 
 
In the US, the administration initially took the lead on outlining the response. There was no 
policy change considered in relation to its own embargo, but the argument presented indicated 
that the logic which underpinned that policy had itself changed. Congress also actively voiced 
its opposition to the proposal and although did not push for policy changes towards China, did 
consider a new policy on defence-related technology cooperation/exchange with the EU 
(Agence Europe, 16/07/2005), although ultimately this did not materialise. However, that it 
almost transpired is indicative of how seriously the perception of China as a potential threat 
was taken. Although the US pushing for the EU to maintain policy continuity as an indirect 
response to China’s growing power, thus we can still talk meaningfully about a US-response 
which was determined through both the executive and executive-legislative subsystems. The 
convergence of preferences within the executive-legislative subsystem (a rarity, as Chapter 
Three demonstrated) meant that the US was able to convey a consistent message to the EU and 
exploit divisions between the Council and the EP as well as between Member States once it 
became apparent in March 2005 that some were having second thoughts.   
 
The EU’s decision-making process contributed to the protracted nature of the transatlantic 
debate.  Consensus between all Member States was required to lift the embargo and the 
difficulty of getting to this point prevented a quick decision. Although the European 
Parliament emerged as the strongest opponent of the move, its exclusion from the 
policymaking process meant that, at best, MEPs could attempt to informally influence the 
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Council’s position by contributing to the wider discourse on the issue. The Commission’s 
position was generally taken to be supportive of lifting due to the political and economic 
opportunities presented by China; it is possible that had the Commission sided with the EP 
then there would have been greater contestation between actors with differing preferences. 
Within the intergovernmental subsystem, not all Member States carried equal influence; the 
preferences of the EU3 were crucial and the Member States which acceded in 2004 signalled 
that they would follow the consensus of the ‘older’ Member States. 
 
The EU Pushes On 
 
In April, the GAERC (2004b: 10) decided that the Committee of Permanent Representations 
(Coreper) and the Political and Security Committee (PSC) should “take the discussion 
forward”. Although the issue did not feature in the conclusions of the May meeting (GAERC, 
2004c), this was followed by a significant development: the UK came out in support of the 
proposal to lift (Webster et al, 2004), as had Finland and the Netherlands. Sweden and 
Denmark’s positions were more complex as their governments did not wish to break EU 
consensus but faced opposition from their own Parliaments (Casarini, 2006: 31). In 2005, Jack 
Straw indicated that he had consistently supported lifting from December 2003 onwards, 
asserting that he had “long understood China’s argument” that to “lump them in with… Burma 
and Zimbabwe is not appropriate” (cited by SCID, 2005). Blair was more reticent in part 
because of the US’ opposition but by the end of May sought to forge consensus on lifting 
within the EU. However, an actual decision was delayed, as a European diplomat explained 
“the political readiness to make the gesture… has to be ripe and it is clearly not that moment 
now” (cited by Castle, 2004).  
 
US opposition further intensified in June, with Powell warning that the embargo’s end could 
result in EU Member States being barred from access to US military technology (Webster et 
al, 2004). This would be detrimental for the Member States – particularly the UK which was 
highly dependent on access to and cooperation with the US’ defence industry. Yet this did not 
affect the momentum of the drive towards lifting within the EU nor shift the UK’s position, 
although the latter argued that no decision should precede the US presidential election due to 
the issue’s sensitivity (Webster et al, 2004). Given the UK’s political closeness to the US it 
might have been expected that this increasing pressure would have altered its preferences. 
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That same month the UK participated in its first joint naval exercise with China, which a 
British Commander described as “a symbol of our political ties” (cited by August, 2004). 
While the exercise and embargo are separate issues, the timing of both arguably projected an 
image of the UK as increasingly politically close to China as well as the other EU Member 
States.  
 
The interpretation of China as a military threat was non-existent for the UK despite the US’ 
now-explicit message that they were concerned by China’s military development; to some 
extent, this challenges conventional wisdom that British foreign policy preferences tend to 
reflect those of the US (particularly during the Blair and Bush years). At least in relation to 
China, the UK’s interpretation was sufficiently independent to allow it to follow the European 
current. Although New Labour had resumed technology transfers to China as of 1997, this had 
not translated into automatic support for ending the embargo (Brown, 2011: 37). One reason 
suggested by both François Godement
60
 and Rath (2006: 51) for Blair’s pursuit of lifting was 
that the idea of being on the “losing side” of the EU3 in the relations with China would be 
damaging not just for economic interests, but also for the UK’s ambition to be an important 
actor in Europe and a strategic partner of China.  
 
Consensus was proving difficult to forge by August, again with the UK playing the awkward 
partner. While a government official stated that Blair would “probably” still vote for lifting the 
embargo, they also acknowledged that he was having second thoughts (cited by MacAskill and 
Watts, 2004). Aides had also indicated to the press that Blair argued that he had been rushed 
into support for lifting and had not realised what was at stake (Fenby, 2004), prompting a 
reassessment of the government’s preferences. However, rather than being predicated on 
shifting interpretations of China, it appeared to be the case that Blair’s deliberations were 
informed by his interpretations of the relative importance of relations with the US, the EU and 
China. Despite Blair’s hesitancy, the UK did not change stance and continued to work towards 
lifting with other Member States. The US’ position remained the same but was less vocal in 
the late summer as the EU was working quietly but also partly due to its own efforts to reach 
an agreement with China on transfer of nuclear-related technology for civilian use, which 
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officials admitted might send the wrong message to the EU about the embargo (cited by 
Hutzler, 2004). 
 
In October the EU attempted to accelerate the decision-making process. Chirac promised that 
France “shall try to obtain the swiftest possible lifting… of this embargo, which is of another 
time, and no longer corresponds to today's realities” (cited by The Economist, 2010). Ahead of 
a visit to China, Chirac acknowledged to Chinese journalists that “our American friends have 
strong reservations” but reaffirmed commitment to press ahead (cited by Dombey, 2004a). 
State Department official Gregory Such stated that the presidential election would have no 
bearing on the US’ preference, but added that he was “not pessimistic about the reaction we 
are going to get from EU governments on this” (cited by Dombey, 2004a). These statements 
reflected the continued failings of both sides to appreciate the gap between their respective 
positions. Upon arrival in China, Chirac described its economic rise as “an opportunity for our 
growth and our jobs” which France must take (cited by Arnold and Kynge, 2004); this 
argument evinced the principal interpretation of China’s rise which underpinned his 
preference for lifting the embargo. 
 
That month, The Netherlands’ Foreign Minister, Bernard Bot asserted that the EU could soon 
“indicate a positive orientation towards lifting” (cited by Browne, 2004a). A French diplomat 
opined that the “understanding about the need to lift the embargo has increased” (cited by 
Browne, 2004a). The UK also appeared to be back on board with the general EU consensus by 
this point, with Straw confirming that the UK was “not in any sense against the lifting of the 
embargo, but it has got to be done in a proper and sensible way… as agreed by the whole of 
the EU” (cited by Dombey, 2004b). François Heisbourg (2004), director of the Fondation pour 
la Recherche Strategique
61, argued that the “absurdity” of the China arms embargo was 
underlined in mid-October by the removal of an analogous policy on Libya
62
. With Member 
States converging around a consensus to lift, the EP attempted to intervene on the issue again. 
A Parliamentary discussion was less of a debate and more a reaffirmation that the majority of 
MEPs saw the proposal as sending the wrong message to China so long as it continued to 
violate basic human rights (EP, 2004b).  
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The Parliament sought not only to maintain the embargo, but also reinforce it through 
strengthening the Code of Conduct on arms exports (Agence Europe, 19/10/2004). This led to 
the adoption of Raül Romeva i Rueda’s63 report which sought to make the Code legally 
binding as a precondition to lifting alongside definitive progress on human rights, notably 
through ratification of the International Covenant Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (Agence 
Europe, 19/11/2004). Ultimately, without a formal foreign policymaking role, the EP could 
not push the EU to take a decision on the Code of Conduct
64
 or establish formal preconditions 
for lifting. Since the embargo policy fell within the remit of the intergovernmental subsystem, 
the preferences of the EP were excluded from the decision-making process. Nevertheless, the 
US engaged the EP’s committee on foreign affairs in attempt to influence the EU’s position 
(Agence Europe, 05/04/2005).   
 
In November, External Relations Commissioner Chris Patten (2004: 2) addressed the EP on 
the issue, stating that although the nature of CFSP meant that the Commission was not directly 
involved there was an embedded interest in the development of the debate due to the likely 
implications for the wider EU-China relationship. Patten examined both sides of the argument, 
and although he did not explicitly come down on one side of the argument, his choice of 
language seemed to indicate a preference for lifting if China could demonstrate improvements 
in its human rights situation. After outlining continued problems – particularly on civil and 
political rights – Patten (2004: 2) noted that  
 
[w]ithout making any direct link, we have… consistently told China at the highest 
level that lifting of the embargo would be greatly assisted if they could take 
concrete steps in the field of human rights; steps that could convince European 
public opinion of the appropriateness of such action. 
 
In the run up to the December EU-China summit, China’s intensified lobbying efforts were 
acknowledged by Patten (EP, 2004b). The US warned that the issue was “very close to the 
bone” for the administration and that it was “not at all in the EU’s interest to lift the arms 
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embargo” (cited by Browne, 2004b). However, there was now substantial momentum behind 
lifting in the intergovernmental subsystem, with Italy declaring support (AFP, 2004). Bernard 
Bot on behalf of the Dutch Council Presidency stated that the embargo would not be lifted 
prior the summit, but the EU would send a “positive signal” on the issue (cited by Agence 
Europe, 23/11/2004). The summit’s joint communique recognised the “rapidly maturing 
comprehensive strategic partnership” and the EU reaffirmed “its political will to continue to 
work towards lifting” (Council, 2004: 2, 9). The perception of China as a strategic partner was 
pervasive in the rhetoric, which informed preferences to lift with no conditional linkages on 
human rights established (Agence Europe, 19/12/2004). This paved the way for the European 
Council (2004: 19) to invite “the next Presidency to finalise the well-advanced work in order 
to allow for a decision” on lifting, although reiterated that this should not lead to increase – 
either qualitatively or quantitatively – arms exports. The establishment of a putative deadline 
(end of June 2005) highlighted the deepening convergence between Member States’ 
preferences.   
 
The Debate Heats Up 
 
If it was possible to argue that the US had been restrained in its opposition to the proposal up 
until this point – which I contend it is not, in light of the evidence outlined above conveying 
the US’ preference – then the December 2004 declaration was a catalyst for stronger efforts to 
pressurise the EU. US officials warned of a “very powerful reaction” in the event of lifting 
(cited by Spiegel, 2004). In late December, an anonymous Pentagon source announced that if 
the embargo was lifted, a possible retaliatory measure from the US would be to deprive EU 
countries of military technology (Agence Europe, 29/12/2004). The rhetoric became more 
heated and evinced strong perceptions of China’s military rise as not only potentially 
destabilising in East Asia, but also a broader military threat. By contrast MEPs continued to 
object on human rights grounds (see Agence Europe, 22/12/2004), conveying interpretations 
of China as a continued normative threat. Moreover, the predominant view in the 
intergovernmental subsystem was that of China as a strategic partner, with little attention 
given to possible military threats. The divergent interpretations of China’s rise had now led to 




A pressing issue for the US was that China would be able to increase its imports of dual-use 
technologies (those which have potentially civilian and/or military applications), facilitating 
the development of high-end weapons systems and furthering China’s military modernisation 
programme. The Department of Defense was already worried about China’s increasing 
military expenditure
65
, which fed into concerns about the potential implications of lifting the 
embargo. One former UK policy official noted that US officials saw lifting as analogous to a 
European ‘blessing’ on China’s military modernisation efforts66. Additionally, the EU’s arms 
industry is highly interdependent with that of the US with significant levels of cooperation and 
sharing of technologies between the two sides. This meant that an end to the EU’s embargo 
would potentially result in China acquiring advanced American technology via the EU 
(Wacker, 2005: 31), which would again severely affect the US’ relative capabilities superiority 
over China
67
. David Shambaugh (2005a: 27) noted that most observers agreed that China’s 
domestic military-industrial complex lags behind that of advanced countries (such as EU 
Member States) by some ten to twenty years.  
 
Beyond the issue of China’s acquisition of sensitive weapons technologies, there was another 
important concern harboured by the administration. Wilder stated that there was a symbolic 
component related to the future of Taiwan. The administration was concerned by the 
possibility of the EU ending its embargo would signal that it was not worried about China’s 
behaviour towards Taiwan; that is, confirm that it did not see China as a potential military 
threat. Although at the time of its imposition, the embargo was not related to China’s policy 
towards Taiwan; by 2004 the worry within the administration was that with no EU arms 
embargo, the US would be the only state left to have such an embargo against China
68
. This 
would then allow the PRC to complain that the US was the only actor that held concerns 
regarding Taiwan, and that no others in the international arena were committed like the US; 
this would potentially result in China attempting to pressure the US to drop its protective 
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Compounding this factor, as the administration saw it, was the behaviour and rhetoric of 
Taiwan’s president, Chen Shui-bian. The US believed at that time that he would likely push 
for an independent Taiwan. Any unilateral declaration of independence could provoke conflict 
with China, which the US was adamant it wanted to avoid. Even without action, stronger 
rhetoric from Chen would irk the PRC. When the US initially engaged the EU on the embargo, 
it became apparent to US officials that EU policymakers did not view the fragility of the status 
quo across the Strait as they did, and were unaware of the potential implications: the 
administration feared that Chen would become more belligerent if China was able to persuade 
the EU to lift
70. Wilder’s comments regarding the likely behaviour of Chen indicated how 
important the political situation in Taiwan – and particularly the views of its leader – mattered 
to the US’ preferences in relation to the embargo. It was not just interpretations of China as a 
military threat at play here (although they mattered considerably), but the wider context of 
how other regional actors would react. The administration worried that Taiwan’s –particularly 
Chen’s response –could worsen cross-Strait relations, directly undermining the US’ main 
objective of maintaining stability.   
 
The issues of Taiwan’s security and regional stability tended to be concerns of the US 
(Archick et al, 2005: 31) rather than the EU Member States. This was perhaps predictable 
because the EU had no comparable regional role; however US critics were apparently 
surprised that their European allies would fail to recognise the problems lifting the embargo 
would cause in this dimension. Additionally, US critics often argued that China may yet use 
European weapons technologies to further oppress its own citizens but with virtually no 
impact on EU preferences; these arguments were made in 2004 and yet the EU pressed ahead 
into 2005 with its intention to lift the embargo, arguing that it would not result in a flood of 
European arms to China. For the US, the Taiwan Strait crisis in the mid-1990s had arguably 
reinforced the necessity of the embargo by demonstrating how China was increasing its ability 
to project its power across the Strait: the EU’s non-involvement in that episode meant that the 
same conclusions were not drawn. The passage of the Anti-Secession Law (see below) was a 
tipping point, because its language was directly relevant to the concerns that the US was trying 
to communicate to the EU. In Congress, the Cox Report in 1999 had cemented interpretations 
of China’s rise as inherently militarily threatening to the US. 
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Despite the US’ explicit opposition to the proposal, the EU stuck to its plan; even after talks 
with US National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice in January, Javier Solana said that he 
expected the US to “be able to live with” the EU’s decision (cited by Fidler et al, 2005). The 
main argument used in defence was that the US fundamentally misunderstood the implications 
of embargo’s removal. On the basis of the European Council’s December Conclusions, the 
EU’s line was that it would not increase China’s military capability as the US feared. Solana 
argued that lifting was “more a political decision than a military one... it simply involves 
putting a stop to a political decision made at a specific time in the history of China, rather than 
a modification of military relations” (cited by Archick et al, 2005: 19).  
 
There appeared to be a belief within the EU that the US’ objections were in relation to the 
technicalities of arms control; policymakers failed to recognise that the US’ interpretations of 
China’s rise were significantly different to their own. Jack Straw argued that while the move 
would undoubtedly create tensions, “the challenge in terms of foreign policy is not to 
eliminate differences… but to manage [them]” (cited by Blitz and Dombey, 2005). A senior 
US official rejected the idea that the US had misunderstood the implications of lifting, 
warning that “a failure to understand the significance of this issue is going to result in major 
problems for transatlantic arms procurement” (cited by Dombey and Fidler, 2005). These 
statements from Straw not only highlighted the UK’s continued support to lift at that point, but 
arguably also that the failure to recognise that the divergence in interpretations on the two 
sides of the Atlantic effectively made such management impossible. 
 
In an interview with European media in February 2005, Condoleezza Rice (2005b) argued that 
the two sides did not fundamentally disagree about China:  
 
We have the same concerns about how to deal with the prospect of a China that is 
economically rising very quickly, and of course… the political power… [and] the 
regional power that goes with that. I think we both agree that we want to help to 
integrate China into the international community so that it’s a positive force, not a 




For diplomatic reasons, Rice may have attempted to downplay the gap. Although both the US 
and EU have consistently identified the objectives of integrating China into the international 
community as a positive force, their positions on the embargo revealed that their 
interpretations of the implications of China’s rise had diverged substantially. Both sides still 
wanted China to integrate into the international community and play a constructive role, but 
the EU was more optimistic about the inevitability of this outcome than the US. Within the 
US, frequent debates between rival interpretations of China’s rise had kept threat perspectives 
near the surface of policy discourse; the EU lacked such stark divisions, with disagreements 
largely over whether to conceptualise China as more of a political than economic opportunity. 
Further, the question was not only about China, but about the appropriateness of this particular 
policy. Thus when the EU raised the prospect of removing its embargo, the threat perspectives 
were able to dominate the US’ policy discourse: for US policymakers, there were no benefits 
and evidently no political space for a reconsideration of the US’ own arms embargo against 
China to emerge. Due to the persistent lack of clarity of China’s intentions in East Asia, there 
has been no desire in the US for exporting any military hardware due to the common 
interpretation amongst policymakers that China’s military development indicates hostile 
intentions
71
.   
 
The EU’s apparent inability – or unwillingness – to factor in the US’ concerns and preferences 
led to increased US activism, particularly from Congress which had until that point left the 
majority of the work to the administration. The House of Representatives passed a resolution 
which reaffirmed the US’ own arms embargo and condemned the EU proposal. The language 
employed was direct: the House “deplore[d]… the European Council’s decision to finalize 
work toward lifting its arms embargo on China, actions that place European security policy in 
direct conflict with United States security interests” on the basis that China’s military build-up 
“and the strategic doctrines and policies that underpin such a buildup remain shrouded in 
secrecy and imply challenges for strategic deterrence between the United States and China” 
(HoR, 2005). Receiving 411-3 support, this had only a symbolic impact that did not compel 
the administration to act. With the passage of a similar resolution in the Senate the following 
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, the message clearly revealed strong interpretations of China as a growing military 
threat.   
 
In February, Condoleezza Rice held talks with high-level officials, including Council 
President Asselborn, High Representative Solana and External Relations Commissioner 
Ferrero-Waldner. At this point, Rice (2005a) stated that those she had discussed the issue with 
had “tried to take account of our concerns” and reported that the US was “being listened to”. 
Nevertheless, she still pressed that the US had “to worry about the military balance in that 
region and… [the impact of] technology transfers” as well harbouring concerns about human 
rights, referring back to Tiananmen (Rice, 2005a). It appears, however, that Rice was too 
generous in her assessment of the extent to which the EU was taking on board US concerns, as 
the EU continued ahead with its approach to the lifting effectively unaltered thereafter. Shortly 
after Rice’s visit, a senior US official stated that “Europeans don’t feel [China’s threat to 
occupy Taiwan] is their problem… they need to understand just how much the Americans feel 
it is theirs” (cited by Allen-Mills, 2005). Again, perceptions of China as a regional – and also a 
broader military – threat, were clearly coming through from the US, but were not salient in the 
EU.  
 
European arguments that increased arms exports were not a motivating factor were 
undermined that same month when French Defence Minister Alliot-Marie stated that 
maintaining the embargo would lead China to develop its indigenous defence industry rapidly, 
thus lifting “could be a better protection for us than maintaining it” (cited by Spiegel and 
Thornhill, 2005). This added to US concerns that the EU’s arguments were nothing more than 
a fig leaf and provided more ammunition to those arguing against lifting. Importantly, Alliot-
Marie’s claim overlooked the fact that China’s indigenous defence industry was, around that 
time, regarded as somewhere between ten and twenty years behind the West (Shambaugh, 
2005a: 5). Therefore weapons and high-technology transfers would potentially negate the 
barriers to rapid military development faced by a relatively less-developed arms industry 
dependent on outdated Russian exports. Consequently, for those US policymakers who 
already perceived China’s growing military power as indicative of hostile intentions, the EU 
was effectively seeking to facilitate China’s ability to act upon these. This ran contrary not 
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only to US security interests, but also to the EU’s stated interests in regional and global 
stability.  
 
In terms of the economic opportunities bound up with the embargo, Member States had 
frequently stated that profiting from arms sales was not their intention – although the French 
Defence Minister’s comments on the embargo’s end potentially preventing China’s domestic 
arms production from expanding undermined this argument to some extent. Nevertheless, 
some Member States who made this point also called for a reinforced Code of Conduct (such 
as the UK), in an effort to add credibility to their stance. However, there was also the incentive 
of increased trade with China in non-arms trade which would be potentially lucrative, as 
Chinese policymakers were keen to stress (Agence Europe, 28/04/2005); thus the economic 
factor was not restricted to the one dimension of the trade relationship. China’s rise as an 
economic opportunity had long been the prevailing interpretation within the EU, therefore its 
centrality to policy preferences in this case is consistent with the overarching approach to the 
relationship. Member States generally made few references to human rights conditions in 
China, implications for regional stability or cross-Strait relations, at least in the early stages of 
the debate, which tended to be the concerns influencing some Member States to favour a 
longer timeframe for lifting. 
 
Throughout February, there was a marked intensification of the transatlantic debate, fuelled by 
what officials on both sides identified as a “deep philosophical divide” (Bumiller, 2005). The 
aforementioned Blumenthal and Donnelly (2005) article referred to the EU’s proposal as a 
“threat” which would constitute “a genuinely hostile act” against the US. Although this was 
their personal view, the article conveyed the policymaking community’s consensus: the EU 
was actively working against US interests given that China was, self-evidently as far as 
Americans were concerned, a potential rival (if not outright threat, although for some it clearly 
was) to its interests in the region. Henry Hyde (2005) opined in the Wall Street Journal that 
lifting would strike a blow to China’s pro-democracy movement, invoking normative threat 
perceptions alongside the broader security concerns.  
 
A meeting between President Chirac and Bush further underscored the persistent divergence in 
preferences and the disconnect between their views on China more broadly. Chirac stated that 
the EU intended to lift “the last obstacles to its relations with this great power of the 21st 
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Century”, reaffirming that China was the EU’s “strategic partner” (cited by Rennie, 2005a). 
However, Chirac qualified this by stating that it should be done so under conditions that the 
EU and US “define together” (cited by Bumiller, 2005). Bush reiterated the “deep concern in 
[the US] that the transfer of weapons would be a transfer of technology to China, which would 
change the balance of relations between China and Taiwan” (cited by Rennie, 2005a), again 
evincing regional military threat perceptions underpinning the US’ preference. 
 
During his Brussels visit, Bush addressed the issue of strengthened EU Code of Conduct on 
arms exports, stating that the EU needed to give Congress assurances and guarantees which 
would “allow it to stand down from its position” (cited by Agence Europe, 24/02/2005). The 
emphasis on Congress was due to its ability to legislate sanctions on the EU, and also arguably 
suggested that only Congress was the ‘problem’ in the US. This appeared to be taken up by the 
EU, as an official commented to the press that “there is no way that we will ever satisfy… 
Congress” (cited by Castle, 2005). A spokeswoman for Solana also stated that the real battle 
was with Congress as “the [Bush] administration knows that they cannot stop it” (cited by 
Cooper and Champion, 2005). The prospect of a battle with Congress however, evidently did 
not deter the EU especially as officials seemingly interpreted the administration’s position that 
the lifting was inevitable. A US official later sought to dispel such a notion: “I should not 
leave you in any way with the impression that we [in the administration] have changed our 
view. We have merely heard out the Europeans” (cited by Bullimer, 2005). 
 
The Anti-Secession Law and the EU’s Change of Heart 
 
The adoption of the Anti-Secession Law (ASL) by China on the 14
th
 of March had a 
significant impact on the course of the EU’s consideration of the embargo and the transatlantic 
debate. One EU official referred to it as “an unfortunate coincidence”73. The law – which 
affirmed that “[t]he state shall never allow the “Taiwan independence” secessionist forces to 
make Taiwan secede from China under any name or by any means” (China Daily, 2005) – was 
interpreted by some policymakers in the US and EU as evidence of China’s hostile intentions 
towards Taiwan, stoking regional military threat perceptions. These were predicated on the 
specific assertion that the PRC would “employ non-peaceful means and other necessary 
                                                 
73
 Interview with EU policy official, 28/05/10.  
257 
 
measures to protect China's sovereignty and territorial integrity” (China Daily, 2005). The law 
emphasised that peaceful means must be exhausted or independence declared by secessionist 
forces before such recourse; language which Austin (2005: 16) noted had previously never 
been officially adopted in respect to Taiwan. However the mere inclusion of the force 
provision served to reinforce the arguments made by those in the US who already perceived 
China’s rise as a growing threat.   
 
The ASL effectively ended the chances of a final decision to lift by June 2005 as intended. 
The EU had dispatched a delegation to Washington headed by Annalisa Giannella in a bid to 
persuade the US to drop its opposition, but their arrival coincided with the ASL’s adoption. 
The delegation found itself on the defensive in what became an embarrassing situation for the 
EU
74. Consequently, according to one EU official familiar with the delegation’s work, their 
arguments were not taken into account by US policymakers for whom the issue – as actors in 
the EU saw it – became intensely emotional75. British officials in Washington stated that they 
were not just caught off-guard by the strength of the US’ reaction, but also by China’s 
decision to pass the ASL (Jaffe and Champion, 2005). This reflects something of an anomaly 
in the EU’s decision-making process as the ASL had been in the pipeline for some time but 
the EU had, apparently, not considered its implications for lifting. At this point, European 
proponents of lifting effectively gave up as there was a realisation that US political pressure 
was now too great
76
.   
 
The passage of the ASL combined with the US’ continued pressure altered the political 
environment in a way that made lifting extremely unpalatable. Rather than the US dictating 
the EU’s policy, European actors recognised that they risked damaging EU-US relations if 
they continued to pursue lifting. Giving Beijing the answer it wanted would be untenable, yet 
proponents did not want to damage relations with China by taking it off the table altogether. 
Solana’s spokeswoman asserted that the EU’s position had not changed, but they were now 
“in a more complex environment” which made “the initial timeline a little more complicated” 
(cited by Watts and Watt, 2005) – perhaps something of an understatement. Thereafter the EU 
continued to talk about the embargo as though it was still under real consideration. This led to 
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the presentation of the “non-decision” (Stumbaum 2009: 199); the EU would continue to work 
towards lifting the embargo at some unspecified time in the future.  
 
France’s position was not influenced by the ASL77; Chirac was adamant that there was no 
reason to think there had been a change in the EU’s plans (Dombey and Minder, 2005), 
apparently due to his underestimation of the impact of this legislation
78
. The strength of his 
perception of China as a political opportunity/strategic partner was unaffected by this new 
development. The reality was that the UK, Netherlands, Czech Republic, Luxembourg (then 
Council President) and the Scandinavian countries were now having second thoughts (Watson 
et al, 2005). Belgium and Italy also changed position on an early end to the embargo (Dinmore 
and Harding, 2005); although it is worth pointing out here that the opposition was to lifting by 
June 2005 rather than the principle of the December 2004 Conclusion to move towards lifting 
(Agence Europe, 19/04/2005) – Member States’ preferences had undergone an adjustment 
rather than complete revision. As was evident from the EU’s continued attempts to push ahead 
with the strategic partnership over the remainder of the timeframe of analysis, the arms 
embargo debate had not led to a fundamental shift in the EU’s interpretations of China as a 
rising power; the strategic partner and economic opportunity perspectives still prevailed.  
 
For the UK, China’s adoption of the ASL appeared to impact the government’s preferences in 
relation to the embargo based on the potentially negative implications that continued support 
would have, particularly for transatlantic relations. Blair already faced difficulties managing 
relations with the US on one side and France and Germany on the other
79
 which were then 
exacerbated by the embargo debate, particularly after ASL came into force. When the UK 
assumed the Council Presidency in July, Blair did not want responsibility for lifting nor, in the 
political climate at that moment, back an end to the embargo in June as the Council was still 
committed to (Rath, 2006: 51). Thus, we saw a shift in the UK’s preferences from support in 
principle to seeking to delay the lift in a relatively short space of time. Without the UK’s 
support, an agreement through the intergovernmental process was off the table in the 
immediate future.  
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The ASL provided the US with a platform for being more direct in its arguments against the 
embargo. Rice, contrary to her previously rather diplomatic stance, warned that the EU 
“should do nothing to contribute to a circumstance in which Chinese military modernisation 
draws on [EU] technology. It is [the US], not Europe, that has defended the Pacific” (cited by 
Watts and Watt, 2005), Senator Lugar
80
, chair of the Foreign Relations Committee, noted that 
while he had been reassured by Straw’s promise that the reinforced Code of Conduct would 
prevent technology transfers, cautioned that if this was not the case “then there could be some 
unfortunate and dramatic consequences” (cited by Alden and Sevastopulo, 2005), referring to 
possible sanctions on US-to-EU technology transfers. When Deputy Secretary of State Robert 
Zoellick met with Ferrero-Waldner, he repeated the warning of negative implications for 
future transatlantic defence-related cooperation, adding that the US did not want to expand 
problems further into non-arms commercial relations (Agence Europe, 05/04/2005).   
 
In the following months, the EU maintained that it was working towards lifting, although 
qualified this by calling for progress from China on human rights. For instance, External 
Relations Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner indicated that China would need to ratify the 
ICCPR and release the Tiananmen Square political prisoners (AFP, 2005a). Of the Member 
States, only France maintained strong public support for immediate removal predicated on the 
perception of China as a strategic partner. Talking to the press, an aide to the defence minister 
declared that  
 
the embargo is politically counter-productive, unnecessary and does not concern 
itself with American interests. If we want to make China an important partner, we 
must show them that we do not rate it at the same level as Zimbabwe (cited by 




Prime Minister Raffarin reaffirmed the commitment to lift, describing the embargo as 
“anachronistic, unjustly discriminatory and in complete contradiction with the current state of 




 Original: “cet embargo est politiquement contre-productif, inutile et il ne concerne pas ce qui intéresse les 
Américains. Si on veut faire de la Chine un partenaire important, il faut lui montrer qu'on ne la met pas au même 
rang que le Zimbabwe”. 
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the Euro-China strategic partnership”82 (cited by AFP, 2005b).  In mid-April, the Member 
States decided at an informal meeting to delay a final decision, with German Foreign Minister 
Fischer admitting “there was no consensus” (cited by Rennie, 2005b). Interestingly, France 
was so intent on lifting the embargo that, according to Foreign Minister Michel Barnier, it was 
willing to accept a legally-binding Code of Conduct which it had previously opposed 
(Dombey, 2005)
83
. However, although the EU committed itself to renewing the Code of 
Conduct, the opportunity to lift the embargo by June had effectively evaporated.  
 
However, that some EU officials continued to indicate publicly that a decision could still be 
reached led to the US Congress drafting a law that would sanction the EU in the event of the 
embargo’s end. The aim, according to Agence Europe (01/07/2005), was to dissuade rather 
than punish European arms sales and promote transatlantic coordination of their arms sales 
and policies. This legislation – the East Asia Security Act – ultimately failed 215-203 as it 
required two-thirds support. There was reportedly a last-minute change in preferences of 
around one hundred legislators due to intense lobbying from the US Chamber of Commerce, 
the aerospace and electronics industries (Agence Europe, 16/07/2005) due to the potential 
negative impact on their commercial interests. The change in preferences was predicated on 
US economic interests rather than a softening of Congress’ position on the EU’s plans to lift 
its arms embargo, which remained the official policy. The ASL had reinforced perceptions of 
China as a threat, not lessened them. By the time of the vote, it was apparent an immediate end 
to the embargo was unlikely, thus there was less at stake with the outcome of the bill. 
 
Indeed, Congressional activism on the embargo had eased upon the UK’s assumption of the 
rotating Council Presidency in July 2005, as it was largely accepted in both the EU and US 
that there would be no move to lift during the following six months. In September, Solana 
repeated the EU’s pledge to lift on political rather than military grounds (Agence Europe, 
07/09/2005) but he had little ability to influence Blair who was now firmly against lifting in 
the immediate future. When President Hu Jintao visited the UK in November, it was reported 
that he wanted to persuade Blair to revive the process, but an FCO official gave the non-
committal response that the UK was working with the other Member States towards the 
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eventual lifting (Doyle and Russell, 2005). In this context, there was no need for continued 
transatlantic debate over the arms embargo as the momentum towards lifting within the EU 
had dissipated even before the UK took over the Presidency, at which point the EU reverted to 
a non-committal position on the embargo with no set deadline.  
 
Although the substantive transatlantic debate effectively ended following the passage of the 
ASL, it cannot be inferred from the EU’s response that Member States’ interpretations of 
China were fundamentally altered. While there was some increased concern about China’s 
intentions, these were short-lived. The interpretations which had led to the move to lift in the 
first place proved resilient, with continued invocation of the concept of China as a strategic 
partner in the policy discourse. This explains why even after the very public argument with the 
US on the issue, the EU has persistently maintained that it is working towards lifting the 
embargo. The main change was a revaluation of the preference to lift the embargo by June; the 
main impact of the ASL’s passage was that Member States recognised that continued attempts 
to lift at that time would be futile and possibly jeopardise the EU’s relationship with the US84. 
Although Congress’ attempt to legislate for reciprocal action ultimately failed, the mere 
attempt to do so had an impact
85
. Before the vote had even taken place in the House of 
Representatives, there was acceptance amongst European policymakers that the attempt to lift 
the embargo was dead in the water
86
. Another compounding factor was the rejection of the 
EU’s Constitutional Treaty referendum in late May 2005 by the French public. Following this, 
French officials accepted that they had lost the ability to influence EU policy at that time as 
they were in “defensive mode”87.  
 
The UK’s reluctance to support continued attempts to lift the embargo was not simply 
deference to the US position, which had been explicated in early 2004, prior to the UK 
adopting a much more favourable stance towards lifting. The US made it clear to the UK that 
it wanted it to oppose the move, which initially the UK refused to do (Agence Europe 
21/01/2005). Kayte Rath (2006: 54) argues that the UK had resisted US pressure and 
attempted to act as a bridge between the US and the EU until the passage of the ASL, which 
made this untenable and offered a way out for the UK, as a “convenient ladder… to climb 
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down”88. The ASL did not fundamentally alter the UK’s interpretation of China but rather the 
government’s assessment of the contemporary political environment; this goes some way to 
explaining why the UK government only sought to delay the lifting rather than reverse the 
Council’s commitment to lifting entirely.  
 
The other side of this would be that such a move would drive a wedge between the UK and the 
other two main Member States – France and Germany – at a time when sensitivities over the 
Iraq war remained. Although the UK’s position on the embargo was initially one where it 
supported the principle but was more restrained than others, its move in 2004 to fully support 
lifting indicated that its interpretation of China was closer to that of France and Germany than 
it was the US. Despite apparent concern that trade and political relations with China may 
suffer it did not push for the embargo’s end along with the prospect of losing influence in the 
EU by being on the ‘wrong side’ of this issue89, had the UK government interpreted China’s 
rise as threatening then it would be unlikely that support for the embargo’s end could be 
considered.  If we consider a hypothetical situation in which the UK was opposed to the 
proposal when it emerged on the EU’s agenda, it is reasonable to suggest that it would have 
fallen at the first hurdle.     
 
5.5 Conclusion  
 
The transatlantic debate over the arms embargo resulted from the differing interpretations of 
China’s rise within the US and EU’s respective policy communities. As the debate unfolded 
over 2004-05, it was apparent that it was not being contested on the grounds of its original 
imposition, but rather perceptions of China’s rise more broadly were entangled with the 
embargo policy; in the US, the prominence of military threat perspectives in policy discourse 
had contributed to a shift in the underlying logic of the arms embargo – security issues 
superseded human rights concerns. These concerns have less to do with China being able to 
suppress its own citizens and more to do with its increasing ability to close the relative 
military gap with the US and potentially threaten regional security in East Asia. Although the 
US’ policies had up until then largely been dominated by perceptions of China’s rise as an 
economic and political opportunity, the issue at hand could not be conceptualised within these 
                                                 
88
 Interview with former UK policy official, London, 28/04/11. 
89
 Interview with François Godement, Paris, 20/05/10. 
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interpretations. That is, for the US there was no ‘opportunity’ presented by the EU’s proposal 
to lift its arms embargo, only losses. Essentially for the first time in the post-Cold War period, 
the policy discourse did not feature a debate between differing perspectives as policymakers 
were effectively united in their perceptions of the implications of the EU’s proposal. PTT 
struggles to account for the evolution of the US’ preferences on the arms embargoes against 
the wider context of the US’ interpretations of and responses to China’s rise up to that point.   
 
On the EU’s side, interpretations of China as a normative threat which had informed 
preferences for the embargo had given way to perceptions of China as an economic and 
political opportunity and latterly a strategic partner. Taking the EU as a unitary actor, PTT 
cannot account for the evolution of the EU’s preferences; however my approach of examining 
perceptions provides a nuanced account. Combined with the lack of military threat 
interpretations in European policy discourse, this created a permissive environment for the 
consideration of lifting the embargo. As the two sides attempted to persuade the other to 
accept their position, these differences produced a discourse in which they were unable to 
reach a common ground. In the end, a combination of political factors effectively ended the 
debate, but the divergent interpretations of the implications of China’s rise persisted. 
Accordingly, neither side was able to persuade the other as dominant interpretations of 
China’s rise in their respective policy communities were unaffected by the debate. Both sides 
effectively ended up talking past each other; while the outcome might have been to the US’ 
















Through this summary of my findings, I reiterate the central arguments and discuss their 
significance in terms of the questions posed at the outset. Most importantly, I posit that 
interpretations of ‘China’s rise’ vary between actors and over time, shaping policymakers’ 
preferences and how they debate potential responses. Within the US, there has been greater 
contrast between interpretations, resulting in persistent debates over how to respond. In the 
EU, considerable convergence between interpretations has effectively precluded contestation 
between rival preferences over the substance of policies towards the rising power. These 
different experiences of debating and responding to the rise of China were most clearly 
demonstrated in the transatlantic dispute over the EU’s proposal to lift its China arms 
embargo, where the US strongly opposed the move; even though both sides imposed similar 
policies at the same time in response to the Tiananmen crackdown, their preferences drifted 
apart due to the differing patterns of interpreting and responding to China’s rise since 1989.  
 
I also consider what implications my findings have for the academic literature. Returning to 
the various subfields reviewed in Chapter One, I reflect on how my thesis challenges and adds 
to each, setting out ideas for possible directions for future research. I have discovered that my 
arguments speak to wider theoretical debates in International Relations (IR) scholarship, thus I 
briefly consider how my thesis adds to these. This gives me an opportunity to explore where 
my contributions fit in the existing literature but also outline points of departure from the work 
of others. Overall, I believe that the thesis’ focus has enabled me to contribute to the literature 
in several dimensions, furthering the ideas of numerous scholars by drawing them into one 
original piece of research. I close the chapter with some final thoughts on the research and the 
new questions which have been opened up during the research and writing process.  
  
The main contributions of this thesis are threefold. First, it provides a novel and useful 
explanation for why the US and EU have responded to China’s rise by looking at how 
policymakers have interpreted this phenomenon and understood its implications. Second, the 
systematic study of US- and EU-China relations fills gaps within the existing literature and 
also adds to the small amount of literature which examines US-EU-China relations within a 
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single research framework. Third, the thesis provides a more comprehensive account of the 
transatlantic arms embargo debate, particularly in terms of original empirical material, 
redressing the dominance of euro-centric accounts. In addition to these central facets, there are 
a number of other, though smaller, contributions of the thesis, which I outline below.  
 
6.2 Main Findings 
 
I started by observing that it is now commonly accepted that China is rising, a change which 
has already had – and will continue to have – significant implications for the future of the 
international system. How the main (status quo) powers of the system respond to this will be a 
crucial factor in global affairs over the coming decades and beyond. The puzzling part is that 
despite concerns frequently expressed by some observers that China’s rise will be disruptive 
and potentially dangerous, the actual behaviour of two of the  main powers – the US and the 
EU – have not treated it as such. Instead, both have embraced the concept of engagement, 
committing to bring China into the international system rather than blocking its development. 
The central question which drove my research is simple: how have different interpretations of 
the ‘rise of China’ influenced the foreign policies of the US and the EU towards China? 
 
At the outset, I made the case for analysing the utility of power-transition theory (PTT) in 
relation to understanding how the US and the EU had responded to China’s rise. While other 
theoretical perspectives have gained more prominence in the field of IR, I highlighted that the 
generality of many of these dominant perspectives meant that they lacked the capacity to 
develop very specific expectations for how the established powers should respond. Thus 
employing any of these perspectives would leave too much room for variance in behaviour.   
PTT on the other hand, has a clear prescriptive element and thus should be a useful lens to 
employ. Reflecting on the empirical evidence reinforces this justification on two fronts: first, 
the evidence indicates that China is indeed rising relative to the established powers thus PTT 
should be relevant, especially given the added uncertainty created by the rapidity of China’s 
rise and the development of military capabilities which pose problems without attaining parity. 
Second, there was evidence that PTT’s logic had entered policy discourse: some policymakers 
and commentators were well aware of the historical cases of conflict during transitions and 




On the other hand, there was no evidence that policymakers saw China’s growing power as 
conducive to a more stable international arena through creating bipolarity – which is the logic 
of Waltz’s (1979) defensive realism. Crucially for the arguments presented here, PTT logic 
however was not all-pervasive in policy discourse; nevertheless, there was sufficient evidence 
to support looking closely at its analytical purchase on the cases at hand. Theories which select 
the state as the unit of analysis – such as neorealism, neoliberalism of Wendt’s (1999) 
constructivist account – would be severely limited in their capacity to account for the 
divergences between actors’ preferences within decision-making processes. Although PTT is 
similarly constrained, its clear expectations for behaviour in a shifting power dynamic meant 
that when examining each case it was straightforward to deductively establish what actors’ 
preferences should have been, whereas alternative theories would have necessitated a greater 
degree of ambiguity.    
 
PTT claims that status quo powers will respond to the rise of a potential challenger: they will 
seek to prevent a power-transition where possible by curtailing the rising power’s emergence. 
PTT’s main contribution to received wisdom has been that such transitions throughout history 
have been violent. ‘Threat’ is rooted in material power but also the rising power’s 
dissatisfaction with existing international arrangements; in a system led by democratic powers, 
an authoritarian power is considered inherently dissatisfied. This logic has translated into the 
‘China threat’ rhetoric – predominantly in the US. Due to its very nature as a rising 
authoritarian power, China is expected to seek to overturn the Western-led international 
system, imposing new rules and norms consistent with its own values and interests. This has 
led scholars to devote considerable energy to determining the extent to which China is rising, 
whether it is ‘satisfied’ or not and the implications for the established powers. I have 
contended that this is actually less important than understanding how policymakers in the US 
and the EU perceive the international environment as this has a direct impact upon policy 
development. That is not to say that this work is not relevant, as it can play a part in the 
debates over the nature of the changing international landscape and try to inform 
interpretations. In reality, variations between interpretations as opposed to precise calculations 
of shifts in the relative distribution of power need to be our starting point to understand why 




The main argument is that the US and EU’s responses to China’s rise are shaped by actors’ 
perceptions of this (i.e. what is happening) and, subsequently, their inferred implications. 
Policymakers’ preferences are not predetermined by the polity they act on behalf of or by the 
power dynamics relative to third parties. ‘China’s rise’ is a contested notion, taking on 
different meanings for different actors which results in a shifting discourse, with 
interpretations rising and falling in prominence over time. Even so, in Chapters Three and 
Four I identified the recurrence of the economic and political opportunity interpretations 
amongst key actors in both the US and EU, facilitating the maintenance of overarching 
engagement strategies. Further, these interpretations cannot simply be forced into a ‘threat 
versus opportunity’ dichotomy, as it depends on the issue-area in question. It is perfectly 
feasible for China to be seen as, for instance, a threat to economic interests but not to regional 
security. These nuances are important as they give rise to variations between preferences.  
 
Additionally, the process of translating preferences into policies was an important step in 
determining why particular interpretations appear to have greater impact than others. While 
the policy community is continuously engaged in policy discourse, certain actors have greater 
‘success’ in acting upon their preferences. Discourse still matters because it serves as the 
venue where the varying interpretations of China’s rise are contested when responses to 
developments in the relationship are considered. I utilised foreign policy subsystems to 
explain this; rather than treating foreign policies as the product of the state/polity, the 
particular institutional arrangements of specific subsystems allowed us to identify which 
actors had responsibility for formulating policy responses. In both the US and EU (both 
representative democracies), this is always a subsection of the policy community; all can 
participate in the wider debate, but not all are involved in policymaking. This made it feasible 
to trace decisions back to specific actors’ preferences and, from their arguments, determine 
how they interpreted China’s rise.  
 
On the basis of the empirical analysis throughout, I argue that the six interpretations of 
‘China’s rise’ (identified in Chapter Two) are validated as useful ways of disaggregating the 
main ways in which the concept has been articulated. These were developed through an 
iterative process of examining the evidence and drawing on some ideas explored by other 
academics – although to my knowledge no-one has delineated such a set of contrasting 
interpretations of China’s rise. These interpretations are deliberately wide-ranging because 
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they are not constant over time, thus a degree of flexibility facilitated identification of 
recurring patterns without getting tangled in aspects unique to specific situations. For instance, 
the perceived extent of the political opportunity China’s rise presents shifted dramatically 
between the early and late 1990s. These six interpretations provide a better foothold for 
examining how China’s rise is perceived beyond the generic ‘threat versus opportunity’ 
dichotomy.     
 
My analysis rested upon a two-step analytical approach which firstly questioned how 
interpretations of China’s rise informed policymakers’ preferences and secondly identified 
how preferences were mediated by the subsystem through which the response was developed. 
The findings enable me to argue that examining the interaction between debates over specific 
events and the wider discourse on China’s rise provides significant insights into why particular 
decisions were taken. The within-case comparisons – that is, the examination of the events in 
the US and EU’s respective relations with China – revealed how the differing contexts of 
interpreting China’s rise and formulating policies in response. From these analyses, the 
reasons behind the similarities in their approaches – pursuing engagement – had emerged from 
different political contexts in each polity. 
 
For the US, the events examined themselves became reference points in the continued debate 
over China’s rise and despite the peaks and troughs in the relationship divergent 
interpretations have persisted and shaped actors’ preferences.  Tiananmen clearly cast a lasting 
shadow over the relationship, with threat-perception proponents continually referencing the 
episode to bolster their arguments. The Taiwan Strait crisis was similarly used as an example 
of China’s hostile intentions. The period of 1999-2001 saw the most intense debates between 
competing interpretations. Ultimately, perceptions of China as an economic and political 
opportunity prevailed within the administration despite strong expression of economic and 
military threat perceptions by some in Congress. It seemed that the new Bush administration’s 
perceptions were going to take policy in a different direction; however the EP-3 incident 
caused policymakers to reconsider the importance of the relationship both politically but also 
in relation to regional stability. Thereafter, despite the gravitation towards threat discourse, the 
political/economic opportunity perceptions have largely continued to underpin policy choices. 




My research builds on Garrison’s (2005) work by employing decision-making analysis and 
incorporating consideration of the importance of interpretations of China’s rise within US 
foreign policymaking. It differs through tackling broader questions about US-China relations 
and by employing subsystems, which is novel for the literature. The thesis moves beyond 
largely descriptive approaches to US-China relations and accounts of decision-making 
processes which do not relate their findings to wider debates about US behaviour towards 
China or more general IR discussions. This is important because it offers insights into larger 
questions regarding the factors which shape the US’ response to China’s rise. Other studies 
which divided interpretations into either ‘threat’ or ‘opportunity’ have overlooked important 
nuances, neglecting the evolution of notions of ‘China’s rise’ and consequently how debates 
based on differing perceptions influence preferences. The application of PTT – explicitly and 
implicitly – to US-China relations was found wanting precisely because it cannot capture these 
dynamics.  
 
Various authors have touched on the importance of perceptions and interpretations, but 
without developing categories for these on the basis of empirical research. More work could 
be done to develop these further and examine their utility in US-China relations since 2009 
under the Obama administration. The evidence in Chapter Three indicated that perceptions 
endured over time, but whether this remains the case post-2009 requires consideration. If they 
do not, this thesis’ assertions will require reconsideration. It will be interesting to see whether 
the general drift towards threat rhetoric has continued. Particularly after the 2008 financial 
crash which weakened Western economies while China continued to grow, research into 
perceptions of China would be enlightening. Tied into this is the importance of views on 
China’s rise in the context of the US’ so-called ‘Asia pivot’ and the push for a Trans-Pacific 
Partnership trade agreement.    
 
I have attempted to steer clear of making predictions about the future and concentrate on 
recent relations. Nevertheless, without claiming any predictive capacity, it is not unreasonable 
to suggest that having a good understanding of prevailing interpretations at specific points in 
time helps identify the origins of particular preferences. As events unfold in the relationship, 
we should look to how China’s continuing rise has been portrayed in recent discourse; this can 
point to the range of possible responses and identify whose perceptions matter most, although 
it will not determine the precise decision that will be taken. In general, understanding how the 
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notion of China’s rise is interpreted and the ensuing debates has been shown here to be a 
useful mode of analysis when it comes to exploring why the US’ policies continue to prioritise 
engagement even when China is becoming more powerful and threat rhetoric more prevalent 
within discourse.  
 
The tendency for convergence between the EU’s main actors’ interpretations precluded 
substantive discussion of the significance of China’s rise, limiting debates around specific 
events. Although Tiananmen has had a lasting impact this has not been to the same extent as in 
the US, in part due to the lack of threat perceptions in other issue-areas meaning there are 
fewer instances to refer back to the event. The EU’s policies on human rights resolutions and 
China’s WTO accession illustrate the dominance of perceptions of economic and political 
opportunities, with differences between Member States’ preferences usually determined by 
which of these they prioritised. Across most of the cases, interpretations of the events 
themselves were strongly shaped by perceptions of China’s rise as a positive development. 
Market Economy Status proved an exception, although this was influenced by Member States’ 
competing economic interests and the Commission’s technical criteria. The central argument 
is reaffirmed by these observations as the convergence around the opportunity/non-threat 
interpretations can help explain why the EU has not responded to China’s rise as though it 
were concerned about an impending power-transition even though the former is acting as a 
unitary international actor. In the absence of substantive policy debates, the EU’s foreign 
policies developed unconstrained by interpretations of China’s rise as a threat. Accordingly, 
the ‘China’s rise’ discourse did not develop along the same path as that of the US, facilitating 
the pursuit of alternative policy responses.  
 
EU-China relations are still understudied: considerable attention has been devoted to single 
issues or what the EU’s objectives should be, but there have been few attempts to link together 
various events to analyse trends in policies. In a number of cases, I have added new empirical 
evidence; the EU’s limited response to the Taiwan Strait crisis has barely been mentioned let 
alone explained in the literature despite occurring in the mid-1990s. In this sense, I hope to 
have added to cumulative knowledge on the relationship as well as offered insights to how the 
EU’s primary actors have perceived China’s rise and acted on their understandings of the 
associated implications. The linkage to IR debates on how established powers respond to the 
rise of a potential challenger is also novel as scholars have predominantly focussed on the 
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actualities of the relationship. Since there are few studies on EU-China relations overall (in 
comparison to US-China), it is to be expected that there has been even less work on 
perceptions in this field. In part, the scope of existing scholarship might be explained by the 
general convergence of Member States’ interpretations of China’s rise which at first glance 
might suggest a lack of obvious puzzles. This convergence cannot be assumed a priori, and is 
an important factor in explaining the development of EU policies. PTT has not been used in 
the literature, which is in itself unsurprising as there is little evidence of its logic within EU 
discourse over China’s rise. Rather than assuming it cannot provide insights, it deserves 
consideration as the EU is an established power. My evidence confirms that its explanatory 
capacity is indeed limited.  
 
My analysis provides support for studying EU foreign policymaking via subsystems. Building 
on Stumbaum’s (2009) analysis, I go further by looking at a wider range of cases over a longer 
timeframe and interrogating what the evidence tells us about how the EU has responded to 
China’s rise and why.  Fox and Godement (2009) did not identify their Member State 
categories as descriptors of prevailing interpretations, but this is essentially what they boil 
down to. My empirical evidence shows that these categories are analytically useful, although 
to remain current will periodically need to be refined. Future research will also need to 
incorporate changes to the EU’s foreign policy subsystems brought about by the Lisbon 
Treaty. The EU’s subsystems and actors are in a state of flux due to continued integration and 
enlargement, thus understanding foreign policy behaviour is a dynamic area of research. The 
implications of the 2008 financial crisis on European interpretations of China’s rise (if any) 
would be a prime example of where my approach could be applied in future research. 
 
Looking at the US and EU together allows for reflection on the similarities and differences 
between their experiences of responding to China’s rise. The US consistently pursued 
engagement even as China’s power increased rapidly and debates intensified over the 
implications of its ascent to great power status. From a power-transition perspective, this is 
puzzling as we would expect the US to see China’s rise as inherently threatening to its own 
position and the status quo arrangements of the international system. Under this logic, the US 
should prioritise maintaining its predominance in the system and preventing China from 
accumulating the necessary power to challenge it at both the regional and global levels. Yet 
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the patterns in the US’ behaviour and, moreover, the preeminent interpretations of China’s 
rise, did not match up to these expectations.  
 
For the EU, its relationship with China is arguably less important than its relations with the US 
and Russia. To some extent, China is a ‘choice’ for the EU, giving it more latitude in its 
approach to the relationship. This presented an interesting opportunity to look at how two very 
different international actors have conducted their distinctive relationships with the same 
rising power. The EU also advocated a strategy of engagement but unlike the US this was less 
qualified, with little substantive debate over the implications of China’s rise. PTT could be 
utilised to explain a situation where the EU as a unitary international actor responds to China 
as a potential challenger but also the alternative scenario where it ignores shifts in the 
international order because it is not a state. While this flexibility may initially appear 
advantageous, it is problematic from a PTT-perspective; we do not know when to expect one 
outcome over the other. Only through analysis of internal factors can we determine why the 
EU chooses one path over the other; systemic pressures alone do not account for the 
development of the EU as an international actor as it is the product of agreements between the 
Member States. Even when treating the EU as a unitary international actor, in all the cases 
analysed it was evident that PTT’s expectations were out of step with the reality of its 
developing foreign policies towards China.   
 
EU foreign policy is predominantly determined through the intergovernmental subsystem. Yet 
this is evidently far less hierarchical than the US’ subsystem arrangements, with Member 
States formally enjoying an equal voice – although in reality the influence of the EU3 has 
often created a de facto hierarchy even if they need to persuade other Member States to agree 
to their preferences. This was often possible because of a dearth of strongly contrasting 
interpretations of China. Utilising the four categories of Member States’ approaches towards 
China devised by Fox and Godement (2009) helped simplify the array of preferences present. 
The supranational subsystem is notionally easier to comprehend as the Commission is the key 
player, although Member State preferences shaped the working policy agenda. Perceptions of 
China’s rise which challenged Member States’ prevailing views were mainly contained with 
the European Parliament which could do little beyond contribute to the discourse since it is 




It is worth considering the few cases which were examined in both the US and EU chapters in 
terms of how they help us understand the differences between their responses to the rise of 
China. Table 6.1 provides a brief summary of the responses to these. Looking back over the 
responses of the two polities, we can see that their respective responses highlight the 
importance of looking at broader perceptions of China’s rise. In response to the Tiananmen 
crackdown, the US’ response was very much shaped by a play-off between the President’s 
interpretation of China as an economic and political opportunity versus Congress’ perceptions 
of a normative and potential military threat. The EU had no such contestation, with Member 
States united in their perceptions at that time. However, after the initial furore had died down, 
perceptions of economic opportunities resurfaced and displaced normative threat perceptions 
which had emerged. In response to the Taiwan Strait crisis, the US’ response was conditioned 
by the prevalence of perceptions within the administration that China did not present a military 
threat to Taiwan or the US. Although the US wanted to protect its regional status and interests, 
the response was far more tempered given that the crisis could be taken as evidence of the 
rising challenger flexing its muscles and ‘testing’ the dominant power. 
 
 By contrast, there was not only a complete lack of military threat perceptions in the EU but 
also strong economic – and growing political – opportunity perceptions. This was despite two 
Member States retaining regional interests at that time. Their recent policy discourses had 
evolved differently, with the US’ debates over China’s MFN status, shaping the context in 
which the wider debates over China’s rise took place. In relation to WTO accession, both 
pursued engagement policies based on strong perceptions of economic opportunities first and 
foremost, but also political opportunities. This demonstrated the centrality of the opportunity 
interpretations in both polities around this time. However, their domestic policymaking 
contexts were very different: in the US, there was a vociferous debate due to the prevalence of 
threat perceptions in Congress – not just economic, but military and normative too. In the EU, 
these were all effectively absent, to the extent that the supposed democratic clause of the EU’s 
trade negotiations dropped out without any controversy.  These cases illustrate that there were 
different perceptions of China’s rise present in the US and the EU at the same time – as PTT 
assumes a single understanding of international relations, it cannot account for these 








This argument also applies to the arms embargo debate, which revealed a sharp division 
between the responses of the US and EU to China’s rise. The dispute was fuelled by differing 
perceptions of China’s rise which influenced assessments of what was at stake with the EU’s 
proposal to lift. Although their respective embargoes differed in substance (the EU’s was not 
binding but rather a vague political commitment), the original motivations behind them were 
the same. The case revealed that their stances had diverged over time creating a situation in 
which there was a shift in preferences not only within the two polities but also between them, 
presenting a unique opportunity to examine how interpretations mattered in the evolution of 
preferences on the same policy. When the debate emerged, it was clear that the embargo’s 
status related to military, economic and normative issues thus it could provide insights into 
broader understandings of the implications of China’s rise. In the US, the EU’s proposal was 
considered wrongheaded and detrimental to its interests. Whereas economic/political 
opportunity interpretations previously prevailed in the US, in this case there was no potential 
opportunity thus the discourse was dominated by those who held threat perceptions.  
 
It became clear over the course of the debate that the US and EU’s strategies of engagement 
derived from different understandings of the implications of China’s rise. EU policymakers 
saw the embargo as not only as unnecessary but actively detrimental to bilateral relations. In 
the US, it became more necessary as time passed due to uncertainties over the intentions 
behind China’s developing military capacity. China’s human rights record seemed relatively 
inconsequential to either side – its importance in the primary interpretations of China’s rise 
had ostensibly decreased. Instead, the perceived economic and political opportunities strongly 
shaped European policymakers’ preferences. In the US, the increasing prevalence of 
perceptions of China as a potential threat both in East Asia and more widely on the global 
stage hardened preferences for preventing arms and technological transfers. The shifting logic 
underpinning the arms embargoes led to a situation where both sides were effectively talking 
past each other in the sense that neither fully appreciated the content of the interpretations 
behind the other’s preferences.  
 
From the US’ side, there was no evidence that any actors saw the EU’s proposal as acceptable. 
Although perceptions of China’s rise as an economic and political opportunity had not 
diminished, the idea of the EU ending its embargo could not be reconciled with these 
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perspectives, thus no counterargument emerged in the discourse for allowing the EU to pursue 
lifting. That is not to definitively rule out the possibility that some individual actors took such 
a view; however if there were any, they did not express this at that the time and were not 
amongst the key decision-makers, at least as far as is discernible from publicly available 
sources and my interviews (future research once documents become available will provide 
answers here). The implication was that the administration was able to advance its position 
with domestic backing and while the prospect of the embargo gained momentum in the EU, 
the introduction of the Anti-Secession Law (ASL) evidently led to a reassessment of the 
appropriateness of such a move in the altered political environment, based on shifted 
perceptions of China’s behaviour. However, it was evident that the dominant interpretations of 
its rise were unaffected.  Indeed, the EU is still committed to lifting the embargo, and twice 
the issue has resurfaced (more on this below).  Prior to the adoption of the ASL, only MEPs 
had strongly argued within the EU for retaining the embargo, predominantly based on 
interpretations of China as a normative threat.   
 
That the distance between American and European preferences – and more broadly, their 
interpretations of China’s rise – was apparently not recognised until the EU undertook its 
review of the embargo is interesting because it illustrates that these two strategic partners had 
not engaged in sustained dialogue on China despite its growing importance. The lack of 
communication on the embargo prior to the announcement was problematic for the US as it 
removed the opportunity to convey its security interests clearly
1
. While in the GHW Bush 
administration there had been regular contact with European states to emphasise the continued 
need for the ban on arms sales, this had ceased well before 2003
2
. The public side of US-
China relations constantly emphasised the positive aspects
3
 which created a situation where 
the EU was either not factoring in the concerns of the US or was simply not aware of them in 
the first place
4
. Again, PTT’s single understanding of international relations fails to 
satisfactorily explain how the two sides ended up in such different positions on this issue. The 
aspects of China’s rise which were most salient in their interpretations of that time differed 
considerably, leading to incongruous preferences on the status of the EU’s embargo.   
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US policymakers had not recognised that American and European interpretations of the global 
security environment – forged during the Cold War – were diverging5. There was a general 
sense that had the US maintained better communication on security issues or had the chance to 
voice its opinion prior to the announcement then the debate may not have emerged. This 
would possibly have been preferable for both sides as its public nature undermined the 
strength of the US-EU relationship. However, I would argue that the proposal would still have 
been pushed onto the agenda by Chirac given the strength of his perceptions of China as an 
economic and political opportunity; these perceptions were pervasive in the EU, although 
Chirac was arguably their strongest proponent. This highlights the impact of evolving 
interpretations upon bilateral relations not only between the established powers and the rising 
power, but also between the former. PTT assumes satisfied powers are on the same page, thus 
fails to consider the possibility of such divergences which can be detrimental for their 
relationship. While exploring this issue was beyond the scope of my research, it deserves 
further contemplation from academics on policymakers as the transatlantic relationship can 
clearly be affected when discrepant perceptions of China (and other changes in the 
international system) arise.  
 
Although the outcome was what the US wanted (the embargo remained), the issue has not 
disappeared. China still raises the issue in the bilateral summits, where the EU reaffirms that it 
is still working towards lifting, gently reminding China that it would like to see some 
improvements in its human rights situation – although formal conditionality has never been 
proposed. In early 2010, the Spanish Council Presidency suggested that the embargo issue 
may be revisited, only to have Catherine Ashton sweep the issue back under the carpet
6
. In late 
2010 and early 2011, there were reports that the High Representative for Foreign Affairs 
Catherine Ashton, France and Spain had engaged in discussions to look again at lifting 
(Korski, 2011) although once word of this was out, the plan was quickly dropped.  
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6
 Interview with Spanish policy official, Brussels, 31/05/10. 
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Around this time, Ashton was spearheading an assessment of the state of the EU’s strategic 
partnerships. A leaked internal document
7
 described the embargo as a “major impediment for 
developing stronger EU-China cooperation on foreign policy and security matters” (Ashton, 
2010: 4). If there was hope that the Obama administration would not object as the Bush 
administration had, I would suggest that – on the basis of my research – the US’ preferences 
have not shifted even with a binding EU Code of Conduct for exports now in place. The 
optimism amongst some in Europe suggests that even after the 2004/5 debate, there is still a 
gap between interpretations of China’s rise which precludes fully appreciating how important 
an issue this is in the US. Any future moves on the embargo’s status would require extensive 
transatlantic dialogue if the EU wants to avoid a downturn in relations with the US. The 
pattern of the issue periodically resurfacing on the agenda will not do US-EU-China relations 
any favours.  
 
6.3 Implications for the Literature 
 
In this section, I will outline the contributions to the literature of these findings. The findings 
are not definitive but provide satisfactory answers to the research question and raise more 
questions which could form the basis of an interesting future research programme. Beyond the 
specific points mentioned below, I am confident that my empirical material adds to our 
collective knowledge on US- and EU-China relations, especially on the arms embargo case 
because of the previous focus on the EU side, with less said about the US. In addition, I 
address how the thesis speaks to some of the wider issues in IR scholarship.   
 
Arms Embargo Debate Literature 
 
The arms embargo is often treated as a self-contained episode, with limited analysis of how 
the evolving interpretations of China’s rise contributed to the divergence of US and EU 
preferences. I believe I have shown that the differing positions from which the two viewed 
China’s rise contributed to the emergence of the debate. The thesis also fills a gap in the 
literature through analysis of the US side; Casarini (2009) and Stumbaum (2009) both 
                                                 
7
 This is now widely available online – see bibliographic entry. I submitted an ‘access to EU documents’ request 
to the EEAS in 2013 in the hope of verifying the authenticity and accuracy of the leaked document, but was given 
only a heavily redacted copy with key information missing.  
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considered its input but treated it as an external actor impinging on the EU’s decision-making 
process, rather than examining what it said about US-China relations in its own right. The US-
China literature has overlooked how the debate serves as a window into the evolving 
perceptions of China’s rise. The US interviews add new empirical material and move the 
discussion beyond the prevailing euro-centric focus.  
 
Many volumes on EU-China relations mention the debate in passing but tend to oversimplify 
it by asserting that the EU dropped the issue when the US objected. I argue that we should 
seek to avoid oversimplifications as to avoid future problems in US-EU-China relations we 
need to be able to understand the factors which made the debate so complex. We have already 
seen signs in 2010 and 2011 that the issue is never far from consideration in the EU. Despite 
arguments that this issue is solely between the EU and China, if policymakers want this issue 
resolved the reality is that the US will always have a view and should be consulted by 
Europeans to avoid damaging the transatlantic relationship. Research into the evolution of the 
policies from 2005 to 2011 could provide further insights into change and continuity in 
interpretations of China’s rise. If and when the embargo is lifted there will be an opportunity 
to reassess each point from imposition to lifting, examining the evolution of European and 
American preferences in parallel with their evolving interpretations of China’s rise.  
 
PTT and Wider IR Literature 
 
Although I have been mostly interested in how PTT’s ideas have pervaded ‘China threat’ 
rhetoric, my findings have some implications for PTT scholarship. The thesis challenges PTT 
assertions over how established powers respond to the rise of a potential challenger. The main 
tenet of this is that my findings suggest that material power alone does not determine 
behaviour in the international arena. While it can tell us something about the hierarchical 
structure of the system we still need to know how actors perceive this and what implications 
they infer. Although power-transition theorists still debate how to measure levels of 
(dis)satisfaction with the status quo, they take it for granted that established powers will 
perceive these accurately. The debates over whether China is status quo or revisionist and the 




PTT’s main legacy has been the assertion that power-transitions are violent. Although its 
empirical analysis is grounded in complex models, this has been extricated from scholarship 
and embedded in collective knowledge. The logic and language of PTT has worked its way 
into discourse over China’s rise. This is arguably a natural consequence of research on such a 
highly important subject, but there needs to be more critical reflection on PTT as its theoretical 
precepts have not kept pace with the changing reality of international relations. Such reflection 
is imperative as there is a possibility that PTT’s central expectation could lead to self-fulfilling 
prophecies: if actors see both a transition and conflict as inevitable then China’s rise is 
inherently a threat and ensuing attempts to head-off a transition would bring about the very 
result they feared by transforming China into a hostile power.  
 
PTT’s proponents have acknowledged that decision-making processes need to be taken into 
account but have not followed through with this. PTT posits a single state-centric 
understanding of international relations without considering how variations in interpretations 
impact decision-making at the domestic level. PTT is a specific manifestation of realism, even 
though proponents of PTT have attempted to distance it from this school of thought. As I 
argued in Chapter One, offensive realism and hegemonic stability theory share many of the 
expectations of PTT. In this sense my findings also speak to realism more broadly which is 
important as this is arguably still the dominant perspective in IR, with neorealist theories 
focussing on how the structure of the system determines behaviour. 
 
My findings show that rather than a single, objective perspective of the structure this is 
actually what is contested when policymakers debate China’s rise and its implications. 
Differing interpretations can increase or decrease in salience over time, with rival perspectives 
catalysing competition amongst policymakers for influence over decisions. The realist 
assumption that actors perceive their external environment objectively overlooks the 
considerable degree of subjectivity in perceptions which directly influences behaviour at the 
international level. The findings suggest that material power is not what has driven responses 
to China’s rise, directly challenging core PTT and neorealist assumptions. Instead, we need to 
take into account a wider range of factors – my thesis indicates that interpretations of the 




Some mainstream IR theorists have attempted to link perceptions into their studies. Taking 
Walt’s (1987) refinement of neorealism, perceptions of threat inform the idea of a “balance of 
threat” rather than “balance of power”. However, Walt (1987) continues to presuppose that 
policymakers act on the basis of a common national interest, which I have argued is 
problematic. This latter point is also taken up by other FPA scholars, who have critiqued 
assumptions of national interest. Thus although Walt takes some steps away from traditional 
realist perspectives, there are still limitations in his approach to understanding behaviour at the 
international level through domestic level factors. Further, Walt (1987) only appears interested 
in perceptions of threat – perhaps because of his realist pedigree – without giving due 
consideration to perceptions of opportunity and the mediating effect these can have on threat 




The analytical framework proved useful for not only independent analyses of the US and EU 
but also comparative analysis which has generally been absent from the literature. Tacit 
acceptance that the US and EU are too ‘different’ has seemingly put others off undertaking 
comparative FPA. I contend that this is not the case and that cross-polity analyses are both 
possible and illuminating. In line with much of the EFP literature, I treat the EU as a unitary 
international actor in its own right. This entails a rejection of the assumption inherent to 
mainstream FPA that foreign policies are the output of states. Decision-making FPA 
scholarship was spearheaded by US scholars and thus the traditional state model has 
predominated. Instead, I adhere to the concept of policies as the product of foreign policy 
subsystems, which has been utilised in some EFP works in order to move away from state-
centric FPA.  
 
Due to the project’s scope, I have treated perceptions as ‘given’ rather than attempt to assess 
their genesis, but further research into perception formation could help advance my findings. 
For instance, political psychology approaches to FPA could provide a more comprehensive 
account of the origin and impact of perceptions. Explaining why actors within the same polity 
can develop contrasting perceptions would provide new insights not only to China’s rise. This 
could be a three-stage analysis, adding to the analytical model used here to understand where 
the perceptions which influenced policy came from. Analyses at this level would be complex, 
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necessitating a more selective focus on a smaller number of events. Extensive interviews with 
the involved policymakers and access to minutes of key meetings in the process at multiple 
levels of government would be essential. As I discovered, current officials are often unable to 
talk on sensitive issues or were not present for events being researched and former officials 
can be hard to track down. Access to relevant documents is heavily restricted for decades, 
making it difficult to get a full picture of what was going on and to triangulate between 
various sources.  
 
Although mainstream rationalist FPA studies often follow Allison (1971) by concentrating on 
competing bureaucratic interests, the evidence presented here suggests that within agencies 
there is scope for disagreement identifiable through policy discourse. Allison’s work is based 
on state structures that are less readily adaptable to the EU. Rationalist FPA is restrictive as it 
overlooks the importance of discourse and ideational debates between actors. These can often 
reveal that even when actors want the same outcome – such as China’s peaceful emergence – 
they can have contrasting or even incompatible ideas of how to achieve this. While I have not 
adhered to a constructivist mode of FPA – such as that advanced by Jutta Weldes (1999) 
which focus on self-perceptions of identity as the driving factor behind actors’ behaviour – I 
do incorporate constructivism by focussing on the subjectivity of perceptions and the 
importance of discourse as part of the process, rather than distinct from it. 
 
 Weldes’ (1999) model would allow future research to examine the origins and development 
of perceptions – both of the self and other – and their implications for policy formation. For 
example, in the arms embargo debate US policymakers had argued that the EU did not have to 
maintain stability in East Asia thus did not understand the necessity of its embargo. Since the 
US is there by choice, its regional security role is a component of its self-perceived identity; 
this is missing from the EU’s identity, creating an opportunity to explore differing identities 
and how they influence the way in which actors perceive the world. I am more sceptical of 
constructivist claims regarding state identities, as we would expect all actors to then follow the 
same behaviour – this has not been the case in many of the events examined. In the EU, I 
touched upon what was happening within Member States but did not explore national-level 
discourse extensively. Henrik Larsen’s (1997) study of French and British discourse on 
Europe could serve as a model for this purpose, potentially adding to our understanding of 




FPA scholars have looked to neoclassical realism (NCR) as an intersection between FPA and 
IR theory due to its ontological position that “understanding the links between power and 
policy requires close examination of the contexts within which foreign policies are formulated 
and implemented” (Rose, 1998: 147) with behaviour as the product of “systemic pressures… 
filtered through intervening domestic variables” (Schweller, 2006: 6). I have not linked my 
approach to NCR because of differences in basic assumptions about the nature of international 
relations and different research objectives. At its core, NCR assumes that material power and 
systemic pressures which can be understood objectively drive international relations. 
Domestic-level factors are treated as obstacles to states behaving in accordance with standard 
realist expectations. Rathbun (2008:297) asserted that a “necessary component of [NCR]… is 
to demonstrate that when domestic politics and ideas interfere substantially in foreign policy 
decision making, the system punishes states” [emphasis added]. I argue that there is no 
definitive ‘national interest’ as actors’ perceptions of the international system vary, shaping 
their understanding of the implications of changes within it. Domestic politics and ideas are 
not interference with decision-making; the latter cannot be disentangled from the former.   
 
Although not part of the original research question, the thesis also has implications for EFP 
scholarship. Primarily, it reinforces the claims that the EU can be treated as a unitary actor as 
it provides an analytical framework which accounts for the development of the EU’s foreign 
policies towards China. Secondly, it also supports the EFP approach of moving beyond state-
centric analyses in the study of foreign policymaking, which provided considerable analytical 
leverage here and allowed for comparison between the EU and the US, which has not been 
given extensive consideration elsewhere in the literature. Treating the EU as an international 
actor with distinct foreign policy subsystems turned out to be an effective approach for 
understanding the development of the EU’s China policies. As such, this supports the school 
of thought that the EU should be treated as an international actor beyond the aggregation of 
Member States’ behaviour. The findings, however, raise questions for Normative Power 
Europe – arguably the dominant approach in EFP – as it suggests that the EU’s policies were 
rarely based on normative considerations such as human rights and the promotion of 
democracy. Indeed, the evidence suggests that China’s rise has rarely been interpreted through 
a normative lens – instead, political and economic concerns take precedence. Consequently, 




Criticisms of the EU as a ‘strategic actor’ – relevant in the context of EU-China relations – are 
predicated on the fact that it is not a state (Biava et al, 2011: 1233). The problem is that these 
criticisms compare the EU to an idealised strategic state actor with clearly defined strategic 
objectives towards which all policymakers are working. However, my analysis revealed 
divisions in the US between the administration and Congress (as well as within these 
branches) which would fall short of such criteria; yet it would be difficult to argue that the US 
is not a strategic international actor just because it does not have a comprehensive China 
strategy. EU scholars should perhaps re-examine their criteria of a strategic actor. I have made 
steps in this direction in a spin-off from this thesis (Brown, S. 2012), arguing that 
consideration of the EU as a strategic actor could be reoriented to examine subsystems rather 
than expecting it to conform to this ideal type.     
 
Finally, my approach contributes to wider debates about international relations and foreign 
policymaking beyond the relationships examined. A key point that emerges is that there are no 
objective assessments of ‘threat’ based on national interests. In the US debates over China’s 
potential threat illustrated significant discrepancies between perceptions. Across the various 
cases, there was no ‘clear and present’ threat perception, thus with speculative assessments 
there was significant scope for disagreement between actors. This relates back to the point 
made in the previous section regarding realist assumptions of objective perceptions of 
international relations based on clearly defined interests. Policy debates between perceptions 
of threat versus opportunity and what to do about it are relevant in all power relationships, 
thus the approach and arguments generate insights for the field of IR more broadly.  
 
6.4 Final Comments 
 
To close, I would like to reflect on the central value of this project. Returning once more to the 
original question – how have different interpretations of the ‘rise of China’ influenced the 
foreign policies of the US and the EU towards China? – I think that the thesis has contributed 
to the debates over these relations between great powers by departing from prevailing 
approaches. The proposed answer, in concise form, is that the very concept of ‘China’s rise’ 
has different meanings to different actors, and this has influenced their preferences for what to 
do about this change in the international order. This has been overlooked in the debates up 
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until now, but its significance extends beyond academic curiosity. The analysis presented 
suggests that it actually has had an impact on how the US and EU have – so far – responded to 
the (re)emergence of China as a significant player in the international arena. I hope that I have 
been able to add a new perspective on the driving factors behind these increasingly-important 
relationships and made a contribution to the ongoing debates within the literature over how 































The primary source for military budgets was the Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute’s (SIPRI) online database. Other sources were used throughout where conducive to 
create a comprehensive analysis of relative military power. Finally, since the US’ Department 
of Defense has been producing reports on China’s military power since 2002 these were used 
to examine whether the US’ estimates are in line with independent analyses, as significantly 
different figures may influence how policymakers view China’s power.     
 
One potential limitation of ‘external’ sources is that of accuracy. Even for states which divulge 
data freely, complete accuracy cannot be guaranteed and indeed some figures within reports 
are estimates or approximate numbers. SIPRI Yearbooks report that reliability of their data is 
limited as it does not encapsulate actual expenditure, only reported expenditure or their own 
estimates. Additionally, comparisons between states are limited by the varying coverage of 
country reports and the method of currency conversion (Stålenheim et al, 2009: 214).  
However, within the context of this research exact data is not a necessity: PTT focuses on 
variation in relative power over time, thus trends in capability build-up and force orientation 
are of greater significance than precise measurements. Additionally, what policymakers in the 
US and EU think China has or is developing is more important so long as the data is accepted 
as credible.      
 
One method sometimes adopted for the analysis of military expenditure is to apply purchasing 
power parity (PPP) calculations. However, this was rejected for this chapter for several 
reasons. Bitzinger (2003: 171) cautions that such estimates are not entirely useful as 
calculating PPP for military purposes is essentially guesswork and fails encapsulate variations 
in quality and the level of sophisticated technology available (generally quite low for China). 
Crane et al (2005: 16) argue that since military equipment is not included in calculations of 
PPP – and is generally priced at world market values –these figures should be utilised 
carefully. SIPRI evaluations of military expenditure also note similar problems with PPP, 
adding that there is no “ideal method for comparison of military expenditure” (Stålenheim et 
al, 2008: 179). SIPRI’s calculations of military expenditure use Market Exchange Rates as 
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opposed to PPP due to the associated problems and uncertainties with the latter (Sköns and 
Stålenheim 2008: 247). Finally, when actually applied to the data in Figure 2.4, China’s 
military expenditure had essentially caught up with the US (once GWOT appropriations were 
subtracted). These figures exceeded other estimates substantially – including those from the 
US and SIPRI (Figures 2.3 and 2.4 respectively) – thus the utility of applying PPP is limited if 
other analyses do not use it.  
 
Human Rights Reports  
 
The analysis drew on the reports of two prominent international non-governmental 
organisations directly involved in research into and protection of human rights: Amnesty 
International and Human Rights Watch. Analysis of both groups’ country profiles on China in 
their annual reports facilitated triangulation between the data presented in their respective 
assessments. As with other independent sources examined previously, no measures will be 
completely accurate but the importance of these reports is that they are produced by influential 
groups and contribute to how policymakers view the issues. Following the approach of 
previous sections, the analysis rested on ‘snapshots’ from the reports at five year intervals, as 
the analysis is interested in broad trends rather than year-on-year variations. Additionally, the 
analysis draws on human rights reports produced by the US and EU to assess whether these 
actors view the human rights situation in China in a similar light as these influential NGOs. 
Comparison across the four series of documents also facilitated verification of the arguments 
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